-DATE- 19691106 -YEAR- 1969 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- SPEECH -AUTHOR- F. CASTRO -HEADLINE- CASTRO STRESSES FAR'S PARTICIPATION IN HARVEST -PLACE- REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES THEATER -SOURCE- HAVANA PRENSA LATINA -REPORT_NBR- FBIS -REPORT_DATE- 19691107 -TEXT- FIDEL STRESSES FAR'S PARTICIPATION IN HARVEST Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 0320 GMT 6 Nov 69 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) [Fidel Castro speech [Unreadable text] November at the Revolutionary Armed Forces theater, presumably in Havana, to the officers and men representing all the troops who will work in the sugar harvest] [Text] [The first two paragraphs of Castro's speech are supplied by a report carried by Havana Domestic Service in Spanish at 1130 GMT on 5 November. Subsequent material is text as supplied by Havana PRENSA LATINA.] Yesterday afternoon our commander in chief, Fidel Castro, made a speech in the MINFAR Theater to the soldiers and officers who represented all the troops who will take part in the 10-million ton sugar harvest. He began his speech saying that the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a decisive factor in this 10-million ton sugar harvest and that a maximum effort has been made to keep back only leaders and personnel absolutely necessary for the maintenance of equipment, to maintain some units in full fighting readiness, and to keep some courses in progress. He added that although this is an almost total mobilization this does not mean that we are going to be disarmed. There will always be forces available against any attempt to attack us, and something more important, there is always the ability to mobilize all the armed forces and the people quickly in case of a large-scale aggression. Fidel said that during these 10 years we have lived under an almost permanent combat alert and our country has had to devote most of its energies and best contingents of men to the defense of the country, which is under a condition of permanent danger and threat of aggression. He emphasized that a large number of men have taken up the machete but their weapons are within reach. [Havana domestic service report ends at this point. PRENSA LATINA text follows:] Many of the original comrades, a very large proportion of the comrades who participated in the initial struggle in the mountains, have remained in the armed forces during these years. That is, during this period our country has had to dedicate most of its energy and the best of its contingents to the defense of the fatherland, in a situation of constant danger and threatened aggression. Now, a large number of men have simply taken their machetes, but their weapons are at arms reach! And, of course, if they should force us to interrupt the harvest to face an aggression, I am absolutely certain that it would hurt us very much, it would hurt the people if their effort, for which they have been preparing all these years, were interrupted. Undoubtedly, the pain, the hate, and the decision with which they would fight could not be surpassed by any other circumstance. Some counterrevolutionary spokesmen talk about petty invasions, infiltrations, and things of the sort. We already know quite well what the prescription is for some of those actions. We recall how the counterrevolutionary bands of Escambray--when for a while there was the illusion that guerrillas could be organized against a revolutionary country--forced us to mobilize many men, to invest much funds to liquidate those bands. But they were eradicated completely and totally, because those who tried such adventures against the revolution knew what awaited them. Likewise, if in the midst of this harvest they try to interrupt us, if during this harvest they execute infiltrations in our country, what we can assure them beforehand is that none of them will leave here alive! What we can assure them is that those who survive in combat will die anyway before the firing squad! Our soldiers in battle try to exterminate the enemy, but when they surrender they are made prisoners. This is normal and a historical practice from the beginning, from the first nuclei of revolutionary fighters, which we have maintained and will continue to maintain. Our soldiers do not fire on a person who lifts his hands, because from that moment the task is not his any more, from that moment the matter becomes one for the revolutionary tribunals and the laws! But the law is going to be applied with special vigor against those who attempt to interrupt the work of a people who completely, body and soul, undertake a task that is as decisive as this. So let this be a warning to the charlatans and to the counterrevolutionary merchants of adventure. Now, let us concentrate on the main matter of this meeting this evening. There are representatives here from all the units that are to take part in the harvest. Already there are many contingents in the canefields, others are preparing to leave for the fields, and others will incorporate during the harvest. In all--we will provide some figures--the Revolutionary Armed Forces will incorporate 54,612 men in the first period, beginning in November; by January, 67,632 men will have been incorporated, and during the final phase 75,240 men will participate. These figures include only a portion, the officers and soldiers who will operate the Henderson combine machinery. Here is included approximately half of that personnel that during this first phase will participate as cutters until the combines for the harvest are completed. So, counting these comrades, the total will be approximately 80,000 men. But there is a reserve, besides--We want to think of it really as a reserve, which will be employed in critical places, when in each of these places maximum effort has been made with available resources. We have a reserve of approximately 25,000 men. It is taken for granted that at a specified moment during the harvest an important part of these reserves will be employed. We have classified them in order of priority, so that having to employ all the reserves under certain circumstances would be painful since some of them are made up of persons who work in very important activities. And, of course, we hope we will not have to employ all the reserves. I really have the deep conviction that if we work well, if we correctly employ the resources we have, it will not be necessary to mobilize all the reserves. Undoubtedly, it will be necessary to mobilize the 25,000 men to complete the harvest of the 10 million. But approximately 100,000 men from our armed forces will participate in this harvest. And that is a respectable figure. Of course, our armed forces are of a respectable size, considering the size of our country. But also,among all revolutionary countries, among all socialist countries, our country is in a peculiar situation in that we are located only 90 miles from imperialism, that is, the most powerful imperialist; a power that carries on its aggressive wars as far as 15,000 and 20,000 kilometers from its own coasts. We have had to live these years and we will live these years and we will have to live many more years in the face of this reality, which we cannot disregard or forget even for an instant. We are very far away from the socialist countries. We are here alone, geographically, 90 miles from the United States. And this is one of the reasons, the principal reason why we are obliged to keep a powerful army. Sometimes it is reported that the Cuban army has so many men, so many weapons, and that it is the strongest armed force in Latin America. Analyzing it from the standpoint of the number of men and by the technological knowledge that we possess, it is without a doubt the strongest. But if it is analyzed also with relation to its technical training, the revolutionary content of that force,the objective of that force, the spirit of the force, and besides, if the rest of the people are taken into account, undoubtedly it is an objective reality that our country, from a military point of view, cannot be compared with any other Latin American country, and, of course, this is not because we have arms as our hobby, but because this has been a really important need in our country. But with all this, the fact that at a given moment 100,000 men of our armed forces, without counting the Interior Ministry--which also has made an important contribution, within its possibilities, to the 1970 harvest--are participating, is equivalent to saying that the greater portion of our armed forces will be taking part in this harvest battle. This has a series of implications--revolutionary implications, economic implications, and political implications. In the first place nothing pleases us more than to know that you will participate in this decisive battle of the revolution because the revolution sometimes has to fight battles with arms in hand, and other times--and this is very important too--with instruments of labor. And the economy is an important part of the revolution. The economic front has been where the enemy has tried to hit us and destroy us. Our economy was the target of imperialism when with its blockade it tried to sink us, to sink the revolution. Economy is a very important front of the revolution, one that has received most of the enemy attacks. So, when the revolutionary army participates in that front decisively, it is fighting, it is waging an action that cannot be deemed less important than the action it has to fight with weapons in case of aggression, in case of an invasion. In other words we, the revolutionaries, should realize there is not only one front: there are various fronts. At one moment the battle is waged on this front, and at another on another front. We must work in that direction ,since that is a struggle that does not wait for events but is constantly being waged. Moreover, there is nothing more pleasing than to think that our armed forces are decisively participating in this struggle. We cannot fail to recall the origin of the armed forces, origins which were so modest in the beginning--of such small contingents of men in the first phase--and how, over these years the struggle has been accumulating a volume of experience, a volume of experience, a volume of organization, a volume of tremendous experience--how it has grown, nourished from the people, and how it has grown as the needs demanded. But undoubtedly this a triumph of morale, a triumph of the revolution, and a triumph of our cause. One fact which to us indeed constitutes a reason for pride--much much more than the magnitude of our strength, much more than the magnitude of our technology--is the fact that we can say in this continent that our armed forces, an essential part of the revolution, an essential part that is indissolubly united with the people, is an institution that participates in the tasks of development in a decisive way. In other countries of Latin America attempts have been made for the so-called civic participation of the armed forces, but these have been limited to constructing a small stretch of road, a little highway, or a small school. From the historic point of view, from the social point of view, from the political point of view, the fact that are armed forces are not a privileged segment of the population in a country that must face arduous tasks--as occurs in all the Latin American countries--is a highly revolutionary thing. The armed forces do not constitute an unproductive segment of the country, but basic factors in the development and work of the country. This fact, more than our arms, more than our technology, points up the essential difference between our armed forces and the armed forces of the rest of the Latin American countries. It is fitting to point out that there is one country at this time where the armed forces are playing a revolutionary role. As you know, this country is Peru. Without a doubt this too is an all-important event, for the armed forces were the instruments in those countries which imperialism always used to preserve its privileges and maintain its hegemony. This is why we should observe the unfolding of the political process in Peru with deep interest. For there, without the slightest doubt, a new phenomenon, an important phenomenon has occurred. This is why when I talk of other countries I do not talk about all the countries. Rather, I say almost all the countries of Latin America, because it is necessary, even good, even pleasing, to be able to mention some exceptions. But this circumstance of the role being played in our country by the armed forces also stands as an example for all the rest of the underdeveloped world--it blazes a path. This is because without a doubt all the countries that are developed due to the problems they have with colonialism, with imperialism, will have to pay special attention to their military defense and possess strong armies. For countries that do not have a developed industry, that do not have a developed economy, the need to have strong armies undoubtedly constitutes a heavy burden for their effort. But our country points the way: It points to a new type, the new character of the armed revolutionary institutions. Armed institutions will have to exist for a long time, armed revolutionary forces will have to exist in countries as long as imperialism exists. Thus the illusions that the revolutionaries or some revolutionaries entertained, at one time or another, that once the exploitation of classes vanished they could wholeheartedly devote themselves to the people and work, that expenditures of energy and resources for the armed institutions would be unnecessary, are totally groundless. As long as imperialism exists, and as long as the country must defend itself from foreign aggressions emanating from imperialism--even when the revolution has been totally consolidated in the internal order; even when the society of exploiters and exploited has vanished; even when the fundamental role and function of the armed institutions in those societies, which had been to preserve the sway of the exploiters over the exploited, has vanished; and even when those circumstances of internal order have totally vanished in any country--the circumstances of international order will force those revolutionary countries to possess numerous and strong military contingents and to give special attention to the problem of the armed institutions for an indefinite time. Now then, in our country, that contradiction--between the country's poverty, between the underdevelopment of the economy, between the tremendous demand of energy and resources to undertake in a few years what other countries have accomplished in 100 or 200 years--that contradiction has been resolved by us precisely through the decisive and fundamental participation of our armed forces in the tasks of development. This is why in this case, and at this decisive moment, in this decisive battle, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba are playing a decisive role. We have talked of the numbers of men. The entire country has mustered huge forces for the harvest; the civilian organizations and a huge number of workers and peasants have been mustered by the party and the Central Organization of Cuban Workers; the youths have been mustered by the Centennial Youth Column; middle school students have been mustered. This means that the decisive forces in this harvest, the fundamental forces are: the mustered workers and peasants, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Centennial Youth Column, and the students of the technological institutes and the pre-university students. These are the decisive forces. There are very few of the common canecutters left, as you know. That category of workers ceased being built up since the triumph of the revolution. Many of the oldtime workers were workers of 55, 60, and even more years of age; tens of thousands of these old canecutters were retired. Many other caneworkers participated in the revolutionary process; these were incorporated into the ranks of the revolution and became revolutionary soldiers, workers of the revolution. Many others were also taken into the Interior Ministry. All-in-all we have constant evidence of this: At a given moment a group of comrades organized a microbrigade of canecutters and some extraordinary macheteros begin to stand out. Then there are the comrades in escorts, in the state security, and comrades who work in various activities. Then we say: "well, why is this?" And the answer is: "He used to be a canecutter," "He was born in a canefield," or "he has cut cane for years." And we constantly found one of the old canecutters who cut 500 or 600, or 700 [measure not given], though they now have different jobs. Many other canecutters, since it was logical and just, were made operators of tractors and general equipment. There are 50,000 tractors in our country today and there were 5,000 or 6,000 prior to the revolution. A large number of those equipment operators came out of the ranks of regular canecutters, many others have become agricultural technicians, inseminators, or have entered technological institutes. When a school for equipment operators was opened, how could one deny the right of a man who spent 10 years, 15 years cutting sugarcane to become an equipment operator? So that category was constantly reduced. Thus, you arrive at a railroad spur--spur number such and such--where 200 canecutters are needed and there are seven regulars, 15 regulars. The regulars in this harvest of 1970, after 11 years of revolution, possibly constitute 10 or 15 percent of the harvest labor force. So that totally, during this harvest, in a given moment, there will be some 350,000 men cutting cane. We must say--as we pointed out during the ceremony beginning the harvest--that the estimate were made on relatively low yields by the men doing the cutting: that the estimates have been made with yields practically of 100 to 105, 110 arrobas to start with. If we are going to talk on the problem of the productivity of the cutters, we must, with all sincerity, say the following: That these phenomena serve to show the fact that in our country work habits really did not exist. Let us not talk about work discipline. We must bear this in mind: The essential contradiction that is disappearing with the revolution and the possibilities it has created for the workers is the oldtime canecutter. Thus, a category of worker that was on the bottom rung of living conditions is disappearing. It was the worker who impatiently, sorrowfully, uncertainty, waited whole months until the moment arrived in which they let him cut 100, 150 arrobas every day, and it was not all that he could cut. Because in that era, with the huge army of unemployed which we had in the country, even then the quota of daily cutting was rationed and the cutters did not always cut what they wanted to cut, and during those restricted harvests and a mass of half million unemployed, many of whom received a quota of sugarcane which they could cut, and they had not only to cut it by hand, but also carry it by hand! So that there were a large number of people hoping to become canecutters. Dozens of thousands of workers spontaneously went from Oriente, Las Villas, and other provinces to cut sugarcane in Camaguey. Now, that could have been substituted only by machines. But since sugarcane cultivation is in tropical areas, fundamentally in underdeveloped countries, and almost all the countries had the same problems Cuba had, the machines could not have been introduced because it would have resulted in unemployment. The same things happened with bulk sugar and with many other activities. You will recall the strikes which the workers were forced to carry out against the machines simply because they took the work away from them and left them hungry. In that situation, sugarcane mechanization would not be developed practically in any country. In a country like Hawaii, which is a territory of the United States and where there is sugarcane, they developed a number of different methods which did not prove satisfactory in our country. They used bulldozers to move the sugarcane; then they had to use huge quantities of water washing it, employing huge investments to do all that, and besides, each enterprise developed its own different technique. That is why being a difficult product to harvest--not like rice, you can see how easy it is to harvest rice in a combine, because the harvesting of rice has been mechanized for some time. The mechanized harvesting of corn and wheat was developed in industrial countries--adequate machinery for sugarcane cutting was never developed. Here, we had to start inventing, to start that difficult and long road with the first combines with all the problems derived not only from the harvest, but the terrain, the rocks, the tree stumps. Many of the areas in Camaguey must be virtually cleared again with bulldozers because the tree stumps remain, because those lands and other irregular terrain were cleared by hand for dozens of years. And that has been the process. The first combines were made in the Soviet Union, then some Cuban designs were manufactured until the design of a strong machine, not too complicated, which apparently is the one with the greatest possibilities to solve the problem combined with the distribution centers, has been definitely achieved. The first combines cut and cleaned but the fact is that we had to put what amounted to a distribution center on top of each combine because it had to have enough blowers, belts, and equipment to clean the trash. They were fragile and complicated machines. The distribution center made to increase the productivity of the canecutter turned out to be the ideal equipment to combine with this new machine, which cuts the sugarcane but does not clean it. Thus, at this time, considering the upper part of the La Libertadora machine--because La Libertadora was still the old concept without distribution center, that is: the machine with the distribution center on top. Now the Henderson is a bulldozer which has a device--a strong machine which cuts the sugarcane and carries it to the distribution center. [sentence as received] In that way we can be progressing with the distribution centers. That is why the program to build 300 distribution centers next year has been established. That is a tremendous effort, what it means in the industrial setup is to provide electricity and solve all the problems which are part of that kind of enterprise and to try to assemble some 300 centers every year. And by 1973, practically the whole country will have distribution centers. Logically, we will first have distribution centers, then machines for all the areas. You know that we have quite a bit of sugarcane in hilly terrain where no machine can be used. In the next years, to achieve 100 percent, we will have to relocate areas,including the dismantling of some mills, and build some new mills to arrive at the mechanized 100 percent. But first we will arrive at the 100 percent in the distribution centers and later, at last, at the 100 percent with distribution centers and machines to cut the cane. The machines must be mounted on bulldozers. The acquisition of all those bulldozers is going to be a hard task. The construction of all those machines implies a task of years. And we are thinking of building for next year, for the next harvest, no less than 600 machines and try to reach some 1,000 machines per year. This means [word indistinct] 1,000 bulldozers per year only for the cane combines. Nonetheless, this was a genuinely difficult task, one which had no precedent in any other country, but which was necessary to resolve. But this took more years than the disappearance of the category of the regular canecutter. In other words, there will be 350,000 men cutting cane, at a given moment, in this harvest. It must be said--as we pointed out at the beginning of the harvest--that the estimates were made on the basis of a relatively low yield per cutter; that the estimates were made on a virtual initial yield of 100, 105, and 110 arrobas. But if we are going to dwell on the productivity of the canecutters, we should with all sincerity say this: That these phenomena serve to point up the fact that there actually had been no working habit in our country. We are not talking about working discipline. That discipline is hard to find in a country lacking a highly developed industry. Industry does much for disciplining a worker in view of the productive processes involved. A country with few industries, a country, the majority of whose population are peasants who are used to working like an ox, with a hoe, and beginning to work at this or that hour, or to wait for rain... amid such an uncertain situation with uncertain factors for carrying out work, had no conditions to develop the habit of working. The harvests were carried out with relatively low yields. For actually, as I explained before, there was an excess of canecutters and furthermore, the country had neither habits nor organization for working. When the loader is introduced, when the truck is introduced, and when the tractor-drawn carts are introduced, all this demands control, all this demands organization, all this demands maintenance, all this demands precision, all this demands discipline. You know from experience drawn from the new military techniques: that modern armament, electronic equipment, the tanks, the modern weapons pose a series of exigencies that did not exist and even less when we had the guerrilla army; that the problem boiled down, perhaps, just to a small oil can for oiling the rifle once in a while, or just attending to the ammunition, a knapsack, a little food, or a small gun, a squadron, a sometimes a column, to be moved forward. We had none of all these enormous problems of services, supplies, and maintenance demanded by modern technology. To reach the present level of discipline in our armed forces it was necessary to promote the task of mastering the technology and to possess a new and demanding technique. It must be said that that technology has decisively contributed to the process of rapidly developing the organization and discipline of our Revolutionary Armed Forces. For otherwise all the means of combat of all those units could not be managed in peacetime and even less in war. By the same token, when the loaders, trucks, tractors,--almost all the hauling is being done by tractor and combine, and not oxcarts--required discipline, precision, exactness. These habits were nonexistent. We should furthermore say, with all candor....because every country should be cognizant of its virtues as well as its defects, that this is not a question of the disdainful concept which the reactionaries had of our people, when they justified their actions by saying: "The one who gets ahead works," "all the people are lazy," or all those things. That is not the case because, all to the contrary, the people on many occasions have given infinite proof of their spirit for sacrifice, work, and a willingness to do anything. The problem hinges on habits, discipline, and precision--habits that did not exist. And what historic factors helped accomplish this? It must be said that slavery as an institution existed here for almost 4 centuries; all heavy and hard work was done by men in chains under the fierce lash of a taskmaster. When that hateful institution disappeared as a result of our independence struggles--and there followed conditions which converted our country into a semicolony--labor forces were frequently imported to do that type of work. Either that, or the conditions of hunger and poverty set aside a large part of the mass and foisted on them difficult conditions for such activities. So too, the philosophy that whoever worked was a fool prevailed for many years. It was thought that the smart one did not work, that the smart one went into politics, that the smart one invented some business. Thus it was that for years, up to the revolution, physical work by man was practically despised and denigrated. Moreover, this virtually became the philosophy of many persons. The conditions of capitalist exploitation, the corruption, the politicking, for decades were inculcating the poison, the abhorrence of work, which was looked upon almost like punishment. All these historic conditions influenced underdevelopment more. The handicraft methods of production greatly contributed toward this country's not acquiring working habits. With the revolution, an awareness, enthusiasm, were acquired. But enthusiasm alone does not solve the problem; awareness alone does not solve the problem, though it is fundamental. Creating the habit of working, the habit of organization, even for precision, requires a culture. This requires a level of culture that our country did not have. Or with a man who did not know how to sign his name, with a man who did not know even how to add, or estimate anything, it was difficult to organize anything. Furthermore, many tasks are complex: the task of directing the movement in a sugar central, the itinerary of trains, the program. So, we are not studying things, even to the point of producing the first computer which in a sugar central will daily indicate the best itinerary for the trains. This is because a program is made but circumstances constantly change. Thus this problem is such that to solve it adequately even having checkers there, well-trained men to calculate things is not enough; because no one can assure that the calculation is the best. In addition, the number of factors and elements that must be handled daily is too great to enable executing the program in the best way. However, there is a possibility of charting the itinerary of the trains and the distribution of the transportation equipment by means of setting computers in each sugar central. Look at how even our traditionally historic sugar industry needs modern technology, needs electronics, needs computers, needs computers to carry out its work in optimum conditions. The level of the population's training, which had been very low, the level of culture could not help, and in no way whatever help in the organization, the precision, and the discipline of the working habits. For any time that a man stops his tractor or truck at a corner, or forgets to send the trains to the loaders, or miscalculates, he creates all kinds of difficulties. Right now, to carry out the work at the loaders, the carriers, the carts, the loaders, and the cars must all be on the spot to carry out the daily work. If there is a lack of trains, the canecutters logically must stop work; if there are no lifters the cane piles up in the fields; and if there is a lack of drying equipment, it is indeed some kind of problem.... Almost anything can interrupt the process. Moreover, our country--and I repeat and insist on the point--never had these working habits, and it is these that are being developed. I would go so far as to say that at this phase of the 10 million, one of the most important things, one of the most important byproducts that we are going to acquire is a greater habit for work, a greater organization, and a greater discipline. This fact is genuinely notable and historical for our country; it will not be the slaves who performed the hard work in the past nor the unemployed threatened with being starved in the recent past who will insure the obtaining of a harvest that will astonish the world by its size. Our country will have reasons to be highly proud of that harvest--and this will be a historical change that completely upturns, that completely changes the concepts that held sway in our country for centuries--to be carried out by men who are not driven by hunger, unemployment, or poverty, and to be done by the participation of the people mobilized by the CTC, the MINFAR, the Youth Column, the students, and entirely new forces. And there is not the slightest doubt but that this stands as something which was brought about gradually but nonetheless is still a veritably historic event: It is still hard work, but it will not be done by the slaves; it is still hard work, but it will not be done by men threatened with starvation. And this fact, without any doubt will net us something every important for the future; discipline, and working habits. It no longer will be just a question of overflowing enthusiasm to do things any which way; it no longer will be just a question of a desire, nor just awareness, but rather organized awareness and effort used in the most intelligent way. And even when in the not too distant future those activities will be done by machine, this does not mean that once the problem of mechanizing the cane, of cutting the can,e this industry will be held back in the country. All to the contrary, our country will enter new phases of economic development, more complex phases; the needs are enormous in all fields, in construction, in industry. We are entering a phase of genuine industrial development. The enemies of the revolution have become tired of talking foolishly about whether Cuba has attempted an accelerated development of industry and later abandoned all that and turned to single crops cultivation. They will awaken from their illusions in a hurry because there never has been less one-crop cultivation than now. The 10 million amazes them and they believe we are only dedicated to sugarcane. Agriculture will be notably diversified. We must say that it was almost 80 percent of the gross product of agriculture. It will turn out to be 20 or 25 percent of the gross product of Cuban agriculture. And I am not talking about sugar--which is still less--, I say sugarcane because there will be much more sugarcane than for the 10 million and it will be devoted to other uses also related to agriculture such as livestock, milk production, beef, poultry, hogs. We can say that sugarcane will be the fundamental base of the concentrates to fatten cattle, pigs, and poultry. In short, sugar will be approximately 15 percent of our gross agricultural product in 1980. The sugarcane will, as a whole, be a little more because it will also participate in support of other aspects of agriculture. Thus never--paradoxically--has there been less single crop cultivation than in the 10 million tons of sugarcane campaign. The rice plans have a tremendous impetus so that--as we said a few days ago--you will have another phenomena in 1971: There will be a surplus of hundreds of thousands of tons of rice after eating all the rice that we want to eat; it is another one of the plans which is quickly progressing. The transformation of livestock by insemination and other techniques. [sentence as received] In short, we are working in all aspects of agriculture. In regard to the production of feeds, we have also progressed--quite a bit in the fishing industry which has had a tremendous increase in these years. But we entered a serious phase of the industrial development. It was right to emphasize the effort in agriculture. We had to guarantee, first and foremost, feeding for the people; that was essential. But important industrial installations have been built, above all in energy, in electricity, in cement, mechanical industry, fertilizers, and so forth. Of course, not yet in the volume which the country needs. But the industrial development of the next years is going to be approximate to or equal to the development of agriculture in these years. And agriculture will continue to be developed naturally will need many industries to process the products, but industry in general is going to have a tremendous flowering in the next 10 years so that we, with an insured feeding base, are already entering a serious industrial type of development of which we have spoken in general terms. We have not wanted to be precise simply because we do not want--many of our plans are being studied, being analyzed, but they are advanced--to alert the imperialists to our fundamental objectives so that they will not devote too much time to sabotaging what we want to do. We have to say that the blockade is ever more unpopular and the blockade is ever more full of holes, and really prestigious for our country. The officials of the revolution receive attention everywhere they go. Interest is expressed in industrial techniques. The attention they receive is tremendous. But, in any event, we are seriously studying the development of the country from 1970 to 1980 and it will be fundamentally industrial. What does that mean? That we need increasingly more organization, more work habits. Then, it will not be the problem of the manual cutting of the sugarcane, but the development of a series of activities which require a population with high technical standards, which require work habits, discipline habits, even though it will not be the physical labor of the canecutting type. All we are going to accumulate in these years is going to be decisive for the country in the future. Then we will have to say that the estimate for the sugarcane cutting has been low. Everyone who has cut sugarcane knows what it is to be 2 hours, 3 hours, 4 hours, 8 hours, and even 10 hours cutting sugarcane; everyone who has cut sugarcane knows what an average man, not a supercutter, not--as we said the other day--one of those Oriente Province soldiers who averaged more than 800 arrobas in the month of August, leading us to the conclusion that with the conditions of the climate in Oriente, the heat in Oriente in the month of August, that was undoubtedly a great deed--But average men know what can be cut in 1 hour, in 4 hours, and in 8 hours. And anyone knows that when they have some training in the sugarcane, when the first days go by - because the sugarcane has its traumatic moments, the moment in which every bone in the cutter aches, in which all the hands have blisters, in which the trash, everything, is an arduous job, those first traumatic moments--when the first calluses appear on the hands, when the body adapts a little to the activity, any cutter without hurrying, in cane which is not out of this world, can cut 120 arrobas after having been in the field a few days. Everyone knows that even a figure of 200 arrobas in one day is not a great effort, not even for an old man, not even for an old man! A young comrade, 20 to 25 years old--it is possible that maybe men 40, 50 years old, have stronger bones, as we say--undoubtedly, if we see him walking, practicing a sport, we see that that young comrade does not get tired. When athletes are being trained they keep at them for 4 hours executing tremendous exercises. And a young man who cuts for eight hours, if he does not have problems with the spinal cord, if he does not have any organic problem--we are talking about cases of normal persons--who seriously cuts for 8 hours, can cut 20 in the second or third week of cutting cane and can cut 300 when he has been cutting for 2 months. If not, let us have a test some day: We will choose any 30 men. We will submit them to a test with a determined type sugarcane, normal sugarcane--not sugarcane in optimum conditions, no; not Casa Grande blue cane superdeveloped in 18 months; no, in a normal sugarcane--proving that a man seriously working during 8 hours can cut 200 arrobas, and without an extraordinary effort can surpass the 200 arrobas. Now, it is necessary that a man who undertakes a task of 2 hours, 3 hours, 4 hours, work seriously, that he goes for that purpose. If he converts the canefield into a club, into a place of conversation, a place where everything is talked about, then the yield will greatly decrease. If one does not concentrate on the cane, then, naturally, the yield will drop. But a man who works seriously for 8 hours can easily cut, not for the distribution center but for the crane, an average man, more than 200 arrobas. A little willingness is required, a bit of tenacity is needed, and a bit of philosophy is also needed. If one understands the importance of the matter; if it is understood that this work of the present is going to free us in the future--by means of machines--from precisely this kind of physical effort; if it is clear that this work has to be done by us--the people, that we are no longer living in times of slavery, luckily, that in our situation if our country wants to advance, if it wants to develop, it must face its obligations seriously and resolutely, and that we are not working for the owner of a sugar mill or a plantation, that we are working for the country--for the whole country, and that each cane that is cut is going to benefit the whole country, and that labor is taken in a spirit of sportsmanship and enthusiasm... Because, after all, every time a man has to face a problem this becomes a test for that man. It is a test of his character, a proof of his will, a test of his integrity as a revolutionary and as a man. And the concept of man implies the disposition to face tests and labor. It is true that the work is rigorous in the same way that it is rigorous to climb a mountain, to walk long hours climbing hills and mountains. We have sometimes seen university students climbing the mountains for the first time, full of bruises, and after a week, 2 weeks, they adapted and were able to accomplish their task. We have all had to climb hills, and hills always cause fatigue, hills are always difficult, especially when one is carrying a sack on his back. And yet, when we had no need to climb hills, we frequently felt the desire to do so, to repeat these difficulties, to climb hills with a sack on our back, to walk long distances. And we always feel satisfaction when we remember the time when we faced up to this task and were victorious. And we shall always remember with pride each effort realized; and we shall remember with the most pride that which cost us more, not that which cost us less. We shall always remember with greater satisfaction the difficult, not the easy! I am certain that work of this kind will serve to temper a man's spirit, to strengthen his character, to make him harder, to make him a better fighter. It is no longer a test of valor to face a risk. Another kind of valor is needed--the valor of perseverance, the valor of tenacity, the valor of resistance. This is an important morale matter. It is what draws us closer to the true concept of the revolutionary, to the concept of manhood. And more than of manhood, of a revolutionary, which--as Che used to say--is the most honorable title, the highest post to which any man can aspire--to be a revolutionary! That is what draws us close to those men who have made history, that is what draws us toward our Mambises. Ten years of fighting under such difficult conditions against better equipped armies, suffering terrible hunger, terrible sufferings of all sorts, 10 years! And we always admire the tenacity with which are Mambises resisted and persisted for 10 years, and the fact that those who fought during those 10 years fought also in 1984. What for? Only to see the country taken away. Only to see our country in the hands of the Yankee invader. To see the country in the hands of shameless politicians, thieves of all kinds. After so many years of struggle they did not have the satisfaction to say "this is our country, we own these lands and this wealth, we are master of our future." And our generation has struggled, our generation has made sacrifices. But this cannot be compared--and I say this sincerely--with what other generations, less fortunate than we are, have done; it cannot be compared with those who fought for 10 years. Our struggle was shorter, our effort was less. We have, however, worked for the last 10 years. War is not the only thing that counts. At one time war was the measure of the people's disposition to serve the country. During these years, war has occasionally been this gauge; but more often, work has been the measure of our disposition to serve our country and to serve a cause. But we have had a special privilege--we have inherited the efforts of those who struggled during 10 years. We have had the privilege of seeing our country freed from the hands of an intruder, freed from the hands of fat owners of sugar centrals, of lands, of which whole caballerias were bought--they bought land by maps for a few measly pesos, then enslaved the combatants, their descendants, the people, by means of the economic conditions of capitalism. We have had a rare privilege--we have been freed of all that. We may have an inefficient administrator and we suffer, but he is not mister so and so and we teach him or change him if he is not fit for the post. We suffer other things, but is is in our own hands to solve them. No one hinders us or can hinder us, only our own limitations, only our lack of vision, only our own inability to resolve our problems can prevent us, only our technical level, our cultural level, for which we have struggled, are struggling, and must struggle even more in the future. For the first time we can say "this land, this factory, all that our eyes can see, is Cuban." All that your eyes can see is the people's. There is no other owner but the people; all benefits derived belong to the people. And this is the privilege that this generation has had--it is a generation that has reaped the struggles of Cubans during 100 years! It has this opportunity for the first time. Of course, future generations will have other tasks. Perhaps they will have it easier. They will have other living conditions, made possible precisely by this generation. But what is the least that we can do--those of us who reap the fruit of the sacrifice and effort of Cuban revolutionaries during 100 years, those of us who have had this opportunity--But to fulfill our duty, with honor, but to do something for the present, and to do all that we are doing for the future. This is how all-soldiers, workers, students, youths of the youth column, and the few regular (?canecutters) that are left in the country--should undertake their task with regard to the 1970 harvest. A few days ago we explained the decisive economic importance of this harvest; not only the political importance, but the economic, and basically the economic. We do not want the 10 million [tons] simply so that we can proudly say that "we have produced 10 million!" Is this a matter of honor? Yes; honor is involved in this. Is it a matter of fulfilling one's word! Yes; our word is involved. But this matter is decisive for our economy, it is decisive for our future, it is what is going to open the way to great achievements in the future. That is what we must think about. We must fulfill our task with enthusiasm, thinking of its importance, and thinking--as I was saying--of the fact that this is what draws us close to our Mambises, to the revolutionaries. It is what draws us close to all that we have admired. It is what draws us close to the fighters who gave their lives in the mountains during the war, or in the underground, the fighters who gave their lives in Giron, the fighters who gave their lives in Escambray, the fighters who gave their lives in Bolivia or in other places serving the cause of the revolution. This is what draws us close to the good revolutionaries, the heroes, the martyrs of our country's history. This is what draws us close to those who fell, those who gave more than we did, for they gave their all. They could not even live to see this moment of beginning the work, the moment of beginning to cut the cane of the first sacks, and the infinite pleasure of cutting the cane for the final sacks, of this economic victory for our country that indubitably will make a deep impression everywhere in the world. Millions of persons anxiously and wishfully await Cuba's success in this endeavor. Representatives of the fighters from such far off places as Vietnam will come to cut cane with us--five fighters of the South Vietnam Liberation Front and five North Vietnamese fighters. Those who have to confront a million Yankee soldiers over there, in a magnificent, extraordinary, and moving gesture, withdraw five men from their battalions to come and cut cane here with us. What a splendid example! And what a symbol of the importance which other peoples are attributing to our country's present effort! Many young men want to come from Europe to cut cane. Hundreds of youths from the United States want to come here to cut cane for the 10 million harvest. Just imagine how bitter and caustic such a gesture of the North American youths is in comparison with those who sought to sink and drown our country! Recently hundreds of Soviet technicians and diplomatic officials also went forth to cut cane so as to participate in the 10 million harvest. And I am sure that if we had the means of brining all the youths willing to participate with us in this task--whose significance they do not overlook--we would most likely have too many cutters. But there is more: We believe that if we put forth a little spirit, if we put forth a little spirit, we would have more than enough [cutters] with what we have. If we put forth a little spirit we can bring the centrals' milling to 100 percent capacity, above all after the first weeks and as the cane's sugar yield reaches the maximum. And you, the comrades who are to direct and coordinate these activities, must keep in mind the need to act, to carry out all the necessary steps so all the factors conducive to the fulfillment of the cutting program, the delivery of fresh cane to the centrals, the drawing of carts, trucks, cranes, the railroad flatcars and all these means--at first we will have some trouble with the loaders because those we ordered for delivery in 1969 are only now arriving, but of what we have we must make the best organized use. We must be attentive to all details, to all those factors of organization. Thus, you can prevail upon, act, and move even in matters that do not depend on you. The army, the armed forces, in discipline par excellence, are the most experienced, the most disciplined. It is necessary that the constructive influence of that organizational discipline, the experience they have, be constantly lent. Every time you see something halting the work of the cutters, holding them up, or affecting the freshness of the cane--all these factors must be kept very much in mind. You can do much in this sense. Targets have been set, but of course those set for cutting in Camaguey are the highest. But actually we should consider these as minimum goals. I trust that these goals will be exceeded. Some targets have been set higher than others. But I can assure you conscientiously that these are modest targets. It has been calculated that the armed forces will cut 18 percent of the cane. We believe that by full use of the reserve, and exerting fighting spirit, conscious that it is a battle like the one they will have to wage in a trench to face an invasion, they can exceed this figure by 18 percent. I sincerely believe--and I am not exaggerating and I am not utopian--that it could be said that with the forces you will muster you can cut up to 30 percent of the 10 million harvest! Logically, if the other forces, such as the column, the technologists [students], the workers and peasants, if the rest of the forces do their utmost, you cannot cut 30 percent. This is because there are enough persons so that it would be hard for you to do so even if you exerted 100 percent of your will. In other words, you have the strength to do this, though I am certain that if the other forces likewise do their utmost it will be hard for them to leave you enough margin to cut the 30 percent. You understand me perfectly well: if the column [Centennial Youth], if everyone raised his quota, everyone would have a high percentage share. Nonetheless, you have the forces for the 30 percent even without using 100 percent of the reserves, but only 15,000 or 20,000 men. This is of tremendous importance. The enemies thought that by threatening us, by harassing us, forcing us to employ great human resources in possessing armed forces to meet the situation, they could do tremendous damage to our economy. But what a lesson! What an example for our enemies! What a lesson to imperialism! What an example for the other peoples, that we should be able to say that in this historic battle the Cuban armed forces played a decisive role, played a fundamental role! By this revolutionary path we thereby resolve the contradiction that they had created for us. In all truth we can feel sure that this victory will hurt the imperialists more than the one of Giron. More than the one of Giron! For this will quash their lies, their false arguments. This will ideologically disarm the reactionaries, the imperialists, and the capitalists. This is because they have tried to make the world believe that man must be a slave, that man must be despoiled by hunger to make him work, that man is incapable of living in a more fraternal, more human way. They have tried to combat revolutionary ideas, the socialist ideas, the communist ideas with the argument that man is capable of carrying out a task only by means of material type pressures. They have bet their all that we cannot; they believe it is impossible, and they are convinced that it impossible that a country which no longer has the oldtime canecutters can harvest 10 million. And what that lesson will mean politically, morally, and revolutionarily is worth more--no doubt about it--much more than the 10 million tons of sugar. It will be a great ideological victory of the revolution and the revolutionary camp! It will be a victory that not only Cuba but hundreds of millions of people will celebrate! It will be a victory that all the socialist countries will celebrate, a great moral victory, a great ideological victory over imperialism, over capitalism, over the reactionaries! A lot of things are being bet at this moment. A lot of things are at stake at this moment. And as for us fighters, for our officials and soldiers who are now going to join in this battle, our wish is that they be like the fighters in Giron, like the fighters of the Escambray, like the combatants of the October crisis, like the Mambises when they carried their machetes. We want them to behave as if the enemy were invading our coasts, to behave as they would in the midst of a war: with all the heroism, with all the valor, and with all the abnegation which they can draw up when defending their cause, when defending their flag! Let us do this in homage to all the fallen, in homage to all who made this fatherland possible, in homage to all who made possible this privilege of seeing the country master of its destinies! Let us do this in homage to all the dead comrades who gave their lives here and in other lands! Let us do this in homage to the great thinkers! Now that we are going to be the standardbearers of the best thinking of Marx and of the best thinking of Lenin, let us likewise do this in homage to Lenin, whose centennial is completed this year! We are now the standardbearers of those ideas, the standardbearer of that cause. Let us defend it with all the dignity and honor of which we are capable, and carry it to victory! Fatherland or Death, We Will Vanquish! -END-