-DATE- 19920219 -YEAR- 1992 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- -AUTHOR- -HEADLINE- Castro Remarks at Missile Crisis Conference -PLACE- CARIBBEAN / Cuba -SOURCE- Havana Cuba Vision Network -REPORT_NBR- FBIS-LAT-92-043-S -REPORT_DATE- 19920304 -HEADER- ========================================================================== Report Type: Daily report AFS Number: FL1902223092 Report Number: FBIS-LAT-92-043-S Report Date: 04 Mar 92 Report Series: Latin America Start Page: 1 Report Division: CARIBBEAN End Page: 4 Report Subdivision: Cuba AG File Flag: Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Language: Spanish Document Date: 19 Feb 92 City/Source of Document: Havana Cuba Vision Network Report Name: SUPPLEMENT Headline: Castro Remarks at Missile Crisis Conference Source Line: FL1902223092 Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0230 GMT 19 Feb 92 Subslug: [First of four parts of the special program: ``Reflections on a Crisis,'' a tripartite conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana from 9 to 12 January-recorded] -TEXT- FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE: 1. [First of four parts of the special program: ``Reflections on a Crisis,'' a tripartite conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana from 9 to 12 January-recorded] 2. [Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Fidel Castro] Sometimes, I have been really surprised as I listened to representatives from the American delegation, because it seems to me that they are living in a unreal world, and I ask myself if history can be ignored this way, as if there were no history of relations between the United States and Cuba, a history of almost 200 years of relations between the United States and Latin America, from long before Cuba or the Cuban revolution existed. 3. I ask myself the following question, without trying to create a controversy, but in reflection: How many interventions were there in the Caribbean before the Cuban revolution? U.S. interventions? How many actions have they carried out against Latin American interests throughout history? How can we forget, for example, how the United States emerged with great force from among a small group of countries? They were the first to become independent in this hemisphere. Later they expanded throughout their territory, and then they expanded into the territory of neighboring countries like Mexico. They took half of Mexico's territory, more than half of its territory. 4. How can we forget what happened with respect to Central America and the expeditions into Central America, or what happened in, let us say, Panama? The whole process through which they gained control of Panama? How can we forget the way in which they intervened in almost all the Central and Latin American countries? How can we forget about the interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and several times in Cuba? Well, here I am analyzing far beyond some of the things that McNamara said yesterday. 5. There is the issue that Cuba was always seen as a direct threat to the United States. There was the perception that Cuba was a direct threat to the United States and a violator of accepted norms of international conduct. He added: Especially in the sphere of political freedoms and civil rights. I have already referred to that. We could look for a list. We could see who has really violated more international norms in the world. 6. Then he talked, yesterday he talked, and I listened and noted, about the different ways we perceive each other. The United States teaches their citizens that they freed Cuba. I truly believe that is incorrect. They should not teach that to the American people, because if the United States intervened at the end of our war for independence, we have our judgments, our opinions of the situation. We believe that Spain had been defeated, that Spain could not endure the war with Cuba any more, the Ten Years War and later the War of 1895. Spain was completely worn out. That is when the United States intervened. They occupied the country for a number of years. They occupied Puerto Rico at the same time, and they kept Puerto Rico. They occupied the Philippines, and they kept the Philippines. In fact, McNamara said that some Americans thought they had been too generous and should have kept Cuba, too. 7. Cuba really received great support from world opinion. It had fought very heroically. Despite this, they were still here four years later, and they imposed a government on us, really. They imposed the Platt Amendment. You know that the Platt Amendment was an imposition. They told us: Either you accept the Platt Amendment, or there will be no independence. No country in the world would accept this kind of amendment of their constitution, because it gave another country the right to intervene to establish peace. The Platt Amendment is greatly repudiated in our country, highly repudiated. 8. I believe Americans would be offended if they were told that their independence was won by the Spanish and the French-Lafayette, Miranda, Spain, etc. It would be unfair to say that. The Spanish and the French helped, but the American people did most of the fighting. No one has ever tried to say anything else. I believe one of the things that needs to be done, since there are different perceptions, is to educate American citizens, tell them the truth so opinions are not formed on false premises. 9. Last, McNamara said something that when I noted it, I thought about it. The United States continue to think that their investments in Cuba contributed to this country's development. From a technical, economic point of view, it is undeniable that the U.S. investments brought about economic growth, economic development. That is not under debate. But this all ended at a given time. That was the initial stage in the first decades when they built a lot of sugar refineries, but at a given time the economic development of Cuba ended. 10. Alright, but I admit that; it seems right to me. It is right to say that we have different perceptions, that we should begin to look at our different perceptions of each of these issues. In any case, I believe that what we should do is work to make sure that the historic, objective truth is told. 11. [Passage omitted] [Castro] Smith has spoken about their major concerns, which were Cuba's military relations with the Soviet Union. That was among their three major concerns. He spoke about Eisenhower's decision because [Anastas] Mikoyan had come here. Now it turns out that Mikoyan, and Mikoyan's visit, is to blame for everything, because it occurred to the father of our friend to visit us in the name of the Soviet Union. All this immediately justified an order to organize the overthrow of the Cuban revolution. 12. If they had known who Mikoyan was, and Mikoyan's nobility! If they had not initially acted based on prejudices! Mikoyan almost rid the United States of Castro, without meaning to, because he brought a Soviet helicopter that had just been manufactured. I would say it had just been designed. We made a tour of all of Cuba, showing him tourist places, beaches. We went to some beaches on the southern coast of Cuba, in Cayo Largo, where no one lived. There, Mikoyan took off his clothes, took a swim in the Caribbean, got back on the helicopter and continued his trip. At that time we did not have protocol or organization. We did not have anything. We made almost a round trip throughout Cuba in an act of friendship with him, courtesy with him, at that time. 13. It was a miracle that we were not killed in that helicopter. The Soviets had just conquered space. They had sent a man into space, and when we were in the south and had very little gasoline left, the Soviet pilot insisted that we should head east. I told him that to the east was the sea and we would crash. I told him we had to turn north and go to a certain point, and we had 20 minutes of fuel left. For the first time in the contemporary era, an aircraft was hijacked. I did it. I reached the point where I said: Well, I am in a very difficult dilemma, about to drown out of courtesy. [laughter] Either drown out of courtesy, or out of the elementary obligation to survive I have to hijack this helicopter. 14. Fortunately, at the last minute I thought of appealing to Mikoyan, and I persuaded him. I said: Look, if I am wrong, the worst that can happen is we will reach land. But if I am right and the pilot is wrong, what will happen is that we are all going to drown in the sea. There is no other solution. I was able to convince Mikoyan. That was a trip. About 20 years later, the Soviets recommended to us, they sent us a recommendation, that leaders should not travel by helicopter because it was too dangerous. [passage omitted] 15. [Castro] We based ourselves on the concept, the assurance, that if an invasion of Cuba occurred, a nuclear war would break out. We were certain a nuclear war would break out if an invasion occurred, in the situation that had been created, with the possession of nuclear weapons. Well, everyone here was resigned. We said: Well, we have to pay this price. We will have to disappear. I say this frankly. We saw that danger. I think that the conclusion that can be drawn, Mr. McNamara, is that if we are going to go by matters of opinion, nuclear war cannot be avoided. 16. We must eliminate the danger of nuclear war through other means and not based on the idea that people are afraid of nuclear weapons, the idea that people will hold back for fear of nuclear weapons. We have lived through that very special experience in which we became almost the first target of those nuclear weapons, and no one lost their composure or lost their calm. How can one assume that humanity's instinct for self-preservation will act with much greater energy in the face of a danger of this kind? 17. I share the view that those 50,000 warheads are crazy. But people have been doing crazy things for some time now with their technology, which is much more developed than their organizational ability, and much more developed than their politics. These dangers exist. Right now we are all concerned because of the problems that have arisen in the Soviet Union. Everyone is concerned about the possibility that there are several republics that have nuclear weapons, that the republics have nuclear weapons, because all this is an enormous danger. 18. Now, he asks me my opinion if in the event of an invasion by all those troops, with 1,100 flights and all that, I would have agreed to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I answer with all frankness that yes, I would have agreed to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Because in any case, we based ourselves on the principle that this war would become a nuclear war and that in any case we were going to disappear. Before the country was totally occupied, we were willing to die to defend the country. I would have agreed, if this invasion that is being talked about had occurred, to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 19. You have asked me to speak frankly, and I must say with all frankness that that would have been my view. I think that if Mr. McNamara or Kennedy had been in my place and had their country invaded and their country was going to be occupied, because the correlation of conventional forces was enormously unfavorable, they would have used tactical nuclear weapons. 20. After the experience we went through, do you want me to tell you something? I am happy that the decision was in the hands of the military officers here, and that they did not have to ask permission. That made it easier for the Cuban and Soviet military officers to reach an agreement. It was an advantage for us. I wish they had given the tactical nuclear weapons to us. It would have been wonderful. We would not have been in a hurry to use them, you can be sure of that. So the closer to Cuba the decision to use an effective weapon against a landing was made.... [changes thought] Of course, after that they would have fired 400 tactical weapons; no one knows how many they would have fired against us. But we were already determined and resigned to our fate. I have already told you that the idea of the withdrawal of the weapons had not crossed our minds. 21. I have read Khrushchev's letter to you. That letter shows a total political willingness, a total determination. Khrushchev knew all the factors, he knew what weapons they had, what the correlation of forces was. But we were firm. In fact, in my message to Khrushchev I tried to avoid the least indication that we were worried. In my letter to Khrushchev I had to.... [changes thought] Look for the pamphlet that is around here. Have you not found that pamphlet? Is it there? Has it been lost? 22. Now, in my letter to Khrushchev I had two concerns. First, not to use language that would conflict with his great desire for peace, that would conflict with his language, his psychology, and all that. I did not want to use words that might be too strong and conflict with his idiosyncrasy, his mentality. I think that he must have suffered a lot in those days, because he was not a man of war, a man who wanted war. He was a man who was sincerely concerned about peace. Of course, when the result of all of that was going to lead to war, he must have suffered an extraordinary amount. Therefore, in my message I wanted to do two things: not say anything that would conflict with that, but at the same time not say anything that would imply that we were worried or afraid. 23. I said that in some of the sentences. I said: You have been and are a tireless defender of peace. I understand how bitter these hours must be for you, when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened. Nevertheless, up to the last moment we will keep our hope that peace will be saved, and we are willing to contribute whatever we can. But at the same time, we are calmly preparing to face a situation that seems very real and close to us. Here I thank him and express once more the infinite gratitude and appreciation of our people for the Soviet people, who have been so generous and fraternal with us, etc. 24. I had those two concerns because that was a very delicate message. I thought it out well, because as I said on a previous occasion, I was afraid of hesitation, because you know, and historians know very well, that hesitation has been the cause of many defeats throughout history. Behind every defeat there has been hesitation, hesitation and mistakes. I said: If there is hesitation, there may be defeat. Because I also know the Americans. I think the Americans always do everything possible not to make mistakes. They can make mistakes; I do not mean that they are infallible, but in general they like to foresee everything. Why 5,000 warheads? That seems like too many, and then they continued to make more. Between the USSR and the United States, they made a great number of warheads before this movement began in the reverse direction. But others continue to make nuclear warheads, and the manufacture of all these weapons is incomprehensible and unnecessary. [passage omitted] 25. [Castro] But you put up that satellite. Perhaps if you had informed us about the number of missiles the Soviets had.... [changes thought] Why did you keep quiet about it? It would have been a good thing if the satellite you put up there had showed the missiles the Soviets had. It would have been a good thing to say so. But you must have had your reasons to keep quiet about that information. You had it and we did not. It seems that Kennedy did not have it, when he was conducting his election campaign, according to what has been said here. Later he found out, of course. They gave him the briefcase and the codes and all those things. They gave him the information about what the Soviets had. We did not know this. So I imagined, I could imagine that the Soviets had a few hundred intercontinental missiles, not a lot. Later it was said that they had reached 800 or 1,000, I do not know. This has been said publicly in all those talks. It seems that later they accelerated their production of missiles. But the figure that was given here yesterday of 40, 50, or 60, is really a low figure for missiles. 26. We could think of a figure of thousands, because that was the impression that was created. If Kennedy, who was a senator and was in the top circles, thought there was an imbalance in ballistic missiles, what is so strange about the rest of us, the rest of us beings in the world, having incorrect information? Because of all of this, I said that if I had known of a figure like that, and we had discussed this based on the strategic issues that really I believe, I continue to think, are at the bottom of this matter, I would have advised prudence, since for us there was no anxiety or fear because they were going to invade us or crush us to dust, because when it comes down to it we had been raised with the mentality of fighters and patriots, ready to fight. We were not afraid of fighting. [Words indistinct] at that exact momen