Volume 2, Number 53
December 1997
Written by Thomas Cardamone, Council for a Livable World=20
Editors: Martha Honey (IPS) and Tom Barry (IRC)=20
Key Points
* The 20-year old U.S. moratorium on sales of advanced military equipment=
to Latin America was successful in preventing a high-tech arms race in the=
region.
* Even throughout the moratorium, the U.S. was the world's largest=
supplier of military equipment to Latin America.
* The U.S. decision to allow the sale of advanced fighter jets to Latin=
America was driven by jobs and export earnings rather than security=
imperatives.
On August 1, 1997, the Clinton administration announced that the U.S. would=
end a successful 20-year moratorium on the sale of advanced military=
equipment to Latin American states. This marked the culmination of a=
protracted interagency debate that highlighted Defense and State=
Departments' differing opinions on the issue. Despite opposition by a=
number of Latin American leaders and warnings from President Clinton's=
first Secretary of State Warren Christopher in August 1996 congressional=
testimony that the U.S. should show "great restraint," the White House=
abandoned the moratorium, creating the possibility for billions of dollars=
in high-tech arms sales to the region.=20
An early test of the new policy is a U.S. offer to sell jet fighters to the=
Chilean military, whose army chief is former dictator General Agusto=
Pinochet. Ironically, Pinochet's bloody 1973 coup and human rights=
violations during his dictatorship (1973-90) were the reasons the Carter=
administration originally imposed the high-tech arms sale moratorium.=20
In May 1977, based on concerns about human rights abuses by Latin America's=
many dictatorships, President Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Decision=
Directive 13, banning sales of US attack jets and other high-tech items.=
Except for a 1982 transfer of 24 F-16 jets to Venezuela in response to=
Cuba's acquisition of MiG-28 fighters from the Soviet Union, the policy=
held for two decades. Other jet suppliers such as France and Sweden=
followed the U.S. lead and refrained from selling the most sophisticated=
equipment. As a result, Latin America now has one of the world's lowest=
levels of military technology.=20
Despite Washington's moratorium on the sale of advanced weaponry, the U.S.=
is still the largest supplier of military equipment to Latin America.=
According to a 1997 Congressional Research Service study, from 1993-96 the=
U.S. supplied over 25% of all arms shipped to the region-three times more=
than any other nation. Moreover, a 1997 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament=
Agency report notes that from 1984 to 1995, the U.S. led all countries in=
deliveries (through both sales and military aid) of military aircraft to=
the region.=20
The 1997 White House decision signaled the successful conclusion of a quiet=
but tenacious lobbying effort by American military contractors, the=
Pentagon, and 116 senators and congressmen who had received aerospace=
industry PAC funds in the 1996 election. This lobbying effort was itself=
prompted by the Chilean military's decision, first announced in 1994, to=
purchase 24 advanced combat aircraft, estimated to be worth $1 billion. The=
contractor's primary rationale for reversing U.S. policy-the possibility of=
lucrative new contracts in a post cold war era when both domestic and=
foreign orders for combat equipment have plummeted-was especially=
persuasive to the White House. The Clinton administration has made arms=
exports an important component of its economic globalization strategy, and=
Washington assesses the economic impact on U.S. weapons makers when=
contemplating export decisions. The lure of the Chilean contract, together=
with intense industry lobbying, convinced the White House to lift the=
moratorium, even though Chile faces no significant security threat.=20
Within weeks of this decision, the U.S. further ruffled feathers in the=
region with the announcement that it would grant Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)=
status to Argentina, ostensibly as a reward for that nation's participation=
in Desert Storm and UN peacekeeping missions. In reality, Washington's move=
appears aimed at quelling Argentina's vocal opposition to the shift in U.S.=
policy. With MNNA status, the Buenos Aires government will be given deep=
discounts on used American defense articles and allowed weapons=
co-production agreements. The move is highly unusual. Only six other=
nations, including Israel, have MNNA status; none is in Latin America, and=
there are no threats to U.S. security in the region. After Chile and Brazil=
protested granting Argentina MNNA status, Washington added to the confusion=
by reportedly indicating that those nations might be given MNNA status as=
well.=20
Problems With Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems=20
* The sale of advanced weapons to Chile will likely spur neighboring=
states to increase purchases of advanced weapons at the expense of domestic=
investment.
* Sales of such equipment will not address drug trafficking, unequal=
income distribution, or other security threats faced by the region.
* New sales could undermine President Clinton's effort to promote economic=
development and political stability in the U.S. and Latin America.
Despite the implication by the lengthy interagency review process that the=
move is an exception to normal U.S. foreign policy, the Clinton=
administration's decision to end the moratorium on sales of advanced=
weapons to Latin America is consistent with its conventional arms export=
strategy. A 1995 White House fact sheet on the Clinton administration's new=
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy described arms sales as a "legitimate=
instrument" of U.S. foreign policy, adding that a criterion for approval is=
the "impact" the decision will have "on U.S. industry." Under the combined=
weight of Chile's effort to acquire new jets, U.S. arms exporters' intense=
lobbying, and millions of dollars in political donations, the=
administration's decision was easily forecast. Ironically, though, there=
was no firm deal with Chile, whose air force is also considering purchasing=
the jets from France or Sweden.=20
Historically, the U.S. has justified arms exports as vital to bolstering the=
security of its allies around the globe. With no cross-border security=
imperative in South America, however, the U.S. arms industry was successful=
in shifting the debate to focus on economic gains. American weapons makers=
argued that if they did not sell Chile the jets, their European competitors=
would. Statements by administration officials underscored the point that=
regional security was not the only issue discussed during the policy review=
process. In early April 1997, after a preliminary move to allow U.S. firms=
to supply technical data to potential Latin American arms buyers, State=
Department spokesman Nicholas Burns noted that the decision was reached "so=
that our companies. . . would not be at a disadvantage in the competition."=
=20
Washington further justifies its new arms policy by noting that all=
countries in the region (except Cuba) are democratically elected, that=
trade ties among these states are increasing, and that their economies are=
improving. Further, the administration argues, most border disputes that=
for decades plagued regional security have been resolved, and human rights=
abuses have decreased. While supporters of the new U.S. policy argue that=
these gains should be rewarded with renewed high-tech sales, opponents=
question how the transfer of sophisticated military aircraft will promote=
stronger democracies, foster civilian control of the military, or continue=
trends of economic growth and regional interdependence.=20
Transfers of advanced equipment are likely to adversely affect both the=
external and internal security of the countries in the region. Although a=
massive arms build-up reminiscent of the Middle East after the Gulf War is=
improbable in cash-strapped Latin America, countries are likely to begin=
acquiring expensive arms with little military utility. South American=
nations now enjoy relative military parity, but Chile's purchase of F-16s=
will represent a substantial technological leap in the region, forcing=
other states to bolster their defenses. This is certain to create, in turn,=
a call for foreign military financing and increased military assistance=
from the United States.=20
Given the fragility of both democratic institutions and economic stability=
in Latin America, these countries need to be investing their limited=
resources in production for local and export markets, as well as in=
physical infrastructure and social services such as health care and=
education. A 1996 World Bank report found, for instance, that Latin America=
needs to spend up to $1 billion per week to maintain and upgrade crumbling=
or non-existent communication, water, and transportation systems.=20
Advanced attack jets cannot address the real security threats currently=
facing Latin America, such as extreme economic inequality, rampant=
drug-trafficking, and nagging guerrilla movements. The large investment=
needed to address these infrastructure, social service, and security=
challenges will be impossible if a new round of military acquisitions is=
initiated. Indeed, just days after the Peruvian government announced its=
purchase of 18 MiG-29fighters-at a cost of some $200 million-from Belarus=
in December 1996, the Japanese embassy in Lima was occupied by Tupac Amaru=
rebels.=20
Further, the decision to abandon the current policy of arms sales restraint=
may actually undermine the Clinton administration's longer term goals. The=
president's domestic policy emphasizes exports to build the U.S. economy=
and create job growth. At the same time, his stated foreign policy=
objectives are to promote democracy, regional stability, and strong=
economies in order to provide viable markets for U.S. goods. Though lifting=
the moratorium may bring a short-term boost in weapons exports, in the long=
term it will undermine foreign policy objectives by shifting investment=
capital away from domestic development and into military spending. This=
shift will likely result in lost export opportunities for non-military=
American industries and a downturn in export-related jobs. In sum, the=
Clinton administration's decision to lift the high-tech weapons moratorium=
and extend MNNA status to Argentina is militarily and politically risky and=
economically short-sighted.=20
Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations=20
* The U.S. should endorse and promote the call by 27 Latin American states=
for a two-year moratorium on acquisitions of advanced military equipment.
* The Clinton administration should propose a regional convention that=
would set numerical and technological ceilings on combat equipment.
* The U.S. should encourage additional confidence- and security-building=
measures to lessen regional tensions.
Ideally, the U.S. should reimpose its moratorium on all advanced weaponry,=
but this is unlikely. There are, however, steps the Clinton administration=
can take prior to authorizing sales of combat jets or other advanced=
equipment to Latin American countries.=20
First, the U.S. should embrace and promote a recommendation put forth in=
April 1997 by current and former Latin American heads of state for a=
two-year moratorium on the purchase and sale of attack jets to the region.=
The goal of the proposed moratorium is to provide time for high-level=
representatives of all states to meet and discuss their security concerns=
and formulate a plan to provide for their defense without purchasing=
expensive combat aircraft.=20
Twenty-seven current heads of state in the hemisphere, including those of=
Colombia, Mexico, and Canada, now support such a cooling-off period to give=
them time to address regional security threats and needs. While some of=
Latin America's largest nations (including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru,=
and Venezuela) have not yet endorsed the plan, there is increasing interest=
in a new framework to ensure regional stability. Indeed, during a visit to=
Washington in September 1997, Chilean Foreign Minister Jos=E9 Miguel=
Insulza noted that there is "no hemispheric security [and] there hasn't=
been a security policy since the cold war."=20
Second, the Clinton Administra-tion should propose a regional convention=
calling for numerical and technological limits on military hardware. The=
resulting treaty should be modeled on the Conventional Forces in Europe=
Treaty-with some modifications. For instance, the number of weapons=
categories should be expanded from the five used in the European compact=
(tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack=
helicopters) to include warships and missiles, which are part of the UN=
Register on Conventional Arms. Further, the treaty should put limits on=
technology to prohibit ground-attack or night-attack capability for jets,=
thereby reducing the risk of a fatal miscalculation in times of high=
tension. Provisions such as these would build military security in the=
region by providing for a strong defensive force while decreasing the=
probability of an offensive military action.=20
Third, the U.S. should foster additional discussions on confidence- and=
security-building measures (CSBM). These measures could include requiring a=
defensive positioning of military forces and the creation of crisis=
management teams to aid in the peaceful resolution of disputes. Such=
actions would allow nations in the region to resolve disagreements and=
preempt military crises.=20
Over the past year the Clinton administration has taken several steps that=
demonstrate a willingness to seek CSBMs. Washington has urged all states to=
promote transparency in defense planning by issuing defense white papers=
describing each nation's foreign and security policy. The U.S. has also=
established the Inter-American Center for Defense Studies at the National=
Defense University in Washington in an effort to enhance civilian expertise=
in regional security and defense issues. Moreover, the Clinton=
administration is sponsoring a promising proposal to require all nations in=
the hemisphere to notify other states before acquiring weapons in the seven=
UN register categories. Transparency of defense acquisitions is a key=
component of a peaceful region, and the U.S. is wise to pursue this=
approach.=20
Given the region's long-held distrust of U.S. intentions, the Clinton=
administration must walk a fine line in promoting these measures. The=
approaches discussed here must be pursued as a pragmatic attempt to ensure=
national security, enhance regional stability, bolster democratic=
governments, promote civilian control of the military, and foster economic=
development. Moratoriums on high-tech military acquisitions and transfers=
of excess defense articles are crucial components of a comprehensive=
approach toward these goals. Further, the U.S. must embrace the notion=
promoted by the 1996 Presidential Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation=
Policy stating that an unwise arms sale is still unwise no matter how many=
jobs are created. Without a serious attempt at arms restraint, further=
progress is at risk.=20
Thomas Cardamone is director of the Conventional Arms Transfer Project of=
the Council for a Livable World Education Fund and editor of Arms Trade=
News, the project's monthly newsletter.=20
Sources for more information
World Wide Web=20
=20
The Carter Center Latin American Program
http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER/demo.htm#lacp
=20
The Library of Congress
http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/
Organizations=20
Arms Control Association=20
1726 M St. NW, Suite 201=20
Washington, DC 20036=20
Voice: (202) 463-8270=20
Fax: (202) 463-8273=20
Email: armscontrol@igc.apc.org=20
Arms Sales Monitoring Project=20
Federation of American Scientists=20
307 Massachusetts Ave. NE=20
Washington, DC 20002=20
Voice: (202) 675-1018=20
Email: llumpe@fas.org=20
British American Security Information Council=20
1900 L St. NW, Suite 401=20
Washington, DC 20036=20
Voice: (202) 785-1266=20
Email: basicusa@igc.apc.org=20
Website: http://www.basicint.org=20
Center for Defense Information=20
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW=20
Washington, DC 20005=20
Voice: (202) 862-0700=20
Fax: (202) 862-0708=20
Email: disenberg@cdi.org=20
Website: http://www.cdi.org=20
Center for International Policy=20
1755 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 312=20
Washington, DC 20036=20
Voice: (202) 232-3317=20
Fax: (202) 232-3440=20
Email: cip@igc.apc.org=20
Website: http://www.us.net/cip/index.htm=20
Conventional Arms Transfers Project=20
Council for a Livable World Education Fund=20
110 Maryland Ave. NE, Suite 201=20
Washington, DC 20002=20
Voice: (202) 546-0795=20
Fax: (202) 546-5142=20
Email: cardamone@clw.org=20
Website: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/cat/catmain.html=20
Demilitarization for Democracy=20
2001 S St. NW, Suite 630=20
Washington, DC 20009=20
Voice: (202) 319-7191=20
Email: pdd@clark.net=20
Latin American Working Group=20
110 Maryland Ave. NE, Suite 203=20
Washington, DC 20002=20
Voice: (212) 546-7010=20
Email: lawg@igc.apc.org=20
Website: http://www.igc.apc.org/lawg/=20
The Arias Foundation for Peace=20
and Human Progress=20
PO Box 8-6410-1000=20
San Jose, Costa Rica=20
Voice: 011-506-225-5905=20
Fax: 011-506-222-6782=20
Email: funpaz@sol.racsa.co.cr=20
Website: http://www.arias.or.cr/=20
World Policy Institute=20
New School for Social Research=20
65 Fifth Avenue, Suite 413=20
New York City, NY 10003=20
Voice: (212) 229-5808=20
Fax: (212) 229-5579=20
Email: hartung@newschool.edu=20
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Foreign Policy In Focus is a joint project of the=20
Interhemipsheric Resource Center (IRC) and the Institute for=20
Policy Studies (IPS). In Focus briefs document the problems=20
of current U.S. foreign policy and offer recommendations for=20
alternative policy directions that would make the United=20
States a more responsible global partner.=20
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Erik Leaver
Communications Director
Interhemispheric Resource Center
Box 4506
Albuquerque, NM 87196
Voice: 505-842-8288
Fax: 505-246-1601
Email: leaver@swcp.com
Web: http://www.zianet.com/infocus