by Carlos M. Salinas
Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS_
Colombia, an oil exporter and leading producer of coffee, is rich in
resources. It is also plagued by violence (homicide being the leading cause
of death among males), leads in producing cocaine entering the U.S., and is
an increasingly important source of heroin. Although violence is often
blamed on Colombia's large-scale drug trade that dates from the mid-1970s,
politically motivated killings predate this considerably.
Colombia has been ruled for decades by two political parties, Liberal and
Conservative, whose power struggles have resulted in major civil wars and
regional conflicts. Their last major conflict, La Violencia (from 1948 to
1953), left 145,000 dead. Residual violence from 1953 until 1960 added more
than 20,000 deaths.
The current conflict pits the government against two major guerrilla
forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN). Other guerrilla forces such as the M19 have
demobilized and attempted to integrate themselves into the legal political
process. However, hope for the transition of armed guerrillas into unarmed
political movements and parties has been undermined by the continuing
killings of activists and officials of the Patriotic Union party (UP),
created in 1985 out of supporters of FARC and leftwing parties. To date,
more than 2500 activists and officials of the UP have been killed.
Thousands die in combat, but the brunt of the killings is suffered by the
civilian population as the belligerent forces avoid each other, targeting
instead each other's perceived civilian supporters. Since 1987 more than
25,000 noncombatant civilians have been murdered or made to "disappear"
mostly by the security forces and their paramilitary allies. Torture often
precedes killing targeted victims, who include perceived or actual
government opponents: human rights defenders, lawyers, judges, peasant
activists, trade unionists, teachers, students, and those who live in areas
of guerrilla activity. For their part, the guerrillas target those
suspected of collaborating with the armed forces or the paramilitaries.
Colombian military strategy is to deprive the guerrillas of support in the
countryside. In practice, this means indiscriminate and illegal killings of
civilians by the armed forces and by well-equipped and well-trained
paramilitaries that operate in heavily militarized areas and coordinate
their operations with the army. In recent years, paramilitary killings have
escalated dramatically. This has resulted in massive internal displacement
and refugee flows into Panama. For their part, guerrillas also kill
noncombatants, contribute to displacement, and hold hundreds of hostages,
including three U.S. nationals of the New Tribes Mission.
In urban areas, guerrilla-linked militias and police-linked death squads
target political activists and those labeled socially undesirable:
vagrants, street children, thieves, homosexuals, and prostitutes. Drug
traffickers' violence has targeted police, judges, lawyers, journalists,
editors, and politicians (including high-level officials and Presidential
contenders) who dare oppose their operations. With their new wealth, drug
traffickers have become large landowners and thereby come into direct
conflict with guerrillas and peasants. These drug traffickers sometimes
collaborate with the armed forces in creating and financing paramilitary
death squads.
This violence is not the result of competition over scarce resources.
Colombia has a moderate population density and abundant resources. But
wealth is not distributed equitably. The bottom third of the population has
an income share of less than 10% while the top third has an income share of
close to 70%. Land is concentrated in vast tracts although coffee
production appears to be more equitably distributed. For those in misery,
drug trafficking and political struggle are attractive options.
In 1997 the war in Colombia intensified, with FARC and the ELN launching a
series of high-profile attacks against the army. In September 1997, shortly
after the government proposed peace talks with FARC, the Colombian Army
launched its largest offensive of the decade. Meanwhile, both guerrillas
and paramilitaries announced that they will prohibit electoral campaigning
in areas they control by politicians they oppose.
Problems With Current U.S. Policy
According to the State Department's Congressional Presentation Document for
Foreign Operations FY98, U.S. policy toward Colombia seeks to "reduce the
flow of cocaine and other drugs from Colombia into the United States,"
"strengthen the democratic institutions of Colombia against the corrupting
influence of narcotrafficking," and "promote the protection of human
rights." These objectives appear to place democracy and human rights on an
equal footing with the counterdrug struggle. In practice, however,
counterdrug operations predominate.
Counterdrug efforts-supported directly by U.S. military and other forms of
aid-have not strengthened democratic institutions or improved respect for
human rights. U.S. counterdrug programs have, for example, assisted the
development of Public Order Courts that are designed to combat terrorism
and narcotrafficking. In reality, they eviscerate due-process guarantees.
Rather than supporting human rights, the U.S. government has provided
counterdrug aid to Colombian military units implicated in gross human
rights violations. Also part of U.S.-supported counter-narcotics operations
is the defoliation of large tracts of forest and farmland with chemical
agents. Counterdrug agents indiscriminately spray fields, livestock, and
people.
The U.S. counterdrug program in Colombia continues a long history of U.S.
support for the country's armed forces and police. Since the 1960s the U.S.
has supported Colombia's counterinsurgency operations in the name of
fighting communism. This support has included training at the U.S. Army
School of the Americas at Fort Benning and the Special Warfare Center at
Fort Bragg, in-country training through advisers and Special Operations
Forces, and International Military Education and Training (See In Focus:
Military Training in Latin America). In addition, the U.S. has supplied the
security forces with arms, munitions, and equipment.
Since 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and then-President Bush declared drug
trafficking a national security threat, Colombia has been the number one
recipient of U.S. military aid in the Americas. Until recently, the
Colombian Army did not deny that its priority was fighting guerrillas, not
drug traffickers. To this day, not a single Colombian military unit is
dedicated exclusively to counternarcotics operations. Instead the military
lends occasional assistance to the Colombian National Police's counterdrug
operations, while continuing to focus on fighting the guerrillas.
Since the early 1980s the U.S. government has promoted the theory of the
narcoguerrilla in Latin America. In recent years Colombian army generals
have also advanced the concept that drug traffickers and guerrillas are
part of the same operation. Those supporting continuing U.S. military aid
to Colombia also refer to the narcoguerrilla threat. But this is
essentially a false argument. Drug traffickers and guerrillas have separate
identities and goals.
It is true, however, that drug traffickers and guerrillas often operate in
the same regions and have converging interests. Many guerrilla fronts tax
drug trafficking operations, just as they tax anyone in areas they control.
Thus some fronts protect the fields of traffickers. But for protection,
traffickers also get the help of members of the Colombian security forces.
If one is going to advance a narcoguerrilla argument on the basis of
sometimes converging interests, one should also advance the narcomilitary
and narcopolice hypotheses. Drug traffickers are highly opportunistic and
will work with anyone willing to advance their interests. However, some
guerrilla operations, such as kidnapping, put the guerrillas and large drug
traffickers in direct conflict, particularly when the drug lords are
directly affected. As a result, drug traffickers sometimes finance
paramilitary groups and death squads to target actual or perceived
guerrilla supporters.
The U.S. government has sent mixed messages to the Colombian government and
military. In the 1996 and 1997 annual reviews of the drug control efforts
of drug exporting countries, the U.S. "decertified" Colombia, declaring
that it has not sufficiently cooperated with U.S. officials to halt the
flow of drugs. Yet the U.S. has stepped up the counternarcotics assistance
programs. While the State Department has reported widespread human rights
violations by the police and military, the country's security forces rely
on extensive U.S. military aid.
In 1996 Congress passed the Leahy Amendment, which prohibits the State
Department from using its counterdrug aid to support military units
implicated in human rights violations. Yet documents obtained from the U.S.
Embassy in Bogota show that the U.S. had given such aid to units implicated
in such violations, contradicting State Department officials who have
assured the U.S. Congress and human rights groups that the U.S. was not
aiding units implicated in human rights violations. In fact, of thirteen
offending units identified in a 1994 Amnesty International report on
Colombia, twelve had received U.S. aid.
Reacting to increased publicity about the extensive human rights violations
in Colombia, the Clinton administration has extended the Leahy prohibition
to all U.S. agencies, including the Pentagon, providing counternarcotics
assistance to Colombia. It also obtained an agreement with the Colombian
government that provides for the tracking of U.S. counterdrug aid. At the
same time, however, the U.S. has expanded counterdrug aid, approving more
than $115 million for the fiscal year that ended on October 1, 1997. Of
this $115 million, $85 million came from the Defense Department and $30
million was from the State Department's counterdrug program.
Toward a New Foreign Polciy
The following steps must be taken to chart a new policy direction for
U.S.-Colombian relations.
1. Help Colombia end the war. The belligerent parties have had no real
incentives for ending the war. The current conflict is based on pervasive
misery and wealth disparities and is complicated by the number of actors.
The U.S. should encourage a neutral third party to convene the principal
actors, namely the government and the guerrillas. For its part, the U.S.
should firmly encourage the Colombian government, especially the Colombian
military, to move in good faith toward a negotiated solution. Those in the
military opposed to a negotiated solution should not be given any U.S. aid.
2. Encourage the aggressive dismantling of all paramilitary structures. It
is very clear that many paramilitary groups work in close coordination with
the Colombian security forces. The U.S. should condition any continued
relation with the Colombian military on paramilitary dismantling. Cattle
ranchers and other rural landowners supporting the paramilitaries should be
considered pariahs and denied visas for travel to the United States.
3. Aggressively and transparently enforce the Leahy Amendment. If there is
to be any military aid whatsoever, it needs to be carefully screened and
monitored because of the frequent participation by Colombian security
forces and their paramilitary allies in human rights violations. Thus the
Leahy Amendment should be vigorously enforced. The U.S. embassy should
gather information about the Colombian military units slated to receive
U.S. aid. The State Department should clarify which units have received
U.S. aid and which units it is considering aiding so that information can
be provied about their human rights records.
4. Reevaluate its source country strategy. As long as coca crops command
higher prices than other crops, peasants are going to grow them. But the
peasant output is probably minuscule compared to the fields of drug
traffickers, which apparently are rarely touched. Regarding peasants, the
U.S. should encourage crop substitution alternatives that make economic
sense. This may mean crop subsidies and investment in infrastructure. One
of the many casualties of drug policy has been accuracy. No one likes
drug-related violence in the streets of either the U.S. or Colombia. But a
good solution is not going to be found by finger-pointing or grandstanding.
There should be a rational discussion of the options by Congress and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, with broad citizen input that
allows all alternatives and evidence to be aired.
5. Promote the rule of law by removing support from those benefiting from
impunity. Even if the war ended, human rights violations would not
automatically end. Violations will end with the prosecution of violators.
Any official benefiting from impunity should not receive U.S. assistance.
The final objective of a counterdrug strategy is to achieve respect for the
rule of law, i.e. the observance of drug laws. But if counterdrug efforts
are themselves lawless, they in effect tell people that law is not what
matters, power is what matters. Also, those breaking one set of laws may be
tempted to break other laws.
Finally, any intelligence officials or agents implicated in violations
should be handed over to the Colombian authorities (not military courts)
for criminal prosecution. Any payment to those implicated in violations is
immensely counterproductive and morally indefensible. Furthermore, the U.S.
practice of protecting intelligence sources and methods should not shield
anyone from prosecution.
6. Evaluate policy based on its impact on the Colombian people. Options
that should be discounted are those that harm people anywhere. The children
of Popayan are no less important than the children of Peoria. All policy
should be evaluated based on its effect on civil liberties and human
rights. If an option contravenes basic rights, it should be discarded.
After all, policymakers combat the drug trade because they believe the drug
trade is harmful to people. But if the alternatives proposed are equally
harmful-as unfettered support for the Colombian security forces or or
unchecked court systems such as Colombia's Public Order Courts clearly
are-then other alternatives are needed.
Carlos Salinas is the Advocacy Director for Latin America and the Caribbean
at the Washington Office of Amnesty International USA. This paper covers a
wider scope than that organization's mandate and does not necessarily
represent Amnesty International's views.
Sources for More Information
Organizations
Colombia Human Rights Committee
PO Box 3130
Washington, DC 20010
Voice/Fax: (202) 232-8148
Email: colhrc@igc.org
Amnesty International USA
Colombia Coordinator c/o AIUSA Washington Office
304 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20007
Voice: (510) 482-0944
Email: ppaz@igc.org
Websites: http://www.amnesty-usa.org
http://www.amnesty.org
Contact: Paul Paz y Miņo
Washington Office on Latin America
400 C St. NE
Washington, DC 20002
Voice: (202) 544-8045
Fax: (202) 546-5288
Email: wola@igc.org
Human Rights Watch
1522 K St. NW
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 371-6592
Fax:(202) 371-0124
Email: hrwdc@hrdw.org
Colombia Desk, Inter-American Affairs Bureau
Department of State
2201 C St. NW
Washington, DC 20520
Voice: (202) 647-3338
Fax: (202) 647-2628
Colombia Program, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Bureau Department of State
2201 C St. NW
Washington, DC 20520
Voice: (202) 647-8727
Publications
Ana Carrigan, The Palace of Justice: A Colombian Tragedy (New York: Four
Walls Eight Windows, 1993).
Javier Giraldo, Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy (Common Courage, 1996).
National Centrum Voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, El Terrorismo de Estado en
Colombia (Brussels, Belgium: Ediciones NCOS, 1992).
Colombia Bulletin: A Human Rights Quarterly (To subscribe, send e-mail to:
mlopez@igc.apc.org).
World Wide Web
Colombia Suppport Network
http://www.igc.apc.org/csn/
Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project
http://www.fas.org/asmp/
Peace Brigades International
http://www.igc.apc.org/pbi/colombia.html
U.S. State Department Colombia Human Rights Report
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report /colombia.html
Semana newsmagazine
http://www.semana.com.co
El Tiempo newspaper
http://www.eltiempo.com.co
El Espectador newspaper
http://www.elespectador.com.co
Radio Cadena Nacional
http://www.rcn.com.co
University of Texas
http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/colombia/
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