-DATE-
19591214
-YEAR-
1959
-DOCUMENT_TYPE-
SPEECH
-AUTHOR-
F. CASTRO
-HEADLINE-
STATEMENTS BY CASTRO AT PRIME MINISTER OF THE RE
-PLACE-
HAVANA
-SOURCE-
-REPORT_NBR-
FBIS
-REPORT_DATE-
19591214
-TEXT-
STATEMENTS BY MAJOR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT, IN THE TRIAL OF FORMER MAJOR HUBERT MATOS, CIUDAD LIBERTAD, 14
DECEMBER 1959

Introduction

It was their obligation to think that they were preparing a
plot against the fatherland. One must be Cuban first of all,
and one must defend the fatherland above all. Better our
fatherland than the fatherland destroyed. (Fidel Castro Ruz)

With evil intent,the story that former Major Hubert Matos is not a
traitor and that the trial before a revolutionary military court
is not consistent with the classic practice of the law has been
spread among certain sectors of the Cuban population, especially
those to which the clean spirit of the revolution which end in the
triumph on 1 January 1959 has not penetrated.

Since Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz set forth his reasoning with all
possible clarity at the trial of the defendant, which was carried
out without hindrance we will not attempt to go beyond the main
basis, the positive and real accusation made against him: treason.
What do the authors of these stories mean by treason, or is it
possible to stimulate treason and remain as calm as one who
transgresses and insists repeatedly that he was not the guilty
party? Are those who take the lives of their fellow men in
cowardly fashion the only traitors? Is a man who has taken an
oath, swearing on his honor and his integrity, and who goes back
upon that oath and dares to throw away what he previously swore to
defend a traitor or is he not?

One betrays the fatherland by killing or destroying its spiritual
or symbolic assets, by conspiring deliberately against it out of
personal ambition, or by surrendering to the enemy. There are
many and varied ways of committing treason, but whichever of the
1,000 forms of treason is involved, it is weak, it is
contemptible, and it has always been punishable when it results
from motives which are a strain on the honor of the man and which
in the end will destroy the principles of patriotic dignity or the
doctrine for which he has sworn to fight or die.

Treason has never been tolerated in the ranks of the military or
among civilians either. The traitor is a moral assassin who
continues to live, because the merited punishment has not been
meted out. Those who state that Hubert Matos is not a traitor, or
at least only a traitor in his own way, should study the pages of
history to become convinced that the sentence of the
revolutionary court was not inspired by hatred, but by a clear
and frank sense of justice and the principles which have governed
this revolution, generous in the extreme, noble in its auctions,
but firm and vigorous with regard to its watchword of citizens'
probity, because only thus is a nation saved.

Pursuing our very firm revolutionary guidelines, the Propaganda
Secretary of the Central Organization of Workers wishes to make
available to all the workers, peasants, students, rebel soldiers,
and men and women born in this marvelous land, the details of the
trial in which, along with a group of his general staff officers,
former Major Hubert Matos was convicted. It is our great hope that
each Cuban whom this document reaches will read it calmly, study
it and come to the full conviction that the truth was found in the
democratic development of the trial and even that this court, made
up of young officers, was rather merciful in not imposing the
requested death penalty for betraying the revolution which gave
him fame and honor, and to which he was disloyal in a criminal act
which history, too, will condemn.

The reader will find the rest in the pages which follows this
introduction and in which we contribute, very modestly indeed, to
giving truth its primacy, because ruth is the light of reason.

Jose Ma. de la Aguilera,
Propaganda Secretary,
Revolutionary Cuban
Workers' Organization

David Salvador Manso,
Secretary General,
Revolutionary Cuban
Workers' Organization

***

Presiding Judge: Do you swear to tell the truth?

Major Fidel Castro: I swear.

Judge: Then you may proceed.

Prosecutor: Major Fidel Castro: As you are the highest leader of
the revolution, and as no one knows better than you the men who fought
under your command in the Sierra Maestra, since currently we are examining
what happened in the City of Camaguey on 20 and 21 October, and as at this
moment it is a question of clarifying the position of the revolution, I ask
you, as a special witness in this case, but not as a representative of this
body, to inform the court of all you know which might help to clarify the
situation outlined.

Major Castro: Your Honor: You will understand, as I do, the
importance of this trial, because it even involves the question of the
integrity of our revolution.  Therefore, my interest in attending today is
simply to clarify and to contribute to a knowledge of the truth.

I could have no reason for desiring that absolutely anything
unjust be done here.  I have come precisely to contribute through my
personal efforts to the knowledge of the truth by the court, the audience,
the defendants themselves and the people of Cuba, and the entire world if
necessary -- since the press has been summoned here and has been asked to
attend, and both domestic and foreign correspondents attend our trials --
because our fatherland has been slandered outside of Cuba and our
revolution has been slandered within the country enough for us to fear no
truth.

This is why I have come, to answer the necessary questions and to
explain what is necessary and to discuss what is necessary, with the truth
in hand, as I have done all my life, and accepting absolute responsibility
for what I say here and the results of this trial.

Prosecutor: Doctor Castro, as there are matters in this trial
which arise from and go back to the war campaign waged in the Sierra
Maestra, just as there are matters which go back to 1 January and 21
October, I would prefer it if you would recount the history of the campaign
in the Sierra Maestra, and if you would explain to the court if this
revolution had its origin in a program, a schedule, with a defined plan,
and if you at any time prior to the disembarkation from the Granma what
would happen at the time of the triumph of the revolution.  At the same
time, I would like you to explain to the court how the work of the
revolution came about, how the revolution was attacked in the
insurrectional territory, that is to say, in the insurrectional stage, with
what weapons it was attacked and on what occasions, with what weapons the
revolution was attacked in this particular case, who attacked the
revolution then, who is attacking the revolution now, and finally, all in
all, because what we need to clarify is the development of the revolution,
whether the revolution has or has not completed its final purposes, whether
the revolution has a goal, or if the revolution is, in a word, a dynamic
thing, which no one can hold back.  Explain this to the court.

Major Castro: Mr. Prosecutor, even when a question of justice is
being discussed here, an effort has been made -- with very evil intent,
certainty -- to convert this into a political trial.  In other words, we
have come to this trial to discuss matters of justice, but the enemies of
the revolution have come to discuss political matters.

Since this is the case, I believe that I must discuss the
revolution politically here.  We will discuss our ideas, and we will see if
those who impugn the ideas of our revolution have ideas or nothing but
pretexts.

I believe, then, that the political aspect is very important, and,
therefore, I would like to discuss the events first, in order later to
proceed to an analysis of the political program of the revolution, that is,
the ideological aspect of the revolution.

Therefore, I would prefer to refer first of all, and to clarify,
all the questions which have to do with the events which gave rise to this
trial.

Prosecutor: Well, Major Castro, it has been said in this trail
that on 20 October the resignation of Major Hubert Matos became known
through rumor in Camaguey.  It has been stated that you had news of this
resignation through a private letter,which was presented at the time of the
indictment, that later Captain Jorge Enrique Mendoza called you by
telephone and explained the gravity of the problem,and that you gave him
some instructions.  At the same time, two things which you should clarify
have been said by the defendants and some witnesses.  First, it has been
stated by the defendants that the resignations on 21 October were carried
out because of charges made by Captain Jorge Enrique Mendoza.  It has been
said that the resignations on 20 October were designed to prevent the
resignations of Major Hubert Matos.  Some witnesses have denied that there
was no participation by students and workers.  At the same time, some
defense witnesses have said that there were -- and the word used was
"cheers" -- on the part of the citizens, and a considerable stir, when
Captain Jorge Enrique Mendoza spoke.  On the other hand, there has been an
effort to convince the court that the events in Camaguey occurred because
Captain Mendoza spoke over the loudspeakers.  Again, Major Hubert Matos has
tried to justify what happened in Camaguey by the fact that he had asked to
be released from the rebel army because he wanted or needed to go and
render professorial services in the city of Manzanillo.  Also, it has been
stated by other witnesses, including an officer, that what happened in
Camaguey was really the result of ideological differences.

Major Castro: I believe so, I believe that it was a matter of
ideological differences.

Prosecutor: Could you, in view of the fact that you were in the
city of Camaguey, tell the court all that happened that day, and what
knowledge you have of the 20th, as well as when and where you were and what
action was taken when you received the letter of resignation from Major
Hubert Matos?  Furthermore, what was your first interpretation of that fact
and what were your later interpretations and actions after having acquired
further information.  Further, if you have any prior information, because
it has been said here by Captain Mendoza that you had told him to watch
Major Hubert Matos.  Another thing, did Commander Hubert Matos on any
occasion make known to you his concern about the matter of the definition
of the revolution, and finally, could you tell us about the 19th, 20th and
21st with regard to the events which occurred in Camaguey and about the
activities of Major Cienfuegos on that occasion, his attitude, and whether
at any time he told you that Major Hubert Matos had told him of his concern
about communist infiltration in the rebel army, because Major Camilo
Cienfuegos was at that time head of the general staff of the rebel army
and, precisely because he was the immediate superior of Major Hubert Matos,
should have been the first to learn of this attitude on the part of Major
Hubert Matos.

Major Castro: I said that in my view there were ideological
differences, by which I mean that Comrade Hubert Matos and we do not see
eye to eye about what a revolution is.  We do not have the same concepts
about revolution, and I am not even completely sure that Major Hubert Matos
had any concept at all of what a real revolution is.

You asked me about the resignations, and if I knew the reason for
the resignations on the 21st.  I want to make it clear that I received no
notice of any resignations on the 21st, and that in the file of
resignations delivered to me by major Camilo Cienfuegos there were none
bearing that date.  The resignations I have are those dated the 20th, that
is to say, the date preceding our visit to Camaguey.

As to the reasons for the resignations, that a simple statement
will not suffice.  It will be necessary for us to go back a little farther
to get to the heart of this problem.  What should be put on record is that
the resignations -- and here they are -- are all dated the 20th.

I received a communique on the 19th of the month sent to me by Mr.
Hubert Matos through a rebel army officer.  I received this letter, if I
remember correctly, on the afternoon of the 19th.  It seems to me that this
same day I had come here to Ciudad Libertd for the investiture of Major
Raul Castro as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.  It is possible
that there are here present some journalists who were at that inauguration,
and they can tell you whether I spoke or not, and in what rather visible
state of mind I was.  I did not speak, and some even noted by preoccupation
that afternoon, because I had in my pocket the letter from Mr. Hubert
Matos.

I planned to answer the letter on the 20th, and in fact, although
I had only a few minutes during the day,in the midst of my innumerable and
constant and intensive obligations, I wanted to write to Hubert Matos.  I
called major Camilo Cienfuegos that afternoon to ask him to take my answer
to Major Hubert Matos to Camaguey the following day.

It has been questioned here why i could not have asked him to
postpone his resignation for a week, but it is necessary to remember first
of all that his resignation was in categorical terms, because in his final
paragraph he said his decision was irrevocable.  But this is not the main
thing: the reason for which I could find no other solution in the case of
Hubert Matos was because Camaguey already knew of his resignation.

If, as Mr. Hubert Matos said, he sent me a private, a most private
letter, brought by hand, and I was not supposed to inform anyone of this
letter, nor inform anyone of my answer except Major Camilo Cienfuegos, how
is it that the officers in Camaguey already knew that Hubert Matos had
resignation?  How did it happen that the people of Camaguey were all
talking about his resignation?  If the people of Camaguey were aware of it,
it was not through me, and if they did not know it from the person who
received the letter, they must have learned it solely and exclusively from
the writer.

And the fact that the officials in Camaguey knew of this letter,
the fact that rumors were circulating in Camaguey, and furthermore, the
fact that the editors of a newspaper whose publisher was in on the secret
drafted a note the following day, the fact that a group of student leaders
issued a statement the following day calling for a gathering on the night
of the 21st made any other solution in the Hubert Matos case totally
impossible.

It would have been possible to find another solution if there had
been in iota of good faith, if this had not been a carefully worked out
plan, but when I felt the need to answer his letter on the afternoon of the
20th, I was not by any means aware of the things which were happening
already in Camaguey.  The people of Camaguey already knew of Hubert Matos'
resignation.  That is, preparations were being made for the 21st, a whole
plan to create crisis in the revolutionary government,and we had already
had two crises: that involving the traitor Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, in which
we took the initiative, that is to say, we replaced him, and another,the
crisis in the executive branch, with Mr. Urrutia, in which again, faced
with this maneuver, we took the initiative.  However, this was not true of
the case of Mr. Hubert Matos.  We did not replace him.  It was he who
presented his resignation, and he did so under conditions which left no
possible alternative, because there was none.

The court and the people will understand that for the
revolutionary government and for the revolution and for all of the men
responsible for the revolution, it would have been much more useful and
much more desirable if Mr. Hubert Matos had left room for another solution,
but the plot was already established.  The type was set for the morning
newspaper report.  The meeting had been called for the next day and the
resignations had been signed on the 20th, before they were made officially
known.  Thus, on the following day, 14 officers would have already
resigned.  Yes, it was the 20th, when it was assumed that the resignation
was a secret, but they had already resigned, and it is necessary to read
these resignations, and we will read them later, because we must get to the
bottom of the matter.  We must examine the content of the resignations to
see if the false accusation is being made here that I am to blame for this
problem, that I am the culprit, because I received a resignation in strict
secrecy and made it known.  I did not make it known.  The next day I went,
as was my duty, to mobilize the people, because there remained no other way
to destroy a plot which Mr. Hubert Matos had very carefully planned.

I believe that these resignations signed on the 20th constitute
irrefutable proof that the revolutionary government, faced with a crisis of
this nature which had been created could not have taken any other steps
than that it did, because it would have even been preferable to be
tolerant, anything would have been preferable to this scandal which was the
delight of the reactionaries, and which was the fruit of the plot against
our fatherland and against our revolution.  If we had been able to find any
other way, if there had existed another measure and if anyone had shown me
that another measure was possible given this state of crisis, given the
collective resignations of the army officers, which was but the preclude to
what was to happen the next day, I would then cheerfully accept
responsibility for this incident.

Prosecutor: Commander Castro, apart from the 19 October letter,
and prior to the 21st, did you have knowledge through any person or officer
of the rebel army of what was going to happen in Camaguey?

Major Castro: I could not have had news of precisely what was
going to happen.  I did indeed hear rumors, and they even spread beyond
Cuba, to the effect that a mass resignation was being planned that there
would be a mass resignation in the province of Camaguey.

Prosecutor: How would you describe the resignation of the officers
on 20 October?

Major Castro: As a counterrevolutionary plot, Comrade Prosecutor.

Prosecutor: Could you give us an analysis of the letter from Major
Hubert Matos, because in this trial there are two sides.  That is to say,
one is attempting to show that his request for release was for the purpose
of avoiding public disorder, and that the private letter was sent expressly
to justify his action to you.  Could you make an analysis of that letter
and also your answer?

Major Castro: I would like to know if Major Duque is present.

Prosecutor: Your Honor, I ask that Major Duque be called.

Major Castro: No, I simply want to know if he is here.  I believe,
Your Honor, that if it were possible, Major Duque should make a statement
here.  But if you believe it preferable that he not be present during this
part of the testimony, he need not be.

I would like Major Duque to be called upon in due time to make a
statement, because I believe that none of them would dare to deny the moral
and revolutionary integrity of Major Duque.  None of them would dare to
deny his valor and courage, and therefore, I think it is important, since I
believe that some of these comrades have been led unaware into the
situation in which they find themselves.  Therefore, if there is need for
honest testimony, if we must call upon a comrade with prestige and
integrity, I do not believe that any of them would dare to challenge him,
because they must know him sufficiently well.  Let him be called upon to
make a statement and be asked for testimony some of the particulars I
regard as interesting in this trial.

Judge: Then we will ask Major Duque to leave the courtroom, and he
will be recalled later by this court.

Prosecutor: Doctor Castro, could you make a judgement of the
letter from Mr. Hubert Matos dated 19 October, and at the same time explain
to the court why he said that he did not want to become a hindrance to the
revolution, why he told you that all he wanted to say to you frankly about
the communist problem should be discussed before his retirement, why he
asked you to keep silent about him, and, in a word, a whole series of
things which it would be well to have definitely clarified?

Major Castro: Comrades, it is obvious that the defendant, Hubert
Matos, has tried to represent himself here as a victim of the revolutionary
government, of me, of all the loyal commanders in the rebel army, and it
would be well to clarify all of these things, all of the background of this
problem, so that we will not be dealing with sentimentality here and his
alleged position as a victim.  There has even been talk here since the
Costa Rica expedition, there has been talk here since the occasion on which
a group of fighters sent by Frank Pais from Santiago de Cuba went up into
the mountains.  There has been talk here even since 10 March when,
according to the testimony of the defendant, Hubert Matos, he left his
classroom to visit all his students and explain the meaning of 10 March to
them.  There has even been an effort to present us as unjust, as denying
the merit Mr. Hubert Matos may have shown in the insurrectional
struggle,and as it seems to me that his intention is to make it appear that
I am to blame for his discredit, since one day I spoke of other with
greater merit than he, it would be proper in the practice of the law to
clarify these questions which have been discussed before the court and have
been made public.  There has naturally been no lack of applause, which
should also be analyzed here, because there were among the reactionaries
those who wanted to create a great issue, thinking that the entire army of
the republic was treasonable, because a group of tame Camaguey soldiers,
quartered here through our generosity, were summoned and gathered of Hubert
Matos.  I believe that these things should not be allowed to be left in
doubt.  I believe that these things should be clarified, because we are not
playing games here.  These are very series things,and what the
reactionaries want is to destroy us, what the counterrevolutionaries want
is to discredit us, what the enemies of our fatherland and our people want
is to demoralize us, and if possible to make it seem that all the rebels
are traitors, while representing all the officers as victimizing the
innocent Hubert Matos.  And for this reason I believe it would serve the
revolution and the clarification of the facts if we go back a little
further, so that things can be placed in context.  I am not going to deny
Mr. Hubert Matos' the virtues he has, nor will I fail to make the
accusations I must make against him, just as I have never denied the merits
of anyone, just as I can place virtues where they belong, because what I
said one day publicly I can say again here.  There are many comrades of
much greater merit than he.  Thus, no one should try to represent as yet
another act of injustice the discrediting of deeds which Mr. Hubert Matos
may have committed.

A group of the defendants are here, possibly the least important.
I recall Captain Alamo, Captain Cabrera, and Captain Quiroga.  It is
possible that there were some others who arrived in the Sierra Maestra in
the summer months of 1957.  They arrived there with Captain Ramon Paz,
among others, who died during the last offensive in the Sierra Maestra.
This was a group of comrades which the movement sent to the Sierra Maestra,
and I remember that one of them specifically, Captain Cabrera, had the
greatest difficulty in mountain climbing when he reached the Sierra Maestra
where we were, and believing that he could not survive the night, and out
of pride and honor, he talked of suicide.  I remember that group well, as
all those who were in the Palma Mocha Heights with us will.  As soon as I
learned of this incident, I approached Comrade Paco Cabrera, asked him
where his rifle was and handed it to him.  I told him: take it, because I
know that you will manage and I can trust you with your weapon.  I was not
mistaken, and Comrade Paco Cabreara was always a magnificent comrade during
the revolution, and a good officer.  I really do not have to note that here
and express the opinion I have of him, as I will have to express the poor
opinion I have of others.

Thus they came out.  They are witnesses to what the struggle in
the Sierra Maestra was.  They participated, along with Major Paz and Major
Duque, who in those days were not majors but merely lieutenants, but they
won their promotions, on an equitable basis, without favoritism of any kind
-- a principle which always prevailed in the Sierra Maestra.  They will
also remember the occasion when, without orders, a troop leader where they
were led an attack on the Veguitas military post.  They will remember the
severe measures I was forced to take to punish this action without orders,
first of all, as well as the carelessness which in the carrying out of that
operation could almost have caused the destruction of the entire platoon.
It was ambushed while returning to the mountains, in the early hours of the
morning in the truck in which they were traveling.  They were surprised by
soldiers of the tyranny, and because the latter were so inexperienced, all
of the comrades in the platoon were able to escape unharmed, except for
minor wounds.  These comrades were there in the days which if not the
hardest were hard enough,and they know the story of the Sierra Maestra,
from the months when they arrived until the month when they left with
Column 9, and thus they are familiar with all the details.  They will be
the best witnesses of what I say here.

I did not know Mr. Hubert Matos in that era.  I had certainly
never even hard of him, perhaps by change.  Many people did something
notable, but this did not mean that everyone knew them.  However, it is
certain that I had not heard the name of Hubert Matos.  And so the entire
year of 1957 and the first part of 1958 passed, then, in those days as
April approached, when all of Cuba was under the illusion that the war was
about to end, we made a survey.  We asked the citizens -- who in general,
like all people, are inclined to believe what they want to believe -- if
they believed that the dictatorship would fall on 9 April, or during the
month, particularly since a general revolutionary strike had overthrown the
regime of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela.  The vast majority answered that they
did indeed believe that the strike would put an end to the dictatorship.
And the majority of the leaders of the 26 July Movement believed this,
which also explains the tremendous disappointment which occurred in the
following days.  When that date approached, and when censorship had even
been reestablished and the constitutional guarantees and the manifesto
alerting the people about the approaching campaign of struggle had been
issued, I received a communication from Mancanillo one afternoon containing
the report from Mr. Hubert Matos in which although I still had not had an
opportunity to meet him, I remember that he mentioned the possibility of
sending some weapons, and he asked me, through the messenger, to write a
letter to President Figureres, who I believe was still President of Costa
Rica, and he also asked that we send 10,000 pesos to cover the cost,
because they already had some weapons.  I immediately wrote the letter to
Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, and we also made the arrangements to obtain
the 10,000 pesos which were needed.  Then, a few days later, I received the
news that the plane would arrive in the afternoon, according to the
instructions we had given, at the place we had indicated.

I understand that this letter was read here, or was submitted with
the indictment, and if it was not read I remember that I read it, and
indeed I have here a clipping from a section of the newspaper Avance
(Advance), the section of this newspaper which has most systematically been
waging counterrevolutionary campaigns, and from which I have brought
several clippings in case it is desirable to show them.

My attention was called to the letter in this section of this
newspaper because I have a copy of it and I suppose that the other is in
the files of Mr. Hubert Matos, which does not explain how it came into the
hands of a counterrevolutionary.  This was my answer.

And on the afternoon of 30 March we were already proceeding toward
Cienaguilla, where the plane was expected, having sent some patrols ahead,
while the bulk of our troops were being concentrated at another point in
order to safeguard the arrival of the plane.  And at dusk, the plane
arrived in Cienaguilla, piloted by Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz.

Who will deny that this was a source of great joy to us?  And
indeed, to guarantee the safe arrival of the plane orders had been given to
the forces to attack any troops which moved, which would not have been
difficult, because there is a flat plain from Campechuela to this point,
which might have provided a rapid transport route for enemy forces.
Moreover, we had given instructions that the plane must not fall into enemy
hands under any circumstances.

Who will deny that we welcomed that plane with joy?  When did we
not receive weapons for the Sierra Maestra joyfully?  When did we not
receive bullets for the Sierra Maestra joyfully?  Whenever a rifle or even
a bullet was captured, it was a source of joy for our forces.  Thus we
welcomed that plane, piloted by a man whose later history I did not
recount, a pilot who often brought us this happiness, the happiness of
receiving weapons for the Sierra Maestra.  And who will deny it and why
should anyone?  What does the conduct of men at a given moment have to do
with their later deeds?  And thus, on that occasion, we received our
reinforcements of weapons and ammunition.

I understand it has been said here that we might have lost the war
if we had not received those weapons and that ammunition.  There were not
many weapons, and they were not even the best, because for most of them --
38 Mausers - there were only 5,000 bullets, and for many months we had to
suffer from the agony of having guns without ammunition for them.  There
were 10 Rainser hand machine guns, and certainly the defendants themselves
can testify that they were the worst kind of weapons.  There were 10
Veretta machine guns which were in fact good weapons.  There were several
M-3 machine guns, 2 50-caliber airplane machine guns without tripods, and
above all, there was ammunition.  The ammunition was indeed abundant, at
least for the number of guns we had then.  Thus, we received than
reinforcement in the final days of March, just prior to the general strike
effort.

It was on that occasion that we met Mr. Hubert Matos personally
for the first time.  We immediately undertook to distribute the weapons to
the various patrols, to transfer the load to a safe place, and on that 30
March Mr. Hubert Matos began the war struggle in the Sierra Maestra.

I will not go over that era detail by detail.  He participated in
the first battle of San Ramon, and in a second battle near Manzanillo,
where the patrol which had arrived in the plain was sent to harass some
enemy transport.  Later -- the days of the campaign were approaching -- I
said that I had somewhat lost the thread of that thought stated here that
it was possible, that is likely that we would have lost the war without
that reinforcement, and I say that it was a valuable contribution, but in
honor of the historic truth I must say that we would not have lost the war
because even with much less ammunition, fewer weapons, many fewer men and
much less experience than we had at that time, and with much more adamant
enemies, with greater confidence in themselves, they could not have
succeeded in defeating us, and therefore, I should say, in respect for the
historic truth, that we could never have lost the war, with or without
bullets.  This was a valuable contribution, but each thing must be put in
its proper place.  And it can serve no interest of mine to minimize the
merit or the value of any historic fact, because we must love, above
everything else, the truth, just as we cannot permit those who want to
misrepresent things and present them as they would like to confuse issues
or alter them.

When the strike failed, that summer campaign was approaching.
Everyone remembers what a great disappointment the people felt.  Everyone
remembers that the dictatorship decided to deal a decisive blow,
concentrating its best and strongest military forces in the Sierra Maestra.
We had at that time some 120 men in Column 1. There were 50, or perhaps a
few more, armed comrades near Santiago de Cuba.  There was a troop in the
plain under the command of Major Camilo Cienfuegos, who had gone down with
a small patrol of 8 or 10 men to the plains,and there, fighting almost
daily battles, he had succeeded in enlisting a troop of about 40 armed men.
We also had the troops in Column 4, which were under the command of Major
Ernesto Guevara, in the eastern zone of Turquino.

While the dictatorship prepared for the advance on Sierra Maestra,
we devoted ourselves to laying our plans for th defensive.  During that
period I entrusted the implementation of certain defense construction
projects to Mr. Hubert Matos.  And he did that work well.  Precisely
because he had done good work, we used it during that stage in the
construction of various trenches in the La Plata and San Lorenzo zones.
That work which I entrusted to him he did well.

And so the weeks between his arrival in the mountains and
beginning of the offensive passed.  He was assigned again to the command of
Captain Paco Cabrera, another Captain Paco Cabreara, who died in an
unfortunate accident in Venezuela during our trip to that country.  Enemy
troops advancing from the Bueycito mines zone toward the Santo Domingo zone
were intercepted.  They were blown up by a mine by a limited number of men.
An ambush was laid for the enemy force and the men thee withdrew to
previously agreed positions.

It was in those days that our rebel army had to deal with one of
its most difficult stages.  Against that nucleus of ours the bulk of the
enemy forces had been concentrated.  The Sierra Maestra mountains were
bombed daily.  They encircled us to cut off supplies for many months, and
there were hard days when we had to calculate our ammunition and our
rations carefully.  I well remember that when the enemy offensive began, we
had only 5,000 bullets in reserve, and we had ahead of us a battle which
would be waged for a total of 71 days.

It is well to recall those times because they teach us something,
since somehow our army resisted and our army triumphed.  And this is a wise
lesson, because one does not do what one must, one fails, but when one does
what one must, one triumphs.

It is bitter that comrades of those days, although few of them are
present, have had to be tried at this time.

Thus we must reflect further and make matters still clearer,
because the truth cannot be challenged. and it is good to recall the role
that each played in those days, the provisions which were issued, the
mobilizations we undertook with a handful of men, with little ammunition
and little food, in order to resist the tremendous forces launched against
us by the dictatorship.  We waged that battle which was decisive for the
triumph of the revolution, or at least for the triumph of the revolution
only six months later.  And who would have though, in that month of June,
when the enemy columns and battalions were advancing on the Sierra Maestra,
when the people had lost faith, that we were only six months away from
victory over the hated forces of the oppressors of our people?  And why was
the triumph won?  What was the motivation of our soldiers?  What was the
basic prerequisite?  Confidence in the command, confidence in the
leadership, because when Captain Paz was ordered to take a position,
Captain Paz went to take it and he took the position.  When Captain Sugnol
was ordered to seize control of a road, Captain Sugnol set off without any
hesitation to take that road.  When Major Ernesto Guevara was ordered to
take a certain position and defend a given sector, he did not ask questions
but went to defend that position.  When Major Camil Cienfuegos was ordered
to come from the plains of the Cauto River to the Sierra Maestra, to be
there at the time when the great battle began, Comrade Camilo Cienfuegos,
without hesitation a second, proceeded to the Sierra Maestra to carry out
his duty.  And when Major Juan Almedia was ordered to mobilize 50 armed men
in the Santiago de Cuba sector, and to proceed gradually toward the Sierra
Maestra, toward the Torquino zone, where the general command headquarters
was, major Juan Almedia, without hesitation a second, set forth for that
zone.  When Major Guillermo Garcia was ordered to resist the troops of
Sanchez Mosquera with blood and fire in the Bueycito mines zone, so that
they could not take the Maestra in the period they had planned, Major
Guillermo Garcia carried out his instructions without deviation and
resisted and made the enemy forces pay dear for each meter of terrain,
without vacillation of any kind, because when any one of those 300 men with
their Garand or their Verotta or Mauser weapons, or a 7 mm rifle of any
kind, good or bad, with the ammunition they had, was ordered to take a
given position, those comrades carried out their orders without hesitation.
Why?  Because they had confidence in the command, because they had
confidence in the men who were leading them, because they had confidence in
the commander-in-chief of the rebel army, because they knew that the
provisions and the orders which were being issued were those which would
lead us to victory, despite the overwhelming majority of the enemy forces,
and no one argued.

This was total confidence.  There were not political problems in
the Sierra Maestra.  When the enemy columns and battalions advanced to
exterminate us, and with us the hope of the revolution, there were no
political problems.  Our officers did not discuss political problems.  The
political leadership of the war was ours, and our comrades, were not
concerned.  They had confidence.  The military leadership of the revolution
was ours, and that of the war was ours, and our comrades wee not concerned.
They had faith, faith in the rightness of our principles, in the
correctness of our conduct.  When did any of these comrades, these who may
be among the accused, ever see me order some one shot?  When did they ever
once see me tolerate the slightest abuse of the peasants in the Sierra
Maestra?  When did they ever see me maltreat a prisoner?  When did they
ever see me preach a policy of hatred against the enemy, despite the fact
that this was an enemy which was murdering our comrades, an enemy which was
perpetrating horrible slaughters against our peasants which touched the
hearts of all of us, because we had, impotent, to tolerate all of these
barbarous acts.

When has anyone ever seen me assassinate anyone, making it seem
later that he had committed suicide -- not even the worst of the hired
ruffians, the worst spies, although someone who wrote an article one day in
all of the newspapers of the republic through something quite different.
With a venom and an insolence which he never turned against the thieving
government leaders, the bloodthirsty ones, he wrote that I was capable of
murdering Mr. Hubert Matos and saying that he had committed suicide.

Let history speak for me and let the defendants themselves speak
for me, because it would be impossible for me to come here to slander
anyone, it would be impossible for me to come here to lie deliberately.  I
do not believe myself to be omniscient, but I do indeed say with absolute
and drastic frankness what I believe, with an absolute and radical morality
what I think and what I believe, and for this reason, I can come here to
this trial, which I doubt has been attended by any man who is not fully and
absolutely moral, to do what must be done.  And why am I doing this?
Simply because I have the moral authority to speak, because men, when they
have this authority, can stand in front of anyone at all, wherever it may
be, as an accuser just as I stood as the accused only a few years ago, for
an honorable reason, honorable not because that was what they tried to make
it seem and suggested, but because it was, because of the facts, because of
the reasons, and because of the consequences, and with the same moral
authority I stood before the courts of the tyranny in the past, with the
same moral authority with which I have always acted and to which the
defendants are witnesses -- with that same morality, I come here to speak
and to say what I think, before men who were my comrades in the Sierra
Maestra, and who are today accused in this trial.

It would be well for them in particular to analyze why the rebel
army won its victory, why our soldiers have that confidence in their
leaders, and why those leaders had that confidence in the soldiers.  It is
well for us to recall those days, much purer and more encouraging in the
moral aspect, because this was the era of the direct struggle, not that of
the struggle against the insidious poison and venom they distill to use as
weapons in eras such as this.  It is well to recall some facts which
perhaps the people are unaware of, because the people do not know many
things and after all, nothing was done so that the people should know.
What was done was because it was what was necessary on each occasion.  It
is well that the people should know, for example, that when we were
surrounded by enemy troops, the commander-in-chief of the dictatorship who
was in charge of those troops opposing us sent to us, through the wife of a
prisoner, a message stating his conviction that we would be destroyed,
since as a professional military man he did not believe it was possible to
resist against the resources they had.  It would be painful to destroy us,
he said, and he even urged us to meet and talk with him, noting that as
dead men we would have accomplished nothing,and that faced with this
imminent destruction, any solution was preferable.  I recall that he even
suggested that we reflect about the case of Eduardo Chibas, who once he was
gone could not continue his work.  And I have here the draft of our answer
to that commander, about whom we had our doubts, although we believed it
possible and thought that he might be speaking frankly:

"Distinguished compatriot: I have high regard for you, which is
not diminished by the fact that it is my honor to recognize you as an
enemy.  I thank you for your noble feelings with regard to us, your
compatriots, not your enemies, because were are not at war against the
armed forces, but against the dictatorship.  I note that you are the
official with the greatest prestige and highest rank today within the army,
the fate of which you can influence decisively for the good of the
fatherland, to which alone soldiers owe loyalty.  Perhaps when the campaign
is over, but not before, if we are still able we will write you to explain
our thinking,and I believe that you and the army and we will be able to do
good for Cuba, to which all eyes in America are turned today.  Moreover, if
the men who have armed themselves against the just idea we represent are
fervent enough in the infamous cause they are defending to overcome the
tenacious resistance they will encounter and can exterminate us to the last
rebel, do not mourn over our fate, because we will leave the fatherland an
example beside which the most heroic stages of history will pale, and one
day even the sons off the very soldiers who are fighting us today will
regard the small Sierra Maestra band with veneration."

Why could I write this letter?  Why could I say that we would die
there to the last rebel?  Why did our forces emerge victorious?  It is well
to analyze this.  I beg the court to allow me to explain these things,
because the interests of the fatherland and the revolution require it,
because to analyze this problem in depth is a problem which cannot be dealt
with superficially.

Here is the explanation of that battle in the Sierra Maestra,
which I am going to read, and which is contained in this manifesto we
issued after the campaign:

"Exactly four months ago I spoke over our rebel radio station to
speak to the people at a difficult moment.  This was after the 9 April
strike.  In the citizens, hearts were discouraged.  For many the days of
the revolutionary forces appeared to be numbered and the country, they
assumed, would be plunged for many years into a hopeless night.  Along with
the failure of the strike, the general staff of the tyranny issued a series
of lying reports announcing that also the rebel forces in the military camp
had been defeated.  Once the strike had been crushed, the tyranny regarded
the time as opportune to launch all its military forces in order to destroy
the rebel centors which had held high the banners of rebellion for more
than a year.

"The people of Cuba know that the struggle is being waged
triumphantly.  The people of Cuba know that over a period of 17 months,
since we landed with a handful of men who were able to face defeat without
flinching in their patriotic dedication, the revolution has been growing
steadily.  They know that what was a spark only a year ago is today a blaze
which cannot be extinguished.  They know that the struggle is no longer
only in the Sierra Maestra, from Cabo Cruz to Santiago de Cuba, but also in
Cristal Mountains, from Mayari to Baracoa, on the Cauto plain from Bayamo
to Victoria de las Tunas, and in other Cuban provinces.  Although not all
of the people know that the will and the determination with which we began
this struggle has remained adamant, they know that we are an army which
developed from nothing, that adversity does not discourage us, that after
each reverse the revolution has emerged with greater strength.  They know
that the destruction of the Granma expeditionary force was not the end of
the struggle but the beginning.  They know that the spontaneous strike
which followed the murder of our comrade Frank Pais did not destroy the
tyranny but it established the pattern of the organized strike.  They know
that no government can remain in power after the mountain of corpses
drenched in blood with which the dictatorship crushed the recent strike,
because the hundreds of young people and workers murdered and the
unprecedented repression undertaken against the people does not weaken the
revolution but makes it stronger, more necessary, more invincible.  So that
the blood shed makes the bravery and the indignation felt the greater, that
each comrade who has fallen in the streets of the cities and on the
battlefields awakens in those who share his ideal an irresistible desire to
give their lives, too, awakens in the indifferent desire to fight, awakens
in the timid a feeling for the fatherland which is shedding its blood for
its dignity, awakens in all of the peoples of America sympathy and support.
I will end this address with the following words: "The people of Cuba can
be sure that this fortress will never fall, and we swear that the
fatherland will be free or we will die to the last combatant."

"Today I am speaking again to the people from this radio station
which never ceased to broadcast even during the days when the mortars and
the bombs were bursting around us, not with a promise which we will carry
out, but following a stage of that promise which has been kept.

"The army, after 76 days of constant fighting on Front No. 1 in
the Sierra Maestra, completely repelled and virtually destroyed the finest
flower of the forces of the tyranny, imposing upon it one of the greatest
disasters which a modern army, trained and equipped with all war material,
could have suffered.  This was done by untrained military forces limited to
a territory surrounded by enemy troops, without planes, without artillery
and without regular lines of supply for weapons, ammunition and foodstuffs.

"More than 30 battles and 6 major combat engagements took place.
The enemy offensive began on 24 May. Since Holy Week, the tyranny had been
concentrating troops all along the Sierra Maestra, and they had been
gradually approaching the spurs of the mountain range.  The enemy command
headquarters had succeeded in rallying for this offensive 14 infantry
battalions and 7 independent companies, including the following units: the
10th Battalion, Major Nelson Carrasco Artiles, etc., etc.

"The general staff included Major General Bulogio Cantillo Porras,
Brigadier General Alberto del Rio Chaviano, etc., etc.

"The strategy of the dictatorship was to concentrate the bulk of
the troops against the first front in the Sierra Maestra, where the general
command headquarters and the rebel radio station were located.  After the
enemy had disposed his forces and supposed he had divided ours, the rebel
command secretly moved all the columns in the south and the center of the
province toward the first front.  Column No. 3, under the command of Major
Juan Almeida, which was operating in the Cobre zone, Column 2 under the
command of Major Camilo Ciennfuegos, operating in the center of the
province, Column No. 4 under the command of Major Ramiro Valdes, located in
the eastern part of Turquino, Column No. 7 under the command of Major
Crescencio Perez, located in the extreme west of the Sierra Maestra -- all
of these were mobilized toward the area immediately to the west of turquino
Peak.  These columns, and Columns No. 8 and 1, under the orders of the
general command headquarters, formed a compact defensive front along some
30 kilometers, the main axis of which was the heights of the Sierra Range.

"The rebel strategy was summarized in the following words of the
instructions issued by the commander-in-chief to the column commanders in
the early days of the month of July.  These instructions read, textually,
in part: 'We must be aware of the minimum time we must resist in organized
fashion and of each of the successive stages which will develop.  More than
of the present, we are thinking of the coming weeks and months.  This
campaign will be the longest of all.'

"After this catastrophe, Batista will be hopelessly lost, and he
knows it and therefore he will make the maximum effort.  This is a decisive
battle which is being waged precisely in the territory we know best.

"We are devoting all our efforts to turning this offensive into a
catastrophe for the dictatorship.  We are taking a series of steps designed
to guarantee:

"First, organized resistance.

"Second, exhausting and eliminating the enemy army.

"Third, gathering together sufficient weapons and equipment to
take the offensive, once they begin to weaken.

"These measures have been prepared for each of the successive
stages in the defense.  We are certain that we will make the enemy pay a
very high price.  At this time it is very clear that their plans are
developing badly, and although we pressure that there will be a long
struggle, in view of the effort they will have to make to gain around, we
do not know how long their enthusiasm will last.  The problem is to
strengthen the resistance increasingly and this will develop as their lines
have to be extended and as we withdraw toward the most strategic sites.

As we believe that it is possible that they will succeed in
penetrating the mountains at some points, precise instructions for each
contingency are included in attached documents.

The basic goals of these plans are:

First, to hold the basic territory in which the organization,
hospital, workshops, etc., will function.

Second, to keep the rebel radio station, which has become an
important factor, on the air.

Third, to offer ever greater resistance to the enemy.'

"The plan contained in these instructions was strictly carried
out.  The guerrilla war had ceased to exist, having become a war of
positions and movements.  Our platoons were stationed at all of the natural
points of access to the mountains, in the north and in the south.
[Beginning of sentence missing] as we concentrated our forces and occupied
the most strategic points in order to launch the counterattack.

"Between the troops attacking from both directions, there was only
a distance of 7 kilometers as the crow flies, but the morale of our troops
was bearing up and we were able to conserve almost all of our reserves of
equipment and high destructive power mines.  The enemy had to try to gain
ground within the mountains.

"On 29 June, the tyrant's forces under the command of Lt.  Colonel
Sanchez Mosquera, were dealt the first crushing blow, and this was one of
the most aggressive troops they had.  With the weapons and equipment seized
in this engagement, which lasted three days, we began the blasting
counterattack which in 35 days drove all of the enemy forces out of the
Sierra Maestra, after costing them almost a thousand casualties, including
more than 443 prisoners.

"The battles of Santo Domingo, Merino, El Jigue, the second battle
of Santo Domingo, Las Villas de Gibacoa and Las Mercedes followed one after
the other.  The final stage of the struggle became a desperate effort by
the tyranny to withdraw from the Sierra Maestra what remained of the forces
it had used in the offensive in order to avoid the encirclement and
annihilation by our army of absolutely all of them.  They evacuated the
Pino del Agua Camp without waiting for us to attack it.  This was a
shameful flight from the battlefront which anywhere in the world would have
been sufficient reason for an army concerned with its honor and its
prestige to have demanded the blanket resignation of the entire general
staff, because of the number of lives sacrifices and the war material
stupidly and criminally lost, because the soldiers who were the victims of
the errors of the military commanders are to to blame for the disaster.

"It can be said that panic spread in the command headquarters
before it did in the troops, and thus the retreat became precipitant
flight.

"The 11th Battalion was decimated.  The 19th Battalion lost all
its transport, with the soldiers' equipment, foodstuffs and ammunition at
Merino.  The 18th Battalion was forced by hunger and thirst to surrender.
The G-4 Company was destroyed at Purialon.  L Company of the Infantry
Division was annihilated near the mouth of the La Plata River.  The 92nd
Company was surrounded and surrendered at Las Vegas, along with the CT Tank
Company.  Company P was destroyed at El Salto.  The 23rd Battalion was
decimated at Arroyones.  The 17th and 3rd Battalions, plus some infantry
forces with armored equipment which came to their rescue, took a severe
beating and abandoned the battlefield after 7 days of struggle, virtually
crushed.

"The rebel forces seized a total of 507 pieces of equipment,
including two 14-ton tanks and their guns, two 81-mm mortars, two 3-inch
bazookas, 12 machine guns with tripods, 142 Gurand rifles, about 200 San
Cristobal machine guns, and all the rest -- M1 and Springfield rifles, more
than 100,000 bullets,and hundreds of shells for mortars and bazookas, six
Minipaks and 14 PRC-10 microwave radios."

It is worth noting,at this remove in time, those events of which
the defendants -- some of them -- were the best of witnesses, because they
waged that struggle with us, they traveled with us, in the hours of the
night and the early morning, over long paths through the mountains and it
is they who have the best reason to ask themselves why -- what political
problem did we have with our troops?  What made victory possible, if not
confidence?  None of our commanders, none of our offices, none of our
soldiers raised any political problems and for this reason victory was
possible.

But the war had not ended.  It still remained to overthrow the
tyranny.  We had completed that struggle with some 500 additional weapons.
In other words, we had 800 armed men, and with 800 men -- I believe
sincerely that this is a unique case in the history of warfare, at least in
the history of modern wars -- with 806 men, 807 armed men [sic] we invaded
the rest of the island.  And not only did we invade it, but i that same
manifesto, as eloquent proof of the confidence we had in our men, we
announced that the rebel army would take the offensive.  Although no one
knew how many of us would attack, no one knew how many men there were in
these platoons and columns of which we spoke, although no one knew how many
of there were to invade the island, we announced that we would do so.

In that same manifesto,which is not complete because I have
brought here only the first part, since it was a statement which was issued
in two successive days, we announced that we would take the offensive.  How
could we undertake an offensive with 807 men only, and how, moreover, could
we be sure of winning?  The second part of the manifeso was called "Our
Offensive," and here, too, is a document which explains our campaign.

"Dear Major Almeida, Sierra Maestra, 8 October 1958, 8 A.M. --
Dear Almeida:

"I have worked to advance the preparations for Operation Santiago
as rapidly as possible, in order to ensure that it will coincide with the
electoral farce with the purpose of forcing the enemy forces into a broad
battle at this time, which along with other measures we will take will make
impossible the holding of the election.  I also thought of going there with
the largest possible support forces that same month, but in careful
analysis I realized that this was impossible for various reasons: a. the
supply of weapons and ammunition has not yet reached its peak; b. the
innumerable matters and tasks of all kinds that have to be dealt with this
month would remain unresolved or half settled if I left here and undertook
this long trip.  Determined as you know I am in my intentions, it was very
hard for me to abandon the idea of going.  At the same time, in order
rapidly to assign tasks to all the forces with the elections in mind, I
have begun a series of movements toward various territories in the
province, but I have tried to ensure that these movements, while achieving
specific goals in connection with 3 November, will also serve as a basis
for the strategy to be developed in the weeks following that date, that is
to day, the troops which now control the territories of Victoria de las
Tunas, Puerto Padre, Holguin and Jibara will be called upon to carry out
important tasks in the final months of the year.

"I am not substituting a plan for taking the province for that of
taking Santiago de Cuba first.  Taking Santiago and the other cities would
be much easier thus, and above all, they could be supported.  First we will
occupy the countryside.  Within 12 days, approximately, all of the
municipalities will be invaded.  Then we will take over and if possible
destroy all the land, road and railroad communications routes.  If parallel
operations are carried out in Las Villas and Camaguey, the tyranny may
suffer a complete disaster in the province as it did in the Sierra Maestra.

"This strategy seems much safer to us than any other and,
therefore, far from concentrating the bulk of our forces in any one
direction, which takes time, requires a great accumulation of logistical
supplies and involves risks which must be considered, we will distribute
them such that we can keep the enemy under constant harassment everywhere.
on your front, the Santiago de Cuba front, Columns 3, 9 and 10 have now
been assigned.  You must make of these troops a powerful and disciplined
force which will gradually dominate the zone, and above all, you must study
it carefully before the time arrives.  There are many weapons we have
recently received without notice.  The prolonged stay of Pedro Luis has
delayed supplies and this problem of ammunition must be resolved.


"You must organize people who will try to buy bullets from the
soldiers.  If necessary, you can pay up to a peso for each 50.06 or M1
bullet.  This is a tempting price and we may have more than enough money.
We should be able to spend half a million pesos on half a million bullets.
What we must not do is be left without bullets of any kind.  I have urged
their shipment from abroad, but each time it is more guns and we must seek
other solutions to the problem.  If I receive some ammunition this week, I
will send it to you without fail.  Now, I am sending you the two 50
calibers with all the bullets there are, about 800, two anti-tank guns with
5 magazines and 120 bullets for each one, and two rifles which, because
they have the same bore as the anti-tank guns, can also be used with this
ammunition.

"Fidel Vargas is bringing all this and your promotion to
lieutenant colonel.  I am also sending you four mines now, if Crepso has
them ready for me.  I hope that these weapons will cheer the boys up.  Here
I am left with 60 Springfields and 30 M1's without a single bullet, but I
would rather send you these 2,000, becaue if I receive some in the next few
days these will already be reaching you sooner.

"After 3 November, all of your thoughts should be directed toward
preparations for the moment when we decide to surround all the cities
simultaneously.  Your forces will have the task of surrounding the cities
of Palma Soriano and Santiago de Cuba.  You must be thinking about the
destruction of the highway, which means blowing the bridges, digging
anti-tank trenches, a study of the heights and surrounding strategic
points.  You must get together as many as possible picks and shovels, as
well as cables and batteries for making detonators.  Planting mines on the
asphalt highways is a technical problem to be resolved.  We must see that
the roads have as many potholes and the like as possible, such that any one
could contain a mine.  If the highway is in good condition we can surprise
the enemy the first time with a mine planted in the asphalt, but after that
they will suspect each pothole.  As control of the highways is gained,
holes must be dug with picks.  However, these cannot be used to make the
anti-tank trenches.

"I want to tell you that if after one or two mines explode on the
highway, and a patrol digs holes in the asphalt in various places during
the night, the tanks will have to stop to check them one by one.  Also, we
can place mines in the earth embankments on either side of the road,
opposite each other, to explode simultaneously.  The explosions will come
at the tanks from the embankments on both sides and, between the two
explosions, I think this will finish them, because of the question of
distance and other considerations.  The important thing is that we must
resolve the problem of the use of the mines on the asphalt highways,
because this is our most powerful weapon against the armored vehicles.  I
leave this to the imagination and the intelligence of the rebels -- always
prodigious.

"Meanwhile, we must maintain all of the time both before and after
the third, a systematic war on transport, as you have been doing to date.
We must wreck the transport companies if they do not suspend service along
the highways and railroads.  I am sure that they will not be able to stand
the losses and will have to suspend operations, thus creating a very series
problem for the dictatorship.  Communications must be improved daily,
establishing the largest possible number of service points.  I talked to
Jose Antonio about this when he came here.

"Another thing.  The people must try by every possible means not
only to cause casualties, but to seize enemy weapons.  I have thought that
the three columns, by this date, would have been able to seize more
weapons.  It seems to me that they have developed quite a fear with regard
to the microwave radios and it is going to be difficult to find them after
the demonstrations of force there have been.  They will go back to their
barracks shortly, and we will have had a period to search the highways
before this happens.  Now, then, when they return their camps and send out
ever fewer expeditions, we must again begin the systematic destruction of
the roads and highways.  Then we will establish a Magninot Line from
village to village.  Then we can prevent them from obtaining either water
or food, and you will see how docile we will make them all.  But it is of
the greatest importance that these plans be kept absolutely secret and
therefore, I urge this upon you instantly.  Experience has taught me that
even commanders are sometimes indiscreet.  I am not referring to you,
because I know that you are an old fox in these matters, but I remind you
of it in connection with your command.  Above all, it is necessary to keep
the secret of the strategy planned for after 3 November, so that the enemy
will never suspect it, so as not to be able to prepare to counteract it.  I
will be on the move myself and locating forces and at the proper time I
will give he order.  I think the whole thing will be a matter of months.  I
will reveal my plans to very few, and each will receive his instructions
separately.

"Send me the greatest volume of information on your communications
and the terrain in your zone you can.  You must choose a skilled person to
take charge of this task.  Obtain maps and draft whatever outlines you
regard as necessary for a proper report, and send me copies.

"For the moment I have no other important matters to mention to
you.  I am impatiently awaiting news of Cho and Camilo.  I have the
impression that it has been hard for them to get ahead, but that they have
come out all right.  I congratulate you on your merited promotion to
lieutenant colonel.  I have received the stars and certificate.  When all
is well, I will send them to you.  Write then, giving news of all these
aspects: economic, military, public order, etc.  With warmest regards..."

This letter contained the plans for the offensive which is less
than three months was to bring ruin to the dictatorship.  What had occurred
meanwhile?  I wanted to give the court, and the public, and to remind some
of the defendants of these facts which are important in that they reveal a
state of mind which made possible victory, a state of confidence which made
the triumph possible.  Perhaps some of the defendants do not and never did
have any idea of this, but some of them do.  What was the role of Major
Hubert Matos at that time?  He was assigned to the Santo Domingo zone.
There they resisted.  Vanious of the officers who have been charged were
assigned to that zone, and I remember that one of the difficult days was on
that occasion when while we were encircling troops in the Merino zone, the
enemy tried to take the Maestra heights.  In one of these positions was the
then Lt.  Alamo, who resisted valiantly, and I remember that in the zones
where we all were, we followed the details of that day of battle.  And they
remember them, because they know that in everything I have said, in
everything I have written, I have not lied in the slightest detail, because
not even in wartime, when many believe it is necessary to lie in order to
demoralize the enemy, even in wartime when it was a question of life or
death, did I lie about even a single bullet.  And when that enemy campaign
ended and rebel army seized 507 weapons, the columns which invaded the rest
of the national territory were organized.

Column 2 was under the command of Major Camilo Cienfuegos, Column
8 under Major Guevara, Column 3 under Major Almeida, Column 10 under Major
Rene de los Santos, Column 9 under the then Major Hubert Matos, Column 12
under Major Eduardo Sardinas, and this accounted for all of the forces we
had in the Sierra Maestra, all, because we were left there with 24 men, all
veterans of the offensive plus the recruits we had armed with the weapons
seized by our forces.  The columns were organized and one of these was the
Column 9. Major Guevara's column had been formed, as had that of Major
Camilo Cienfuegos, and Major Almeida's column which was the first to set
off in order to try to intercept the troops located in Pino del Agua in the
heights of the Maestra, after the campaign, but they could not be
intercepted because of their hasty retreat.

Column 9 was organized and we gave it the best weapons.  This was
the best armed column and the one in which we placed many of our veteran
comrades, particularly the group of comrades of Major Paz, formidable
soldier that he always was, loyal comrade that he always was.  It contained
the comrades of Paz, those of Paco Cabreera, and those in that group which
arrived in the mountains one day in the summer months of 1957, and which
included such men as Duque.  They were very worthy men and had experienced
long months of struggle.  But, however, we did not assign comrade Duque to
that company, because he seemed to us too impetuous, to such an extreme
that one day at the end of the campaign, having gone to intercept enemy
troops which were retreating at dusk, he proceeded at such a speed and so
far ahead of his troops that he fell into the hands of the enemy and lost
contact with the other comrades.  They assumed he was dead until the
following day, when he appeared all beaten and bruised, after having waged
a battle with the guard at the enemy encampment, who had thought he was a
common soldier -- a singular battle from which he only escaped with his
life by a miracle.  And precisely because of these impetuous deeds on his
part, which on other occasions had served to enable him to win great
triumphs, we did not assign command of the troops to him, but to Hubert
Matos, who had arrived almost a year later.  Does this mean a denial of his
merits, of what he did during those months?  No, I do not deny them, I am
simply saying that he arrived a year after some of the officers who were
under his command.  It was at the time when that column which contained so
many individuals who had spent much time in the mountains was being
organized, that column which was the best armed and as I will show -- it
was then that the first episode involving Mr. Hubert Matos developed.

I never had any difficulty with any officers in the Sierra
Maestra.  I never had any problem of insubordination or impertinence, nor
of lack of respect -- and there were many commanders, of whom some are
present here.  I never had the slightest complaint about any of the, those
who were me at the Moncada Barracks and those who arrived on the Granma and
those who were with me in the Sierra Maestra for 25 months.  However, in
those days in the month of September, if I remember rightly, only 5 months
after he arrived in the mountains, where I treated him with full
consideration, which no one can deny, with all deference, he achieved the
rank of major, because I took into consideration first the arrival of the
expedition, second, the heard work he had done in the trenches, and third,
his participation in the engagements.  He was not among those who had
fought the most battles, although he had fought many.  All will recall that
the troops which fought the most in that campaign were those under Comrade
Lalo Sardinas, because they took part in every single battle.  Indeed, this
was the group which was in Santo Domingo and which fought so well, behaved
so courageously and carried out its objectives.

In only five months, he won the highest rank in the rebel army,
was promoted over officers who had been there a year longer than he, and
was given the best weapons.  However, it was because he was of a character
different from all the others. in other words, all the others were the
older veterans -- those from the Granma, from the Moncada Barracks, with 25
months experience beginning with Comrade Guillermo Garcia, who was the
first peasant to join the expeditionary force, but I did not believe they
would have the honor, the disposition or the extraordinary character he
did.  And they understood me, and I understood them, because I never had
problems with any one of them, and yet, this first problem developed with
Mr. Hubert Matos, and I must...

Mr. Hubert Matos: May I ask a question with the permission of the
Court?  In order to answer the testimony of the prosecutor.  I was not
present, but I understand that there was earlier a problem with the man who
is today Major William Galvez.  Is this true or not?

Doctor Castro: There was a problem, not with Major William Galvez,
not with Captain William Galvez, but with a soldier named William Galvez
who had come to the Sierra Maestra and who was punished for violations of
discipline. he was not an officer of the rebel army.  (Applause)

And it was necessary to explain this precisely because I spoke
publicly of this incident and here are the papers.  Moreover, in the same
article which presumed me capable of murdering Mr. Hubert Matos and then
saying that he had committed suicide, there was a public denial of the
veracity of the papers I read and which I had brought here again, because I
could never be capable of bringing here a false paper.  I will never be
capable of inventing such a lie, because on that day I would feel lacking
moral authority to speak to anyone.  On that day I would feel that I had
lost the honorable right to be a leader in my fatherland.  I would feel
myself unworthy as a man and as a leader of the revolution (applause) and
therefore...

On 27 August 1958, that is to say, the incident was not after 5
months but 4, I received a paper sent to me by Comrade Crespon from the
Armory.  I was signed by Hubert Matos and said: "Comrade Crespo, I would
like you to get me some extra bullets for launching Garand grenades.  Also,
I would very much appreciate it if you could provide one of the weapons you
have here to Omar, since our Browne machine gun is in the workshop and thus
we are lacking a weapon.  Yours ever, your friend and comrade, Hubert
Matos."

Hubert Matos was doing something improper in writing to the
Armory.  At that time, we had to keep a check on all weapons, on their
issue, since in those days precisely we were organizing the columns, and
those here know what work we had in organizing all the columns, because as
everyone wanted the best weapons, if possible, they had to be distributed
with the greatest of equity.  I had to take the note, and I wrote later on
27 August 1958:

"Hubert, I cannot understand how you can be lacking a weapon, when
the boy who was here from the Armory had a Cristobal.  I do not like the
things behind my back, because they confuse and disorganize everything.  No
one can take what weapons he likes from the Armory.  We need to create
order, not disorder.  When will we be able to count on the cooperation of
the commanding comrades?"

This note was written on 27 August 1958.  I do not know whether or
not it reached Hubert Matos.  Possibly it was returned to me.  Because the
following day...  But do you admit that you wrote this note, Mr. Matos?

Matos: Your note did not arrive.

Dr.  Castro: But you admit that you wrote the other, that it was
yours, and not written by Crespo?

Matos: I request the floor as I would like to explain...

Dr.  Castro: You admit that you wrote it, and the other did not
arrive.

Matos: But I would like to make this clear.  Not only did it not
reach me, but just a few days before, one of our Browne machine guns we had
given to Crespo, to the workshop.

Dr.  Castro: It is explained here, it tells here about the Browne
machine gun.  I have read about the Browne machine gun.  But apart from
this...

Matos: They were to repair it for us.  As later they informed us
that it was not ready and we had one of our oldest men there, Omar, without
a weapon, which was still in the workshop where he had sent it, I made this
request of Crespo, whom I had directly entrusted with the machine gun for
repair, and I do not believe that it is a dishonest thing ...

Dr.  Castro: I am not saying it is dishonest.  I said that it
violated a principle of organization, because if everyone took weapons when
they believed it necessary and exchanged them when they thought it
desirable, you know that we could not have maintained the slightest hope of
order under such conditions in the mountains.  I do not say it is
dishonest, I am simply presenting papers, notes, and answering questions.
I am not drawing conclusions, because this precedes the other note.

Matos: But one cannot be criticized, I believe.

Dr.  Castro: Fine, you will have an opportunity to explain this.
I believe that you will have to answer for many other things. if you want
to speak on each matter as it comes up, I believe we will never finish.  I
have heard your comment, and I hope that you will answer all the arguments,
and all the papers I am presenting here.

Matos: I hope that you know in advance that I am very aware of all
the acts I have committed in my life, and that it is clear to you ...

Dr.  Castro: Fine, but are you going to defend yourself now or
when the time comes?  You will have your turn to answer, no one will
prevent you from speaking here, no one here will send the journalists away,
as was expected.  We will not prevent the journalists from describing the
"marvel of the century" (applause).  Here the journalists are present, they
are witnessing everything, as are the people, and the court will judge,
because if the people judged, as you already know,..  I say the "rabble,"
Niss (in answer to a question from the audience) because this is the term,
those who are opposed to the revolution are the "rabble," because the term
"high life," obviously, is counterrevolutionary (applause).

On 29 August, on 27 August, moreover, I received a communication
in response to one of mine, I repeat it was on the 17th.  This was a note
which provoked the first incident.  In connection with a Verotta machine
gun, I wrote a note.  I do not have it here, unfortunately, because I sent
it with my answer to Hubert, with Captain Paco Cabrera, to show to Comrade
Duque, in order to inform him of what had happened in the event that Hubert
Matos did not correct the matter.  I received this note:

"Sunday, 27 August 1958.  Major: My desire to have more weapons
for the column has a limitation imposed by my own dignity as a many, which
is no less than yours.  I am unaware of why Duque might have been
interested in having four [grooving tools] instead of two, and you know me
well enough to have supposed this.  Your Veretta was given to Cesar Suarez
with 200 bullets to be taken to the command post.  Believe me, I now regret
having come here to the mountains.  I take your insult as one more
sacrifice at this time when what is important is the fate of Cuba.  I am
returning your note and urge you to change your way of dealing with certain
of your colleagues, particularly all of those who believe that they have
shown that they are here defending ideals and principles."

Matos: It is too bad that you have not read the note he sent me.

Dr.  Castro: Your Honor, please tell me if I must argue constantly
with this gentleman, because either we must talk here and discuss
everything that comes up, or instead I will speak first in peace and
develop my testimony, and then he can give evidence, Your Honor.

Judge: He will be given his turn.

Prosecutor: Your Honor, I believe the witness for the prosecution
should be allowed to speak freely, and in his turn, the other will have ...

Dr.  Castro: Let him answer, because we will not forbid it.  At
least, they have not prevented me from speaking.

Judge: Continue.

Dr.  Castro: It seems to me that this impatience has a cause, but
it is lack of conviction.

Matos: This is a captious representation of the case.

Dr.  Castro: But if it is, you will have your chance to answer.
You have said a number of captious things here, from the very first day you
have been saying such things.  From the very first day you have been
playing the great game of the counterrevolution, accusing the revolutionary
government of being communist (applause).

I believe that if all have spoken, it is proper that we should be
permitted to speak and in tranquility.

This is the answer to my letter.  Perhaps Comrade Duque recalls
it.  Paco did not return it.  I believe that the letter ...  Well, it is
not worth it.  I would rather speak on the basis of documents, papers,
irrefutable evidence rather than "he told me," "they told him," "I said,"
"you told me," -- no, none of this.  I speak on the basis of fact and with
the documents here.  You will not deny that this was my answer.  Did you
here it?

Matos: Yes, I heard it, but not what you said.

Dr.  Castro: Well, my answer was this:

"Sierra Maestra, 30 August 1958.  Hubert: More than an act of
indiscipline and rudeness, unworthy of the spirit of comradeship with which
we have always dealt with each other, I grieve at the obvious ingratitude
with which you have ignored the repeated proofs of personal regard I have
shown you.

"I am a man little given to theatrical gestures, but I have always
dealt here with those whom I hold in highest esteem with the confidence and
familiarity with which one treats them when they re not guilty of
ridiculous conventionalism or hypocrisy of any kind.  I am frank and
natural in all my expressions and this compensates for my lack of courteous
formality in my relations with the comrades whom i have always regarded as
equals, because I am not an aristocrat in even the smallest corner of my
mind.

"I have been waging this revolution with men of humble origin, and
here they are with a greater instinct for the true basis of my democratic
and human feelings than the somewhatmore privileged men who have had the
opportunity of gaining a little more education, and with it, more
prejudices, too.  I have never regretted, despite the fact that I have
suffered much greater bitterness, more insults and greater sacrifice than
you, having fought for this cause for seven years, overcoming many other
obstacles of the kind encountered by the men whom in some way I have helped
to satisfy their desire to flight and their eagerness to realize an ideal.
For this reason, I have been patient and tolerant, which should be taken
into account by those who, like you, so readily regret having come to a
place of sacrifice, where the only regards to be expected are hurtful
things, such as the contents of your untimely and inconsiderate message.

"You are not a colleague of mine, but of the revolution.  Here I
am not a master nor an arbitrary commander, but a slave of what I believe
to be my duty.  If I am some times expressive in the emphasis I place on
insignificant details, such as the allocation of a weapon to other units
may seem to be, with the goal and interest in which I dealt with the one
you demanded, and this has happened with other comrades, it is due to the
struggle which I have to wage in an atmosphere in which everyone wants the
best for his troops, and it is easy to forget that victory can only be a
product of efficiency and effort on the part of all.  And this struggle
against individualism and personal tendencies should be of greatest concern
to those who are victims of it, who tend to stress non-existent
irritations, as if pride were more important than anything else.

"I categorically reject the term 'insult' which you use abut the
words contained in my note, which I will keep as a record of this incident.
I invest my energies and my time in more important matters.  Your action is
the more serious because of the fact that it occurred at a time when to
demand an accounting of your conduct would do irreparable damage to all the
plans, or at least one of the most important ones, we have made with regard
to the enemy forces, whose destruction interests me much more than
repairing personal relations. personal matters are not important to me, and
when personally I am a hindrance to this cause, and those who today take my
orders believe this, I will resign without hesitation, because in this I
see much greater honesty and honor than to continue to give orders to
others and to occupy posts of leadership which are for me no pleasure, but
a bitter duty.  And I would have preferred that someone more capable and
better than I, and I say this with all sincerity, were leading this
struggle, because with the modest philosophy which has come to dominate my
most intimate convictions, I feel profound contempt for all human vanity
and ambition.  All of the pride in the world is worth less than an iota of
humility, of understanding that we as men are a mere nothing.

"Please do not trouble yourself with the thought that I am
concerned in the least abut the attitude anyone has toward me personally.
I am only concerned with the way in which each individual carries out his
duty, and this duty, you must understand clearly, I never view as something
which has anything to do with my name or my pride or my personal interests,
which fortunately do not exist at all.  And when others regard their duty
in a way different from what my conscience tells me mine is, and when I am
certain that my acts are free of any ignoble purpose, I do not concern
myself further, because after all, this is my calling and my destiny: to
fight as I am doing now.

"It is hard to have to invest the energies of a man to carry this
message which should have been unnecessary to you, but you re not a rank
and file soldier, but a column commander, and it is of interest to me to
clarify these concepts.  I do not exhort you to do anything.  I must give
you orders, and not exhortations.  I would thank you, in exchange, for all
that you are doing, whenever it is authorized and I categorically demand
that you correct the mistaken concept in your message.  If your honor, your
pride, as you see it, prevents you from correcting the insult of having
returned my note, turn over your command to Captain Felix Duque, whom I
will inform of this incident, in which case he will have to apply to
Almeida's command headquarters for instructions and you will present
yourself at the general command headquarters."

The weapons each column had were as follows:

"Column 3: 25 Garands, 19 Crisobals, 12 M1's, 4 Brownings, 1
Johnson and a tripod, that is to say, 72 automatic weapons; column No. 10,
headed by Noncada Comrade Major Almeida: 1 tripod, 6 M1 rifles, 22
Cristobals, 14 Springfields, 1 Me, 1 Johnson, 1 Veretta, 4 Streings, 11
Italian rifles, 2 Thompsons, 2 Brownings, 9 Garands, in other words, some
50+ weapons.  Guevara's column had 25 Garands, 2 Brownings -- I am speaking
of the automatic weapons which were the greatest value to the rebel
soldiers -- 2 tripods, 15 Cristobals, 11 M1's, that is, some 70 weapons, if
we count up, or rather 55.  Camilo's column, the Invasion Column, had 42
Garands and 11 San Cristobals -- 66 automatic weapons, of which 6 were left
in the plane, and they got out with 70 automatic weapons.  Column 9 had 22
Garands, 21 Cristobals, 6 Verettas, 5 M1's, 1 M2, 2 Brownings, 4 M3's, a
Thompson, a Reming automatic rifle, and a 30 caliber -- 64 automatic
weapons."

I am speaking of the automatic weapons, which were those most
valued by the rebel soldiers.

In other words, two-thirds of the weapons our columns had were
automatic.  I asked Hubert Hatos for a correction, and he sent it.  Do I
retain any rancor against him because of this incident, have I the
slightest shadow of resentment becaue of that action, which was the only
one in the harsh experience of the war?  What was our later behaviour?

First, it would be well to see how different, for example, was the
case with Camilo, when I sent a similar note complaining abut certain
papers which had to be filed at a given point, when I learned that he had
left without depositing them.  This was a note similar to that which I had
to send to Hubert, and we all of us here know each other well, know the
style of each of us and how we all write.  Camilo answered:

"Major Fidel: The Williams papers are with Franki.  I left them
with him because I regarded him as the most responsible of the boys who
remained at the little shop.  I have made the selection of men and weapons.
Tomorrow everything will be completed and I will be able to send you the
list of men and all the weapons.  This is going a little slowly, but you
know how these things are and the delay, even against our will, happens.
Doctor Del Valle has already arrived.  I could not bring Guevara's light
machine gun, because Ramiro, following your orders not to surrender it
without papers, would not give it to me.  I have only now to get some
Garands grenades.  We only have 12 and I need some more in order not to
have "sputniks."  Of the 500 bullets I asked for on your orders, the S.V.
gave me 300, the rest having been delivered to Guillermo.  I talked with
Crespo about the M2, and he told me that if you had no orders, he was
willing to change it.  The column was made up of 75 or 80 men.  Tomorrow I
want to visit it, since tomorrow we cannot depart and thus we will be able
to exchange impressions.  When he reaches La Plata, he will note that one
bottle is missing from those there were, but I took the liberty of taking
it, planning to replace it with two that were to come from Camaguey.  I
have 24 men hidden in Cuatro Caminos, reinforcing the 12 others, since
various reports have come that the army will be coming along, and there are
a number in Estrada Palma."

This was the answer from Camilo, from whom I have dozens and [word
or words missing from the text] the same humility.

What were, what was my attitude with regard to that officer who
had committed an act of real insubordination, an action intolerable in any
army, because political problems had never arisen, political problems.
What was our attitude?  Here, for example, I have a document issuing orders
to Major Rene de los Santos to put more troops at the disposal of Hubert
Matos.

"I have received the report informing me of the difficulty with
Jose Antonio.  A few minutes earlier, Raul Castro had happened to inform me
from the Second Front that there was a lack of coordination between the
forces operating on that side of the Bay, nearer Siboney.  Have Humbeto
return to your command post, along with any other patrols you have moved to
the other side of the Bay.  Jose Antonio, with the company which was in
Raul's Column 10, and which then was transferred to your column, will be
placed in Column 9 under Hubert's command.  Thus Hubert, who is much closer
to Siboney, will be responsible for dealing with that territory."

And another:

"Sierra Maestra, 9 November 1958.  Dear Almeida: I am sending you
10,000 bullets.  There are 5,000 30.06's and 5,000 M1's.  Of these 10,000,
send 4 to Hubert, 2,000 of each kind.  Distribute the other 6,000 between
Columns 3 and 10.  I urge you to save these 6,000 bullets for the moment
they are most needed.  If you give them out they will be fifed.  This is an
old experience."

In other words, my attitude with regard to that case was one
completely free of resentment, completely free of irritation.  Whenever it
was a question of distribution, I saw that he was sent his portion, which
was even the larger one.  I might have wanted to be sure that it would
never seem that there was any resentment on my part, that is, to be able to
justify myself, to clear myself, if necessary.

Later on, forces were jointed near Santiago de Cuba, when Column 1
was moved toward Santiago and the towns of Guisa, Baire, Jiguani,
Contramaestre, Maffo and Palma Soriano were being taken.  We were again
converging all of the columns, except those forces which were in the zones
of Holguin, Victoria de las Tunas and Manzanillo, which naturally, like
those in Las Villas and Camaguey, had to continue to carry out their tasks.
Until that time I had not seen Hubert Matos again, although we had some
communications, and here I have one, for example, which says:

"Today I am returning, ready to carry out my part, as you ordered.
I am concerned about the attitude of Jose Antonio, who did not come to the
meeting as he should have, because Rene and I let him know that he should
be there to receive instructions from Almeida.  I find in Jose Antonio, to
judge from reports, the kind of revolutionary who likes to be in a safe
place, to enjoy conveniences and to satisfy his vanity."

And when Camilo was already advancing on Las Villas, I received
this note, which also concerns one of the defendants here, and it says
here, because Comrade Camilo was a very specific comrade and very graphic
in his expressions, he said to me on 1 September 1958:

"1 September 1958.  Fidel, the case of Comrade Benigno Gonzalez is
simply revolting.  They are accusing this man of being crazy with the sole
purpose of getting him out of the way so that the accuser will remain
commander of the zone.  The accuser is Roberto Cruz -- one of the
defendants here -- and there is nothing here but a desire for power.  This
letter signed by the colonel is the man who has helped not only us, but all
of the elements crossing or in the zone as well, the most.  Doctor del
Valle has made an examination, and here is the certificate.  This Roberto
Cruz is one of the Lara men.  The so-called mad man has been living in the
home of Colonel Arcado Pelaez for more than a month."

And I have here the letter, which he wrote long before, of course,
any of us could imagine that one day Roberto Cruz would appear accused of
counterrevolutionary activities, when this veteran of many years could not
possibly imagine that one day this letter would come to light again:

"Oriente Plains, I September 1958.  Mr. Fidel Castro,
Commander-in-Chief of the 26 July Movement, Sierra Maestra.  Most esteemed
commander:  Although I do not have the honor of knowing you personally,
though we have mutual acquaintances, I beg your pardon for taking your
precious time from your many concerns to make a report in all humanity on
Comrade Benigno Gonzalez Batista, who was recently engaged in the southern
zone of Camaguey, and who was brought to me here with the recommendation
that I take great care with him, since he was stark raving mad.  Mr.
Gonzalez Batista has been in this house, if I remember correctly, 40 days
now.  During this time I have had an opportunity to talk with him a great
deal, to study him in order to determine from what kind of madness he might
suffer, and indeed it is possible to get to know him.  I have come to the
conclusion that he is saner than I am, and it is a pleasure to talk with
him, hearing his very sensible ideas, and I can even tell you frankly that
I have learned a great deal about the military discipline of the 26 July
Movement from him.  The doctor has examined him and will submit his report,
but my simple opinion is that he has not been nor is he insane, and you
personally should be able to evaluate what is involved.  You already know
me by reputation.  I am simply an individual who wants to help these brave
men who are fighting for the freedom of Cuba, newly oppressed, and to
attempt to save from error those who out of lack of knowledge and perhaps
ignorance are mistaken in their evaluations and are endangering one of
their comrades.  With warmest greetings, the colonel."

"Medical Certificate, Revolutionary Army, 26 July, Antonio Maceo
Invasion Column No. 2, Doctor Sergio del Valle Mimenez, Doctor in the 26
July Revolutionary Army.  I certify that having examined by the methods
available to us Mr. Benigno Gonzalez Batista, I find neither symptoms nor
indication of mental abberation or personality distortions, at the time of
the examination, which would incapacitate him for carrying out any task or
duties.  Doctor Sergio del Valle."

And above this, Comrade Camilo Cienfuegos said to me:  "The case
concerning Comrade Benigno Gonzalez is simply revolting."

Judge:  This court believes a recess of ten or 15 minutes
necessary.

(The court recessed and later reconvened.)

Judge:  Court is in session.  We would ask the representatives of
the defense, as well as the other members of the court, to take their
places.  You may continue, Major Fidel Castro.

Dr. Castro:  Gentlemen of the court:  I have completed my
explanation of the Sierra Maestra background.  I would like to stress two
things in conclusion.  One is that the rebel army never had any political
problems, that there was absolute confidence in the political and military
leadership of the revolution.  As a revolution, it had a political leader,
a military commander, in which the soldiers and the officers had
confidence, and that revolutionary movement, despite the extraordinary
obstacles which confronted it, managed to triumph, when very few believed
this was possible.  That army even accomplished such deeds as the invasion
by two columns, one of 80 men and the other of 110, which, overcoming all
of the natural difficulties of being an army without planes, without
armored equipment and without artillery, swept across the island, opposed
by an army which on the other hand enjoyed all these advantages.  And it is
my satisfaction to be able to say without fear of error that one day
history will record the accomplishments of the rebel army as one of the
greatest deeds any arm has ever been able to carry out, because with 807
men we undertook the invasion of the enemy territory.  And this was
possible because of the spirit of the rebel soldiers.  Demoralized soldiers
could not have achieved this goal.  Corrupted soldiers could not have
achieved this goal, and all of the officers of the revolutionary columns
came down from the Sierra Maestra, came from Column No. 1 in the Sierra
Maestra, which was the school of the rebel army, the school of the rebel
officers, and they were educated by deeds, educated by example, educated by
conduct, and this was the army which came down from the Sierra Maestra,
without political problems.  And here are the commanders of this army, here
are those men, the few who remain of those who undertook that struggle, the
few who remain from the Granma, the few who remain from the first who
joined the rebel army.  Here they are,never having had political problems,
because they always had confidence in the comrade who had led his rebel
army to triumph.  They had confidence in its military leadership and in its
political leadership.  They had confidence and the people had confidence.
But there was one, who did not, who did not believe and who inculcated that
lack of confidence in a group of officers, among whom there were both bad
men and good men who had had no political problems in their minds, because
they believed in the political and revolutionary leadership of the comrade
who had assumed this responsibility, and who had not done so by accident,
who had not seized it from anyone.  It was simply the result of a long
process of struggle.  And we have the great satisfaction that the destiny
of our country was changed, the great satisfaction that thousands and
thousands of young people who had in many cases had no opportunity to go to
a school are the men who made the fate of the fatherland change, because
although there is a great effort here to make it seem that the revolution
was the work of all the classes, there is a truth which should be stressed.
The various classes may have contributed more or less, but the revolution
was the work mainly of the dispossessed peasants of Cuba (applause).  The
revolution was the work of the most humble people in the country, and all
of the commanders of our army -- who were they but humble men, workers or
peasants?

There has been an attempt to show here, because it is here we must
discuss the ideological essence of the revolution, that it was the work of
all the social sectors of the country.  And I say here and I have a right
to say it because I know, that the revolution was basically the work of
the humble sectors of the country.  And when we disembarked from the
Granma, the first person we met was a charcoal peddler, the first person
who gave us something to eat was a charcoal peddler.  As we advanced those
we met along the way were humble people.  The first to join us were
peasants, the first to give us bread after many days of hunger were the
peasants of that zone.  The first to join us to swell our ranks were
peasants.  Our guides were peasants, the first to be murdered were
peasants, the huts and the houses which were burned were the huts of our
peasants.  The slaughters committed were against the peasants and we were
there and the defendants who were there know that where we went was to the
homes of the peasants, and that the food we received was food from peasant
homes.

The revolution was undertaken by the humble sectors of the
country.  But if the humble sectors of the country had not undertaken the
revolution, it is being waged for the humble sectors of the country, or it
is not a revolution (applause).

I do not know why the defendant Hubert Matos says here that he was
less radical than Raul, because he believed that all of the sectors were
responsible for the revolution and that therefore, Raul's attitude was
wrong, because Raul was more radical then he and I believe that we should
discus this ideological question here.  That we should seize this business
of communism by the horns here, this thing which has been invented, the
spectre to which they have had recourse, particularly in this trial, in
order to play the game of the enemies of the Cuban revolution.  In other
words, to accuse the Cuban revolution of being communist.  We will refute
this argument here, because we have had enough.  This is a very convenient
attitude -- to come here to accuse the revolution of being communist so
that tomorrow all of the cable reports of the UPI, the AP, the journals
Avance (Advance) and Diario de la Marina (Coastal Daily) and all of the
counterrevolutionary press will hasten to spread through Cuba and
throughout the world the story, seeking help abroad, as reactionaries all
over the world so, in order to keep the privileges which they know they are
not strong enough to retain in our fatherland.

Hubert Matos did not invent the invention that the revolution is
communist.  Let us not be accused of the slander of saying that he invented
the communist accusation against the revolution.  This was invented by
Batista, by Masferrer, by the spokesmen of the dictatorship.  When we were
in Mexico at first, we were not accused of being communist, or rather very
rarely.  We were not accused of being communist in that era, but you will
remember that we were accused of supporting Trujillo and it even seems
strange and amazing that when we were in Mexico we were accused of
Trujillism because in that time there was a group of pseudo-revolutionaries
associated with Trujillo seeking weapons, and so the dictatorship found it
most convenient to accuse us of being Trujillo supporters.

When we landed, when months after Batista and Trujillo had settled
their pending debts and it as no longer suitable to accuse us of supporting
the latter, and as also the falsity of all of this had already been
demonstrated, it occurred to them to accuse us of being communist, and
there was not a single newspaper under the dictatorship, not a single
spokesman of the dictatorship which did not accuse us of communism.  All of
you recall the Otto Meruelo hour, the Diaz Balart radio program.  You all
recall the periodicals Ataja (Interception), Tiempo (The Times), Pueblo
(The People).  Not a single day went by but that the revolutionary movement
was accused of being communist.  When we received arms from abroad, when we
asked for aid in foreign weapons, then we were all communists, and then
Hubert was a communist, because Masferrer and Ernesto de la Fe and Salas
Amaro and Diaz Belart and Tabernilla, Ugando Carrillo and Chaviano and all
the spokesmen and all the leaders accused us of being communists, because
this was the pretext on which they tried to create confusion, the pretext
for the US to send weapons and bombs.  But then it was a lie, because
Hubert Matos was accused of being a communist and it was a lie, it was not
true, it was nothing but a pretext.  And when the revolution triumphed,
when the first day of January came, everyone supported the revolution,
everyone.  You will all remember it.  There was no one who did not say:
"Thank you, Fidel!"  And I smiled, but without cynicism, I smiled because I
was aware of the phenomenon which was going to happen later.  Because I had
not forgotten, I had said some years before, that a revolution cannot
please everyone, and I knew well that some of those "thanks" were those of
individuals who hoped that the revolution was not really a revolution, that
it was only a change of command, that it would only remove some to replace
them with others.  And what happened when we began to promulgate
revolutionary laws?  What happened when the revolutionary laws were
implemented?

When we issued the first revolutionary law lowering rents -- that
was when many left us and the little placards saying "thank you, Fidel"
disappeared, because they were the cards displayed on the cars of the
owners of the apartment buildings.  The tenants there became more grateful,
and their confidence in the revolution increased, but the owners of those
buildings began to a great extent to become enemies of the revolution
again.  As soon as we began to implement revolutionary laws they began to
accuse us of being communists, and who was the first to make this
accusation?  Well, it was that captain in the rebel army who was arrested
for abuse and intoxication and whom we knew as the Mexican.  In the days
following 1 January, in the tremendous convulsion of the triumph, he left
prison, came to Havana, went to a barracks and once more donned the uniform
of a captain, and as soon as he saw that his situation was untenable he
went to the United States and made the first statement denouncing the army,
because this was a communist revolution.  Then there was another case, that
of Captain Humberto Rodriguez, whom all of the defendants know.

One night, while were paying a visit to an embassy in our capital,
we were called to the telephone by a lady who informed us that her husband
had been murdered in a police station.  Immediately all of the memories of
the barbarous acts which had been committed came to mind, and as our army
never tolerated crime, as in the war no one was ever murdered, the murderer
would be someone who would have to pay the penalty.  The order we gave
immediately, although this was a question of a captain who had fought, who
had shown merit, with the exception perhaps that he was a bit fanatic, but
who had both good and bad qualities -- the order we gave was the he be
arrested and brought before a revolutionary court.

With the lack of vigilance in those days, and perhaps because of
the carelessness of his own comrades, he was able to escape to the United
States.  He immediately made some public statements and said that he had
been punished because he had killed the brother of a communist.  Here was a
man who had committed a crime and was faced with exemplary punishment, and
again we were accused of being communists.

Then came the case of Diaz Lanz.  Exactly the same, he was removed
from his post for nepotism, a post which he had won by merit, a post he had
been given in recognition of the many trips with weapons he had made to the
Sierra Maestra.  But when that evil, that nepotism, that immorality which
existed in the air force was halted, and he was replaced, he reached an
agreement with enemy agents, and the foreign cable services there came out
one day with an anti-communist statement.  He left the country immediately,
went into exile, and went to the Senate of the United States, the Senate of
a foreign country, to accuse the revolution of being communist.

And it was then, when we had to sound the alarm, when we refused
to tolerate people or did not let them do as they liked, when it became
impossible to commit an immoral act or a violation of discipline, when no
one was allowed to carry forward his own plans -- then they began to
blackmail the revolution with the accusation that it was communist.

Then came the case of the man who had been appointed, thanks to
the generosity of the revolution, President of the Republic, and we were on
the point of having one of the worst crises, because this involved nothing
less than the maximum legal authority of the republic, and again the
pretext was communism.

And as the revolution proceeded with revolutionary laws, as there
were more revolutionaries and more laws, there were more accusations of
communism, in which communism became the tool for attacking a government
which would not be accused of thievery, which could not be accused of
criminal acts, which could not be charged with failing to carry out a
single one of its promises, so it was accused of being communist.

And what does this accusation mean?  It means just what the
reactionaries have done everywhere in the world.  Everywhere in the world,
when they find themselves impotent within the country to defend their
privileges, they appeal for foreign help.  The reactionaries always do this
everywhere in the world, when they find themselves incapable of defending
their privileges.  They have always called for foreign help.  What the
French nobility did, what the counts and the marquises and the dukes of
France, the nobility of France did in 1790 and in the years following the
revolution, when the people revolted and put an end to those privileges,
was to call upon the English, the Germans, the Austrians, the Spaniards and
all foreigners to come and reestablish their privileges.  And this is the
serious error, the most serious error the reactionaries have committed,
because we will see here if there is any reason to accuse the revolution of
being communist, and indeed, accusing the revolution of being communist, as
they are doing as a basis for this trial, to discredit the revolution, to
divide it, to confuse it and to threaten and endanger it ever further is
the worst thing these comrades who have abandoned the line of duty could do
to their fatherland (ovation).

One has only to read the Diario de la Marina.  I ask those present
if they believe that this is a revolutionary journal.  I ask if they are
unaware that beginning with Narciso Lopez, this periodical has been waging
campaigns against the national interests.  I ask if they do not know that
they applauded the shooting of Narciso Lopez, they called our rebels
bandits, they applauded the death of Maceo, the death of Cespedes, the
death of Marti, and they have always fought the best and most just ideas of
the fatherland.  I ask those present if they believe that the Diario de la
Marina is or is not a reactionary periodical, and whether they have read
its headlines stating:  "Hubert stated he opposed red infiltration,"
"Hubert stated he opposed communism," "Hubert stated there was communist
infiltration."  In other words, Hubert said everything which suited the
enemies of the revolution, everything which served as a pretext of the
reactionaries, everything which was the argument of Batista of the past,
the argument of the deserters, of the war criminals, of the Trujillo
supporters, of all of the enemies of the revolution, because there is
nothing else they can invent and so they have invented the accusation that
we are communists.  There is nothing else they can say, and they have
thought up this vague thing, they have come to stir up this vague fear of
the threat of communism, the confusion of communism, accusing a revolution
which they have no right to accuse of being communist, for two reasons.
First, because it is not a communist revolution.  In Russia, there may have
been a communist revolution, but we are waging our own revolution and it is
a profound one and a radical one, but one which has its own
characteristics, one which in its essence, in its methods, in its style and
in its peculiarities is a revolution different from any of the others which
have occurred in the world.

They have no right to accuse the revolution of being communist,
first because the term communist revolution is not applicable to it
scientifically or theoretically.  Secondly, because this is an action
against the interests of the fatherland, an appeal to foreigners against
the fatherland to call our revolution communist, because thereby they are
seeking first to divide and second to attack us.  And I say here with full
responsibility, as I have always spoken, and I have here documents which
prove that in moments such as this, the things I have said have happened, I
say that today the reactionaries are deliberately and consciously devoting
their planning to attacking the fatherland through foreign interests.  Some
in Santo Domingo, other in Miami, others who have the ear of the Senators
in Washington, they are all urging foreign intervention in the country.
Anything is preferable, and even one who is mistaken, even one who truly
believes that this is not the kind of revolution in which he believes
should, if this mistaken individual is a Cuban, if he is an honest man, if
he does not want to see rivers of blood, if he does not want to see foreign
boots trample the fatherland, if he does not want to see the rebel soldiers
and the rebel people of Cuba die in the trenches (ovation) should rather
adopt the attitude of accepting anything, anything that is ours, in
preference to foreign invasion, the sacrifice of the privileges of
sovereignty, the sacrifice of national independence, the sacrifice of a
people.  Because there is something here which I believe no one doubts:
although there is something here which I believe no one doubts:  although
there may be a Hubert Matos, or even 20 such, nothing and no one will be
able to prevent the people of Cuba from defending themselves to the last
drop of blood in case of invasion (ovation)!

And though there be a Hubert Matos or a hundred such individuals
attempting to divide the rebel army, trying to divide and weaken the
people, nothing and no one will prevent Cubans from defending our flag
should a foreign band, supported by mercenary forces, attempt to establish
itself in our fatherland (ovation)!

And I know that even now if this should happen, there will be
mistaken comrades, confused comrades, who wherever they may be will regret
their error, will be ashamed of their error, because I believe that it will
be hard for these comrades to watch the struggle when they no longer have
any doubt, when they have faith because no one has killed them, when they
have confidence because no one has destroyed them.  Full of courage, full
of idealism and full of pride, they battle the enemy soldiers, and I know
that for them, for some of them, there can be no greater punishment as a
consequence of their error, of the mistake they have made, than for the
fatherland to deny them the right to fight for it, because the least that
those who urge aggression against the fatherland merit is that it deny
their right to fight for it (ovation)!

And while we are making these things clear, we should read an AP
cable dispatch, which will cause you to laugh, but it shows how the
counterrevolutionaries and those who consciously or unconsciously are
playing their game are advancing in their plans for aggression, how they
are advancing, how it even seems that this trial has helped them, because
it suffices to read the counterrevolutionary periodicals, those who have
been given the "brief stories" and "notes" and "extracts" from the
archives, conscientiously, so that space can be used, to the detriment of
the revolution and the fatherland, although this is vile and infamous
space, to accuse the revolution.  In order to see how they are advancing in
their campaign, this report, which I did not invent, as I have not invented
any of the papers here, as I have never invented even the slightest trifle
in the history of the revolution, suffices.  It says:

"Miami, Florida, 14, AP.  Reverend Eduardo Aguirre, a Cuban
priest, who has come to seek asylum, says that Fidel Castro is seeking to
isolate the Vatican from the Cuban church.  He says that Castro has
discussed the idea informally with members of the clergy during an
interview arranged by Thomas Milan, a reporter for a Fort Lauderdale radio
station.  Rev. Aguirre said:  'Castro suggested that a national church
independent of Rome be established.  This is what they are doing in
communist countries, to divide and weaken the church.'  Rev. Aguirre said
that he and another priest, Juan R. O'Farril, came to seek political
asylum, and that they are the first Cuban priests to do so.  It is claimed
that their intention is to denounce the government of Castro as a communist
dictatorship.  The Reverend refused to name any of the clergymen with whom
Castro had spoken, saying that no true priest could do such a thing.
Castro could fund his own church, but the people would know that it was not
a church, nor its servants priests.  Cuba has some 8 million inhabitants
and perhaps 90% are Catholic.  The interview was also attended by Pedro
Diaz, who was commander of the Cuban Air Force, and who fled to the United
States and denounced the revolutionary government, saying that it was
infected by communism.  He and his comrade, said Rev. Aguirre, also fought
with Castro.  Cardinal Cushing of Boston was right when he spoke a short
time ago of 'the silent church in Cuba,' because the priests can no longer
speak freely there..."

Here on the first pages of La Marina and Avance, they have
insulted us as they never insulted any thieving government, any bloody
government, and I ask the people of Cuba, who know this, who have read
these journals in the past and know that this is the strict truth, to bear
witness.  No one can make this denial, not even the defendants here, nor
those whose thinking is on the lowest level of tolerance, not even those
are most mistaken can make this denial and state:  "The priests cannot
speak freely in Cuba, and for this reason we fled."

And they made this statement after a Catholic congress which was
carried out with all of the facilities we could provide, just as we are
ready to do for any congress of evangelists or representatives of another
religion, because religion is not in conflict with the principles of our
revolution.

"Father O'Farril and I both worked as revolutionaries to overthrow
the dictator Fulgencio Batista, but the communists have transformed the
revolution for their own purposes.  Now it is dangerous for men with our
ideals to remain in Cuba."

This Father O'Farril, at the time of the Trujillo conspiracy, met
with Father Velasco, and I was informed of this by various comrades who
were here at the time of that conspiracy and I said:  "Leave him out of it
in order to avoid friction with the church.  Leave him out of it, so that
it will not seem that we are provoking anyone, or they will use it as a
pretext to attack us."  And this Father O'Farril, who had been exiled once
because he was beaten and tortured, has now, although no one has interfered
with him, no one has harassed him, no one has annoyed him in the slightest
way, goes abroad to say that "now it is dangerous for men of our ideals to
remain in Cuba."

And thee has been talk hero of communist infiltration.  They have
dragged in here the case of the communists who may have joined the rebel
army in order to promote the slogan that the fatherland is in danger
because it has been infiltrated or occupied, or because there are some
communists in the rebel army.  And the truth, the truth that all rebels
know, the truth that all the peoples know, is that since 1 January, many
have come here who did not fight.  You know that there were many who raided
the barracks, because the soldiers surrendered.  They flooded into the army
posts and seized the uniforms and the weapons, and suddenly the army had
more than 30,000 or 40,000, perhaps 50 or 60 times as many men as we had at
the time of that battle of which I spoke before.  And the rebels
multiplied, that is to say, those who were not rebels and men of all groups
joined, and many who belonged to no group.  Even the scoundrels joined,
because there were here a thousand despicable deserters who went into a
barracks, took a uniform on the sly, put it on and seized a rifle.  And the
truth, the great truth, is that the fewest of those who joined the army
were the communists!  Here every organization has hundreds of officers in
the army, and here the smallest group to join the army was the communists
(applause)!

Indeed, there were communists in the army.  It has been said here
that there were communists in the army, and indeed there were, but they
were fewer than the number representing any other party, and they were in
the army for the simple reason that they were fighting.  Those who were in
the army, those I know, and I know really very few, were in the army
because they wanted to fight, because here were the guidelines of the
revolution, the instructions of the revolution, and it was never said that
anyone was forbidden to fight.  It was always our code when an individual
came to the mountains to join our ranks to ask if he was a good man, a
brave man, a moral man, if he would make sacrifices and observe discipline,
but who asked Guillermo Garcia, who asked Escalona, who asked Puerto, who
asked any one what he thought?  Because what concerned us was those who
would make good use of a rifle and all the rest.  Those who abandoned their
comrades or deserted -- they were not important to us, and it never
occurred to anyone to say "who are you?" as a requirement for joining the
rebel army.  And they know that this is true, they know that no one would
ever ask, and therefore, there may have been communists in the proportion
of members of the Communist Party in the country, a really small
proportion.  But there were communists in the proportion of members of the
Communist Party in the country, a really small proportion.  But there were
communists, and when they were accepted without questioning and given
rifles and fought, I wonder if it would be moral to say to Felix Torres,
who was mentioned here, now: "Leave the army, because you are a communist,
and we are glad that you fought and risked your life and if you had died,
well -- but you did not and you are alive, and you are a communist, and if
there is a communist among here they are going to accuse us of communism,
and the Americans are going to regard us askance, so you must leave here.
In other words, we were opportunists, we accepted you without asking any
questions, but now we are throwing you out, so that Hubert Matos or some
one like him or Father O'Farril can go around saying that this is a
communist government" (ovation).

What if Felix Torres is a communist.  Who denies it?  I understand
that he does not, and while he is a soldier who carries out his duties,
while he serves the revolution, while he carries out orders like a good
soldier, so long as he does not go there to defend estate owners against
the peasants, as long as he remains uncorrupted, as long as he commits no
act against the revolution or the laws of the republic, it is just and
moral that he remain (applause).

I have mentioned Felix Torres, and I happen to have papers here
which are nothing less than a report of Major Camilo Cienfuegos, of which I
have the original, which he sent reporting this deed of extraordinary
prowess which to the eternal glory of Comrade Cienfuegos will go down in
history among the greatest war feats.  Here I have what is actually the
original copy of his report of the invasion, the first pages of which read:

"Yesterday we reached this rebel encampment..."

In other words, when he reached Las Villas, and I do not know if
there are any present here from his invasion column, Your Honor, when he
reached Las Villas, after crossing a whole province and experiencing some
very difficult times, because they traveled through swampy and deserted
zones, the movement did not have proper organization, although the blame
does not lie by any means with the province, but with the movement, which
was poorly organized, and that was natural, because these commanders of the
26 July Movement who come here today to speak in favor of Hubert Matos were
not in Camaguey, no, they were in an embassy of abroad, but now, indeed,
now that Camilo is gone and the revolution has triumphed, now, indeed, they
are commanders of the 26 July Movement in Camaguey (applause).  But when
Camilo was there, they were not, and as they were not, Camilo had, I think
11 meals in 30-some days, and as he says, they stopped only 11 times in 31
days in the march to the province of Camaguey, the leading livestock zone.

"After 4 days without finding any food, we had to eat one of our
mares, the best of our now meager supply of horses.  Almost all of the
animals had been left in the swamps and quicksand along the southern coast.
Yesterday we reached this rebel encampment, where we were welcomed
enthusiastically.  Its commander, Felix Torres, gave us every
consideration.  This group is made up of members of the Popular Socialist
Party, and while waiting for us, had sent out guides to the boundaries of
the province.  In this zone, too, a 26 July group is operating, and I have
already made contact with it."

Is it immoral to say this, is it incorrect to do so?  Should I be
a selfish servant of deceit or should I respect the historical truth,
particularly when it is bolstered by the signature of one of our most
beloved and glorious commanders (applause)?

I would not say this of a man who was not honest, now that the
reaction is waging its campaign against us, but if a man is honest I must
tell the truth.  And this is not the only reference Camilo makes.  Here in
another of his reports dated 19 November 1958, Camilo tells us, in his
unmistakeable style:

"The people of the Maximo Gomez unit -- that which rebelled, which
was in revolt, which promoted the uprising in the zone through which Camilo
traveled to Yaguajay -- the people of the Maximo Gomez unit have shown true
revolutionary conduct, free of any regionalism and contributing to real
unity, following our orders at all times.  However, other elements, which
should have had the same attitude or a better one, although I have had no
problems with them, have at times indicated that our presence in this zone,
where they have never done anything but eat, does not please them.  The
civilian population is 'wild.'  They welcomed us with passion the likes of
which I never saw before.  We were fortunate in scaring off the soldiers,
although there is a threat of an offensive.  But the people call this a
'free zone,' although I have not yet declared it to be one.  When dynamite
is obtained, then perhaps, but this is difficult.  We have rigged up a line
with chlorate and will explode it soon.  All of the lines are down, the
railroads are not running, practically, and the roads are deserted and
without traffic.  As of the next strike we make which will be soon, I am
going to put pressure and work personally on the highway, to see if we can
prevent the soldiers from reaching the free territory of Cuba:  Oriente.
Here the men now complain that they are not there when they hear the news.
In our modest way, we have made a great impression on all of this zone.
The people see the invaders as legendary figures.  Today when I was talking
with a sugar workers I was moved as much as I have been during those two
years of struggle.  These men lived for hours truly free, setting forth
their ideas, speaking sincerely as men who had never lived through
difficult situations or battles would never have dared to do.  These men
see in the revolution salvation, the brilliant future of Cuba.  These
ragged men, after marching many kilometers at the risk of their lives, have
reached the encampment in large groups, despite my instructions to come
only in small groups.  A column of 108 men arrived early, whooping with joy
and happiness, cheering the revolution.  This was a moment of true
satisfaction for us, and one of deep reflection and profound thought.  The
path ahead is long and rugged but we will reach the end of it.  The day