-DATE- 19830803 -YEAR- 1983 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- INTERVIEW -AUTHOR- F. CASTRO -HEADLINE- 28 JULY NEWS CONFERENCE WITH U.S. NEWSMEN -PLACE- CUBA -SOURCE- HAVANA DOMESTIC TV -REPORT_NBR- FBIS -REPORT_DATE- 19830804 -TEXT- CASTRO 28 JULY NEWS CONFERENCE WITH U.S. NEWSMEN F1031157 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 034 GMT 3 Aug 83 [Press conference granted by President Fidel Castro to a group of U.S. journalists during a reception hosted by the Cuban Government on 28 July for visiting foreign delegations -- recorded -- Castro speaking in Spanish with consecutive English translation; translator occasionally blocks out Castro's words] [Text] [Castro] Where are the North Americans? [sentence indistinct] There were several [words indistinct], not an interview. [Unidentified Spanish-speaking journalist] A talk? [Castro] I did not promise an interview, (?but a) talk. [Unidentified Spanish-speaking journalist] You speak to the North American people and tell them what you think are the most important things. (?We won't) say anything. A message for [words indistinct]. [Castro] If I have to say something to the American people -- I imagine that they have received diverse reports, (?including) unfavorable ones, about our country -- I may say that our feelings toward the American people, despite the problems that we have had with the U.S. Governments, are those of respect and admiration. Actually, I make a distinction between the American people and their governments. These are my feelings about the American people. I wish that I could express myself in English so that I could say it in English. [words indistinct] the American people have a great independent spirit, they are a people who have made a great contribution to [words indistinct], and I sincerely wish that someday [words indistinct] to expand the contacts with the American people. We are neighbors and we are forced to be friends. Whatever the system, there is a socialist system on one side and a capitalist system on the other. But I think that the Latin American peoples and the American people all have to live on the same continent under conditions of equality, respect, and friendship. [Unidentified Spanish-speaking journalist] Can you tell us anything about the mistakes of the Reagan administration to the extent that it is trying to change the image of Cuba? Can you tell the American people the true moderate message, which I believe was in the speech which you gave.... [sentence unfinished] [Castro] I spoke to you a little while ago when the cameras were not here. And I was saying that Reagan's press conference had been more cautious and more moderate. In that sense, I consider it to be positive, although in substance he has not changed. There are all the measures taken in regard to the military exercises in Latin America. I was saying that if we were enemies of the United States, we would wish for a conflict to come about between Latin Americans and the Americans. But we do not want that to happen because it would be costly for the Latin American peoples and costly for the American people and would create great resentment between the Latin American and American people. I believe that we should struggle to prevent such a conflict from taking place. And in a certain way because of our position, as I was joking with the journalists earlier, saying that as we try to prevent U.S. intervention in Central America from taking place, we are helping Reagan. Because I really believe that it would be a very serious mistake which would definitely divide the United States from the Latin American peoples for a very long time. I understand that there is a Latin American consciousness which did not exist 30 years ago. The Malvinas war demonstrated that. I was telling the journalists earlier that the Americans generally tended to side with Great Britain. And Latin Americans, despite their political differences with the Argentine Government, tended to side with the Latin American cause, the cause of the Falkland Islands. And that shows that there is a Latin American feeling which must be taken into account. You were asking whether I held any hope for the settlement of the problems. And I said that I was convinced, but could not talk about hopes because I do not have the assurance that the same attitude exists on the part of the U.S. Administration or that the U.S. Administration would want to find a negotiated political settlement to the Central American problems. [Unidentified Spanish-speaking journalist] Would you be willing to hold direct talks with Ronald Reagan in some sort of conference? [Castro] I was asked that question once and I responded then that I had no objections to meeting with the U.S. President. Then later I read reports claiming that I had proposed a meeting with the American President. I am not proposing it. But if some day such a prospect should be raised, we would not be opposed to it. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] Mr President, what are the first steps which Cuba and the United States could take to bring about a peaceful solution to the problems of Latin America? [Castro] That is a very difficult question. I would not be able to answer that question with a couple of words. [Castro to translator:] Is he referring to relations between Latin America and the United States? [Translator] Do you mean relations between Latin America and the United States? [Journalist] No; what are the first steps Cuba and the United States could take to bring about a peaceful solution to the problems of Latin America? [Castro] Is it clear that he asking about Latin America? [Journalist] And Central America. [Translator to Castro] And Central America, specifically Central America. What steps could Cuba and the United States take to try to bring about a peaceful settlement to the problems in Central America? [Castro] I believe that first there must be a willingness to reach such a settlement. For our part, that willingness exists. I believe that a solution to the problems in Central America cannot be achieved by one party imposing conditions on the other. I think it would have to be a solution based on the principles of equality and honor. I believe that, for instance, a negotiated political settlement could not be achieved if a negotiated political settlement cannot be achieved in El Salvador. That is a key point. I believe that a solution cannot be achieved by sacrificing someone. Everyone's interests must be considered. The interests of the Salvadorans and of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement cannot be ignored or neglected. No one can expect to reach a solution based on ignoring the revolutionary movement in El Salvador. Nicaraguan interests cannot be ignored and, in general, the interests of the countries in the region cannot be ignored. I believe it is possible to reach a political solution. This has been expressed by the Nicaraguans seriously and sincerely. The Salvadorans have also expressed this. It would be necessary to discuss it with them. No one can impose a solution on them. No one can impose elections on them in which they do not believe. They cannot believe in elections in a country where elections have been rigged for 50 years. How can anyone ask the Salvadoran revolutionaries to believe in elections where the guarantees for such elections are an Army and a government that have murdered over 40,000 Salvadorans? I believe it would be essential for them to sit down, have discussions, come to agreements, and set up guarantees for [word indistinct] in El Salvador. I believe the United States can have an influence in this. If the United States opposes negotiations, there will be no negotiations. If the United States supports the idea of negotiations, I am certain that the Salvadoran Government and the Salvadoran Army would talk with the Salvadoran revolutionaries. And that is essential if solutions are to be found for the Central American problem. I agree with the statement of the Contadora Group in the sense that a political solution ought to be found based on respect for the sovereignty of countries and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. This requires that each country be able to install the political system it prefers. If it wants to be capitalist, it can be capitalist. If it wants to be socialist, it can be socialist. If it wants to have a mixed system, then it should have a mixed system if that is possible. I believe that the principle of self-determination is essential. And the principle of nonintervention is essential. I believe that we can all abide by that principle. I mean that the United States and all the countries of the region would be able to abide by that principle. In my opinion, there are possibilities for finding solutions. But it is essential that a settlement be reached in El Salvador. If this can be achieved, I believe that the path would be open to a negotiated political settlement requiring concessions from all parties involved. And it would prevent serious complications and above all it would prevent the intervention of the United States, an intervention which would not be beneficial to Latin America or the United States. [Unidentified journalist] What type of concessions would Cuba be willing to make? [Castro] Well, in the first place, we must not make unilateral decisions on that. There has been talk about the advisers. We cannot unilaterally say that we have advisers. It would not be honorable for us to make unilateral concessions, to give you an example. However, if any solution implies the withdrawal of all the advisers, we would support (?such a solution). However, we should not be the ones to decide this. This should not be decided by the country that makes a contribution or engages in cooperation. It must be decided by the country that receives it. It must receive this as a basis, on principle, on equal conditions. If the demand is made that the advisers be withdrawn and the United States maintains its advisers, then it would not be on an equal basis. Therefore, we cannot make the concession. The ones who can discuss this are the Nicaraguans. That is, if they reach an agreement with the United States on the basis of the withdrawal of all advisers from Central America, we would support that, to give you an example. However, we cannot make a decision (?and we should not make a decision). We are not directly involved. I believe that the decisions and concessions would have to be made by those directly involved. I give you this example. If they make a decision on this issue or any other issue, we will support it. If the principle is accepted that no one will interfere in the internal affairs and the United States accepts the principle, we will accept it and apply it faithfully and firmly. That is what I mean when I speak about mutual concessions. The United States cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Central America. We recognize that we cannot interfere either. However, our situation is different because we are not directly involved. We cooperate with [words indistinct] Nicaraguans and are in solidarity with the Salvadoran revolutionaries. It is not up to us to make this decision with respect to Nicaragua. We would sincerely support solutions and would be prepared to assume our commitments. [Unidentified journalist] The U.S. Government has said that, in the last several weeks, the Cuban military presence in Nicaragua has increased and that this is part of the reason for the maneuvers in the Caribbean. What do you think about this? [Castro] That is absolutely false. This is a typical example of how false information is handled. We have cooperation, we have advisers in Nicaragua, but it has been said that we have 3,000 or 4,000. Someone said recently that we had 7,000. We do not have thousands of advisers in Nicaragua. We have approximately 200 advisers in Nicaragua, if you want to know the figure: 200. But they are not really advisers. They are academy and military school professors. They are not advisers. The group of advisers is minimal, a few dozen. However, a professor of a military academy is considered an adviser. The number of advisers that we have in Nicaragua is one tenth of what has constantly been claimed. They number approximately 200. It has been said that they number 2,000 or 3,000. We do have a few more than 2,000 teachers, of whom 50 percent are women, and we have 500 doctors in Nicaragua. We also have construction workers who are helping with the construction of a sugar mill and various other projects -- highways, hospitals -- in Nicaragua. That is, we do have several thousand, approximately 4,000 Cubans, including the 500 doctors and several hundred additional health technicians, but the total number of military personnel is approximately 200. [Unidentified journalist] Commander, a question: Concessions, commitments. What is it that Cuba can now say to the U.S. Government and the world that it can give in the form of commitments or concessions to the Reagan administration in the search for peace. [Castro] Well, I ... it is not a matter of concessions. It is a question of finding an agreement that entails commitments for all parties. In this sense, we are sincerely prepared to assume these commitments. We cannot dictate a formula for these commitments. I believe that those who can or must define the ways to find an agreement are those who are directly involved in the conflicts. We would support this formula. If the principle calls for no one to interfere in the internal affairs, if a policy is accepted in which everyone agrees in one way or another to support the revolutionaries as well as those who are oppressing the country -- are oppressing -- we would be prepared to accept this formula. If the withdrawal of advisers is agreed to, we will accept this. We must not decide. It is not up to us to decide. This must be decided by the countries involved. If it is agreed that no one will send arms, we would be prepared not to send arms to Central America. Simply stated, we would be willing to accept a commitment of this kind. In this sense, this is what I call mutual concessions, if we could change the terms, that is, and make an honorable agreement in which both parties assume similar commitments. [Unidentified journalist] Could Cuba act as intermediary in negotiations with the Salvadoran guerrillas? [Castro] We are not the leaders of the Salvadoran guerrillas. We have friendships. We have relations with them. We have a very high regard for them. But they are absolutely independent and autonomous in their decisions. [Unidentified journalist] Cuba's influence is truly great. If Cuba decided to moderate, could this be a channel for peace? [Castro] Cuba cannot restrain anyone. It does have friendship. It can have influence. However, it must not exercise it to exert pressure. What we can do is to support any decision that is taken in the search for a solution, but we cannot exert pressure. Well, this has turned into a news conference. However, basically, if you want to know our serious position, we are willing to assume commitments similar to those assumed by all the other countries -- including the United States -- to find a solution, and we are seriously willing to support a solution, because the alternative to a solution is the worsening of the conflicts and the intervention of the United States. This is not in the interest of the Central American peoples. It is not in the interest of the Latin American people, it is not in the interest of Cuba, and it is not in the interest of the United States. If you ask me whether there is any possibility [for a solution], I do believe there is a possibility. But we must find an honorable formula that does not entail unilateral commitments, but one that implies multilateral commitments. We would be willing to support an agreement of this kind. [Unidentified journalist] Do you believe that the Contadora solution is the best solution? [Castro] I believe that is one form and that it is very important. I believe that the Contadora group is playing an active and constructive role. [Unidentified journalist] If there were something that the United States could do to improve the situation over the short term, what would that be? [Castro] It should define itself. The United States has opposed a negotiated solution; it has systematically opposed a negotiated solution. [Passage indistinct] If the United States were willing to find a negotiated political solution, then I am sure that a negotiated political solution could be achieved. For the time being, I would say that the United States should support a negotiated solution. I am sure that it could be achieved. [Unidentified journalist] Commander, can Contadora have any influence in the case of El Salvador? [Castro] I said there cannot be a negotiated political settlement in El Salvador if there is no negotiated political solution for El Salvador. It is to ask us to forget our Salvadoran friends, to betray them, and at those prices, nobody can make a compromise. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] If the United States continues its military tack in Central America, what can the Cuban response be? [Castro] Cuba is not a power. Cuba cannot commit itself in response to the United States. Cuba cannot anticipate itself and say what it would do. I think that the response would not be a Cuban response, but a Latin American response; it would be a world response actually, if there were an intervention by U.S. forces. Cuba is not in a position to speak as if it were a power. It is not going to try to be on an equal footing with the U.S. forces. But we would try to express our solidarity in all possible ways and means, although we would not be able to think in military terms because we are not a military power. [Unidentified journalist] Can there be solutions in Central America without there being solutions between the United States and Cuba? [Castro] These conditions are not being established by Cuba. We have had bad relations for the past 25 years, even before the problems in Central America existed. We cannot come forward now either, as things stand, because we would be immoral and lose our authority within this panorama if we did so. We will not pursue national interests. We would rejoice were a grave conflict to be avoided in Central America and were relations between the United States and Cuba to be improved. To tell the truth, we have lived this way for 25 years. We have lived under U.S. hostility for 25 years. But we can continue to live like this for many more years. This is not an essential matter nor a prerequisite. I believe that if things improve and if a solution is found in Central America, then, indirectly, there would be a reduction of tensions between the United States and Cuba. [Unidentified journalist] [Question indistinct] [Castro] I believe that the Sandinists are strong. If Honduras has been harassing Nicaragua, Somozist groups have been training them, supplying them. It has been the tool for supplying the Somozists. The Sandinists have made a very wise decision and a very discreet decision. They have conducted no action against Honduras, and I am absolutely sure that the Nicaraguans will not fall into the trap of making a military response to Honduras. I do not think they will do that. I am fully convinced of that. They have shown serenity despite the attacks. Even though more than 400 Sandinists have died, they have never organized a reprisal. They understand that to respond militarily would mean falling into a trap, a provocation. Their attitude has been defensive. Now then, if Honduras attacked Nicaragua, they would have to face an enthusiastic people defending its own territory and Honduras would be defeated. Nicargua does not need foreign assistance to resist aggression from Honduras. There is no need for Cuba to be involved. If Honduras invades Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan people will swallow the Honduran Army. If the United States invades Nicaragua, that would be different. We could not say that the Nicaraguans would be able to swallow the American Army in a short period of time, but if the United States invades Nicaragua, the Americans will find themselves involved in a people's war, it will find itself fighting against a people -- the Nicaraguan people -- and, in the long run, the United States would lose that struggle. [Unidentified journalist] Would Cuba intervene directly or would it remain out of the struggle? [Castro] Well, it has not been decided yet what Cuba would do in such a situation. We would have to wait for the events to come about to make a decision. [Unidentified journalist] Do you think that a peaceful solution for Central America could be better achieved through direct talks between you and Mr Reagan? [Castro] I do not believe so. They are not necessary. They are not essential. Cuba is not a fundamental factor. Cuba is not a party to the conflict. On the other hand, the United States is directly involved. I think talks between Reagan and the Nicaraguan leaders would be more important because they can speak on their own behalf. I think a meeting between Reagan and the Salvadoran revolutionaries would be more important because they can speak directly on their own behalf. We cannot speak on behalf of Nicaragua. We cannot speak on behalf of the Salvadorans. So, what are we going to discuss? We can discuss our readiness to cooperate in achieving a solution. And there is no need to meet with Reagan to state it or to work in that direction. If some day the U.S. Administration should consider it useful to help create a climate of detente, we would not oppose that. But regarding your question, I say it is not necessary. This does not mean that we reject any contact with representatives of the U.S. Government or direct contacts with the U.S. Government. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] What kind of signals are you, Mr President, giving to the Nicaraguan leaders right now? [Castro] I do not need to give them signals. We have many contacts, good relations, considerable trust, and relations based on mutual respect. They are aware that we support their policy of seeking a negotiated political settlement. They know it. And I state it publicly. But signals, I have no signals for them. I can't give them any signals because I am not the manager of the team. I am only a friend, not the leader of the Nicaraguans. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] Are you increasing your aid to Nicaragua these days? [Castro] No. No, we are providing normal aid. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] There were reports in THE WALL STREET JOURNAL that Cuban ships had arrived recently with armored personnel carriers and that the top Cuban general who had commanded forces in Angola had gone to Nicaragua. [Castro] No, No, he was not in Angola. No. There is one of our officers there. A very competent man who was in Ethiopia. We have many competent officers and we want our cooperation to be of high quality. If we see that they are being attacked heavily and continually and we see that they could use some help in that field, we would try to send comrades who are capable. We cannot send someone who lacks experience. We send someone who is capable, but we have many men who are capable. It has also been said that -- I believe it was Reagan who said it -- we had sent thousands of soldiers. We have not sent one soldier to Nicaragua. There are no Cuban troops in Nicaragua. Yes, there are Cuban military advisers. There are some 200 Cuban military advisers and collaborators. Moreover, in my opinion, they are not essential. I believe the Sandinists also have experience in this area. They have experience in people's warfare. They defeated the Somoza government. They have fought for many years. They have been in power for 3 years. They have trained cadres. I do not consider the Cuban advisers to be essential. And if a settlement can be reached which would call for the withdrawal of all advisers, and if the Nicaraguans agree, we would support them 100 percent. In other words, since you asked, if an agreement could be reached among all the sides involved which called for the withdrawal of all advisers, we would be willing to support such a settlement. If an agreement could be reached which would call for an end to supplying all types of weaponry to any state in Central America, we would be willing to agree. Well then, these are the fundamental issues. The matter of nonintervention, self-determination for each country, no foreign military advisers, no weapons sent. I believe all these problems can be discussed. And we have absolutely no objections to seeking a settlement on the basis of these principles. The Nicaraguans have explained that they are ready to discuss a settlement on El Salvador based on the premise that neither side would supply armaments. And they said they were willing to discuss any other issues which the Contadora Group raised. We have declared that we support that position. The Nicaraguan declaration means that any subject can be discussed -- whether that subject is arms, advisers, or anything else -- on an equitable and honorable basis and not based on unilateral concessions, if that is possible. And Reagan says that is what concerns him. He talks about a Soviet-Cuban conspiracy in Central America. If those are really the issues which worry the U.S. Administration, I believe that all the issues can be discussed. And if a settlement can be reached on those conditions, we would support it. But I really do want to warn that, if they attempt to establish a solution based on the betrayal of the Salvadoran revolutionaries, or ignoring the Salvadoran revolutionaries, then there will be no solution. I do want to make myself clear about the fact that a political solution, on whatever basis, must include a negotiated political settlement in El Salvador; otherwise there will be no solution because it would not be an honorable solution for one side -- the friends of Nicaragua and El Salvador. If we are told that we must reach a negotiated solution based on sacrificing Nicaragua, there will be no solution. In short, I believe that any issue can be discussed. But a solution cannot be attained on the basis of sacrificing the Salvadoran revolutionary movement. A negotiated political settlement must be achieved in El Salvador. [Unidentified journalist] Commander, today what would be the way to move toward a negotiated settlement in El Salvador? [Castro] I believe that the key to this lies in the readiness of the United States to support a negotiated settlement. If the United States would sincerely support the idea of a negotiated political settlement, I am sure that one would be reached. We are willing to achieve this. I am speaking on my behalf. And according to Nicaraguan statements, they are also willing. I believe that the Nicaraguans are sincere. The key issue is for the United States to really and sincerely support a negotiated political settlement. Later, how everything is to be carried out, all the details and all of that is always very difficult to hammer out, but it can be done. [Unidentified English-speaking journalist] Must the Salvadoran revolutionaries participate as an equal partner? [Castro] Well, I believe they are the ones who must respond to that. But I believe that the Salvadoran revolutionaries have every right to doubt the guarantees of a government and armed institutions which have murdered over 40,000 people. It would be absurd to say, "let's go to the polls". Whom are they to trust? Are they to trust the armed institutions which have murdered more than 40,000 people in El Salvador? Therefore, they have to discuss what the real guarantees are going to be before taking part in the electoral process. [Unidentified journalist] Are you in agreement with holding elections, or does the idea of elections appear absurd to you? [Castro] It depends on what kind of elections. Because, when Batista was in power and called for elections, saying he would give guarantees, we did not agree and chose armed struggle. But we said that if guarantees were made and if a government were formed that could really guarantee compliance with the law in the election results, we would support elections. At the time of Batista, that was our position. It would be good if there were a government which would really guarantee the elections. But, under Batista, we were not willing to participate in elections. [Passage indistinct, two journalists speaking at the same time] [Castro] Well, I don't want to talk about formulas because that is more complicated. For the time being, what they have to do is sit down and talk. I mean the Salvadoran revolutionaries and the Salvadoran Government and the Salvadoran Army. I believe the Army should participate because the Army runs the government in El Salvador. And the Army runs the government in Honduras. If we are going to talk about the civilian government in Honduras, let us be sincere. The civilian government in Honduras is only a facade. The ruler in Honduras is General Alvarez. There is no democratic or civilian government there. In Honduras there is a military government. [Unidentified journalist] Commander, it seems that, according to you and to the presidents of the Contadora Group, there is danger that the Central American conflict or crisis could degenerate into a world conflict. Specifically, why do you believe that? [Castro] I would not dare go that far. I have not said that. What happens is that people use certain terms. Well, world peace is being threatened. I believe the peace of the world is being threatened more by the 572 medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. I would not say that the Central American conflict threatens world peace. I would say that it complicates the world situation, the world climate. However, the Central American issue does threaten to create a serious regional conflict, not due to the intervention of large powers, but simply because, in my judgement, the attempt to wipe out the Nicaraguan revolution and the Salvadoran revolutionary movement by force would spread the conflict throughout Central America. It would be like a cancer that is spread throughout the area. I believe it would create a serious conflict among the peoples of Latin America and the United States. I also believe that U.S. military intervention would not be able to eliminate the resistance of Nicaragua and El Salvador. I am absolutely convinced of this. In the long run, the United States would have to withdraw. Even during the Sandino era it was obliged to withdraw, and times have changed a lot since then. [Unidentified journalist] In your 30th anniversary speech, you spoke about an invasion and of what would happen in the event of an invasion of Cuba. However, there are other things, bombings and such that could...[interrupted by Castro] [Castro] We would resist. No problem. We are prepared to resist military blockades. We are prepared to resist attacks and a war of attrition and bombings, and we are prepared for the worst, that is, to resist an invasion of the country. We are even prepared to fight under an occupation of the country. A revolution is one thing and a conventional army is quite another. Traditionally, in Europe, when armies were defeated on the traditional battlefield, all resistance stopped. In Cuba, the resistance was possibly greatest after the conventional battles ended. History has many examples. Napoleon had a powerful army: invincible. He invaded Spain and took over the government, and the Spanish people began their war against Napoleon. In the long run, they defeated Napoleon's army. This means that Europe's most powerful and invincible army was defeated by the Spanish people. Now, Cuba is a revolutionary country, it has a revolutionary people. They have a different mentality. We did not begin our struggle with an army, but with a handful of men. When we began the struggle against Batista, we had 7 rifles and Batista had 80,000 men under arms. After 25 months we had defeated Batista's army. The United States would have to confront not only our armed forces, our conventional forces; it would have to confront the most powerful thing we have; that is, the people, a popular war against hundreds of thousands of armed men and women, against a whole people. If that time comes, the battleships, the aircraft carriers, the nuclear weapons, and the tanks would all be meaningless. The United States would surely lose this war, that is, a war against the people, a war against an armed, educated, patriotic people united under a single flag. It would never be able to conquer the country. It could invade it and occupy it at a very high cost, but it would have to face a people's war. We are prepared. I do not believe that we are more courageous than anyone else, but because we have been forced to do so by the very threats of the United States, especially Reagan's threats, we are mentally, organizationally, politically, and militarily prepared for an economic blockade, for bombardments, attacks, wars of attrition, invasion,and occupation of the country. We are prepared for every eventuality. We have no alternative. I am speaking seriously. I am saying what I believe. The Unites States is unquestionably more powerful than we are. It has more planes, tanks, and ships. However, 5 million U.S. soldiers in Cuba, and I would not like for this ever to happen, would not be able to control the Cuban people. We have confidence in ourselves. We are not thinking about others, but of defending ourselves. You imposed this press conference, which is somewhat disorganized, but I want to say that I have a high appreciation of U.S. journalists. Every time I read your articles, reports, and dispatches I find that they are sharp, intelligent and brilliant. I can say this. I also believe that there are some Biritsh journalists who are brilliant, some commentaries, there are some. However, I also believe that an evolution has taken place in the U.S. press in the last 25 years. I believe that you are more independent today, that you are more objective now than then. Then you aligned yourselves more behind a watchword when you spoke about the security of your country and patriotic interests. With those arguments you were often deceived. Now I appreciate that. With evolution, you have become more objective. I have high regard for you. I watched Reagan's news conference on the 26th. I noticed that the U.S. journalists were very sharp, independent, and objective. I believe that you can contribute a lot and that the U.S. people can also contribute if we understand that the idea that someone wants to rule the world and to take over the world is an absurdity, a fantasy. The world has so many problems that anyone who wants to take over the world has to be absolutely mad. If we could forget the myth that someone wants to attack the institutions of the United States, we would reach the conclusion that there are real dangers to peace. There are real dangers for world peace: there is the danger of local conflict believe that the U.S. press and the U.S. people can play a very important role in preventing a world conflict and in avoiding local conflicts. I am of the opinion that Reagan has little concern for international opinion. He has shown no proof of being concerned about international opinion. However, I believe that he is very concerned about U.S. public opinion. He pays great attention to it. He tries to change opinion and its direction, as in the case of Central America; he tries to get the people to support him in his Central American policy. He has not achieved this. However, I believe that the U.S. people and press can play a very important role in the present international situation and in the present Central American situation. [Unidentified journalist] This is a subject that has not been discussed since your speech on the first anniversary of the Sandinist revolution. What is the influence of the Sandinist revolution on the Cuban revolution after 4 years of Sandinist revolution? [Castro] Well, I meant to say that each revolution makes its own contributions, such as combat experience, for instance. Their type of struggle was different from ours. We developed an army which eventually prevailed over Batista's army. They developed a kind of popular uprising. I believe that is another lesson, their contribution. Their conditions are different. The statements they made on the idea of establishing a mixed economic system appeared to me to be an interesting contribution. It just appeared to me to be a viable idea. Then they are not copying, nor should they copy, the experience of Cuba. They are conducting their own scheme, their own formula. And I believe that enriches the political and revolutionary movement. Then, in the sense of Nicaragua's new experience, we are also learning. And I believe that our experience is also (?enriched). We have very good experience. For instance, there is the struggle against illiteracy. This is a very useful experience for the Nicaraguans. We have experience in the field of public health, and I think that it can be useful to them. I believe that everyone can make some contribution which can benefit all of us. The United States conducts technological research which may be useful to everyone. There is experience in agriculture which can be useful, also in the fields of health, science, and many fields which should be devoted to the welfare of mankind and not to developing weapons that can destroy mankind. Of course, this principle should apply to everyone, to all countries, to all superpowers, regardless of their social and political ideologies. Are you going to help me get free of you, colleague? [laughs] [English-speaking journalist] Thank you very much. [Castro] This has been a very disorganized interview. [Journalist] A little chat. [Castro] A little chat, but you are to be blamed for that. [Laughter] Very well, my pleasure. -END-