José F. Alonso, Office of Research, Radio Martí
[2]
and Armando M. Lago, Ecosometrics, Inc.
Part II
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
This section analyzes the exports of the Cuban economy under the three scenarios described earlier. Exports are projected during a 15-year period after the onset of democratization in Cuba. Each of the major export markets is discussed next.
SUGAR
Sugar is the main engine of Cuba's economy. It is the only sector which consistently provides convertible currency and employs a substantial number of the civilian labor force. If employment in the sugarcane agriculture and sugar sectors is combined, the number of employees could exceed over 350,000, which makes the sugar industry "the largest employer in the nation." [26] Therefore, during a period of transition towards a market economy, the sugar industry can and will remain a valuable contributor to the economy of the country.
The role of the sugar industry during the transition period will be crucial. There will be ample opportunities for investments, which could transform the industry and enable the country to break away from a monocultural economy. Opportunities could be realized utilizing the comparative advantage of being the potential lowest cost producer of sugarcane, which could be diversified into the area of sugar by-products. Therefore, with serious private investments and a well-planned diversification program, the country could re-enter the sugar markets as a low-cost competitor. It could also potentially compete for a segment of the industrial chemical markets.
Boosting the sugar industry during the initial period of transition will be very difficult. In addition to the crucial issues of operating an industry which cannot afford many inputs, the blunders of the past thirty years in the fields and the mills, combined with the scarcity of convertible currency and the lack of credit in financial markets, (due to a non-performing debt with the Paris Club), will present a challenge during the initial period of transformation. On a positive note, the agricultural sugarcane sector received the benefit of improved mechanization, additional irrigation and fertilization, which was almost non-existent during the pre-revolutionary days. Despite this increased attention, a pre-requisite remains that, the price paid to the sugarcane farmer be equitable and profitable. This will insure the quality of the inputs to the mills.
Despite the improvements and achievements realized during the past thirty years, a note of caution about ecological damages and abuses to the soil is necessary. During this times, extensive and indiscriminate use of fertilizers and pesticides as well as mechanization might have damaged the soil. Evidence is very difficult to obtain, but several areas have been identified already. For example, agricultural yields in certain crops have not substantially improved despite increased fertilization and irrigation when compared to other countries in similar climatic area. The results of replenishing and rejuvenating the soil is a very complex task and in some cases, the damage is irreversible.
In addition to the above potential changes in the agricultural sugarcane industry, the industrial sector of the economy will necessitate structural changes to regain competitiveness. During the 70's, seven new mills were built to replace others demolished due to obsolescence, while many more were thoroughly repaired and new machinery was added. A cursory review of the state of the industry indicates that, until 1990, repairs were undertaken as needed. However, during the 1991-92 sugar campaign, serious shortages of parts and inputs were reported by the leadership. [27] Attention must be given to reducing the size of the industrial sugar park and to creating truly agro-industrial complexes that are well-automated, with modern plants for the sugar by-products. These must have an adequate supply of water and sugarcane. The goal should be to create an efficient and profitable industry. Forexample, over 40.0% of the mills might be of uneconomical size, and many of them do not have sufficient sugarcane to grind for a period of 150 days per year. [28] While many of these small mills might have to suffer closure, other mills have plants attached that produce torula yeast, animal feed, yeast, dextran, etc. These plants could be made very efficient after a period of modernization, expansion and repairs. Therefore, the basis for the future industry might exist, but there are great limitations and serious investments to realize before the industry can again become competitive.
We would like to examine two possible scenarios for the future of this industry and to give an approximation of potential revenues, as well as costs, during a transition process. However, it must first be made clear that sugar markets abroad demand white sugar, but that sugar, as a commodity, has perfect substitutes such as aspartame and high fructose corn syrup. The effects of those perfect substitutes have undermined the size of the market for the product. In addition, sugar is vulnerable to price fluctuations and trade barriers. Thus, the question remains: Will the sugar industry be a major contributor to the transition and to economic recovery?
Scenario I: Partial Privatization.
The scenario portrayed in Tables 4 and 5, assumes that improvements will occur in agricultural practices and that by the year t+5, mills will begin to reflect higher yields with better returns to farmers and mill owners. During this period, government policy will not change industrial park location, size or composition. However, once operations begin under private ownership, any decision on closure and profitability will be made by the mill owners. It is assumed that repairs and improvements will be carried out to keep the industry in operation. Essentially, the country remains a raw sugar producer. White sugar is produced for domestic consumption. Therefore, alterations made in the year t+0 composition of the industrial park will result from economies of scale and competition. Products such as ethanol and others are not significant contributors to earning foreign exchange. Those products are basically produced for domestic consumption. We assume the transitional government will make the decision to institute a
policy by which molasses is produced for animal feed, for the rum industry and for cooking fuel. Very little, or insignificant amounts of ethanol and other products could be exported in this scenario.
Both scenarios described below assume that those necessary steps for the establishment of commercial relations with the United States will have occurred. The steps include:
1. Lifting of the trade embargo and other trade restrictions imposed under the Cuban Democracy Act
2. Re-establishments of the Most Favored Nation - MFN - clause for Cuba
3. Re-instatement of the sugar quota or a direct trade agreement negotiated with the United States
4. Becoming members of CBI and NAFTA if both regional trade agreements exit.
Table 4.
Exports Potential of Raw Sugar, Partial Privatization Scenario
(in millions of tons)
Year
Markets For Raw Sugar t+0 t+5 t+10 t+15
CIS and ex-socialist countries 3.5 2.0 2.1 2.5
China 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7
Other Western economies 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.5
U.S.A. with CBI and NAFTA 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.5
Total potential sales to world markets 6.1 4.8 5.5 7.2
Production for domestic consumption 0.7 0.8 0.85 1.0
Estimated production 6.8 5.6 6.35 8.2
Note: It is assumed that CIS policy for the near future will be based on the production of grains rather than sugar beets for sugar.
Source: for period t+0 International Sugar Organization, Sugar Statistics, Jan.-Dec. 1992 and Rivero International data bank.
Table 5.
Projected Revenues from Raw Sugar Sales to World Market, Partial
Privatization Scenario
Prices are FOB Caribbean, (in millions of dollars)
Year
Estimated Prices t+5 t+10 t+15
At $303.00 per ton $1,454.0
At $353.00 per ton $1,959.0
At $441.00 per ton $3,175.0
Note: The price per ton was obtained from: Market Outlook for Major Primary Commodities, Vols. 1 and II, Report No. 814/92, (Washington, D.C.:International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1992). See also "Revision of Primary Commodities Price Forecasts," Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets (December 1992): 5.
Scenario II: Full Privatization Scenarios
This proposed scenario could occur in Cuba with an economy under a market system and free trade without any kind of government regulation or interference. That is, free flow of all factors of production and no governmental controls are contemplated, apart from those related to taxation, agricultural and sanitation guidelines for the industry. Sugarcane farms and mills will be independently owned under a free enterprise system and concerned with optimizing profits and minimizing losses. Therefore, for this scenario to occur, several conditions must be met within the transition period, including the continuation of improvements in agricultural practices and the reorganization of the industry by the modernization of the factories. Factories deemed by the owners to be obsolete and unprofitable will close. Free flow of foreign and domestic investments will be received for the purpose of enhancing and transforming the facilities.
The transformation could eventually result in an industry which would produce raw and white sugar but white sugar will be the predominant product to the extent possible. Owners will determine the size and location of additional refining capacity, however it is expected that the new plants will be attached to their respective raw sugar factories. The process employed in the production of white sugar will be determined by the investor(s) and owners. In addition, several sucro-chemical industries already in place will enter production at full capacity. Products with potential for export will be ethanol, dextran, torula yeast, etc.
This scenario takes into consideration existing refineries and additional refining capacity. The domestic market will be supplied with plantation white sugar (blanco directo) for domestic consumption and the price of white sugar is assumed to be slightly than that of raw sugar (See Tables 6 and 7.)
Among the advantages the production of white sugar offers are its marketability and employment benefits, which the country could realize. However, the investments required to modernize the mills and to convert the industry will be considerable. See appendix A for details on costs of potential built-in capacity.
An examination of the two outlines indicates that the production of raw sugar will continue as the transformation into white sugar occurs. Potential revenues will begin to materialize and the marketability of the product will improve due to demand factors in the world. Nonetheless, cost considerations and optimal allocation of resources should be a desired guideline for the industry.
It is assumed that by year, t+5 only 1.0 million tons of total exported sugar will be white sugar, and by year t+10, exports of white sugar will have risen to 2.5 million tons. This indicates that in 10 years the country will have doubled white sugar export capacity, and by year, t+15 at least 60.0% of the exports will be white sugar.
Table 6.
Export Potential of Raw and White Sugar, Full Privatization Scenario
(in millions of tons)
Year
Countries t+5 t+10 t+15
CIS and ex-socialist countries 2.0 2.1 2.5
China 0.5 0.6 0.7
Other Western economies 1.8 2.3 2.5
U.S.A. under NAFTA AND CBI 0.5 0.5 1.5
Total potential sales to world markets 4.8 5.5 7.2
Production for domestic consumption 0.8 0.85 1.0
Estimated production 5.6 6.35 8.2
Table 7.
Projected Revenues From Sale of White Sugar, Full Privatization
Scenario
Prices are FOB Caribbean, (in millions of dollars)
Year
Scenarios t+5 t+10 t+15
3.8 mill. tons of raw at $303.00 per ton $1,151.4
1.0 mill. tons of white at $358.00 per ton 358.0
3.0 mill. tons of raw at $353.00 per ton $1,059.0
2.5 mill. tons of white at $408.07 per ton 1,020.2
3.7 mill. tons of raw at $441.00 per ton $1,631.7
3.5 mill. tons of white at $496.04 per ton 1,736.1
Potential revenues 1,509.40 2,079.20 3,367.80
Note: The price per ton was obtained from: Market Outlook for Major Primary Commodities, Vols. I and II, Report No. 814/92, (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1992). See also "Revision of Primary Commodities Price Forecasts," Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets (December, 1992): 5. The projected prices for white sugar were provided by Nicolás Rivero, of Rivero International, Sugar and Trade Consultants, Falls Church, Va.
ETHANOL
In addition to sugar and other byproducts, ethanol has some potential as an export industry. Given present capacity, the potential for exports of ethanol are limited due to competing uses for molasses as animal feed, for cooking, for rum production and for other by-products. However, under a democratic government, with a diversification program in place and full privatization in effect, it would be possible for Cuba to participate in the ethanol market of the United States.
Several conditions and policy decisions must be made in order to maximize the potential of this industry. Cuba will be required to: 1) change its present policy of using molasses for animal consumption and other uses 2) implement a national diversification program 3) undertake a modernization of the existing plants and 4) begin a moderate expansion of its capacity.
Scenario I: Partial Privatization With Expansion And Modernization Of The Industry
Background on the U.S. Ethanol Market. A market for ethanol was created in the United States with the passage of the of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Meanwhile, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards of 1978 provided credits to automobile manufacturers for the development and use of autos using non-petroleum based alternative fuels. Recently, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 promoted the use of alternative-fuel vehicles and required "to phase in use, in certain fleets, vehicles which operate with clean burn gasoline." [29] In addition, Federal Highway Administration regulations mandate the use of clean burning gasoline. Therefore, to undertake the production of clean burn fuels, known as reformulated gasoline, an oxygenant is needed. Ethanol is a product which meets the properties required because it blends well with gasoline.
The U.S. Market. Ethanol capacity in the United States is limited but will grow substantially to meet projected demand by 2010. Today, ethanol-producing plants of any considerable size use corn as and other inputs. Production in 1992 reached an annual average of 106.3 million gallons per year and stocks averaged annually about 30.6 million gallons per year. [30] Estimated consumption, by 1995, could reach 113.5 millions of gallons per year. By the year 2010 it is estimated that an ethanol demand will exceed over 1,930.0 million gallons per year. The growth projected for this market will be 63.5% between 1990 and 2010. [31] Thus, an import residual market will be created if supply can not meet demand by the year 2005 when a major market growth is expected.
Current CBI Member Participation in the U.S. Market. The Caribbean Basin countries are now benefiting from this newly created market. Some countries are taking advantage of the CBI legislation and are exporting ethanol to the United States. The advantages of being a CBI designated country lies in the lower duties imposed. CBI members with domestic ethanol feedstock receive the benefit of no trade barriers. A general duty of 3.0% is applied to imports from other areas. For example, in 1992, Jamaica exported 7.7 millon of gallons while Costa Rica exported 11.7 million gallons. [32] It is conceivable that within the next ten years, the Caribbean Basin countries could increase imports of ethyl alcohol to meet the market expansion projected in the United States by the year 2010. For Cuba to enter the potential U.S. market after 1995 when demand increases, membership in the CBI must be a reality and NAFTA membership should follow thereafter.
Cuba's Industry and its Potential Participation in the U.S. Market. Presently, Cuba could compete for a small share of this market and benefit from using its installed capacity. Participation in the U.S. market would be feasible once policy decisions are undertaken as described below. There are 17 distilleries on line with a capacity of 66.0 million gallons of alcohol per year. [33] In 1987, Cuba exported 6.6 million gallons of ethyl alcohol, which is only 10.0% of the installed capacity. [34]
The partial privatization scenario assumes the use of installed capacity and contemplates the possibility of additions to capacity through a major overhaul and modification of the plants (see Tables 8 and 9). In addition, it is expected that the government will make some policy decisions with regard to molasses usage. Rum production for exports is expected to continue at present or higher levels because this is a mature industry and it has an existing international market. Therefore, this scenario contemplates an increase in ethyl alcohol production capacity at a rate of 5.0% per year until the year 2010. Thus, capacity by the year 2010 will reach 80.0 million gallons. By t+15, a 25.0% increase in export capacity will be reached. Exports projections made for ethanol are in constant 1992 dollars. Export prices were those quoted and obtained for 1992.
Table 8.
Projected Sales of Ethyl Alcohol to the United States, Partial
Privatization Scenario
(in millions of gallons)
Year
Product t+5 t+10 t+15
Ethyl Alcohol 7.2 8.0 10.0
Table 9.
Revenues From Sales of Ethyl Alcohol, Partial Privatization Scenario[35]
Prices are FOB Caribbean, (in million of dollars)
Year
Scenario t+5 t+10 t+15
At $1.15 per gallon $8.2
At $1.35 per gallon $10.8
At $1.40 per gallon $14.0
Scenario II: Full Privatization
An effective diversification program under a democratic Cuba will be a great challenge to private industry. There are choices to make and opportunity costs to consider in addition to substantial investments to realize. Under a diversification program several distilleries could be built annexed to existing sugar mills which would increase the present production capacity. Rivero provides some insight into the creation of an ethanol industry using sugar as feedstock:
A national ethanol program could be based on converting an equivalent 1.0 million tonnes of sugar into fuel alcohol and this would require 10 million tonnes of sugarcane to manufacture--based on a yield of one tonne of sugarcane equals 18 gallons of ethanol-- 180 million gallons of product. 36
Therefore, using sugar as feedstock, industry expansion and production of over 60,000 gallons per day (in addition to other by-products such as furfural, yeast, etc.) could transform the sugar industry into a sucro-chemical base. In addition, the country must foster and facilitate the production of sugar by-products. The sugar by-products industry could become a mainstay source of new employment and provide the basis for the country diversification from sugar as a commodity. In addition, there are certain advantages to the sugar industry. For example, a modern ethanol industry could become a recycling industry for unsold sugars when the international market is not capable of absorbing the entire output. Raw sugar could be converted into syrup and ethanol could be manufactured at a rate of 142.8 gallons per metric ton of sugar. [37]
Assuming a national sugar diversification program is desired in a democratic Cuba, securing CBI status and NAFTA membership, with an addition of 20 distilleries to the present infrastructure (with a production capacity of 60,000 gallons of ethanol), the country could increase its market share in the United States. Tables 10 and 11 below provide projections of revenues and production possibilities for such an undertaking. Projections of ethanol exports in constant 1992 dollars are presented in the summary export table.
Table 10.
Projected Sales of Ethanol to the United States, Full Privatization
Scenario
(in millions of gallons)
Year
Product t+5 t+10 t+15
Ethyl Alcohol 60.0 80.0 100.0
Source: Rivero International database.
Table 11.
Revenues from Sales of Ethanol to the United States, Full Privatization
Scenario
Prices are FOB Caribbean, (in millions of dollars)
Year
Scenario t+5 t+10 t+15
At $1.30 per gallon $78.0
At $1.50 per gallon $120.0
At $1.50 per gallon $150.0
Note: No duty is applicable as a result of having qualified as a member of the CBI countries. At year t+15, Cuba will be a CBI and NAFTA member. Prices were provided by Mr. B. Haigwood of Information Resources Inc. Washington, D.C. and Rivero International database. F.O.B. export prices were those quoted and estimated for 1992.
NON-SUGAR EXPORTS[38]
Cuba's international tourism receipts had a 3.2% market share of the entire Caribbean region[39] (excluding Mexico) in 1992, lagging behind important competitors, such as Puerto Rico, Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Bermuda, Barbados, and even the Caiman Islands. By year t+15, Cuba's market share of the Caribbean region's tourism receipts is expected to grow to 9% under the partial privatization scenario and to 11% under the full privatization scenario. Cuba's market share could grow to 15% of the Caribbean market if gambling would be allowed in Cuba.[40] Deductions from tourism receipts must be made to reflect the high import content (i.e. as much as 64.5%) of the Cuban tourism industry.[41] By year t+15, net receipts from tourism, were projected to be nearly 1.47 billion of 1992 dollars, as large (i.e. 97% ) as the value of the Cuban sugar exports.
Nickel exports have been depressed since 1991 due to the plummeting of nickel prices in the World market. Current prices are less than half the costs of producing nickel in Cuba.[42] In addition, a large increase in world wide nickel capacity is projected by the World Bank for the near future. The
projections assume exports of 55,000 tons by year t+15, well below the 100,000 tons projected by the Cuban government for year 2,000, but even our projections may be on the high side given the deplorable market conditions in nickel. Nickel exports were projected at 525 billion of 1992 dollars for year t+15 under the NAFTA scenario.
With demise of the centrally planned economies in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Cuban citrus exports have collapsed to a shade of their 1989 peak value of $171 million. The projections assume that citrus exports will recuperate and grow moderately[43] to 266-292 million of 1992 dollars by year t+15. Exports of fisheries peaked at 149 million in 1986 and have been declining ever since. Meanwhile, most of Cuba's catch -92% of its value- comes from domestic waters, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean and the North coast of Brazil.[44] The projections assume abandonment of far away fisheries and concentration on nearby areas. The projections also assume a significant farm-raised fish and shrimp activity. Fishery exports were projected at healthy rates and may be as large as 195-245 million of 1992 dollars in year t+15.
Cuban Coffee exports reached a peak of $57 million in 1986 mainly due to the artificial rationing of internal consumption,[45] but are projected downward assuming that consumption is full liberalized in a democratic Cuba. Exports of Cuban tobacco also peaked at $100 million in 1985 but have declined since then due to production, production quality problems and other agricultural difficulties.[46] A slight growth is projected in tobacco exports to $100 million of 1992 dollars in the partial privatization scenario by year t+15 and to $120 million of 1992 dollars under NAFTA.
Fruits and vegetables were projected to grow rapidly to 331 million of 1992 dollars by year t+15 under CBI, and to 555 million of 1992 dollars under NAFTA. The largest export volumes will be achieved in green peppers, tomatoes, ornamental plants, melons and honey. These projections assumed that under the CBI, Cuba would become the second largest exporter (after Mexico) for a variety of products for which it has competitive advantage. Under NAFTA, Cuban exports of fruits and vegetables were projected to capture 10% to 30% of Mexico's share depending on the product.
Industrial exports were projected for 21 industrial products. These exports would rise to 1,064 million of 1992 dollars after 15 years into the transition under the CBI trade regime and to 1,736 million of 1992 dollars under NAFTA. The major industrial export markets included biomedical products, textiles and clothing (Section 807), rum and orange juice concentrate. Table S-1 presents the total exports projected under each scenario.
Table 12.
Projection of Miscellaneous Agricultural Products
(in millions of 1992 dollars)
Full Privatization Scenarios
CBI Option NAFTA
Misc. Agricultural Commodities Yr. t+5 Yr. t+15 Yr. t+15
Potatoes $ 0.0 $ 0.0 $ 0.0
Green peppers 41.0 65.0 83.0
Honey 17.0 31.0 47.0
Yams 2.0 8.0 11.0
Taro (malanga) 1.0 6.0 8.0
Tomatoes 5.0 31.0 78.0
Onions 8.0 19.0 31.0
Bananas 0.2 8.0 19.0
Plantain 2.0 5.0 6.0
Mangoes 1.0 5.0 6.0
Guavas 3.0 12.0 23.0
Papayas 2.0 6.0 9.0
Yucca 1.0 3.0 5.0
Rice 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maize 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beans 1.0 3.0 6.0
Cucumbers 2.0 6.0 23.0
Broccoli * 1.0 20.0 31.0
Cauliflowers * 1.0 4.0 8.0
Fresh flowers & plants * 7.0 33.0 55.0
Asparagus * 1.0 5.0 9.0
White squash (chayote) * 1.0 6.0 8.0
Eggplant * 0.8 8.0 11.0
Peas 7.0 11.0 15.0
Pineapples 8.0 12.0 18.0
Avocados 1.0 2.0 3.0
Melons 3.5 22.0 42.0
Total $117.5 $331.0 $555.0
Note: * represents new crops which could be developed.
Table 13
Cuban Industrial Export Projections (Excluding Ethanol) 1989
(in millions of U.S. dollars for 1989 and in millions of 1992 dollars
for the projection)
Full Privatization Scenario
CBI NAFTA
Industrial Products 1989 Yr. t+5 Yr. t+15 Yr. t+15
Orange juice concentrate $ 0.0 $4.0 $45.0 $80.0
Iron & Steel products 26.0 40.0 55.0 65.0
Machinery & Parts 32.0 45.0 65.0 75.0
Rum 17.4 34.0 74.0 124.0
Marble 4.5 6.0 7.0 15.0
Cement 0.5 15.0 30.0 50.0
Molasses 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0
Furfural 0.0 1.0 2.0 4.0
Glass containers 0.0 4.0 8.0 20.0
Tile, roof & floor products 0.0 10.0 20.0 50.0
Salt 0.0 10.0 18.0 30.0
Sand & aggregates 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.0
Vehile & engine parts 2.0 12.0 21.0 52.0
Magnetic tapes & radios 0.0 5.0 20.0 75.0
Electronic components 3.0 11.0 33.0 88.0
Footwear 0.1 10.0 25.0 34.0
Rubber manufactures 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0
Books, magazines & printing 5.0 15.0 30.0 40.0
Textiles & clothing (Sec.807) 16.2 36.0 116.0 275.0
Biomedical products 65.0 120.0 500.0 800.0
Fruit preserves and others 14.9 25.0 50.0 60.0
Total $215.6 $440.0 $1,165.0 $1,997.0
Note: Ethyl alcohol products (ethanol) are projected with sugar, see text.
Cuba is assumed to continue exporting molasses in very minimal quantities as in
1989, with potential increases used in the manufacture of ethanol and rum
products.
SUMMARY OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
Our projections of the main Cuban exports of goods and services are summarized
in Table 14. These export projections were developed in constant 1992 dollars.
For interpreting the export projections into current dollars the reader is
advised to use Table 15 estimated mostly from World Bank sources.
Table 14.
Balance of Payments Projections, Current Accounts
(in millions of 1992 U.S. dollars)
Partial Privatization Scenarios Full Privatization Scenarios
Current accounts transactions Yr. t+0 Yr. t+5 Yr. t+10 Yr. t+15 Yr. t+5 CBI CBI NAFTA
Yr. t+10 Yr. t+15 Yr. t +15
EXPORTS
Sugar $1,300.0 $959.7 $1,109.9 $1,439.9 $996.0 $1,177.8 $1,527.4 $1,527.4
Ethanol 0.0 9.4 10.4 11.4 68.4 91.2 114.0 114.0
Nickel 200.0 272.6 325.3 385.3 325.6 403.1 455.3 525.3
Iron ore, scrap steel and other 17.0 54.9 57.2 61.4 75.2 80.4 96.2 122.1
nonferrous metals
Tourism $108.0 $238.6 $520.1 $1,212.2 $285.3 $843.0 $1,476.8 $1,476.8
Gross receipts 305.0 596.0 1040.2 2019.9 714.1 1274.8 2461.3 2461.3
Less: imports for tourism 197.0 357.4 520.1 807.7 428.8 431.8 984.5 984.5
Fisheries 120.0 135.0 141.0 150.0 148.0 175.0 195.0 245.0
Citrus 70.0 170.0 200.0 240.0 188.0 222.2 266.0 292.0
Coffee 26.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 25.0
Tobacco 95.0 95.0 98.0 100.0 107.0 113.0 120.0 120.0
Miscellaneous agricultural 22.0 22.0 38.0 40.0 118.0 190.0 331.0 555.0
products
Net industrial exports $215.0 $316.0 $570.0 $890.0 $405.0 $640.0 $1,064.0 $1,736.0
Industrial exports 215.0 316.0 570.0 890.0 440.0 705.0 1165.0 1997.0
Less: imports for assembly 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.0 65.0 101.0 261.0
TOTAL EXPORTS $2,173.0 $2,323.2 $3,119.9 $4,580.2 $2,751.5 $3,965.7 $5,670.7 $6,738.6
EX-POST IMPORTS
*Paying all claims and debts $1,373.3 $1,961.9 $3,389.1 $2,658.6 $3,309.5 $5,254.6 $8,095.5
*Paying all claims and debts, $2,264.4 $2,705.7 $4,080.4 $3,549.7 $4,053.3 $5,945.9 $8,786.8
except exile claims
Table 15.
Indexes Used for Converting Current Year Commodity Prices and
Transactions to 1992 Constant Dollars
Year
Products 1992 t+5 t+10 t+15
Sugar 100.0 151.50 176.50 220.50
Ethanol 100.0 114.04 131.58 131.58
Nickel 100.0 141.57 181.09 192.86
Iron Ore 100.0 112.97 129.43 135.13
Tourism 100.0 121.98 146.14 157.23
Shrimp/Fish 100.0 115.16 120.55 123.74
Citrus 100.0 116.56 133.13 140.49
Coffee 100.0 193.62 232.62 241.13
Tobacco 100.0 111.73 128.43 135.18
Misc.Agriculture 100.0 125.42 149.16 158.49
Industrial Exports 100.0 120.29 140.00 147.94
Claims & Debts 100.0 121.98 146.14 157.23
Source: Market Outlook for Major Primary Commodities, Report No.
814/92.
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank International Trade Division, 1992). The
ethanol price index was obtained from Rivero International database and from
U.S. Imports for Consumption of the United States, Report IM14, Series
F. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1992). For tourism expenditures,
debts and claims the World Bank's G-7 CPI Index is used, while for industrial
exports the World Bank's G-5 MUV index is used.
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