-DATE- 19920220 -YEAR- 1992 -DOCUMENT_TYPE- -AUTHOR- -HEADLINE- Castro Remarks at Missile Crisis Conference -PLACE- CARIBBEAN / Cuba -SOURCE- Havana Cuba Vision Network -REPORT_NBR- FBIS-LAT-92-043-S -REPORT_DATE- 19920304 -HEADER- ========================================================================== Report Type: Daily report AFS Number: FL2102003092 Report Number: FBIS-LAT-92-043-S Report Date: 04 Mar 92 Report Series: Latin America Start Page: 4 Report Division: CARIBBEAN End Page: 7 Report Subdivision: Cuba AG File Flag: Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Language: Spanish Document Date: 20 Feb 92 City/Source of Document: Havana Cuba Vision Network Report Name: SUPPLEMENT Headline: Castro Remarks at Missile Crisis Conference Subheadline: Part 2 of Castro Remarks Source Line: FL2102003092 Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0225 GMT 20 Feb 92 Subslug: [Second of four parts of the special program: ``Reflections on a Crisis,'' a tripartite conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana from 9 to 12 January- recorded] -TEXT- FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE: 1. [Second of four parts of the special program: ``Reflections on a Crisis,'' a tripartite conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana from 9 to 12 January- recorded] 2. [Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Fidel Castro] I really thought there were more tactical nuclear weapons, because they talked about tactical weapons, and the report the Soviet command gave me talked about tactical nuclear weapons. They talked about the Luna missiles, and I do not know if the Navy also had them. The question was not completely clear, but they talked about the tactical nuclear weapons of the mechanized armored regiments. 3. In the first place, it seems to me that there were very few missiles. I think if the Americans had carried out an operation like this one, they would have brought more tactical nuclear weapons, not just nine. It is logical to bring .... [pauses] If they had asked for my opinion, I would have said that more tactical nuclear weapons were needed. I say this [words indistinct] because the matter needed to be analyzed from a military point of view. [passage omitted] 4. [Castro] The situation was increasingly tense. The low-altitude overflights were becoming more frequent, and we were convinced that to allow them was very dangerous. We could not allow these overflights under these conditions, because any morning they could have destroyed all the military assets. So on the morning of October 27 when the planes began to make their low-altitude overflights at their usual time-they appeared everywhere, they appeared over San Cristobal-our batteries opened fire. So they complied with the order. We did not have surface-to-air missiles. 5. At the meeting with the Soviet commander, I explained to him the seriousness of those flights and our point of view. Knowing them, I tried to persuade them that our point of view was correct. You could say that the war began here in Cuba on the morning of 27 October. 6. Of course, those fast jet planes went higher as soon as they heard the first shots. They went out of the range of our guns. I repeat: we were not experts, but the planes were flying so low, 100 or 150 meters. I saw them flying more than once. They appeared to be fairly vulnerable. The fact is we were not able to shoot one of those low-flying planes down, but resistance to the planes appeared. On this same day, as on almost every day, the U-2 was flying. 7. It is still a mystery, it is still a mystery, [repeats] what made the Soviet commander-as has been explained here-and the battery chief decide to shoot, because of course we could not give them orders, but neither do I want to say that the responsibility was solely theirs. We were in total agreement with their decision to fire on the U-2 because, well, even though it did not present the same danger from a military point of view, it was the principle. I said yesterday that the U-2 flights should not have been allowed, but I agree with the Soviet officer that the order did not come from Moscow. 8. What is my opinion? They are soldiers. We are together, the enemy is there, and the firing begins. I believe it was a basic spirit of solidarity that made the Soviets decide to fire as well. That is my opinion on how the firing began that morning. The planes had begun to fly over the western provinces, and some time later one of those planes was shot down over Oriente Province. [passage omitted] 9. [Castro] Well, I think I explained in my speech the concerns we had with respect to Cuba's image. When I say Cuba's image, I am thinking primarily about its image in Latin America; also in the rest of the world, but it was Latin America that interested us most. For us it was very clear that turning ourselves into a military base-and I said it this way-was going to have a very high political cost. Therefore, if it had been.... [pauses] if the issue had been the Cuba's defense, we would have preferred not to have the missiles. Alejandro [not further identified] was right when he gave the opinion just as it was presented to him, and when he said that we were not going to accept that, because it was presented as being for Cuba's defense. But as we perceived immediately, right away, it was really a strategic proposal, even though the basic argument was the defense of Cuba. 10. That is how we interpreted it immediately, I and the two comrades who were with me. Then when we met, we analyzed the issue, and we all interpreted it exactly the same way: it was a strategic issue, it was necessary for the socialist bloc, to strengthen the socialist bloc, and if we wanted the socialist countries to fight for us, we could not refuse to provide this cooperation-as we could call it-to the socialist bloc, because of the matter of image alone, selfishly. That was the argument we used in our meeting, where we unanimously agreed on the issue of the missiles in spite of all the disadvantages we thought it would entail. We were aware of them, but we were not that concerned about Cuba's image with other governments, because in general those governments in Latin America were more or less manipulated by U.S. influence and U.S. economic and political power. Not all of them, but there was always a number of governments that immediately.... [pauses] Central American governments, but there were other governments with a greater sense of dignity, freedom, and independence that did not yield to U.S. policy with respect to Cuba. 11. One example was Mexico, but other countries also resisted. Chile resisted for a time. Ecuador also resisted for a time, as did Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. There was a group of six or seven countries that resisted. But all the rightist governments, all the governments by force, without exception, supported the U.S. policy. [previous paragraph repeated verbatim here, beginning with ``I and the two comrades'' and ending with ``U.S. policy with respect to Cuba.''] 12. Now U Thant came, to judge by what we read, to negotiate for peace and act as a mediator, introduce the United Nations, and find some way to help end the crisis. However, we could not accept the matter of inspections. We could not accept that. I think that would have reduced our sovereignty. I also think that the withdrawal of the missiles reduced our sovereignty. There was already a commitment. We could not have certain weapons. It was a commitment we did not undertake, but the only country that could supply us with those weapons was the Soviet Union. In fact, we had been excluded from having certain types of weapons. 13. Naturally we could not agree with this because we have a deeply felt concept of sovereignty. It is evident in all our texts, all our documents, and throughout our history, although these may be papers that have not been published. We saw inspections as a humiliation because they were unnecessary. We should have been the ones who carried out the first inspections. We had not even determined if the Soviets had taken the missiles away. But we were sure they had taken them away just as they had brought them, and there was no possibility.... [pauses] We did not try and we did not hinder them, because it would have created a-I do not know-an absurd situation if we had opposed the withdrawal of the missiles. 14. We would have been in conflict with the Soviets. We would have had a conflict with our friends, comrades, brothers, the troops who had been here beside us willing to die. I saw many Soviets crying on 28 October. I saw Soviet military chiefs crying after the news of the withdrawal of the missiles. I will never forget that. Those people had excellent relations with us; Alejandro had excellent relations with us. They all did. They were all upset, really. What should we have done? Use force? Should we have used violence against the Soviets? Say the missiles could not leave? That would have been totally crazy. We had no alternative, moral or political, but to allow those missiles to be taken away. It would make no sense and serve no purpose to do otherwise, because we did not even know how to use the missiles. I had hoped to learn something about the missiles after they had been established, learn what they were like and a few other things. I think the Soviets had some information they gave me. 15. In fact, when I visited the USSR, I asked Khrushchev to take me to see a strategic missile base. He took me to see one. That fact has been published. I was able to see what the strategic missiles were like later in the USSR. I am not going to give more details because they have not been declassified. [laughter] In spite of the photos the satellites have taken and what you must know now, because there are more people working together on this, [chuckles] more people working together. I think that almost everything you want to find out you can find out there now, but just in case, I do not want to take responsibility and I will not give more details about the strategic missile base I saw in the sixties. I imagine that it is more modern now, but really I cannot say anything else. 16. We did not oppose the search for a peaceful solution. I have already explained that. Rather, we opposed everything that had been agreed upon and the way it was done. It was not a matter of form but of content. The fundamental interests of this country had not been taken into account, and we were asked to trust. We were supposed to depend on someone's word. That seemed like very little. We were very opposed to the content, but we could do nothing except what was associated with our sovereignty. We could not allow inspections. If we did not agree with the solution that had been reached, how could we agree to the inspections? Why should we cooperate with this? 17. In addition, the people's mood would have made that impossible, even incomprehensible. Let me say that we had to make a statement about the IL-28's, because the IL-28's were also gone. There was a time when they pledged us the IL-28's, [words indistinct] Mikoyan, when I discussed the problem, he said it was impossible. He said: Let the Americans go to the devil. No, Mikoyan said: Let the imperialists go to the devil. That is more exact. Because we said that the Americans wanted to take them away. He said: Let the imperialists go to the devil. He did not say: Let the Americans go to the devil. 18. Really, what he said is more elegant, because it is not the same to say imperialists as to say Americans. To say it that way, the words Mikoyan said were: Let the imperialists go to the devil if they want to take away the IL-28's. And a few days later, Mikoyan had to come to try to persuade us that he wanted to take away the IL-28's. That was another problem. We said: Take away the IL-28's as well? How could we explain that to the people? I had to make a statement that we accepted the arrangement and the planes were obsolete already and all those things. People did not like it at all that the IL-28's were taken away. Our role was not at all pleasant. We had to go around explaining our agreement so the IL-28's could be taken away. 19. We did not want to accumulate more reasons and factors for irritation in our relations with the Soviets. Our close economic relations with the Soviets must also be taken into account. The country's whole life, energy, everything depended on the Soviets. There were many things with which they were going to supply us. The national oil enterprises that exist today did not exist back then. At that time, a few multinational companies dominated the entire oil market. The Soviets supplied us with oil. They also supplied us with weapons. 20. We gained something after the missile crisis: free weapons. Up to that time, weapons had been sold through credits, but because of the crisis, well, first there were the weapons that were left here. We received them for free. After that, for almost 30 years, we received free weapons. That was a positive result of the missile crisis for us. It was a new precedent, the supply of weapons. So we did not want to sour relations further with the Soviet Union. Who would have benefited from that? No one would have benefited. We had to manage our indignation. But the people would not have accepted the idea of inspections, but of course, for us it was not a question of public opinion. We did not accept the business about the inspections. 21. I think an agreement can be reached with us on any issue, because in fact-and history has shown this- we have been responsible about all our international commitments. When we have made commitments, we have fulfilled them. Our commitment in Angola is a recent example. Why was there peace in Angola? Because of the enormous effort Cuba made at a time of tremendous crisis for Angola. We are willing, we would have been willing, to reach agreements without these humiliations. Were we going to inspect U.S. territory? 22. At one time we accepted some observers who were going to be-this is in the letters-in the United States, I think in Cuba, and in I do not know what other Caribbean countries. That was the general idea, but it also included the United States. It seemed like a more equitable arrangement to us. The United States, however, did not accept observers on its territory. The United States responded to Nikita-and this is in the letters-that in that case, there would also have to be observers in the Black Sea and the ports from which the weapons had sent to Cuba. The United States refused to accept observers, and that fact is in the letters. 23. So that addresses our willingness to make commitments. We could not do it. At that time, the agreements were unjust. I do not understand why we were the only ones who were to be inspected. There should have been bilateral inspections. They should have let us inspect places of possible clandestine attacks in the United States and all that. We might have accepted some kind of observation on a reciprocal basis. It was not necessary, you know? I think the governments' sense of responsibility is the most important thing. 24. We could have published the agreement, put it totally in the public light. In short, I was observing events, and we were leaving the initiative to the adversary. That was not the language we used: We said we were leaving the initiative to the imperialists, the enemy, and all those things. But here with the elegant way we are discussing things, we should say that. [chuckles] I am translating it into elegant language. I told Khrushchev that we were leaving the initiative to the United States because of the line we were taking and that we should publish the agreement. I sent that message to him. 25. But I also said that in any case we would let them make the final decision on the matter. Why am I saying this again? Because they knew the global situation and the correlation of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union better than we did. We did not know more. Therefore we said that the Soviet leadership, and specifically Nikita, who knew the situation and had much more information than I did, should make the final decision. In fact, he made the final decision to continue with the same idea he had at the beginning. He made the decision to continue the same way, that it should not be published, that it should not be talked about. 26. The idea of the elections, waiting for the 4 November elections, may have influenced him. I think he always had that in mind, not to create any scandal about all this. The fact is that that was the decision. It also anticipated that if a crisis arose because the operation was discovered, it would be something legal that was discovered. It is as if a boyfriend and girlfriend go to the movies. They may not have told anyone, but they are not doing anything illegal. Or if a married couple goes to the beach and stays at a hotel. They are not betraying anyone; they are not hiding anything. They are not committing any offense, any crime. But, well, what we were doing was absolutely legal. -END-