-DATE- 19600120 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- INTERVIEW -AUTHOR- F. CASTRO -HEADLINE- TELEVISION INTERVIEW -PLACE- HAVANA -SOURCE- TELEMUNDO PREGUNTA -REPORT_NBR- FBIS -REPORT_DATE- 19600120 -TEXT- TEXT OF CASTRO TELEVISION INTERVIEW Unsigned Source: Transcript of Telemundo Pregunta (TV World Questions and Answers), 20 January 1960 Guest: Dr Fidel Castro, Prime Minister, Revolutionary Government. News Panelists: Dr Carlos Robreno, Mr Guttierrez Cordovi and Mr. Benjamin de la Vega. Moderator: Alfredo Nunez Pascual. Nunez: And a very good evening to you all. This is the moment the people of Cuba and we here at Telemundo have been waiting for so long. The Prime Minister of the government, Dr Fidel Castro Ruz, is appearing here with us tonight on this program; tremendous expectation has been generated all over the country and abroad in connection with his presentation here tonight; the studio audience includes members of the cabinet, his Excellency, the President of the Republic, and foreign dignitaries; for example we have the former world heavyweight boxing champion, Joe Louis here, who came especially to attend this program; we also have Bruck M. here, from the United States, who is an expert in the art of personal defense and in anything and everything connected with the improvement of youth based on a healthy body; we also have a series of personalities here whom you will perhaps get a glimpse of during the program. I would also like to point to especially that our "TV World Questions and Answers" program is today being telecast by all of the television and radio stations of the Republic. If you will allow me, I would like to read off the list of stations that are connected with us here tonight: CMQ-TV, Channel 6; Channel 4, Channel 7, Channel 10, CMQ Radio; Radio Progress; Radio Carcia Serre; Radio Sales; Radio Alverez; the Havana Radio Chain; Radio Levin; Radio Mambi; the Eastern Radio Chain; Radio La Calle; Radio Rebel; Union Radio, Channel 12; the Western Circuit of the Pinar del Rio radio broadcasting system -- a total of 50 radio and television stations all over the country. (Applause) We know that Cuba is anxiously awaiting the words of Dr Fidel Castro and I will therefore not take up anymore time than is necessary tonight. We want to thank him for accepting our invitation, in the name of TV World, the union of TV World employees, the newspapermen who appear on this panel, and myself. And I would like to ask Comrade Gutierrez Cordovi to start the questions. Cordovi: Major Castro, the attention of Cuba is today focused on the economic portion of the beginning harvest. Today, we already have 60 sugar refineries, milling sugar; last year, as of this same date, we only had 23; and we had not yet issued any harvest regulation; there are some people who think that this means that we are going to have a free harvest in Cuba this year, whereas there are other people who think that we are going to work under a decree regulating the harvest. Could you tell us something about this? Dr Castro: All right, in effect, we are working on this decree and we are going to regulate the harvest; we are going to set a production ceiling. In other words, we are going to produce a volume of sugar which will be somewhat more than five and a half million tons of sugar. This is the estimate which we have arrived at, provided of course we find that the prevailing circumstances make this figure realistic and advisable; but there might be a slight variation in the final volume. But the minimum amount at least will be five and a half million tons. As far as the future is concerned, only the circumstances will tell. As I understand it, the situation on the international market is favorable; we have sold enough sugar and we are selling sugar and we think we can sell enough sugar in the months to come. I am quite optimistic in this respect and I hope that the country will next year earn more foreign currency from the sugar harvest, more than we received last year, as a result of the drop in prices on the world market and the large sugar beet output in Europe; last year, we received 80 million dollars less in terms of sugar sales. This year there is every reason to be optimistic and to think that we are going to get more dollars than we got last year. This is what I can tell you about the sugar situation; in this respect, the Revolutionary Government has the advantage that our sugar policy of today is no longer dictated by minority interests within the industry, in other words, the sugar policy is not influenced by the same circumstances that influenced it in the past; in the past, many steps were taken in accordance with certain interests; the sugar policy was managed by a group of big sugar magnates who always tried to do what was best for them and not what was best for the nation. Now, we had to work with a sugar policy which we inherited from the year 1952; you remember that the first big mistake that was made at that time was the announcement that a ceiling was going to be put on the 1953 output and consequently there was also talk of certain limitations in 1952; and so everybody milled sugar, down to the very last stalk and then we had this tremendous tonnage figure and this led to the restrictive policy whose result, as far as Cuba was concerned, led to the gradual loss of its markets; in other words, other sugar-growing areas were developed at our expense. Of course, today Cuba is not in the same position in which it was then, when it comes to fighting on the world market. You must understand that if we -- for example, right now -- had 500 million dollars in reserve, the way we did in 1952, when sugar prices were good, then we would be in a position to fight and we could even try to recover our lost markets. Now we do not have this advantage because the struggle, at any given moment, may be a price struggle; those prices can influence the foreign currency income, that is to say, we have to fight this and we have to fight for our market, but of course we are not in the same situation that we were in back in 1952 -- and we are in a rather difficult condition now to fight the kind of fight we fought at that time. However, I nevertheless believe that if we do not fight the sugar battle in this new era of our fatherland -- then when are we going to fight it? Never before in the history of our country have we had as many advantages as we have today: we have a government that does not defend the interests of small groups or minorities; we have a sugar policy that is governed by the interests of the nation and not by the interests of a group of big sugar tycoons. In addition the people are ready to fight for this. And I believe that we, who are quite aware of this sugar situation, we must, in this new era, do everything necessary to recover our markets because Cuba has natural advantages which are very important in the production of sugar, even though so far we have had an extensive type of production, not an intensive type, without the extensive use of fertilizer; this has kept our sugar output at a technical level that is inferior to that of other areas in the world. But Cuba does have tremendous natural advantages so that there is no justification for the fact that Cuba has been losing sugar markets, especially since we could have utilized these advantages to defend this market and to become the real king of sugar in the world. And this is the battle we must fight. Sooner or later, we are going to have to fight this battle, we are going to have to make sacrifices and that may be necessary to recover our control over the sugar market. The policy under the London Agreement likewise was a restrictive policy. We must go to London with a more determined posture, with greater determination to defend the Cuban sugar quotas and the participation of Cuba in this industry. Last year, we ran into some restrictions. We hope that our quota on the world market will be raised in view of the situation on the market today. Now, this is a very delicate topic which has to be handled very carefully; and so, that I can tell you now is that we are going to pursue the kind of sugar policy that would be good for the country and at the right moment we will take the measures that may be necessary in this connection. In other words, we are today in a situation where we have a free hand to implement a sugar policy that will benefit us and we will do what is best for the country within the circumstances. Cordovi: Thank you very much, Dr Castro. Dr Castro: You cannot talk about a free harvest right now; this would be the wrong kind of policy because it could even influence sugar prices. Cordovi: Yes, the market has already been sufficiently influenced because, as some people say and estimate, Cuba still has a tremendous surplus from last year and this can have an unfavorable effect on the market; because of this, there is tremendous expectation on the world markets concerning the volume of the Cuban sugar harvest, so that this can then be tied in... Dr Castro: ... who is going to cut sugar production? Cordovi: No, no, no, no; I did not say that anybody was going to cut anything. Dr Castro: But, when you first started out, is that not what you said? Cordovi: No; not on the foreign markets. They are still waiting to find out the volume... Dr Castro: But, is the sugar output going to drop or is it not going to drop as a result of the agrarian reform? What is the thinking on the world market in this respect? Are they going to recognize, at last, that we can produce all of the sugar we may want to produce? Cordovi: On that, I have no information at all. Dr Castro: All right, when we began to talk about agrarian reform, we received a lot of telegrams and the most frequently used argument was that the agrarian reform would result in a drop in our sugar output, in other words, that Cuba might possibly not be able to produce her quota. Now, it is rather odd that the arguments which are used today are so different from those that were used in the past; at that time you remember that when we talked about the agrarian reform, nobody was talking about reducing our quota; everybody said that the agrarian reform would ruin the country and that we would bee unable to meet our quota. Why are people arguing today that they are going to cut our quota? This means, first of all, that the lies which people used to spread about the agrarian reform are now being smashed by reality. The reality is that we can indeed produce all of the sugar we want to produce today and of course this explains all of the big expectations because we can produce each year -- if we want to do so, if it it suits us - we can produce more sugar each year; that is the reality. Our sugar refineries will definitely work 3 months, maybe three and a half months; and we are going to have to produce, for example, I think, there are already some installations that are doing this, we are going to develop a program for this production program, on the basis of dehydrated sugar cane juice and we are going to mill more cane and we are going to have more jobs open at the refineries, but we are and we will be increasingly capable of producing all the sugar we want to produce. And as we increase and improve the technical facilities of our production effort, we are going to need less sugar cane areas than the areas we are using now because, if one caballeria now gives us 35,000 or maybe 40,000 arrobas, we can certainly raise this figure to 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 or even 80,000, in accordance with the crop preparation; we are going to have more areas available, more than we have planted to sugar cane today. And I can also tell you that if we want to plant 10,000 to 20,000 or 30,000 caballeries of sugar cane more, we can certainly do all this planting; we have the tractors working day and night, 24 hours a day, and we have more than 2,000 tractors at work right now; and we can plant pangola, we can plant rice and we can plant sugar cane. This is the situation such as it really is and this is why there are all of these expectations because, in the final analysis, this expectation is recognition of the fact that the agrarian reform has been a tremendous success in Cuba. If what they said about the agrarian reform were true and if production had dropped as a result of the agrarian reform, then they would be saying that there are no problems in Cuba today because we had planted a little more sugar last year, a little more than we needed, and that we might reach our objectives, but there would then be no reason to worry or our production during the years after the agrarian reform, if the output were to drop, as they say. But this expectation and this preoccupation is recognition of the triumph of the agrarian reform. At this point it might be a good idea to recall some other arguments. What was it they said in the beginning? In the beginning they said that the production units would be destroyed, that we would create tiny plantations in the process of redistributing the land and that these would be small and individual plots, without the necessary technical support and that production would drop. But what did we do? We established the cooperatives, that is to say, wherever we had a landowner, a tenant farmer, a sharecropped, with a small piece of land, let us say 2 or 5 caballerias, in other words, the fellow who had to pay rent and who did not own the land -- well, we gave him ownership of the land. What did we do with the big estates and plantations? We set up cooperatives because, if we are going to plant 100 caballerias of rice, the only correct way to plant this rice is with big machinery and with large amounts of fertilizer; we were not going to let each farmer struggle along by himself; we had to set up cooperatives because the cooperative is the thing that preserves the production unit, that is to say, far from destroying the production unit, we established a cooperative there and we gave it more technical equipment and facilities and on the big estates we established cooperatives, we did not destroy the production unit either. And what do they say now? Now they come along with other lies, lies to the effect that we are not giving the farmers possession of the land. First of all, this year we though of handing out more than 100,000 land titles, not 200,000, as was announced, because this is a tremendous effort; but this year we are going to try to hand out the major portion of the titles to all of the small growers, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, the small farm owners, etc, and the number of titles thus passed out will increase day after day; we are already beginning to distribute the land to the peasants, and we are going to publish, starting next week, a list of any titles that have been handled over. And the peasants who do not have land on the big estates are going to have cooperatives established for them where the peasants will be the masters of the land. That cooperative land will not belong to the state; that land will belong to the peasants; only where we had a corporation or a company, owned by people who lived abroad -- something that was supposed to have been correct and good -- the such and such company, whose stockholders never even visited Cuba but who still owned the land -- now when we recover that land through the agrarian reform and when we give it to the peasants who are going to live there, peasants who are going to be the masters of that land and the masters of that production output, masters of the land that they are getting free of charge, because they are only going to have to pay for the equipment and installations and the fertilizer, in other words, the expenditures that keep coming up there-- now when we do this for the Cuban peasants and when we establish them on the land, on the land where they are going to live and work, and when they get all this, then this is supposed to be bad! That is supposed to be tantamount to deceiving the peasants. This is the little argument which the counterrevolutionaries use in order to confuse everybody. What they really would like us to do is to destroy the production units or to refrain from setting up any new production units so that we would really have an agricultural crisis in the country; but this is not what is happening and we can say with tremendous satisfaction that this is the first agrarian reform in the world, the first one indeed, and anybody who is not convinced ought to go the history books and study history, the history of all the agrarian reforms and he will see that this is indeed the first agrarian reform in the world which has managed to increase the output. This honor they cannot take away from the Cuban revolution, the fact that this was the first agrarian reform in the world that began to increase the output, because, as the expert from the FAO put it, this was a reform, an agrarian reform that ordered from above, in other words, that this is due to the fact that orders were issued to implement an agrarian reform; but for the big landowners this is disorder, for him this is unwelcome because we send 20 bulldozers to plow land which had been abandoned and we are doing this to give work to peasants who have been dying of starvation -- and that is supposed to be disorder. But everybody remembers that here, toward the end of the war, and at the beginning of last year, as a result of impatience, the legitimate impatience to own land, some lands were occupied in a disorganized manner; and so we put out a law depriving those who simply occupied the land, without any specific authorization, depriving them of the benefits of the agrarian reform. That is to say, when were able to observe some symptoms of disorder in the rural areas, we immediately took the necessary measures; in other countries, the peasants took over the land in a disorganized manner and this of course immediately produced a drop in the output. But, thanks to the cooperation of the peasants, we were able to persuade them that this was a mistake and that the land could not be distributed in disorganized manner, that the only way to distribute the land fairly was to do it in an organized fashion, because otherwise some people would get better land and other people would get worse land, and then agricultural output would drop; these arguments -- that is all they are, just arguments -- were then heeded by the peasants and we did not have a single case of uncontrolled land distribution. In other words, the first thing we did under the agrarian reform was to create a national consciousness to the effect that the agrarian reform was an inexorable measure. Furthermore, we asked the people to make a contribution, we began to collect tractors. In other words, we began the agrarian reform by collecting tractors, as you will see, if you travel around the province of Havana, anywhere, you will find that there are no tractors anywhere; all of the available agricultural equipment has been acquired; all of it; now there might be a little tractor here and there that is of no use, but as far as available agricultural equipment is concerned, we have acquired it. And this is how we began to launch the agrarian reform, by educating the peasants, by creating a national awareness of the need for this and by rounding up the equipment; after we had rounded up all the equipment, we got down to some serious work. If you go to some of the provinces of Cuba, you will be amazed to see fantastic amounts of weeds and jungles and completely barren land which we have now placed in production because all you have to do is see the agrarian reform from a plane, fly over the land, if you travel by highway you cannot see the agrarian reform too well, you can see it much better from the air, these vast zones, particularly in the province of Oriente, because you have to realize that we have cleared and planted areas of 500, 600, and even 700 caballerias and this land is producing now; we have harvested the first harvest here in our agrarian reform which began in the middle of last year. We have gathered in the first harvest this time. In other words, we had an orderly agrarian reform and this is why this was the first agrarian reform in the world which started off with an increase in the output. With the help of the measures we have taken, we managed to divide the land on the big production units, in other words, the big estates and plantations; if we had not done this, then agriculture might have been ruined. Yes, but what we did was to acquire more equipment than there used to be around, we imported more equipment and then we maintained the large production units and we created new large production units. This is what we did and they still kept using their arguments because they continued to pursue their objectives and they continue to hound our revolutionary measures with new arguments. But the facts proved us right now has the kind of sugar production potential that we have here in Cuba. We have unlimited possibilities for producing sugar. And we are going to utilize these advantages as the circumstances require because Cuba is the Number One sugar producer, the champion sugar producing country, and we must hold this position and we must sell lots of sugar and we must sell sugar to the whole world, without having to ask anybody's permission to sell sugar. (Applause) Nunez: Comrade Carlos Robreno. Robreno: Mr Prime Minister, a few months ago, when you did not show up at the "TV World" program, perhaps because you were so busy, we did not have an opportunity to interview you. Dr Castro: Well, that was because of scheduling problems. Robreno: Precisely. But I remember all of the details of your initial appearances on our program and all of the kinds words you said to me on those occasions and I want to thank you very much; I also remembered that I asked you about the Armed Institute which would have to defend the sovereignty and the security of the nation and there was a discussion on two topics: the political army, mandatory military service, which you rejected because at that time you did not think that militia forces would be necessary. But right now, I think that they would be. Why is the creation of a militia force now considered advisable? Dr Castro: Well, there is one very simple reason. This is the obvious international conspiracy against Cuba, the increasingly insolent threats against our sovereignty, plans being hatches by the enemies of the revolution, by the monopolies, by the war criminals, by the international oligarchies, in other words, all those who want to encircle Cuba, to encircle us and is possible to destroy us. I want you, Robreno, and anybody else, any other Cuban, to be sure that we are taking the necessary measures to defend the sovereignty of the country because right now the defense of the revolution and the defense of our sovereignty is one and the same thing; today they are not only threatening the revolution but, in order to destroy the revolution, they are threatening our sovereignty. You know perfectly well on the basis of your experience during the difficult years of our country in the past, because I have often seen you describe episodes, including those dating back to the Machedo era, you lived through all of this, you know that, nationally speaking, the revolution is too powerful for anybody to threaten it. In other words, the interests of the big landowners, the war criminals, all of those elements who for one reason or another are lined up against the revolution, they had neither the strength nor the hope of ever being strong enough to destroy the revolution. All of the efforts that they have made to deceive the people, to confuse the people, all of the weapons they have used, the very worst of weapons, the worst of intrigues, all of the worst slander they have used, the worst lies -- we have lived through all of this in each and every one of the episodes of the revolution. You remember something that happened quite recently, all of the vicious rumors that sprang up in connection with the disappearance of Comrad Camilo Cienfuegos. In spite of all the subtle lies, they were unable to shake the confidence of the people in their destiny. The only hope which the enemies of our revolution have is abroad, in other words, to mobilize foreign forces and foreign resources. In other words, the hope of all of the counterrevolutions throughout the world, the hope of all of the counterrevolutionaries, is to destroy the National Revolution with the help of foreign forces. And if you look at all the great revolutions in history, you will see that the revolutionary forces never had enough strength of their own to destroy the revolution; they always had to seek support from abroad. Robreno: May I say something at this point, Doctor? But this reaction was always based on foreign forces in continental nations. But on an island, history always also shows that this is very difficult to do on an island and we do live in Cuba, in other words, an island; down through our revolutionary history we have seen that a large-scale invasion is not possible; why was England able to stand up; neither Hitler nor Napoleon were able to invade England. Because on an island, this sort of thing is much more difficult, when the people are against the counterrevolution. Dr Castro: All right, but the fact that it would be geographically more difficult to get here does not mean that they are going to try this. You each an island by sea, but you can also reach it by air. Robreno: But then you have to get out again. Dr Castro: All right, I see what you mean. But try to visualize this case; I have not heard anybody say that after the world war a single aircraft flew over Great Britain and bombed it; I have not heard anybody in any country of the world in peacetime say that aircraft coming from foreign territory have flown over that country in order to drop incedary bombs and agents and explosives and to attack a nation that is at peace and that is not at war with anybody. You know that we are an island and nevertheless this does not protect us against constant attacks on our peasants as they try to cut the cane in the cane fields, something that happens almost daily. (Applause) And, furthermore, Robreno, an island would not be in any worse position, if we have a just cause, which we do. Robreno: That is the secret, doctor: the just cause and the support of the people. Dr Castro: All right, but even if we assume that a people has a just cause, did this ever present any aggressions from being launched against the people, anytime in history? Robreno: Man, aggressions, yes; always; but not... Dr Castro: No, it did not prevent these aggressions. We did have a just cause and we won but we won with what resources? Nobody gave us any base of operations anywhere; the police persecuted us tenaciously. I was a prisoner in Mexico for 40 days, mixed with all kinds of prison types, at Miguel Chuz, when I was there in 1956. I remember that I was put in a cell in a Mexican prison, we had lost a good portion of our weapons and a good portion of the hope of ever winning; we were left without anything. Now, you try to figure out the advantageous position of the counterrevolutionaries in various countries, such as in Guatemala, Santa Domingo, and Florida; they have airfields and aircraft and mercenary pilots and money and millions of dollars from big monopolies in a whole series of these countries. This is the money which the war criminals, the oligarchies, and the enemies of our revolution stole; and they are supported by the constant statements made by United States government officials and by the press campaigns against us. Who supported us when we were in that situation? Nobody! In other words, nobody supported us with a declaration, nobody gave us a base to use, nobody gave us weapons; nobody gave us resources. In spite of this, we arrived here in a little boat. The interests which are against our revolution have been supported and are getting support for mobilizing not just one boat but many boats. Now, you mention Great Britain; but I would rather talk to you about Santo Domingo and Haiti; these were two islands and, even though they are islands, this did not prevent United States Marines from landing in Haiti and Santo Domingo. (Applause) Robreno: Well, that was a powerful foreign nation, it was not just counterrevolutionaries; these were the marines from the second or even first nation in the world. Dr Castro: Yes. Robreno: Now, that is different, doctor. Dr Castro: Is that what you think? Robreno: Eh? Dr Castro: What do you think the inhabitants of those islands should have done when they invaded those countries? Robreno: Fight unto death! Dr Castro: What do you think we should do? Robreno: No; I do not believe that, I am sure that they will do this! Dr Castro: What do you think that we should do? Robreno: No. I am sure that here we would fight until death. Dr Castro: Fight until death. And what does it take to fight until death? You have to be prepared to fight until death. Robreno: No; I am not against the militia, doctor. I asked you... Dr Castro: And that is the reason why we want these worker and student militia forces. Robreno: Precisely... (Applause) A few days ago, a report was published to the effect that "the Dominican voice" in Santo Domingo stopped its slander campaign against Cuba. Do you believe that this is a strategy move on the part of Trujillo or that he is already tired? Dr Castro: What do you think of that? Robreno: Well, I do not know whether this is just a strategy move, I would like to ask you. Is this a part of his strategy... (Several voices are heard at this point) or is he following orders issued abroad? Dr Castro: Well, ... Robreno: This is what you would want me to say, that he is following foreign orders? Dr Castro: No; I would like to know your opinion, I would like to hear the opinion of the other newsmen because this is a very important point for everybody. But this is not the only odd thing here; the strange thing is that even they say that one must not attack the revolutionary government because it is building houses for the peasants, because it distributes land, and because Trujillo was the man who launched the policy of land distribution and housing construction in Santo Domingo. That is what they say. Now, look, there is no doubt at all that there are certain movements in this hemisphere. You know that they are attacking us and that they are launching a campaign against us, on the basis of what we are producing here, that we are creating a firm foundation here, that this is supposed to be a base for rockets, in Camaguey, when we were actually only building the school city there; and so they have come up with all kinds of accusations to the effect that this movement is infiltrated by Communists, that we are creating a Communist republic in the Caribbean, that we are dividing the continent, etc, a whole series of accusations which coincide with a number of unusual movements and circumstances in this continent. This is not the right moment but I have a little report here, I have a little report which is very well guarded, and which is certainly very interesting because I see from it that there are certain movements going on in certain foreign offices, certain foreign offices which, when the right time comes, I will reveal, backed up by documents. In other words, certain foreign offices are taking certain steps along certain lines and I can only tell you this: here, any plan of aggression against any country, any maneuver against a country, requires preparation. Nobody could possible believe that we are going to stand by and do nothing; whenever we think that there is any imminent danger, any risk or any circumstance that so requires it, we will reveal everything we know because it is our obligation to foil any maneuvers that are being hatched against Cuba by certain foreign offices. But no one forget that we are a small nation in the midst of this continent, surrounded by interests and oligarchies which are the same that keep talking about democracy and that keep lying to the people, because they are minority governments which control the money, the newspapers, the news media, they control everything, just as they used to control everything in Cuba; and when we make an agrarian reform here, there are many big landowners in Latin America who worry about the agrarian reform; when adopting revolutionary measures of any kind here, there are many interests that get all worked up about this all over the continent. In reality, how many governments are there which are in the same position as Cuba is in today, and how many are able to maintain a strong posture in defense of their interests and the interests of their people? We are just one little nation, we can count on the sympathy and solidarity of the other peoples of the continent; but these peoples certainly are very poorly informed about Cuba; everybody tries to confuse them because this entire campaign against us is not just for sport; all of these magazines and periodicals, which print all this horror stuff, things that you cannot even imagine, all of these magazines are controlled by the monopolies and big interests and they are not doing this for a hobby; all of this propaganda has a very specific strategic purpose within the over-all plans against Cuba: the purpose of depriving us of the sympathy of the peoples in order to create conditions favorable to an aggression against our company. I said this in the past, in connection with "Operation Truth" and I say it again: they are trying to encircle Cuba with a curtain of slander in order to justify their subsequent acts of aggression. In other words, we are a small nation. To what extent can we influence the other governments of the continent? Well, very little. There are others who exercise much more influence than we do, there are other people who influence others much more than we do; that they do this with all kinds of offers, such as: "I am going to give you more sugar; and I am going to give more sugar to you, over there; and I am going to give you more sugar out of the amount which are going to take away from Cuba"; many times they make no offers at all; many times these other countries spontaneously want to split up our quota. In other words, there are many ways in which they can try to isolate our country. Right now we are a people fighting alone -- and we must all understand this. A small nation of 6 million inhabitants whose reserves they have been robbing, whom they exploited miserably for 50 years, from whom they extracted a billion dollars in the last 10 years; in these conditions of economic poverty, in which they left us, we must promote a national program of national liberation, against the interests that want to keep us subjugated, interests that wanted to put us under the control of the same policy that they have been pursuing all the time, continuing to plunder us, continuing to force concessions upon us, continuing to betray the interests of the country to the foreigners. But we are now recovering the land of our country, we are doing things that have never been done before, we are defending the interests of the Cubans, we are establishing definitive norms of honesty and public administration, we are defending the interests of the peasants and the workers and our people, above all the interests of those who have lived here in misery and poverty and without any culture. We are doing unheard of things and we do them simply because we have to, but they are bitter because of the effort the Cuban people are making today and this is why they are trying to force us to fail in every way they can. Now, whom can we count on in all this? We can count on the solidarity of the peoples who are situations similar to the Cuban situation although unfortunately they have very little influence on continental policy. And so we must start with the basic fact that we are a people fighting alone on this continent, where there are extremely powerful interests that decisively influence the policy of other governments, interests that decisively influence the policy of other governments and we just one little nation, alone here. Now, don't you think that it would be irresponsible on the part of the Cubans to neglect something as essential as national defense in view of this truth, in view of the fact that it is becoming each day more apparent that the attacks against Cuba are being repeated and continue, in view of the declarations by senators and vice presidents, such as Nixon, in view of a situation in which the United States State Department repeats its charges against us in its official notes, in view of a situation of hostility, a policy of hostility and a campaign of hostility against Cuba? For example, in the very beginning we entertained the hope that it would not be necessary to mobilize or train anybody. But reality shows that this preparation is becoming more and more necessary each day and that aggressions against our country are repeated day after day. And so they are burning the sugar cane from aircraft here. All of this tells us just one thing: we have to defend ourselves. What was the worst crime committed by the French leaders during the recent world war? What was the task of the Fifth Column in France? What was the task of the reactionary forces in France? The task of the reactionary forces in France was to weaken national defense, that is to say, to keep saying that there was no danger; and they also brought up the topic of Communism and they launched a campaign against Communism. Robreno: The Popular Front was not one of the causes that weakened French defense? Dr Castro: They organized and carried out all campaigns that tended to downgrade the danger that was being debated in France. In your opinion, why was France not defended? Or do you think that France was not betrayed in the last war? Do you think that there was no conformist and pacifist tendency in that country that was the cause of lack of French preparedness in resisting the Germans? The French people were not prepared and the leaders did not prepare the French people to defend their country because France, when she was prepared, as during the revolution, because everybody remembers the 1891 or 1892 years; no, 1791 or 1792, when the revolution in France was attacked from abroad by the nobility and the big landowners, by the dukes and the counts, everybody remembers that these people fled to England and to Austria and to Germany and Spain and Italy; and there they tried to get the governments of those countries and the aristocracy of those countries to take action and they preached a crusade against France and they said that the example of France could very easily spread to those countries and they said that it was necessary to destroy the French revolution so that the same thing would not happen in those other countries which were still controlled by the aristocracy; they mobilized the armies of those countries against France but the people of Paris resisted. This is why Thiers, one of the historians of the French Revolution, said something which I read many years ago but which I cannot forget; he said that a people in revolution is stronger than its neighbors together. (Applause) The France of 1940 was not the France of 1792; the France of 1792 resisted heroically and the France of 1940 did not resist. But you cannot blame the French people who later on demonstrated their valor in the Maqui against the German occupation forces; the blame lies with the leaders who neglected national defense in France. And we, the leaders of the Cuban revolution, can now say that we are prepared to die side by side with our people. (Applause) This is a very old determination on our part and this is an attitude which at the same time is also the attitude of the people and when the leaders of a country are prepared to die with the people when the people will be prepared to die with the leaders. (Applause) And I say that this is one thing which they will always be able to say about us; but the one thing which they will never be able to say is that we left the country, that we abandoned the people, that we left the people without any preparation for defense. Our greatest desire is that there be no need for this sort of thing. And your words demonstrate this because I told you: I do not believe that it will be necessary, as a matter of fact, I did not think so. Then, when they planted bombs in Havana and when they began to plant bombs in the sugar refineries, such as the Niagara plantation, the Punte Alegre plantation, and when we had a number of dead and about 40 injured in Havana, it was we who mobilized the people, as you remember; we then held a protest demonstration in front of the palace and we decided, in view of this aggression, since they were bombing us, that we had to prepare ourselves; we decided that we had to fight back. At least we had to create a spirit of resistance in everyone and this is truly a moving thing, one of the most impressive things to anybody who visits Cuba: the spectacle of seeing men and women and children, all preparing themselves for self defense. This is the thing that creates the consciousness of the need for defending the country and this is what creates the fighting spirit among the people. I sincerely believe -- and I must tell the whole people that it is our duty to orient the people and to lead the country correctly; we believe that we must prepare ourselves and we must have a militia. And here is the best proof: who puts out the fire at the refinery? Does the refinery owner put it out? No! And so far we have not received any congratulations from the owners of the plantations and refineries when one of those little aircraft comes over and gets shot down. Look, I have the proof here, for example, when the aircraft come and drop their incendiary bombs, who puts out the fire? The peasant patrols. Thanks to the peasant patrols we can be sure that we will have a harvest. What are they trying to do by burning the sugar cane? Well, they want to stir things up and ruin the country. They want to deprive us of our basic product and of our most important source of foreign currency, in other words, sugar. Do you think that, if it were not for the peasant patrols, we could have a harvest? When they burn and when they drop incendiary bombs at 20 different points, look at that alone, let me explain, this is part of one of those bombing campaigns in the zone of Las Villas, and we have some parts of these incendiary bombs which were picked up and I am going to read you a report from the commander there, Major Rodriquez Puerta, who is the military commander of the province. This report is dated 20 January 1960: I am sending you a piece of what the little aircraft dropped for the purpose of setting fire to the sugar cane. They burned a total of 11,800 arrobas. Everything will be milled by the nearby refineries. I want to point out that the rapid action of the peasants in the zone prevented the fire from spreading further; as soon as they saw the aircraft drop the incendiary bomb, they came running to the place where it had dropped and they prevented the first from spreading; in some cases they put the fire out right away. We have 17 refineries that are operating in this province and tomorrow 3 more will begin operating. Signed: Major Armando Rodriguez Puerta. Robreno: What make were those bombs? Dr Castro: All right, look here, here is what it says: "Bristol, Navy, here you are... (he holds it up to the camera) -- here it is in English but I have it in Spanish too (Applause). Here is what it says: Red signal flare, 500 candle power, time: 2 minutes; use only when aircraft or ship is spotted (but they forgot to add: to burn sugar cane on the island of Cuba.) Instructions: Rip tape of tip, rub tip forcefully around signal head. Caution: always make sure that the air does not blow toward you." This is what is says, and then again you have Bristol, Navy, made in the United States. This is what they dropped in these cases; this one did not burn and it was picked up intact. And this is the kind of little incendiary bombs that burn for 2 minutes and that they drop on the cane fields. I believe that Cuba is presenting a unique fact to the world. I do not know of any country that produces tin, cotton, or any other product that they are bombing with incendiary bombs. And those aircraft come from the United States because nobody could possibly believe that any of these aircraft could come from Yucatan, from Mexico; those little aircraft do not have that kind of radius and they certainly could not reach the province of Havana from Santo Domingo, for instance. In other words, those aircraft, including the aircraft that came over in that case, when the magazine Bohemia published a photograph of this aircraft as it "appeared" overhead -- that aircraft took off very calmly from an airfield in Florida, and it did not appear until Bohemia published a photograph of the aircraft and then it suddenly appeared and everybody said that measures would be taken later on. Recently, in the Kuchilan section, I saw a photograph of other aircraft that came over, with their license number, all of them for missions of this type, and I have no news to the effect that they have confiscated those aircraft nor that they are paying any attention to them at all. Those aircraft come from the United States; and those are the aircraft with which they try to destroy our sugar crop. Robreno: Doctor -- could this not be the subject of a protest in the OAS? Dr Castro: All right, it can be the object of a protest even in the United Nations. Robreno: All right, in the United Nations likewise. Dr Castro: But of course I believe that these are steps that should be taken at the right moment. Because this is really nothing. They are just beginning. I believe this quite sincerely because there is evidence to the effect that they continue to threaten to deprive us of our quota and you can find this in all of the international cables, they are hurling greater threats against Cuba each day, the threat of cutting sugar prices -- but now they call it a subsidy; they use the term subsidy to denote the difference in the price between the world market price and the American market price; as you know, there are two different prices and this is a consequence of the United States sugar policy which is intended to protect the interests of the sugar producers in the United States; they cannot produce at world prices; so they have to subsidize sugar production in the United States because they cannot produce at world prices. As a result of this policy of quotas and prices, we did not sell our sugar on the world market during the war because we were the chief supplier of sugar for the United States market at that time; but prices were higher on the world market and even so we sold on the United States market where we got a smaller price precisely because there was a sugar shortage in the United States at that time; in other words we often made sacrifices but we supplied the people of the United States every time there was a war and we supplied them with enough sugar and when the war was over they launched a new policy, such as they did after World War I and this caused a real collapse in our sugar industry here because prices dropped extraordinarily; as a result of this, the major portion of most of our sugar refineries fell into the hands of the United States banks; after the war, they always come along with their policy of taking quotas away from us and now they say once again that they are going to cut our quota but in reality they have always been cutting it. The history of sugar in Cuba is the history of having our quotas cut every time; in other words, they deprived us of the rights we had earned by virtue of the fact that we supplied the American market during difficult times; when they could not get sugar anywhere else, they could always be sure that they could get enough sugar from Cuba and after the danger had passed they began to deprive us of the advantages which we had obtained when times were difficult. Each amendment of the sugar law meant a further cut in our quotas. Now this is an old policy, it is not a new policy. For example, they now call the price difference a subsidy; this is indeed a subsidy for their own domestic producers. If, for example, we were able to compete, if, for example, there were a free competitive market, then we could certainly offer better prices than anybody else because of our proximity and our natural advantages in sugar production. That system is a system designed to protect sugar cane interests in the United States; it is not a system of helping or subsidizing Cuba. They have invented this subsidy thing to threaten us and to cut our national income. And this is one of the threats they are making now. The other threat is that this is supposed to be a Communist regime here and that we are only 90 miles from the United States; this is the one statement that they emphasized most strongly. I would like to take up the problem of the postscripts next, this entire problem, possibly... Robreno: One moment, doctor, this is not a long-hair question... Dr Castro: You can grow all of the long hair you want to grow (laughter and applause). Robreno: I have one little question here... Dr Castro: I am not going to get up and I am not going to leave the program because of that. Robreno: Perhaps your answer might solve the problem between the tenants who do not pay their rent and the owners who do not rent out their apartments. Do you think perhaps the urban reform is working or perhaps it is not? Dr Castro: What urban reform? Robreno: The one they have just announced. I do not have a house and this does not worry me. But I have heard other people talk about it. Dr Castro: All right, you know why you heard all of this talk -- because people are spreading rumors again to cause concern and worry. We have not been studying any new measure of an urban character, that is to say, nobody has been talking about this at all; for example, you might look at the pamphlet La Historia me Absolvera [History Will Absolve Me]; there is one part in the pamphlet that discusses the problem of housing; in that portion I said that if the peasant can aspire to be the master of his own piece of land, then it would be certainly ideal, in the city, for every tenant to own his own home. Now they take these statements which I made during the revolutionary period, in connection with the sentencing of Mr. Hubert Matos; and so I had to review all of my statements during the revolutionary period; and I did find statements discussing measures that would tend to turn our tenants into the owners of their homes; perhaps that is what they based their statements on, perhaps that is what gave them an opportunity to cause trouble and to get people to worry about that rumor. I have also heard a number of questions on the urban reform but nobody has discussed measures such as this, nobody has been talking about new legislation along these lines; of course, this does not mean that we would not come out with any new legislation if the circumstances would require new legislation on housing. Right now, we are satisfied with the advances we have achieved, with the benefits that have been given to the people through the reduction of rents, through the reduction of payments and the construction of additional housing and the application of the abandoned housing unit law; the purpose of this of course was to solve the housing shortage. We are not contemplating any measures of this kind but we will not renounce such measures if the circumstances should require us to take action and if the interests of the country should require us to promulgate new laws on the housing problem. The revolution is of course a process in itself and we must act in accordance with the necessities of the country. Now I am not trying to confuse anybody in saying this. In other words, we have not been contemplating any new measures on this, for the moment. Robreno: Yes, in other words, the same thing will happen as in the case of the militia -- if it should become necessary, in other words, if a requirement should arise for a reform. 99 Dr Castro: What do you think of the Pastorita plan, eh? What do you think of the INAV plan? Robreno: The INAV plan? Well, if I don't play the lottery, then I would say it is all right (laughter and applause). Dr Castro: No, Robreno, but to get a house from the Savings and Housing Institute, you do not have to play the lottery; besides, these are not lottery tickets they are shares or stocks. Robreno: They are shares, yes, I want to correct that, they are stocks. Dr Castro: All right. And furthermore, we are not taking anybody's money. Robreno: No, no; that's not at all what I said. Dr Castro: All right, calm down. But try to figure out the advantage of this. This is a real savings system; and you must remember that many people predicted that the INAV would fail. Robreno: Yes, that is true. Dr Castro: But you probably don't remember that a certain political personality, whose name I do not want to mention now, was questioned on a television panel by one of the newsmen, I do not recall whether it was on this panel, I think it was at CMQ... Robreno: I was not on the CMQ program. Dr Castro: All right, you should have seen that fellow on television. Robreno: Yes, I did see him. Dr Castro: Well, they asked him about the INAV problem and he just laughed but he did not give a reply, he just laughed and that is a shame. I remember that very well. But I was sure that the INAV would be a success just like all of the other achievements of the revolution would be a success. Robreno: All right, but Doctor, has there not been a reform here? They did come up with a second bonus. Dr Castro: No. Robreno: There was no second bonus then? Dr Castro: On the contrary, what they did was that we had a thousand prices of one peso and then we had 500, no; we had a thousand prices of half a peso and then the rest was set aside for ten housing units every week. No, we did not change this at all. Robreno: All right, Doctor, the public likes to take a chance with a peso but it did not like winning half pesos and as the second prize, they had these houses and this is why the public ... Dr Castro: The second prize has not been changed. Robreno: Is that right? Dr Castro: No; that is the same as before. Robreno: I am not too familiar with the plan, as I said before. I do not know whether it has been changed but, before, there was only one first prize. Dr Castro: One first prize of a hundred thousand. Robreno: And the others were really very small prizes. Dr Castro: But the number of prizes has not been increased. Robreno: But they have set up only one second prize and the people are going to try to look at those houses and see if anybody likes those houses. Dr Castro: No; we distributed 10 houses. Robreno: Yes, 10 houses, if not everybody goes after those 10 houses, if not everybody hopes to get one of those houses, because this is a big prize, this is not just half a peso. People like to take a chance and they like the idea of having a chance of getting a hundred thousand pesos for just one peso. Dr Castro: All right, I believe that this is true; if this were not the sort of thing that the people like, then we would not have established the INAV. You understand? (Applause) It would have been better if nobody played this game; after all, gambling is damaging to the character because then the individual does not try to improve himself through work or study but only through luck. I was able to see the point up to which the mentality of the Cuban gambler was influenced during the war and I saw it during the revolution and I saw this under all circumstances, when people thought that they could get something for nothing by merely taking a chance; they would do a few things and then they would leave the rest to chance. In other words, the Cuban were gambling on everything and they were always gambling. I believe that gambling came over with the first Spaniard whoever sat foot on our soil. Robreno: Before that, the Siboney Indians would gamble. Dr Castro: No, the Siboney Indians played ball, isn't that right? The Siboney Indians engaged in healthy sports and they played ball; I do not have any information to the effect that they were gamblers. Gambling came over from Europe; all of these lotteries came over with the so-called civilization; and that civilization also brought slavery and it brought special privileges and all kinds of other injustices. Now what did they do with this popular gambling mentality during the republic? They developed it further. Robreno: Doctor, you know that there used to be a slogan put out by the National Lottery which said: "Nobody ever gets rich from work; take a chance on the National Lottery." That was said quite officially in a lottery advertisement. Dr Castro: When? Robreno: In some of the past regimes we have had. Dr Castro: How? Robreno: Well, it said: "Nobody ever got rich from working -- play in the National Lottery." Dr Castro: Is that what it said? Robreno: Yes sir. Dr Castro: Ah, well, how about that (laughter). Look here, Robreno, this is true and you know it very well. I have had my discussions with you but I don't want you to think that I have a low opinion of you. We had these discussions because we have a system of free discussion here. Has anybody prosecuted you? Robreno: No sir. Dr Castro: Has anybody bothered you? Robreno: No sir. Dr Castro: Have you noticed the slighted inconvenience to you because of the things you have said? Robreno: No sir. Dr Castro: Nothing of the kind. Robreno: Furthermore, I am not going to leave Cuba! (Laughter and applause) Dr Castro: All right, then, you know very well that they were promoting gambling here all the time along with other vices; but gambling was a vice that not only damaged the people economically, it also damaged the character; and I want you to believe me when I say that Cubans had become accustomed to gambling and they were not doing anymore planning for the future, they would just figure the odds. I am by nature fortunately against any kind of gambling but I understand the influence which it can have over people; I was able to see all this when they opened the race track. Robreno: Ah, now you are talking about horse racing. And they gave you a ticket on the horse that won. Dr Castro: Yes, they gave me a ticket on the worst horse (laughter). Now listen to me, they gave me, well -- I don't want to say that it was the worst horse -- it turned out to be the best -- but they did not give me the ticket before I got there, nothing of the kind; I got that ticket from a worker there who said to me: "Look here, I am going to give you this in return for the agrarian reform" and he gave me the ticket and then the race began and the horse happened to win, that is, the horse on which the worker had bet; and it paid off, I believe, at odds of 20 to 2; that horse might have been a bolt of lightning. Robreno: He won by a nose, eh? Dr Castro: He won by a nose, by a long nose. But, listen to me, you can be sure that if I were not so strongly against gambling I might perhaps have returned some other day. Robreno: But now you are never going to go back to the race track, is that it, Doctor? Dr Castro: I don't think everybody who comes there for the first time gets a ticket for free and gets to win; I think this was just a lucky accident and I can only credit the agrarian reform with my winnings this time. (Applause) Robreno: The same thing happened with Cuban sugar. Dr Castro: That was one of those things that happened and are symptomatic of the agrarian reform. Robreno: And the same thing happened in the case of Cuban sugar -- they were in last place and they still happened to win the world series. Dr Castro: Yes, the same thing happened in baseball. We were able to win the series here. Robreno: Now, doctor, if I were to buy a ticket someday, I would like to have you come along and pick out one for me. Dr Castro: You go ahead and buy a "26" and you will see what luck you have. (Laughter and applause) But, look here, Robreno: I will explain the advantages of these lottery tickets to you. The best feature of this is first of all that you do not lose the money you spend on these lottery tickets; we don't want you to be thinking of the price you are going to win; the important thing is that you participate and I will explain to you what I mean later on. The advantage is that the money which you invest in these tickets earns interest, but that is not all; if later on you pay the mortgage on an INAV house and if you pay with a bond which you have had for more than 5 years, there will be a 10% reduction in the price; if you pay with a bond that you have had for 10 years, there will be a 20% reduction; and if you pay with a bond that you have had for more than 15 years, there will be a 30% reduction; and if you pay with a bond that you have had more than 20 years, there will be a 40% reduction in what you have to pay for the house, in terms of receipts. In other words, you are getting more for your money, you are getting more than you paid in, because if you pay with money, there is no reduction but if you pay with an INAV bond, then there is a reduction. Now, you can figure out the advantages of this which you can derive but basically everything depends on your income. And I know that newsmen don't make much; now that is a disadvantage in most cases but in the connection here, with respect to the INAV, it may be a good thing, because, if you make less than 100 pesos, the INAV does not collect any interest on the value of the house and you have up to 30 years to pay for it; if you make between 100 and 150 pesos, they do not collect any interest either and you have up to 25 years to pay. Robreno: Doctor, if it takes me 20 years to pay, you are not going to collect even half of the costs. Do you think that I am going to live another 30 years? Dr Castro: But, your grandchildren will take over the payments... Robreno: Ah, well that's all right. Dr Castro: Furthermore, this contingency is properly provided for because there is a life insurance policy on which you pay and if you have some kind of accident, if the head of the family has an accident, if he dies or if he is disabled, this insurance enables his family to own the house outright, without having to pay any more -- if he is disabled. So, in other words, the payments include this life insurance. And of course, there are interest payments. The interest is 2% if a fellow makes more than 150 pesos and up to 250 pesos; it is 3% if he makes 250 pesos; if he makes between 350 and 450, the interest is 4% etc, and up to 5%; now you have got to admit that this is really a very good plan. And one of the advantages is that anybody who holds such bonds is not likely to take out what he has thus invested. This is money that earns interest and this furthermore enables you to pay for your home at a considerable reduction which may be 20 or even 40%, depending upon the value. In other words, these bonds will be worth more than money and so, there may be a hundred thousand or even 120,000 people who will have their own homes within 6 or 7 or 10 years and these bonds will be in great demand. When the demand goes up, the value of the bonds goes up, but not the premium. In other words, we have a system which tends to discourage the gambler and to promote the saver. In other words, this year, the first year, we recovered 40% and what are we going to do then? Well, during the first year the figure will be 10%, during the 2nd year it will be 20%, during the 3rd year it will be 30%, etc, and it will be to everybody's advantage to hold on to his bonds because they will be worth one peso for every 10 centavos, if you hold on to them for 3 years or 4 years, etc, then it might be worth 100 or 110, in other words, this is the system the [Unreadable text] uses to discourage the gambler. We established this system because you cannot eliminate the gambling habit overnight. If we had suppressed gambling by force, then it would not have continued illegally because people who are inveterate gamblers simply cannot live without gambling and they play anywhere and they gamble anywhere, wherever they might happen to be, in cars or on street corners and they will take their changes wherever they can. These people have to be treated like drug addicts, right? (Laughter) I want to make sure that everybody understands me when I say that these people are going to have to be treated like drug addicts. When a drug addict goes to a hospital for treatment, they do not immediately take him off the drug; they withdraw the drug gradually and they cut down the dose which he consumes and the vice disappears only after long treatment. And the same is true of gambling. The moment will come when we have issued a hundred thousand bonds that the prizes will still be the same. And then we will have 150,000 bonds but the prizes will still be the same, and the savings will keep going up. And then there will come a moment when the people will buy bonds just to save, not to gamble; and eventually there will be no more prizes and instead of the prizes the people will draw higher interest on the bonds and the bond holders will derive even greater advantages from this. Robreno: You have convinced me, Doctor and I will hold off gambling, especially until such time as I find out that the urban reform does not work; but by that time I will have my house. Dr Castro: I do not redeem any pledges (Applause). Nunez: Before giving the floor to Comrade Benjamin de la Vega... Dr Castro: You really ought to take a look at the house which the INAV can give you and see whether you like it; you might even pick one in the new city. Have you seen the new city? Robreno: No. Dr Castro: All right, you have never been there? You know, it is one thing to look at it as you drive by on the highway; but, as you know, there is a hill in between and you don't see the rest of the housing. It is really very impressive to go in there and take a look around. This is really impressive; the buildings are not big, as yet; I think it will take another 6 or 7 months to finish this first development; it will have its own schools and nurseries and its own shopping centers; it will be an efficiently organized city of its own because our cities now are not efficiently organized; no city in Cuba is efficiently organized; we do not have enough stores for a number of Cuban families now and we do not have enough schools and parks and we do not have enough other facilities for a certain number of families, that is to say, our cities have not been built on the basis of statistics; they just built one house next to the other and they built one store next to the other. There are areas which do not have stores and there are areas which do not have schools -- but over there, everything is built efficiently; there will be no families that will have to break up when they want to get some recreation to go to the club because the clubs of the Eastern Havana Neighborhood Association will be right there, with their swimming pools and theaters; everything will be distributed efficiently and statistically, according to the number of inhabitants. You, for example, can fly over Havana in a helicopter and you will see a very depressing spectacle. Havana is a city without parks and grass, it is just a vast conglomeration of houses; Havana is a city that was built without any consideration of the geographic situation; factories were built without any consideration of atmospheric conditions and air currents. We can all be affected by air pollution from the factories; we do not have enough oxygen. Robreno: And what about overhead wires, Doctor? Why does the revolution not put the overhead wires underground? Dr Castro: The overhead wire? You mean, bury them? Robreno: Yes, bury all of the telephone and electric power cables. Dr Castro: All right, I think that this is something indispensable but the only thing is that we have economically so far been unable to do this efficiently and so far of course this was under the control of a company that never had any interest in doing this. Who knows how many lives were lost as a result of people running into those utility poles; we don't even know how many accidents have been caused by this because we do not have any statistics. The monopolies do not count the dead; all they count is the millions of pesos they make in profits (applause). Robreno: Doctor, there was one mayor of Havana who forced them to do this. Miguel Mariano Gomez forced them to do this in a large part of Havana, all of Caliano, all the way up to the pier, he forced them to cut the utility poles down. Now, this could have been continued. Dr Castro: This policy should have been continued even then; but this is what we are doing in the new city now. There, all of the cables and wires are underground. I would certainly urge everybody to go over there on Sunday afternoon and take a look at this spectacular development which is taking shape there. Even the engineers who work on this told me that they are impressed by all this. Now they are going to continue with the school unit and it will be completed on schedule likewise. We are highly satisfied with the progress of the INAV and we urge you sincerely to take a look at this situation, you and all citizens, so that you will be able to see for yourselves that it is worth-while to hold on those bonds. In other words, regardless of whether you buy them or not, I think that it is certainly correct for anybody to buy these bonds with the intention of saving because these savings help us solve the housing problem and you get tremendous benefits in this way. Now, what were we talking about? Eh? (Laughter) Robreno: We were talking about bonds; the last thing was... Dr Castro: Yes, how are they going to redeem those bonds? Robreno: It was you who asked me whether I liked the INAV plan and the first urban reform; I was inquiring about the urban reform and you said that for the time being, there was not... Dr Castro: No. Robreno: This is supposed to be some kind of relief for the tenants and the owners. We are going to see whether the tenants now pay the rent and whether the owners are going to rent out their homes; these are two problems here. Dr Castro: This is a problem indeed, a question of the state of mind. Robreno: The state of mind of not paying, that is one thing... Dr Castro: Now, I don't want you to blame the revolution for this. Robreno: No, no. Dr Castro: The situation is changing; in the past, the people very often could not pay and so they developed the habit of not paying; but now we are going to see if we cannot get the tenants and the owners together, particularly in those cases, where we have families that have perhaps just one house, in some of these cases, we are going to see whether... Robreno: And you are going to see to it that the owners rent their houses out, no? Dr Castro: Well, as far as the owners are concerned, I am not going to give the owners any advice. In many cases, they just put a few chairs in those old apartments and they they advertise them as furnished apartments. This has been done in a number of cases; others have shut their apartments down; in some cases, these people believe in the story that the counterrevolution will come back and that the revolution will disappear and then of course they would rent their apartments out again. Well, before that happens, they are going to be many more revolutionary laws (applause). The law on housing control, for instance, because this policy does produce opposition. I have heard many instances of people who do not want to rent out their space; I have heard many complaints about people who do not want to pay; but in reality the thing that produces much excitement and irritation in people and the thing that causes all of this dissatisfaction, I believe that the thing that does all this is a policy which is indeed correct, a policy of lowering apartment rents; all right then we are going to rent the apartments if that is what they want. But right now, there are lots of apartments that are not earning anything for anybody; nobody lives there and the space is not rented out to anybody; and it is certainly wishful thinking that the counterrevolution will come and that these apartments can be rented without at a higher price. The truth is that this is something that nobody expects. Nunez: Robreno's turn is over now and Benjamin de la Vega now has the floor; but before that, I would like to announce that this program is also being relayed by the Voice of the Indian and by the Agramente Chain, from Camaguey; we also have the honor of having with us tonight in this studio Miguel Otero Silva, a Venezuelan intellectual, managing editor of Nacional [The Citizen], of Caracas, who came here accompanied by Comrade Pardo Llada and Nicolas Guillen, the great Cuban poet (applause); in a minute I will ask Comrade Benjamin de la Vega to start his questions. Comrade Benjamin de la Vega, as you remember, has interviewed Dr Fidel Castro on other occasions. He was the Cuban newsman who interviewed Dr Fidel Castro in Mexico, when he was finishing up the preparations for the "Granma" expedition; for this, he won a newspaper prize (applause). De la Vega: Dr Castro... Dr Castro: Did you win a prize? De la Vega: Yes, I won third prize.. Dr Castro: When? De la Vega: Well, it was in 1956, 1956 or 1957, that is. Dr Castro: No, it must have been in 1957 because that was at the end of... De la Vega: Yes it was in 1957. Dr Castro: Do you remember whether you really wanted to win a prize? At any rate, they did not give you first prize for this interview (laughter). That was rather important, that interview, because I gave the exact day on which we would start the war; I was off by only one day, one day in advance, not one day afterward. De la Vega: Yes, it was 14 days after that interview. Dr Castro: No, it was 13 days afterward, 13 days after the interview was published. De la Vega: All right, Dr. Castro, let us talk about a rather important issue right here. In the last few days, two letters from Rebel Army officers have been published and these officers resigned their commission; they are Lt Artime and Major Mitchell of the Air Force. However, today, there is a telegram, I don't know from what news agency, from San Jose de Costa Rica, to the effect that an Air Force captain, who according to the cable, is the commander of our parachute units, Major Manuel Soto... Dr Castro: He is an Argentine, is he not? De la Vega: Manuel Rojo, Manuel Rojo... Dr Castro: Che Rojo... De la Vega: Ah yes, they call him Che Rojo. Dr Castro: Yes, but he is not the Che Rojo in that little counterrevolutionary story (laughter). De la Vega: All right, according to the cable, this gentleman resigned his commission and went to the United States. We would like to know... Dr Castro: Look here, my boy, let me explain something to you because you have to think very thoroughly about all of those problems of the revolution. There will come the time when the philosophers and the writers will begin to record the history of the revolution and they will draw their conclusions, etc, etc. You have read the history of prior revolutions and I think that your account of this revolution will be a part of the general history of what newsmen in the future will have to study when they go to journalism school. I think that will of course draw many interesting conclusion from the revolution. I am sure you remember the Spanish psychologist M. Lopez; there is a chapter on the psychology of revolutionary conduct; Gustavo Ledon wrote his book on the psychology of the masses and it contains many conclusions on the French Revolution; in other words all historians have tried to draw conclusions from the revolution. You have the case of the French Revolution where they were numerous cases of men who started out with the revolution -- isn't that right? You remember some heroes such as Dumurie who was the commander of the French armies that defeated the first invasions of France and who later on became a traitor and went over to the enemies of France. In other words, in each of those cases you have a multitude of examples of men who started out with the revolution and then left it. This happens above all when the revolution turns into a really revolutionary event. So long as it is not a really revolutionary event, everybody believes that he is a militant of the revolution and a soldier of the revolution. All you have to do is remember the first few days of last year. In January of last year, everybody here was a revolutionary; the most unlikely people were revolutionaries. As you looked at these people you would ask yourself: but did this man really renounced all of his property and all of his things and privileges and did he change his way of thinking and has he really become a revolutionary? All right, to put it very simply, there are people who did become revolutionaries and who have not been thinking along these lines in the past; but there are also many people who acted like revolutionaries in those first few moments but who were not revolutionaries at all. And then there is another fact: a revolution picks up many highly dissimilar elements, in other words, a heterogeneous situation, and it also picks up a lot of imposters. We never believed that every single member of the revolution was a man of justice, a man conscious of his duty, a man fully aware of what a revolution is. We always knew that a revolution is a process, a social phenomenon, and there is a whole group of elements who are going to leave the revolution sometime along the way. There might even be gangsters in the revolution. And the revolution may have immoral supporters; many of these people got in. It is therefore not strange that this revolution likewise has men who do things like that. You get a lot of people involved in the revolution and of course some of them are just waste and they are then eliminated. But I believe that anybody who is not a true revolutionary, anybody who is a gangster or who is immoral and ambitious -- all of those fellows fall by the wayside; in reality, we have had very few deserters in this revolution; the revolution has had a few deserters; in one year, we might have had 9 or 10 or maybe 12 cases of desertion. And of course you know what the prior history of those people was. The first was a Mexican, a fellow who was arrested when the war began. But he was able to get away later on. That of course was not the only case. And of course we still run into persons who were squealers all that time who suddenly turned up on our side when it was all over. These are fellow who did nothing all along but who came out of hiding during the very first few moments when some of the military facilities surrendered. And then everybody put on a uniform, everybody picked up a rifle and every now and then we still have occasion to eliminate some of those individuals because we discovered their prior history and record -- after many months. And that Mexican, who was arrested and then escaped, well, he was conspiring all the time because when he figures out that he was going to be discovered he went to the United States and told his story there. And so, these people have betrayed the revolution, either because they had no revolutionary ethical principles or because they had no revolutionary consciousness or because they were ambitious; and there are others who were just scum; let me put it somewhat differently, they were just faking their interest in the revolution. A lot of them tried to pass themselves off as Rebel commanders even though they had never commanded anything; when things got hot, they simply went to one of the embassies and then they went abroad and then they said: "Major So and So has made a statement to the effect that the regime in Cuba is Communist, that he left the government because it is Communist, and so forth, etc; these are statements which the enemies of the revolution love to quote. These individuals went abroad and they claim to have been officers even though they had been nothing of the kind. You mentioned to me the case of an individual whom I knew personally. That fellow whom they called Che Rojo. That gentleman had gone to the Sierra Maestra in connection with the story about that plane there. I remember that when I was in Venezuela I met people who were very disgusted, especially all of the Spanish republicans: and they were wondering what I was doing with this fellow who had fought for Franco in the [Civil] War? One of the complaints I heard most frequently from the Spanish republicans in Venezuela was a complaint about this fellow Che Rojo who was a Franco supporter and who had fought with Franco and they really hated him; they said that he assassinated people in Spain; and I am sure that these republicans who now live in Venezuela have many facts to back up this information. Now, any of those Spanish republicans in Venezuela could send up a report on that gentleman, on Che Rojo, but this fellow did really render us a service and that counts for a lot under those circumstances. You cannot simply drop a man who has served you. Perhaps we were a little bit too lenient in not eliminating him. Now, what about this paratroop commander? What paratroop commander? If there were any paratroopers right here in the middle of the province, I certainly didn't see any. That fellow had been a parachutist, I think in Korea, perhaps, or somewhere else, I don't know where; and he liked to put on exhibitions of jumps. He would put on his show and I think the last time he jumped he broke a leg (laughter). Of course, he was the type of fellow who likes to plot and conspire, a fellow discredited by his prior history, a fellow you automatically did not trust. Well, perhaps he did not feel too good, the way things were going right now, and he did what people of his kind usually do. And now I am going to tell you something about the case of Artime. Who is this fellow Artime? Artime was a fellow who appeared in the Sierra Maestra on 28 December 1958; he was sent in by the Catholic group. Actually, it was not the Catholic group but rather Father Llorente who sent him from the Catholic group; now, this has nothing to do with what Artime did; I am simply explaining this and I know that this has nothing to do with Father Llorente, who is the leader of the Catholic Association; this has nothing to do with Artime; but he had sent him in a group of men who, in those days, wanted to join the revolution; they sent that group to the Sierra Maestra and they arrived there on 28 December. He did not say this in the little note he sent along; he mentioned a heroic veteran of the war and of revolutions, etc, etc, and he arrived on 28 December. Now, this fellow did not carry a rifle nor did he ever fire a shot, nor did he do anything at all; as everybody knows, we had already pushed all the way up to Palme Soriane on 28 December, we had pushed from Jiguani, all the way to Palme Soriane and we were moving by car along the central highway. We had occupied all of the towns between the Cautillo River, to a point a few kilometers from Bayamo, up to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. We had the army surrounded at that time; there were 14,000 soldiers surrounded in Oriente; they did not make any move; they did not move out of their quarters or barracks; the territory was entirely ours. These were the circumstances when that gentleman arrived there; he did not fight, he did not fire a single shot, he did nothing; he simply turned up and introduced himself at Lt. Artime. But nobody knows what that lieutenant did; nobody knows what he was supposed to do there. That is the truth. It seem that he simply made himself a lieutenant, on that front; never in my life have I seen anything like it, anything like what Lt Artime did; but thee are the things that happened during the very first moments of the revolution. He was a lieutenant, he was with a group of commandos, and he went there, into the Sierra Maestra. The first time I saw him, I talked to him and we discussed the agrarian law and he made a very favorable impression on me; he was quite enthusiastic about the idea. And he went to work there and guess what the first thing was that he did? He began to mistreat the peasants. He rounded up a lot of peasants in the lower mountain range, in a place called La Sierrita; he rounded up, by force, some of hte small farm owners there in order to set up a cooperative something which we never did; we never did that with the small farm owners; we gave him the property but that is not all; he began to carry out a terrible policy there; he told these farmers some of the things that should never have been said; he told them that they were not the owners of the land, that the most stupid policy would be to give a group of farmers, who have on caballeria, each, some more land, perhaps one or one and a half or two caballerias of land; but we, instead, gave them the titles to the land; we helped them to get good prices and we gave them supplies, etc; we never did anything by force. And so he set himself up there, in a certain zone, and we assigned him a more important mission; and then, without ever having discussed anything with any of our command centers, without ever having said a word to any of us or without ever having expressed the slightest objection to any of us in connection with the problem in Camaguey, he suddenly disappeared without accounting for hte funds which were based on an allocation of 5,000 pesos from the Ministry of Agriculture; he did not account for this money to anybody, nor any other funds with which he ascended. During the first few days, we were worried that something might have happened to that boy. Maybe he had been captured, but when we made some inquiries, the family did not seem to be worried; they did not know anything but then, after 8 or 10 days, we began to hear rumors to the effect that he had gone into exile or something like that; nobody knew what his problem could have been. Perhaps he embezzled the money and he did not want to have to account for these funds to anybody and so he just vanished and then he sent that letter dated 29 October. When was that letter published? That is what I want to talk about. It was published 3 months later, along with a letter from Mitchell and, I think I have a copy here, some rather interesting things came up on that subject; these are things that everybody should know about, the connection between these gentlemen and a certain policy, certain embassies; fortunately, we are able to get our hands on one of those important documents; we were able to get documents of all kinds and they may be just as valuable as that letter of 16 December 1969 which was taken from a sister-in-law of Mr. Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz. When she was arrested, this letter was found on her; this letter is very interesting because of the information which it contains and I am going to read it here because it will explain certain things, such as what happened to Mr. O'Farrill who, as everybody knows, was involved in the Trujillo conspiracy; he very patriotically went to the United States and made the previously-mentioned statement. Here is what the letter says: 18 December 1959. Dear Billy -- this is the cover name of Diaz Lanz' brother -- I have already sent you another letter but in the meantime a number of things have happened: 1. Spanish and American embassies. 2. Jorge -- I don't know whether this is a capital [Unreadable text] a capital Z here -- I presume this is Jorge Zayas. 3. The priests. 4. Mitchell, that is Mr. Mitchell. 5. The periodical. 6. So-and-So. 7. ... 8. Summary of newspaper dispatches. 9, 10, 11, and 12, etc. 1. They have sent me to look around; the Spanish Embassy had been talking about me in this connection; they sent me to look around and they had mentioned my name at the Spanish Embassy. I went there and my job was to get the Catholics, whom they were holding there out through the American Embassy. They are Artime and another fellow, with important records and documents. I then placed myself at their disposition. I agreed, but then I believe that this can be handled through Guantanamo, yes, Guantanamo, I think that is the base there. But right now I do not know. They either have come out or they will come out. I would have told your sister-in-law that on the telephone when I called her but I assumed that you already know about this. But right now, we do not know exactly how this will turn out. At any rate, I am working with them right now. The embassies, that is, the Spanish and American embassies. I am working with them to get everything they need and our plan is certainly worth-while. Both of them are very helpful and they are going to do anything they can for me. 2. Jorge was quite delighted with you and with your certainty that everything would come off all right. All of this was communicated to the group at the meeting which was held in the home of our comrades -- I don't want to give any names here; we met there several times and then we met in a couple of other places. 3. Yesterday, the newspapers carried the story of O'Farrill and Aguirra; the radio also had a story on that; there was a big uproar in this connection and there is a lot of talk about this. Everybody is quite touche. I thought that Ramon, after all he had told me, would already have taken off. 4. As far as Mitchell is concerned we have a very serious problem. I told you that it was going to be you or that you would send somebody else very discretely so that the whole thing could come off properly. They saw him with Pedro Luis and you know that that fellow is really being watched closely. He was quite peeved because he thought that that plan was a real good one. He had a B-26; they had 50 of them; and then they made their bombing runs here and there have been two score or more victims, a lady living with Mr Diaz Lanz who, in turn, is in cahoots with Trujillo and all of the other war criminals; that is the type of element you deal with here. That would have been a tremendous thing; and that is why he is like a caged lion. Tonight we have to go to one of the embassies for a short time; it remains to be seen what they will do; we are dealing here with another patriotic fellow, the fellow who took charge of the pilots; one of the first things this gentleman did was to take over the pilots; everybody has his own past history and he was in cahoots with the car criminals and with the men who are bombing the country. You have to trust some of the people here, you simply have to. This is a letter which I am now going to read a few paragraphs from because it is quite interesting and it shows us how these war criminals have teemed up with the big landowners and the embassies and the reactionaries, that is, with the traitors; we will see how they are manipulating this whole thing; these documents are very valuable because they tell us a lot about what these people have in mind; and there is no doubt that all of these documents are absolutely authentic. 5. I already have a print shop setup for our little newspaper in a convent and I think you know that. We have the format all set up and the priests and the sisters alternate in operating the printing machine. I have to read this because it is my duty to do so even though it is painful; it would be even more painful however to say nothing about this. Of course, this does not mean that all of the sisters and all of the priests are to be blamed in this connection. I know that there are many good particularly in the most humble orders, who work for welfare and who work in the hospitals; and then there are the Oblate Sisters who are negroes and who teach; there are good little sisters in many places and they work hard and they are humble and they are revolutionaries; they feel with the revolution and they sympathize with the revolution; I am making these clarifying statements here because there are also many priests who are revolutionaries and who are for the revolution; but of course there are also some real had priests like Father O'Farrill and others; but I have to read this because it is my duty and because the people must be informed on all of these things. (Applause) How many copies of the paper are we going to run off? Whatever we do we have to do it very quickly. They have given me all of the necessary tools and the printer's ink and the paper and so on; the little machine does not make any noise; I also have my portable typewriter and I am set up in a place that not even you could imaging that it looks like. 6. This detail is not very important. 7. [No text] 8. We just had some more firing here on one of those airplanes; everybody just started firing away at it from all directions. This was more of an accident; an aircraft came over at night. But: "I am sending you the furniture." This is not important. But there is something that is important here. This has to do with the prisoners who are members of our organization on the Island of Pines and at La Cabana, including pilots; that is to say, all of them are war criminals who have been punished by the revolution and they are on the Island of Pines and at La Cabana; they are all in chains there; I managed to get a large quantity of medicines from which which I want to have sent over. And then I went to see -- here he has a name which I don't want to give because there are some other people with the same name -- and they gave me everything I asked for and everything I needed. I also saw "so and so" and we got some more vitamins and I talked to Balbino, your sister-in-law knows who he is; we are preparing 500 jars of sugar; 500 jars, in other words, for these war criminals. These are jars containing sugar and powdered milk for them, for Easter. We are prohibited from giving alms or donations in the churches. I am not so sure about this but I have been told that they even find people for this but we have already managed to get our hands on some soap and so on. Other have gotten some milk and sugar and coffee for us, etc; we hid the stuff at the Dominican Monastery and at the Sacred Heart Convent; we are doing all right. Alpizar, the doctor, could not afford an attorney; it would have cost him 2,500 pesos to get Aramis Toboado who says he is available if the price is right -- now that fellow is quite cynical, it says here (laughter); I do not know how that family got the idea of hiring that fellow as a defense attorney; but they are quite desperate because they don't have the money and they don't have a lawyer. Then Balbino gave me the money for the Sunday masses and, with some other money we had, we managed to scrape together 200 pesos but we still need another 300 pesos; I don't know whether he is going to try to find some laboratory; after all, he is a doctor and he is taking this request in his name; but we will see if they can help him; today they have asked me to pick up and hide a case with 400 rounds of ammunition of all kinds, including .45's, as well as submachine guns and pistols and 6 cases of dynamite. We are keeping the stuff in one of the churches, but tell me if this is a good idea; tell me if I ought to hand the stuff out or if I ought to keep it. Right now I am quite worried about this and so are the sisters. Besides, the stuff is not doing anybody any good right now where it is. Etc. The rest is not important, the rest of the letter does not really have anything important but it is quite authentic and I have made a copy available to the church hierarchy, the archbishop, so that he can see for himself what this is all about; we have not registered any church and we have not registered any convent but it is my obligation to reveal all of these facts to the people and to make a copy of the document available to the church hierarchy. (Applause) I think that these letters reveal quite a bit, these letters from Mitchell and Artime, all of these documents; these gentlemen are at the Spanish Embassy; some of these gentlemen are in contact with the war criminals and they are all in this together; that is what they call the counterrevolution; that is what is called the "reaction." This is a consequence of the fact that no revolution in the world is every fought without that sort of thing and everybody knows it. All of these interests and all of these forces are involved in this campaign but we haven't seen anything yet; there are lots of things they can try to do to us, they can try to wipe us out physically and they can try to carry out their plans, that ALFA group; I want to make this quite clear to our poor farmers in the mountains, this is Plan A, a plan hatched by all of those counterrevolutionaries; they are trying to stir up all of these war criminals and they are putting out their own magazine. Avance [Advance]; and this gentleman is only trying to incite people to crime; but he must keep in mind that when we were fighting against tyranny, nobody helped us, nobody gave us weapons; we had to hide out in the university and in apartments, wherever we could, to train 50 men or 100 men; we could not give them any firing practice in handling the M-1 or the light machine gun; and there we have 30,000 or 40,000 men who belonged to the old army, to the old police, all of those gentlemen who had been picked out of power, men trained in the use of machine guns and small arms and all kinds of other weapons. This is a very important factor, these 30,000 or 40,000 men. If the revolution had had 30,000 or 40,000 trained and prepared men, well, you figure out for yourself what the advantage would have been in our side; this of course is a factor which is somewhat checked by the vigilance of the people; but these elements are always being stirred up and they are being told that they should ask for arms to be issued to them; all of these are factors on which the counterrevolution counts; it hopes to get not only money but also support from the embassies and from the senators, from international propaganda against Cuba and against the revolutionary government, it hopes to get support through slander and lies because you have to take a look at what they are writing here. Fidel Castro launched religious persecution. Attacks on churches and assaults on priests. They put over the educational reform law. Private cemetery. Washington is very well informed on Fidel Castro's special cemetery. According to statistics, Fidel Castro and his regime have so far killed 15,000 people, 15,000 people in less than one year; this of course includes those who were assassinated by the councils of war, those who were assassinated under a safe-conduct. These are the latest American statistics. Here in the Pentagon they have everything at the Pentagon in Washington, in the Senate, here in the Pentagon, they have the names and the number and now they say that there are supposed to be 20,000 corpses. And so they want to destroy us physically and morally; they want to discredit us; there is not the slightest doubt about that; the basic plan hatched by these gentlemen is the plan for physical destruction; they plan everything quite calmly because they think that they can prepare the way for their attack; but I want to tell you that the problem of the Cuban revolution is a difficult problem for hte enemies of that revolution because even though they have tremendous resources and great strength even though they have weapons, they still are going to find this a tough nut to crack, the Cuban people is going to be a tough nut to crack (applause). We have the men who are prepared to fight this battle without hesitation. We are very much aware of all these problems; none of this surprises us; we understand everything here; we understand this because this is part of the philosophy of history, it is a substantial part of all of the revolutionary phenomena in history; only history teaches us to understand all of these things and we look upon all of these things from a historical viewpoint, with philosophical understanding; we are quite aware that this is a big struggle and that they will try to wipe us all off the face of hte earth; but we will fight hard to win and we will emerge victorious. So, that is the situation. And these gentlemen will find out that they have bitten off more than they can chew. All of this is contained in this letter but of course they are not going to publish it right now. Here are the newspapers which published the first letter from O'Farrill and they published it 3 months later, yes, 3 months later, in a counterrevolutionary type of campaign, quite open and provocative even though they are no longer in power; but this gentleman could not leave and get out. This gentleman launched a provocative campaign, this gentleman from the periodical Avance; I think this is something we have to take up here likewise so that we can see what he is doing, step by step, so that we can see what this counterrevolutionary conspiracy process really is like; and these are the letters and the individuals who write and send those letters; now, I ask you, why are they sending out these underground newspapers, if they cannot publish this information? And if they publish it, why do they have underground newspapers? This is all quite unusual, we are wondering what these underground people are going to do; but we never publish anything, no statements, no accusations, nothing of the sort that they have been publishing. Nunoz: De la Vega. De la Vega: Major Castro, you mentioned the Spanish Embassy. A few weeks ago, the church hierarchy of the Spanish orders here in Cuba got together with the Spanish Embassy and gave the France regime a vote of confidence. What is your opinion of this visit? Dr Castro: Well, let the people judge, let the people judge this, let the people form their opinion. De la Vega: Do you believe that there is a split in the church hierarchy here in Cuba? Dr Castro: Well, I am not very much concerned with finding out what the situation in the church hierarchy is; but there is no denying, at least, I believe, that this sort of thing inevitably does come up. This is really a topic which I don't want to go into right now but we have had diplomatic relations with that country and of course we have preserved all of the necessary conventions and all of the various diplomatic formalities. I, in particular, whenever I went to any diplomatic reception and whenever the Spanish Ambassador turned up, I welcomed him courteously, like all of the other ambassadors; now, I don't know whether this was just done out of an attitude of diplomatic approach on our part, or whether it was just plain courtesy -- in spite of the fact that all of these counterrevolutionary activities were going on. Talking about the case of Artime, now, this case is quite different from the problem of the Spanish priests who came here or who made a statement in support of France. I do not know what the situation of those priests in Spain is; I do not know whether the embassy had asked them to make this declaration; but these church problems are not my problems; these church problems are none of my business. But I venture to express the opinion that these things do create discontents and splits. But these are not our problems; but it is my job to judge everything that may be counterrevolutionary, everything that may be contrary to the interests of the nation, contrary to the interests of Cuba and the revolutionary government; it is not up to me to judge the attitude of others with respect to other regimes; much less am I concerned with church affairs; this is why I believe that the people should form their own opinions on these things and I am quite sure that the people will not find these attitudes very nice. De la Vega: I have another question, Dr Castro, which I believe is of interest here. I would like to ask you how the battle of foreign currency is going. There are rumors to the effect that there is going to be a currency devaluation. It would be quite interesting if you could tell us a few things about that. Dr Castro: Well, I believe that Che is fighting a battle for foreign currency that is as important as the battle of Santa Clara. (Applause) You know, he is making a tremendous effort here to defend our currency and I hope that he will emerge victorious from this effort; he is doing a fine job controlling all of the resources of the nation in order to make only the most necessary foreign currency expenditures, in spite of all of the circumstances which have come up; in the sugar industry alone, we have failed to receive 80 million dollars and even though there was a loss of 70 or 80 million in foreign currency every year, this year the foreign currency reserve dropped only 29 million and if we keep in mind the prior expenses, if we take into account all of the money that we did not get in the sugar industry field, then we can say that we still managed to save foreign currency this year because we spent 100 million or so less; we spent 100 million or so less in foreign currency than last year and the years before that; in other words, we made a tremendous effort and as a result of this effort we were able to save 70 million in foreign currency, the amount we were going to be short, and so we have a favorable balance, in other words, a balance of 50 million dollars or something like that. At the end of the year, we always run into the most difficult foreign currency situation. Consequently, the bank does not get an equal amount in terms of revenues throughout all of the months of the year and sometimes the expenditures are higher. At that moment we were collecting foreign currency at the rate of one million per day. We were getting this money in at the rate of one million a day (applause); things are looking up again and according to the policy which we pursue here, a policy of maximum savings of foreign currency, we will have enough to invest in raw materials; we can invest this in raw materials and in agricultural machinery and in factories; and so we are going to win the battle of currency. De la Vega: What is the amount right now, Doctor? Dr Castro: Fifty million or so, may 52, maybe 53, or 54 or something like that. Robreno: Doctor, may I say something more about currency? Dr Castro: Yes. Robreno: In our commercial treaties with various Latin American nations, is the payment of these goods handled reciprocally in dollars? Do we pay in dollars and do they pay us in dollars likewise? Dr Castro: Payment is usually made in dollars. Robreno: And there are no countries from which we import more than we export and, in other words, can we stop losing out in this exchange of foreign currency? Dr Castro: Yes, there are countries with which, for example, we exchange petroleum; for instance, when we buy 25 or 30 million dollars worth of petroleum, the only other thing to do, if we could do anything at all, or in other words, but these things do come up and we have to try to level off our own balance and we have to buy petroleum from those countries that will buy sugar from us; we have to try to develop our trade with those countries that will buy from us, in return for us buying from them; we have also countries that buy more from us than we buy from them. Take the case of Japan, for example. Robreno: No, I was talking about Latin American nations, nothing more. Dr Castro: Yes, there are some cases, but our commerce with the Latin American nations primarily involves the petroleum trade with Venezuela and that volume, well, here, we have an unfavorable balance of trade because we buy more than we sell and right now we are trying to sell -- we were also discussing the sale of steel bars, by the way -- right now we are trying to sell various things but in reality the balance of trade is unfavorable; we must of course try to balance our trade here along these lines. We do have possibilities in international trade. Here is where we must defend our position and expand trade with all of the other countries so that we can purchase the raw materials we need from those countries, fuel, machinery, etc and these countries, in turn, will buy sugar and tobacco and minerals from us. You know that this year we have sold virtually all of our tobacco and in some cases it is advisable to use the system of selling this tobacco to just a few customers and then buying machinery from them. Robreno: In the future treaties with the Afro-Asian countries, will it be necessary to do a lot of studying of...? Dr Castro: We also have to study the possibility of using any currency because there are countries that operate on the basis of hard currency, dollars or pounds sterling; and we have to try to look for customers in those countries that have neither dollars nor pounds sterling, in other words, countries that could trade with us, countries that could barter their products with ours, because in general, many of these countries produce articles which we do not produce; we produce different items and sometimes a third country produces something that we might want and it sells those items to one country and what other country then sells the stuff to us and we then sell what we have to the third country involved. In other words, we have to develop commerce with all means at our command so that we can turn our products into foreign currency, so that we can turn our sugar and our tobacco into foreign currency, so that we can turn our iron into foreign currency; we must exploit our national resources to the maximum; and we must exchange them for machinery and fuel and raw materials and for some food items which we do not produce here. Robreno: Do you believe that the policy of bartering is advisable? Dr Castro: Well, policy in general, any kind of policy, is a kind of barter. What happens is that one fellow sells some products and the other one buys them; now, money is an instrument of exchange but you can also exchange articles for money and then you take this money and you exchange it for other articles; this is done for instance in connection with the corn harvest. One fellow sells his corn for money and with that money he buys coffee or meat and fats, clothing and shoes, in other words, he exchanges his corn for the other articles and then, in certain cases, it is advisable to barter some of these things. Nunez: Dr Castro... Dr Castro: That is a very complicated problem because not all countries have the same economy; not all countries have the same needs; not all countries have the same facilities; we are better off in this respect because the interest of the nation predominates above all. We do not have any minority group interests predominating here, any minority groups that decide the policy of the country. Our policy here is considered from all angles and we want to develop our trade with all of the other countries to the maximum extent; we are an underdeveloped country; we must obtain raw materials; we still do not have any fuel; we have to spend more than 60 million dollars on fuel; we have to obtain machinery for industrialization. If we can produce sugar now, if we can produce tobacco and minerals, then we have to convert those articles into machinery; the problem of foreign currency is closely tied in with our need for developing our industry; but that is not all, we also need fuel and raw materials for a number of industries; and we also have to build the necessary factories for this. And so we have to convert our resources into machinery for industrialization. We are an underdeveloped country. What do we have? Sugar, tobacco, minerals; we are going to sell all that, we are going to sell this to countries which need these items and which, in return, will give us machinery, raw materials, and the fuel we need. This policy is what we must pursue and we are lucky that we can pursue it because, in the past, as you know, we had to ask for permission as to what we could trade in; today we are a free country and we can trade (applause)... Of course, all of this has its price; this does cost something, regardless of whether it involves a free country, a sovereign country, or a subjugated country. The subjugated countries might have what we had -- lack of culture, starvation, misery, underdevelopment, poor farm laborers without land, illiterate children, sick people without hospitals, unemployment, in other words, a shortage of everything; these are the consequences in a subjugated country, in a colonialized country. Now, a free country can aspire to have land for its peasants, jobs for everybody, culture for everybody, work, a higher standard of living, etc, it can achieve this higher standard of living gradually, but this costs something; it has its price. The price that we must pay is expressed in terms of our problems, in terms of the threats and inconveniences which we must face up to in order to be a free country. Robreno: In connection with the underdeveloped countries, do you believe that the Congress of those underdeveloped countries, which they are now preparing, will be attended by all Latin American nations -- and that some of them might not perhaps want to have their participation approved by Washington? Dr Castro: Well, this will be the moment of truth; this will be the moment of truth for many governments in Latin America because I believe that it is in the highest interests of these countries to get together here in a congress of underdeveloped countries. A congress of underdeveloped countries might consists of as many as 50 countries -- and 50 countries do add up to a considerable force; 50 countries constitute a considerable representation throughout the world. In other words, if all of us underdeveloped countries have the same problems which require higher prices for our products, in other words, if we all require economic development, if this applies to Asia and Africa and Latin America as well, then we all have the same problems because we are underdeveloped countries and because we have a poor economy, a deficient economy, without capital, without resources, without reserves -- and if this congress of underdeveloped countries gets together and states our problems, if it adopts a strong agreement on the defense of our interests, if we all get together to promote similar aspirations -- well, that will be undoubtedly an advantage to all of the underdeveloped peoples; if we do not do this, we will just continue the way we have been, without anybody listening to us, without anybody listening to the clamor of those peoples. In other words, a conference of underdeveloped countries is a conference which should be attended by every Latin American country; no people, no underdeveloped country, no under-industrialized country should be absent from that conference. The word "underdeveloped" is a little derogatory, is it not? But then you also have the term "underindustrialized." There are countries which have a culture and they are quite justified in thinking that they are developed countries because they have a culture of their own, an old culture; but they may not be industrialized countries and this is why we can call them nonindustrialized countries. This conference is in the interests of all countries and it would be a moment of truth for all of those governments that feel that they have enough self-determination, that feel that they have enough self-determination of their own to attend this congress of underdeveloped countries. Robreno: Perhaps, however, some of them might not attend. Dr Castro: All right, I do have my doubts that some of them will come. Of course, some of them have a rather timid policy; some of them have a vacillating policy, a very fearful policy; but I still hope that a number of Latin American countries will attend this congress of underdeveloped countries, along with several African and Asian countries. In other words, I do hope that this congress will be held and that it will be attended by properly representative groups because I am sure that everybody wants to know that there are many peoples in the world that are free, that are sovereign, that are conscious of their problems, -- and they include Cuba -- and we could certainly be the hosts for that congress because we are a free people and a sovereign people; we could certainly issue an appeal to the other underdeveloped peoples to hold our conference here; we could discuss this issue and we could try to develop better trade between ourselves; we could state common issues and problems because that would be an organization, a congress, that would be conducted on the level of the United Nations, in other words, all of these are peoples that are represented in the United Nations. Robreno: In other words, you more or less think that... Dr Castro: All right, I was thinking primarily of the month of June; but it might be postponed for a few months. Everything now depends on the report which Dr Roa brings back from his trip to Europe and Asia. Robreno: And this is going to come off with a simple formal invitation or with some kind of propaganda campaign? Dr Castro: All right, we are working on this and we are going to send out the invitations. The congress will be guaranteed here and I believe that it will be a big event. This will be the first time in the history of the world that we are going to have a congress on that level in which countries from three continents will participate, in other words, underdeveloped countries from three continents. This would be an event of extraordinary importance to Cuba, both in terms of support for Cuba which would thus be united with other peoples in circumstances of equality, and it would also be good for the development of all of those people together, I believe that this is a movement that will have the sympathy of ... Robreno: You said three continents, Africa, Asia, and America. What about Europe? Will there be no country from Europe? Dr Castro: Well, Europe might also be represented. Robreno: Likewise, in other words, because they ought to have underdeveloped countries there, too, especially in the eastern part. Dr Castro: In general, they do have some countries there which do not have the same industrial development level as the other countries. Nunez: Dr. Castro, in connection with the reference you made to the dollar currency policy: at the end of last week, the Chamber of Commerce submitted a memorandum and we had an interview with Major Dr Ernesto Guarrevara; we asked him a number of questions in connection with a more flexible policy here, first of all, to the effect that the 90-day period, which has been granted as the term for foreign currency export authorization, be extended to 180 days since on many occasions the materials or machinery and equipment which we order are put in production at the same moment when the order is placed, that is, the purchase order; and many times, the production effort alone takes more than 3 months. We also were told about the case of industries which require raw materials that have to be bought with dollars and we were told that it would be quite convenient to establish a system of priorities for these imports and for these articles likewise; in other words, this would be for those priority items, not the consumer goods, which can not yet be obtained in Cuba. What do you think of that? Dr Castro: All right, as I see it, we have to figure out some formulas for a solution to these problems, within this policy of foreign currency savings, this policy of correctly investing our resources. Is that right? I believe that this is quite logical and this is actually what we have been saying all along. Isn't that right? In other words, we must try to keep everything going smoothly, we must now slow any of our projects down, all of this must of course be coordinated with the expenditures we are going to make and the expenditures we have already made; in other words, the issue here is the term of the license as such and I believe that this is a problem which can be solved. The entire policy which we are pursuing here requires a number of norms and standards and certain readjustments. Right? Of course, in this problem of foreign currency, we had no alternative; we could only implement the policy which we are now pursuing because we had no choice. If we had been able to choose between one policy or another, if we had had the 500 million which we did have in 1952, then we would have had more freedom of action; we would not have had to have to restrictions at all; we could have oriented our foreign currency expenditures much more effectively, more toward agricultural equipment and not so much toward automobiles. Finally, this economic policy has never been correctly oriented in the past; and because of this we have to pursue a policy of forced savings; the figure involved here is 70 million, as you know. All of this had been accumulating during the war, when the originally high sugar prices dropped from 500 down to 70; a good portion of this money was in the banks or in the private accounts of these gentlemen who were running the country; and this is why I believe that all of these details today force the president of the bank to try to adjust all of this and coordinate everything; this is why you can find Conrade Guevara in his office, at all hours of the day and night, working real hard to solve all of those problems. De la Vega: Dr Castro... Nunez: I beg your pardon, I would also like to refer to another answer you have given here with respect to this manner of establishing trade with solf-currency countries, in other words, currency that is not like the dollar; right now, a number of Latin American countries are meeting in an effort to set up what they call, not so much a common market but rather a regional market, so that they can trade in this framework; let me see if I can explain what I mean here, the way you put it before. Cuba, for example, sells sugar to country A and has to buy a certain raw material or a certain type of machinery from country B; then Cuba does not get paid in dollars from country A but exchanges or barters those items with country A; then it has to make some sale to country B, from which we want to obtain ... Dr Castro: This is a triangle; I can explain it something like this, because if not... Nunez: It is a triangle, precisely. Cuba gets this in the form of a barter. Dr Castro: No, this is a barter, an exchange, it is almost the same as if we were to pay; we use the money of that country which in turn has to pay that money to the other country. Nunez: Precisely. If that the policy you are contemplating? Dr Castro: Of course, if it is a correct policy. Nunez: Perfectly! Comrade Gutierrez Cordovi. Ah! I beg your pardon. De la Vega: I have a little question here, a very short one, Doctor. In connection with import restrictions... Dr Castro: This is going to be a short question but a long answer. De la Vega: No, I believe it is going to be very short. There are rumors to the effect that gasoline is going to be rationed. Is there anything to this? Dr Castro: No, we certainly have not been thinking of anything of the kind. Nobody has been thinking of that. So far, I don't know anything about this; look here, here is the Minister of Commerce; you didn't think of anything of that kind did you? No, he did not think of this at all; all we did was to recommend that everybody buy small cars and this would also be a saving, would it not? At most -- but, no -- this measure, well nobody has thought of anything of the kind. On the contrary, what we are thinking of doing is to continue our petroleum prospecting and to set up a petroleum program to the maximum extent in order to see if we really once and for all solve our fuel problem; this is one of the big problems of our country. De la Vega: What is the output of the Jatibonico well? Dr Castro: I don't have the latest information on that. De la Vega: There have been rumors to the effect that there has been an accident at that well. Do you know of anything about that? Dr Castro: No, I have no information. Numez: Comrade Cutierrez Cordovi. Cordovi: Well, I would like to move on from economics to something that has to do with revolutionary policy. Dr Castro: What kind of policy? Cordovi: Dr Castro, before leaving the editorial offices of El Mundo a UPI cable arrived there, and I think it is very interesting. Dr Castro: What does it say? Cordovi: It says that Dr Nunez Protuondo declared that those who run the Dominican Republic have neither the intentions nor the means of launching a big enterprise in order to put an end to the tragic situation in Cuba. This is interpreted as a rupture of the bonds between the enemies of Castro and Generalissimo Rafael L. Trujillo; although it does not mention his name anywhere... Dr Castro: Well, that's a shame. Cordovi: The former diplomat refers to what he calls the Trinidad disaster, that is to say, the group of men who arrived in Cuba from the Dominican Republic; they fell into a trap that had been laid by the Cuban authorities and they are now being tried in court. In spite of the Trinidad disaster, which was staged in spite of my express opposition because it seemed obvious to me that this was a trap -- says Nunez Portuondo -- I continued to give my moral support to those who stated emphatically that they were materially and spiritually sufficiently well equipped to launch and carry through this big undertaking in order to put an end to the tragic Cuban situation. On Dominican aid, he says the following: I patiently waited for one year without hearing any more from the radio transmitters that were rather doubtful in terms of their effectiveness, anyway. However, he failed to say that "the Dominican Voice," which made these broadcasts, at the end of the week, at the end of last week, announced that it had suspended its anti-Fidelista programs in response to a petition from the Dominican Confederation of Workers. When I have become convinced completely that there was neither the intention nor the means, on the part of those who run the Dominican Republic, to carry out the activities they promised, even under the most favorable conditions, I even withdrew my moral support from them without any further comment because this was just a waste of time. I cannot continue to give my moral support to an undertaking which, I have became convinced, will not be carried through and because of this, in compliance with an obligation, I decided to make public today -- as I am doing right now -- the fact that I believe that there is no possibility whatever for a movement which, instead of increasing its potential, keeps losing strength day after day, both inside and outside the island. The only means for proving that I have made a mistake would be to launch the action before the end of the Cuban sugar harvest which is supposed to earn the Castro regime more than 600 million dollars.