-DATE- 19730104 -YEAR- 1973 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- SPEECH -AUTHOR- F. CASTRO -HEADLINE- ADDRESSES NATION ON AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH USSR -PLACE- CUBA -SOURCE- HAVANA DOMESTIC SVC -REPORT_NBR- FBIS -REPORT_DATE- 19730104 -TEXT- CASTRO ADDRESSES NATION ON AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH USSR Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0132 GMT 4 Jan 73 F/C [Text of speech by Cuban Premier Maj Fidel Castro Ruz from Havana television studios on agreements signed between Cuba and the USSR during his trip to the Soviet Union in December--line, with simultaneous broadcast on domestic television] [Text] As you all know, several days ago we visited the Soviet Union with the delegation of our party and government to the festivities of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. Regarding the high quality of the events held during that commemoration, its significance and the participation by our delegation, the media have reported abundantly on all these matters. It was on this same visit to the Soviet Union, on 23 December, that our delegation signed with the leadership of the party and the Soviet Government a number of economic agreements. This is precisely what we want to report to the people tonight. Five economic agreements were signed. I am going to explain the contents of these 23 December agreements. The first agreement is one between the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR on the deferment of payments for credits granted to the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba. That is, this first agreement covers the refinancing of our debt to the Soviet Union. I am going to read the main articles. The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR have concluded the present agreement based on the following: Article I--The Government of the USSR, in accepting the wishes of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba, expresses its concurrence in deferring payments that the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba must meet during the years 1973 to 1985 for the payment of Credits granted to Cuba up to January 1973. This will permit balancing the reciprocal accounts on commercial trade and providing economic and technical aid, including the interest which will be earned during the year 1972 in accordance with Cuban-Soviet agreements, protocols and letters which are listed in the attached enclosure to the present agreement. Article II--The debt that might accumulate up to 1 January 1986 as a result of the credits granted in accordance with agreements, protocols and letters listed in the attached enclosure to the present agreement, plus the interest earned in the year 1972, will be paid through equal yearly installments over a period of 25 years beginning on 1 January 1986. In similar fashion, the payments for each calendar year will be made through equal quarterly installments. Article III--The interest that might be earned by the credits granted in accordance with agreements, protocols and letters listed in the attached enclosure to the present agreement will be delayed until the final payment of the credits in question. The second agreement deals with the granting of credits by the Government of the USSR to the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba. Eager to contribute to the future development of trade relations and to further the economic relations that exist between the two sides in the common benefit on a long-term basis, in view of the fact that granting long-term credits to the Republic of Cuba will contribute to the stability of its economic development, and being guided by the principles of international solidarity and friendly cooperation, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR have agreed on the following: Article I--The following credits for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 are granted to cover the trade imbalances estimated by both sides without any interest rate. Article II--The credit granted in accordance with Article I of the present agreement will be utilized during the years 1973 to 1975 in three approximately equal installments in order to cover the balance in favor of the USSR. This refers to the agreement account dated 1 January 1974, 1975 and 1976 for the excess estimated on the value of the delivery of Soviet merchandise and services over the value of the delivery of Cuban merchandise and services during 1973, 1974 and 1975, in accordance with the agreement on reciprocal deliveries of merchandise between the Republic or Cuba and the USSR for the period covering the years 1973 to 1975, which were signed on this date, and the protocols on commercial trade between both countries corresponding to those stated before. The amounts of credit that will be utilized in 1973, 1974 and 1975 will be estimated during the negotiations of the protocols dealing with commercial trade between both countries during said years. Article IV [as heard]--The payment of the credit granted in accordance with Article I of the present agreement will be made by the Government of the Republic of Cuba through the payment of equal yearly installments over a period of 25 years beginning with 1 January 1986. At the same time, the payments of each calendar year will be made through equal quarterly installments. Article V--The payment of credit by the Government of the Republic of Cuba will be made through delivery of merchandise and services to the USSR that the Cuban side can offer and that might be of interest to the Soviet side in accordance with the trade and payment agreements which will have been agreed upon by both sides during the period of payment of the credit and or through exchange of currency which can be converted freely. As you can see, the first agreement deals with debts that have been incurred practically from the beginning of the revolution to January 1973. These debts are postponed to the year 1986. They are postponed and will be paid later over a period of 25 years and without any interest beginning from that date. The second agreement deals with the debts that will have to be incurred during the next 3 years as a result of trade imbalances between Cuba and the Soviet Union. This results from the fact that the imports we receive from the Soviet Union are larger than what we can export to the Soviet Union. The third agreement deals with mutual supply of merchandise between the Republic of Cuba and the USSR during the period 1973 to 1975. This agreement deals with the list of merchandise that the Soviet Union will export to Cuba during the next 3 years, and the merchandise that Cuba will export to the Soviet Union during the next 3 years. The fourth agreement is between the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR on economic and technical collaboration. The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR, beginning with the friendly relations existing between the Republic of Cuba and the Soviet Union and guided by mutual aspirations of broadening and strengthening trade and technical collaboration between both countries, have signed the present agreement based on the following: Article I--The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR will collaborate during the years 1973 to 1975 on the development of the textile, nickel, electric power, oil refinery, transportation and communications industries, the introduction of electronic computer systems in the national economy, mechanization of the harvest, automobile repair plants, geological prospecting, irrigation and water resources, as well as in the training of Cuban national cadres. The works and construction, in which Cuban and Soviet organizations will collaborate, are listed in the attached enclosure to the present agreement. The collaboration between both governments in carrying out these works will be continued in subsequent years. Article II--In providing the technical assistance envisaged in Article I of the present agreement, Soviet organizations will insure fulfillment of the project and research work, and the supplying of the Republic of Cuba, under the conditions C.I.F. [cost, insurance, freight] at Cuban ports, with equipment and materials; they [the organizations] will also send to the Republic of Cuba Soviet specialists who will provide technical assistance in the assembly, adjustment and operation of the equipment supplied by the USSR, and carry out geological and other prospecting; they likewise will receive Cuban specialists and workers for technical industrial training. Article III--For their part, the Cuban organizations will insure the fulfillment of construction and assembly work, geological and other prospecting work, the supplying of materials available in the Republic of Cuba; they [the organizations] will take the necessary measures for selecting and training technical personnel, including directive cadres designated for constructions, completion of the work, and insuring the normal operation of the projects envisaged in Article I of the present agreement. Article IV--To finance the work projects, equipment and materials supplied for construction, rehabilitation and modernization of projects, and for implementing the projects envisaged in Article I of the present agreement, the Government of the USSR will grant the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba a credit up to R300 million. Article V--The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba will repay the credit granted under Article IV of the present agreement over a period of 25 years in equal annual installments beginning 1 January 1976. Funds of the credit used after 1 January 1976 will be amortized by Cuba beginning 1 January of the year following the utilization of the respective part of the credit. During succeeding calendar years, the payments will be made in equal quarterly installments. Interest, according to the credit, will be calculated beginning on the date that the corresponding part of the credit is utilized. It will be paid within the first quarter of the year following the year for which it is calculated. The dates for utilizing credits for paying for equipment and materials will be set according to the dates of shipments, and the work on projects will be paid for according to the dates that bills are presented. The last payment of interest will coincide with the last payment on the principal of the credit. Article VI--The payment of the credit and the payment of interest on it will be made by the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba by means of supplying the USSR with Cuban merchandise, under conditions established in the prevailing Cuban-Soviet trade and payments agreements. The projects and works on which Cuban and Soviet organizations will collaborate include: 1. Construction of two new textile mills. 2. Reconstruction of the existing seven textile mills. 3. General repair and reconstruction of the present nickel plants in Moa and Nicaro, with the expansion of their mining bases. 4. Construction of the first phase of the mining-metallurgical complex of Punta Gorda for producing nickel and cobalt, which will have an annual output capacity of 30,000 tons of nickel and cobalt, with the tonnage estimated in refined metal; as well as the drawing up of other projects and the carrying out of preparatory works. 5. Construction of a thermoelectric power plant on the Isle of Pines with a 25,600-kilowatt capacity. 6. Construction of a 220-kilowatt powerline up to 150 kms long. 7. Supplying Soviet equipment and material for a 110-kilowatt powerline up to 300 kms long, 10 substations, and 900 kms of 33,000-kilowatt powerlines to be planned by Cuban organizations, as well as other equipment to be supplied in agreement with Cuban and Soviet organizations for developing the power distribution networks. 8. Creation of a central shop for repairing thermoelectric plants and transformers, as well as the drawing up of recommendations for organizing the power networks and the building of related projects. 9. Organization of the centralized directorate for the power system. 10. Construction of a 110-kilowatt underground power cable 1,700 meters long. 11. Expansion of present capacities for refining petroleum and producing oils and lubricants, including the supplying of equipment for installing atmosphere-distillation facilities in order to increase petroleum refining capacity up to 900,000 tons annually, and also [equipment] for the transportation of asphalt. 12. Construction of storage facilities for gas and petroleum products. 13. Drawing up of a plan for the overall development of the Republic of Cuba's transportation. 14. Blueprinting and reconstruction of the railway between Havana and Santiago de Cuba, including the supplying of equipment for extraction and classification of rocks. 15. Planning and construction of a plant for producing steel-reinforced cement railroad ties, including the supplying of equipment for producing rail-joint bars. 16. Reconstruction of the ports of the Republic of Cuba, including the reconstruction of two mooring wharfs at the port of Havana and one at the port of Cienfuegos. Drawing up of a technical project for constructing an installation for offloading petroleum, a technical project for building a container-handling terminal, and the supplying of equipment for present port installations and for the technical base for repairing port facilities. 17. Construction of a communications line between Havana and Santiago de Cuba. 18. Reconstruction of the technical base of television, which is the second phase. 19. Introduction of electronic computation into the national economy, including the organization of production for producing spare parts for repairing measuring instruments. 20. Construction of a plant for producing and assembling sugar cane loading and cutting equipment with an annual capacity of turning out up to 600 units, plus the rehabilitation of the sugar cane carts plant, raising its annual output to 3,000 carts. 21. Reconstruction of the "Cuban-Soviet Friendship" auto repair plant. This means trucks and automotive vehicles. 22. Construction of two new plants for repairing trucks. 23. Drawing up of a plan for developing and finding sites for plants for repairing automobiles in the Republic of Cuba. 24. Continuation of the work of geological surveys for useful solid minerals and petroleum. 25. Continuation of the work of soil irrigation and drainage, exploitation of the irrigation system, and drawing up of an overall plan for utilization of Cuba's hydraulic resources. 26. Creation of centers for teaching and technical training of national cadres for the basic branches of industry and agriculture. 27. Plants for producing and assembling transitor television and radio sets. Explanatory note: The scope of the projects and the volume of the work will be established by Cuban-Soviet organizations by means of assessing the projects. The approximate distribution of these credits among the various endeavors is as follows: Textile industry, R81 million; rehabilitation of Nicaro and Moa, R52 million, railroads, R35 million; automotive shops, R 10 million; electric power, R50 million; petroleum industry, R15 million; ports, R12 million; irrigation and drainage, R10 million; geological surveys, R15 million; Punta Gorda complex, R15 million; mechanization of cane, R10 million; television-radio assembly plant, [allocation] remains to be established. The three new units for Mariel [power plant] are not included. These units are to be built between now and 1975. This is because the three 100,000-kilowatt units were included in a previous credit agreement. The fifth agreement. This is the fifth agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the USSR on the prices of sugar and nickel. The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the USSR, in keeping with the desire to contribute to the future development of trade relations and to further economic relations between both countries, considering that the exports of sugar and nickel are of importance to the foreign trade of the Republic of Cuba, in order to create conditions that will stimulate the production of sugar and nickel in Cuba, and in order to eliminate the effects of occasional fluctuations of their quotations on the world market vis-a-vis the economy of the Republic of Cuba, have reached agreement on the following: . Article I--The price of R200 per metric ton, F.O.B. in Cuban ports, is established for raw sugar in sacks to be supplied by the Republic of Cuba to the USSR during the years 1973 to 1980. This is approximately equivalent to 11 cents per pound of sugar. Article II--For products containing nickel plus cobalt to be supplied by the Republic of Cuba to the USSR during the years 1973 to 1980, the price of R4,500 per metric ton of nickel plus cobalt contained in the product, F.O.B. in Cuban ports, is established. This is approximately the equivalent of $5,000 per ton. These are the contents of the agreements. We wish to describe very briefly the importance of these agreements. In the first place, we believe that these agreements are of great significance in every sense. But, if we take into consideration the international situation, the situation of the great majority of the world made up of nations with backward economies, the so-called underdeveloped countries or developing countries as others call them, they are confronting very grave problems, extremely acute problems, regarding how to solve matters dealing with development under the present situation. These problems are related to several aspects of the issue. One of the more difficult and grave aspects that the underdeveloped world has is the problem of foreign debt. Due to the fact that they have urgent needs for development, not to mention survival, they have been forced step by step to make a number of commitments and to increase their foreign debt sharply. There are very few nations that have been able to overcome that situation. Only such countries, those for example which are large producers of oil, are able to do it. There are underdeveloped countries that have... [Castro leaves thought, unfinished] countries of the Third World, which are truly underdeveloped, but are great producers of oil. Internationally, oil has a very high price. The price of a ton of oil in today's world market is equivalent to our selling sugar at 20 or 25 cents [a pound]. There is a difference in that once the oilfields have been found and the processing has begun, there is a very low cost for exploitations. Besides, they need very few men for the operation. The rest of the countries that have to depend on sugar or coffee, or some other minerals which are not oil, face a very difficult situation. In our case, we have to depend on our exports and on our production of sugar, which traditionally has required a little more than a million men per year. It is an industry which the revolution found without mechanization of any kind. Machines did not even exist, that is, machines developed for cutting cane. This is manual labor with very low productivity per man. This situation is similarly being confronted by those nations that have to depend on this kind of production. As a result, the situation has led to large indebtedness. You will recall that a few years following the Cuban revolution, the famous Alliance for Progress came into existence. As a result of the Cuban revolution, the imperialists attempted to introduce some reforms in Latin America and granted certain credits. At the end of a few years, the result was that the Latin American nations were indebted to the United States by $20 billion more. You will recall that during the visit of Comrade Salvador Allende he explained how the underdeveloped world had a debt that amounts to $75 billion. These credits granted by the capitalist governments, as well as by imperialist governments, tend in general to be short-term and with very high interest rates. Allende explained that the situation of the underdeveloped countries in connection with the foreign debt was very grave. He said that it was practically impossible for the underdeveloped countries to satisfy the very large debt that they were burdened with. In the case of Chile, we see that one of the most serious problems in its present situation is a debt amounting approximately to $4 billion that was incurred by previous administrations, above all, the one that preceded Allende's administration, including debts that were incurred when the price of copper amounted to more than 70 cents per pound. This is one of the serious problems that Chile now has. It is a situation in which they are forced to refinance their foreign debt, because they do not have enough resources to pay it off. This country is precisely one where imperialism takes every advantage in trying to asphyxiate it economically. Most of the Latin American nations have an enormous foreign debt. All these problems are taken up in international meetings in order to seek solutions; solutions that cannot be found anywhere. Another problem that the underdeveloped countries have concerns credits for development, not only indebtedness but credits for their future development. In general, these credits are scarce; besides, they are short-term with very high interest rates. In the capitalist world, and unfortunately we occasionally have to obtain equipment and industrial installations from the capitalist area, credits have very high interest rates and very short terms--5 years and, in very few instances, sometimes 8 years. In this regard, imperialism's pressure becomes evident everywhere and, over a period of many years, it was able to prevent Cuba from getting any kind of credits in practically all capitalist countries. In the same measure that imperialism's influence diminished throughout the world, the doors for credit were opened to Cuba. In general these credits are granted under the aforementioned conditions to Cuba and the rest of the nations, that is, they have very high interest rates and are short-termed. Another very serious problem confronted by underdeveloped countries is the problem of unequal trade. This is based on the fact that the products of the industrialized world are increasingly more expensive. This can be noted with any item, any type of bus, any type of equipment, any type of transportation, any industrial installation. The prices of all these products, raw materials of the industrialized world, increase every year. If we compare today's prices to those of 10 years ago, we find that those products have practically doubled in price. Any of those things cost double what they did 10 years ago--above all, the equipment and plants. Yet the products of the underdeveloped world, generally raw materials, or some farm products, are worth less and less every year. Up to very recently, we could observe this regarding our sugar exports to the capitalist world. For years, the price of sugar was below 3 cents. The situation improved with the sugar agreement, later. Prices rose to about 4 cents. But even then the price was below the cost of production. That was at the time of the sugar agreement, but in the past 2 years, due to shortages, at a certain juncture, the price of sugar rose. It is fairly high now, due, of course, to the sugar agreement--the same agreement which protects producers from very low prices and the consumer from excessively high prices. However, we do not sell sugar at the world market price--which is over 9 cents. We now must sell at less than 7 cents, according to the clauses of the sugar agreement. Nonetheless, that has been the case with sugar over recent years. This generally occurs with other countries that produce sugar or some other farm products--coffee, cocoa. This is what has been labeled "the problem of unequal trading." This is brought up in all international conferences, in all the UN organizations. One of the things that is most widely discussed is the problem of unequal trading. Thus the world faces the problem of ever-larger indebtedness, high credits [as heard], pressing conditions, development credits with short-terms, high interests, and harsh conditions, and finally, unequal trading. This means a higher cost for products of industrialized countries, and lower cost for products of the underdeveloped countries. These are very serious problems that worry a large part of the world. There is no solution for them up to now, and no solution appears anywhere. It is in the light of these facts that we can appraise the importance of these agreements signed with the Soviet Union. In the first place, this applies to foreign debt, that is, the credits--so much commercial credit to offset the commercial imbalance we have had over all these years. Then there is the credits for development, debts assumed for this. Payment is postponed until 1 January, 1986--in other words, for 13 years. This is to be paid with Cuban products over a period of 25 years. Furthermore, this is without any interest from the signing of these agreements. In other words, this is an ideal formula for coping with the thorny problem of the foreign debt--a problem that is worrisome for the majority of the world. Secondly, we obtain new credits in connection with commercial trade, for the coming years when we shall need trade credits to compensate for trading. Thus, then, this has been handled in the best way. Cuba is granted the credit it needs to import the merchandise it will require yearly from the Soviet Union over the next 13 years. Those are large quantities. By the same token, payment is put off until 1986, for payment over 25 years, and they [the credits] will not bear any interest whatever. On the other hand, there are non-commercial credits--credits for new investments, for development. These credits are granted us with a very low interest, and the payments run 25 years--not 4, 5, 10, or 15, but 25 years. This is a truly ideal formula for any country like Cuba to cope with the problem of development. Finally, with regard to our products, our main exports, the Soviet Union grants us highly satisfactory prices. The prices which it had been paying--prices far above the average of the world market level--have been raised considerably, and these are guaranteed for the future. Sugar prices have been raised to the equivalent of 11 cents. What does this mean? That for every million tons we export, we shall receive 100 million pesos more--for every million tons. This is 6 cents more than the present price. The same goes for nickel. The average has ranged between $2,000 and $3,000 per ton, on the world market. The USSR is granting us a price of $5,000 per ton. We always have run into difficulties selling nickel on the world market, because the Yankee imperialists exert tremendous pressure on all steel producers of the capitalist world, and also on all the nickel consumers of the capitalist world. Such pressures even go as far as to prohibit the importing of steel or articles manufactured with Cuban nickel. The United States prohibits this. With this measure it has been speculating systematically with our sales of nickel on the world market. This affects our convertible foreign exchange. Another ideal solution to the thorny problem of unequal trading is observed. The prices for Cuba's fundamental products are raised considerably. This will allow us to work out our plans on firm economic bases. Also, in virtue of these agreements, construction of a new nickel plant will be started. It will have a capacity of 30,000 tons. Present production of our two present plants--the Nicaro, which has been producing for years, and the Moa plant, which was not completed when the revolution triumphed--is about 36,000 tons of nickel. But with the new plant we will build with the collabortion of the Soviet Union, we will have an installation with a capacity of producing 30,000 more tons. Construction will begin within the next 3 years. This is why only 15 million of the overall 300 million has been alotted for this--because this provides for only the beginning of the construction. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, however, discussions are being held with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CEMA] for building additional installations, which would be capable of producing an additional 60,000 tons. In other words, we are examining the actual possibility of raising our nickel production by 90,000 tons. These additional installations would be built with the cooperation of the CEMA countries, all of them. This would, in the end, enable us to find a way to develop our mineral resources, with nickel as the basic mineral. Our country has one of the greatest nickel reserves in the world. However, installations for exploiting nickel are very expensive. The investments required are very large. The estimate of the investment required to produce 90,000 tons of nickel is approximately $600 million. This of course, does not include housing, physical installations, sources of energy--in other words, this is only the main investment. To exploit 90,000 tons of nickel the approximate estimate is $600 million. For a country with funds such as ours, such exploitation would be virtually impossible. So now, what is being contemplated is to work intensely on this exploitation with the cooperation of the USSR and the CENA countries in order to achieve this production, which at a cost of $5,000 per ton would mean exports of more than $400 million annually, that is, with this increase in nickel production. There is one very important thing that we should point out, and this is that the proposal for the solution of these problems came basically from the Soviet Union. After considering our problems, difficulties, the nature of our economy, our dependence on a few products from sugar production, as is stated in the agreement, and the inconveniences which the economic blockade causes our country, (?the Soviets) came up with most of these ideas. The initiative was theirs. Therefore, these agreements were reached basically as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union itself. We believe that in the long run this will have great repercussions because it points out a way to follow. This does not mean that a solution will be found. It is very hard to conceive that treatment by the capitalist world, the imperialist world, is going to be in any way similar to the treatment that we are receiving in our economic relations with the Soviet Union. In any case, this is a specific and clear reply to the underdeveloped world's very serious problems, and it is really an ideal way, an exemplary way, of conducting economic relations between an industrialized country and a poor and underdeveloped country, such as ours. In our opinion, this is an unprecedented example. We believe that economic relations such as these--between a great country such as the Soviet Union and a small country such as Cuba--are unprecendented in history. This occurs under conditions in which Cuba has had to struggle for its life 90 miles from the United States, putting up during all these years--practically since the triumph of the revolution--with a criminal blockade by the United States. It is true that the Soviet Union bears in mind Cuba's special circumstances--a small country which does not have easy economic resources and which must earn a living under unfavorable conditions. It bears in mind this blockade situation and for this reason--and bearing these circumstances in mind--establishes this type of economic cooperation with us. But we believe that there is no historical precedent for this type of relations. If we recall our country's foreign relations before the triumph of the revolution--the conditions that were the basis for those relations, U.S. investments, and how from the beginning of the republic they took possession of our natural resources and industries, and exploited us for such a long time--those were ominous conditions established in our country. Recently, Comrade Allende reminded us also of what had happened in Chile, how the imperialist companies had invested $18 million or $20 million a little more than 40 years ago and had extracted from the country profits amounting to $4 billion. This is the type of relations capitalism and imperialism impose on countries. We believe that this [Soviet relations] constitutes an example of the internationalist attitude, of a generous and fraternal attitude without precedent, and an attitude that is truly disinterested. That is why little can be said, since the agreements themselves and their contents express their importance for a country under the conditions of Cuba, and their importance for any country in the world. We also believe that these agreements have a moral importance because to the extent that the internationalist spirit is expressed in them toward our people, to such a high degree as the Soviet Union's spirit is expressed toward us, we should develop to the same extent our own internationalist awareness. Of course, our people have given unquestionable manifestations of this spirit. In recent days they gave two examples: First, with the rapid and disinterested reply with relation to our cooperation with our fraternal Chilean people. In the same way, our people gave a quick reply--which fundamentally implies a moral attitude--to help the brother country of Nicaragua at a time when it is the victim of a great natural catastrophe. Barely a week ago our baseball team was in Managua participating in the world championship and just a few days later the catastrophe occurred in Nicaragua. That is why we--halting or setting aside every type of political consideration and thinking of the suffering of the Nicaraguan people--have made our contribution to the best of our ability by sending our medical teams, medicines and some foodstuffs to Managua. This fundamentally implies a position of principles and a moral attitude of solidarity toward a fraternal Latin American country. We believe that in the same way that an internationalist spirit is manifested in our country, we must be completely aware of this factor to serve as a foundation and a basis for the development of our own internationalist awareness, our spirit of solidarity toward the other countries. These agreements we have outlined do not mean that the road to Cuba's development will be an easy one. There wild not be an easy road to the development of any country. Other countries can easily count on more of their own resources. I repeat the case of petroleum-producing countries. There are countries which have real seas of petroleum in their subsoil although, unfortunately for the people of many of those countries which have great natural resources, these resources in many cases are in the hands of imperialist companies which are the ones that extract the basic profits. There will not be an easy road to the development of any country, nor will there be any easy roads for us either. This means that we with the foreign aid that is indispensable for the development of a country under Cuba's conditions--have solid bases for our development. That is to say solid bases, solid bases in the prices for the fundamental goods of our exports to the socialist camp and solid bases in the credits to carry out our work in the forthcoming years. But it also means a very important moral duty. As we receive much help from abroad, we have the duty of maximum effort. In Cuba, we depend on a few export products--sugar, nickel, tobacco, and in recent years with the development of the fishing fleet, sea products have been increased and developed, Therefore, we essentially have four articles on which Cuba's exports depend. On the other hand, our imports run into thousands of articles--general supplies, raw materials, equipment. Our country needs to import thousands of articles every year. A great part comes from socialist countries and another, lesser part, but of relative consideration, comes from the capitalist area. All these articles must be purchased, transported thousands and thousands of kilometers, and brought to our country for use. This makes it necessary to save these raw materials, take care of the equipment--its maintenance and installations. This is an inescapable moral duty of our people. To make the very best use of this foreign aid is a moral duty. This is the conclusion at which we must arrive in this case. In recent years, especially since 1970, in reply to our plea on 26 July of that year, many activities have improved considerably. It must be pointed out that there has been a great improvement in all activities and work. In 1971, and even more in 1972, these improvements could be noted in production figures published in our papers; there has been a great increase in several sectors. Of course, these increases have their limitations in the capacity of our installations. Some of our industries are operating at full capacity. Another limitation is raw materials, which Cuba has to import for many of its products. So, our possibility for increase is not unlimited and is not easy. Of course, we must bear in mind that our workers have made a great effort in recent years. Organizational and administrative efficiency have also improved. There has been a general improvement. The work is being done with much better quality and seriousness. But this should not serve to make us satisfied or to make us believe that we have done our very best. Some work centers have done their utmost but others have not yet done their best. What is important is that all of us realize the need to continue this same path in the coming years. We must continue to struggle for more productivity and efficiency, for better and more rigorous control, a more precise account of all our economic activities. We must develop an awareness of the need to save in all aspects and to maintain and care of our production equipment. This is the path that we must follow in the future. I repeat, this will not be an easy path--there will be no easy roads. The coming years will be years of sacrifice and struggle because our people--like many other peoples--still have to face the important matter of their development, under difficult conditions. The reports that I am now broadcasting make very encouraging news, very positive news, that we hope will encourage our people in their struggle and work. We hope they will stimulate their political, socialist and communist awareness and their internationalist and revolutionary spirit. I repeat, our revolution has had extraordinary help from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union. Who knows how much suffering this aid has saved our country. Who knows how much suffering our people would have had to face in the midst of a cruel Yankee imperialist blockade and of threats from the air, sea and land--besides economic aggression--how much our people would have had to pay for their revolution if we had not had the amount of foreign aid we have received. Who knows how much Cuba would have suffered with such limited economic resources and with such a deformed economy if it had not received this help? This enabled us to survive during the first years, to gain strength in the military area, to substantially develop our conditions and our future policy and to create the conditions we now have for the coming years. This is in addition to the possibility of considerably increasing the services to our people, above all educational services, medical services, cultural activities, sports activities, in sum, all these gigantic advances which we have attained in these areas during these years. In the coming years we will progress at an even higher rate, thanks to the conditions that have been created and which we have at this moment. We have been able to do this without doubt because we have had on one side a great enemy, a powerful enemy, an unmerciful enemy, an unscrupulous enemy whose daily actions are demonstrated by the barbaric, savage and criminal attacks against the Vietnamese people. These attacks have merited the condemnation and repulsion of world opinion. In other words, one cannot underestimate in the least the dangerous nature of this enemy, its cowardice, lack of scruples demonstrated in the actions we have mentioned. This has astonished the world. As a measure of force and violence and in the midst of the peace negotiations, this enemy has carried out bombing strikes against the cities and, above all, the capital of the DRV. On one side we have the world moved by the earthquake which occurred in Nicaragua. On one side many countries of the world were sending medicines and food and, on the other side, there were even worse horrors, greater losses of lives, even greater destruction was being wreaked systematically by the Yankee imperialists against the Vietnamese people. This shows us what kind of enemy we have had and what effort this enemy has made to crush us, above all in the economic area, and the effort it made at the beginning of the revolution; in the military area, and the threat which has been hanging over us all these years and the enormous efforts which we have had to make to survive. On the other hand, we have had a friend--a real friend--who has acted toward us with such a high degree of generosity, unselfishness and fraternity. For this reason, we have said that the Cuban revolution emerged at the exact moment--not a minute before--when the international correlation of forces, the great changes that were occurring in the world made its development possible. One must say that, on one hand, our people have contributed with their enthusiasm, revolutionary faith, determination to fight, determination to die. Fortunately it was true that on the other hand our country--the first country beginning on the path of socialism in Latin America--was able to count on the circumstance of a correlation of forces, of great changes in the correlation of forces and extraordinary and generous foreign aid. I believe the relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba will be recorded in history as a model of truly fraternal, truly internationalist, truly revolutionary relations. This is all. [applause] CORRECTIONS TO CASTRO ADDRESS ON USSR AGREEMENTS The following corrections should be made to the item entitled "Castro Addresses Nation on Agreements Signed with USSR" published in the 4 January Latin America & West Europe DAILY REPORT, 0 1: Page 0 6, seventh paragraph, line four insert word "half" to make phrase read: ... a little more than half a million per year... Page 0 8, third paragraph, line four should read... from the Soviet Union over the next 3 years... Page 0 8, sixth paragraph, line two should read: This is more than the former price of about six cents. The same goes... -END-