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Introduction

The Hispanic population in the United States has grown dramatically since 1990, numbering over 40 million in 2004. This population growth was accompanied by a change in migration patterns. Instead of the traditional destinations of New York, New Jersey, California, Chicago, Texas and the Southwest, many Hispanics chose to migrate to Southern states. There are a variety of forces at play in this change, both economic and social. Migration networks and economic expansion, with its associated increase in the demand for labor, are generally cited as the two key dynamics of the phenomenon of rapid Hispanic population growth in the South. In New Orleans, apparent migration networks have been in place for many years, and the high demand for labor associated with the rebuilding efforts after the 2006 hurricane season has contributed to a noticeably increased Hispanic population. However, the motivations for these migrants are unknown, and as such, the services provided by the community may or may not fit their needs.

This paper analyzes data from the entrance survey given to all visitors to the Hispanic Business Resources and Technology Center (HBRTC or “the Center”) in Kenner, LA, and compares the demographic trends observed with those hypothesized by several models of migration in order to discover the motivations of Hispanic migrants to New Orleans. After presenting some basic economic and sociological model of migration behavior, this paper discusses previous research on the motivations of migrants, then the data gathered is analyzed,

the various models are evaluated and conclusions are drawn. The neoclassical, surplus labor, and segmented labor market models fixate on income or wage differentials between the country of origin and the receiving country. Such models often begin with assumptions that do not apply to real world cases. The osmosis, recent basic trends, and planned behavior theory models have more general assumptions, but as a result do not provide much insight into the motivations of migrants. Migration network theory offers the best means of understanding how the demographic trends expressed in the HBRTC data reflect migration motivations.

Migration Theories

Traditional economic migration theories attempt to understand the motivations and consequences of migration in terms differences in some measure such that the destination of country is preferable to the country of origin, and the differential decreases with migration until the process reaches an equilibrium state. Often, models that explain internal migration can be applied to international migration by adapting the costs of migration being considered. Internal migrants face lower costs than international migrants. The act of crossing an international border adds additional bureaucratic, transportation, and sometimes legal costs, while the additional distance creates greater stress on personal relationships.

The neoclassical model of migration claims that differences in real income per capita motivate migration. Workers from the country with the lower income per capita will migrate to the country with the higher income per capita, which raises the income per capita in the sending country and lowers it in the receiving country. This model assumes perfect competition in the labor markets of both countries, full employment in the receiving country, no surplus labor in the sending country, constant returns to scale of labor and no foreseeable technological advances, which means that the migrants necessarily reduce wages or replace native workers in the

receiving country (Reubens, 1981). The obvious flaw with this model is that these conditions do not hold in the real world. While it could be argued that low levels of unemployment are merely structural unemployment, such that the receiving country does have full employment, technological advances and varying returns to scale mean that the demand for jobs is not fixed. Also, perfect competition in the labor market of either country would require an equilibrium wage such that income is a function of hours worked, which is not the case in most countries.

The osmosis and recent basic trends models of migration both attempt to adapt the neoclassical model and address some of its limitations. Differences in some factor motivate migration, but that factor can be anything—income per capita, but also population density, educational opportunities, capital per worker, or one of many other factors that appear to precipitate migration (Reubens, 1981). These models' greatest strengths are in their rejection of the rigidity of the neoclassical model, and their addition of the concept of threshold effect to the discussion of migration. The threshold effect can be seen in situations where a factor differential between two countries does not lead to migration, because it is not significant enough to motivate migration. However beneficial their rejection of neoclassical rigidity may be, it is difficult to draw substantial conclusions from the application of these models, because their lack of rigidity leaves them overly applicable. When multiple factors have significant differentials between two countries, the osmosis and the recent basic trends models do not help to explain which factors played a greater role than others, or why.

The surplus labor model, developed by Lewis and elaborated upon by Ranis and Fei, is a push-pull, two-sector model, where the “traditional sector” is engaged in agriculture, and the “modern sector” in industry or technologically advanced agriculture. Wages are higher in the modern sector, and surplus labor in agriculture migrates into the modern sector, which is

growing, such that wages in the modern sector do not immediately begin decreasing. Migration continues until the modern sector stops growing, and then the model moves into the neo-classical model of migration. The model assumes that migration is a net-benefit for both the individual migrant and for the area of origin (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1964). Migration and development theorists have found that empirical evidence suggests that it is skilled and semi-skilled workers, not the unskilled labor the model suggests, who are the most likely to migrate, as they stand to receive the greatest benefit from the migration. This criticism does not take into consideration human capital obtained after migration, but reflects the reality of migration between two countries, one with a more extensive traditional sector and the other with a more extensive modern sector. The countries that the majority of migrants to New Orleans come from countries have official economies substantially dominated by the service industry, part of the theorized modern sector.

Related to the surplus labor model, the segmented labor market theory describes an economy divided into primary and secondary labor markets, with secondary being the lower-skilled, lower-wage jobs due to heavy competition. The model assumes that native workers refuse to fill the secondary vacancies, and so migration to the secondary labor market is encouraged. This model, most notably in the work of Doeringer and Piore, describes the secondary labor market jobs as miserable and low quality, with low wages, poor labor conditions, and low levels of labor productivity due in part to the refusal of firms to upgrade their technology (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). If this is the case, such jobs would still have to have benefits far superior to those available in the country of origin in order to motivate migration.

The planned behavior theory comes from the field of sociology, and argues that intentions, as a function of social norms and expectations “that one will attain valued goods as a

consequence of the behavior," determine behavior decisions (DeJong, 2000, p. 309). DeJong's application of planned behavior theory to migration decision-making assumes that individual, household and community characteristics are not immediately relevant to migration in and of themselves, but impact the decision through their effect on expectations. DeJong found that lower income expectancies for non-migration and lower satisfaction with work opportunities in the country or origin were significant determinants of migration intentions. For women, lower income and comfort expectancies, lower work satisfaction, and prior migration were most significantly correlated with migration behavior, while for men lower affiliation expectancies in the country of origin were most significantly correlated with migration behavior (2000). Overall, the planned behavior model can be explained in economic terms, specifically in terms of differences in individual preferences and expected utility motivating the migration decision.

In general, while economics can provide a strong model of patterns in migration motivation, sociology allows for greater elaboration of the nuances in these patterns. In both fields, the more specific assumptions the models are based upon, the more detailed the observations that can be drawn from the application of the model, and the more limited the prevalence of these observations. Migration networks are an example of this dual economic-sociological migration model. Connections with experienced migrants lower the economic (not just financial) costs of migration for new migrants, by providing less risk and better information, through jobs, language skills, illegal status, and public services. They also help establish social capital—ties to the community and relationships with other members of the same society that facilitate interactions. Donato found that migration networks have a greater correlation to female than to male migration and previous migration of immediate family members also increases the likelihood of female migration (1993, p. 751). This finding suggests that the utility of such

networks is greater for women. Historically, Hondurans and other Central Americans have been migrating to New Orleans in significant numbers since the United Fruit Company established a strong transport conduit between Central American countries and Southern US port cities, in particular between Honduras and New Orleans (Chinchilla and Hamilton, 2004). The impact of this migration network on the Hispanic community in New Orleans will be detailed below.

There are also instances where sociological approaches to migration trump economic. Economics is limited in its approach to examining gender and migration decisions. While there are plenty of economic studies on female migration's correlation with having children, education levels, and income levels, economics provides very little on the role of household decision-making processes in effecting female migration. Sociology improves upon this weakness by discussing how women are not always able to express their preferences in household migration decisions (or household decisions in general). If women are not allowed to maximize their utility, or if their preferences are not considered while attempting to maximize household utility, then their migration is not the result of an economic decision.

Patterns of Migration

When Yap examined demographic trends of migrants, he found that marriage and children decreased the propensity to migrate for both men and women. Family creates strong ties to the community (social capital) that lower the benefits of migration, and having children increases the costs of migration. Yap also found that education was strongly positively correlated with migration (1976). The findings of Stuart and Hyclak support this, in that when there is a low to non-existent wage differential for unskilled labor there is little benefit of migration for those lacking skills (1984). However, if there is a significant differential between

standards of living, then all levels of education may have a strong correlation with migration. Cerrutti and Massey explained that “the act of migration is clearly associated with a higher rate of labor force participation, even though the move itself may be strongly connected to life course factors” (2001, p. 187). This suggests that whether or not motivations for migration are directly related to employment, the act of migration itself is. Labor force participation may not be immediate, but it is highly likely.

Hispanic Migration to the United States

Passel’s work at the Pew Hispanic Center has found that Hispanic migrants in the United States are usually young, male, Mexican, illegal, and temporary. They are here to work and go home, or migrate around the country, and send most of their money home as remittances. While most migrants initially come alone, they often eventually have their family join them in the United States (2004). This is the traditional view of Hispanic migration to the United States, and seems to support the segmented labor market model.

That said, the Hispanic population is decidedly not homogenous, and the experiences of its subsets vary greatly. Borjas (1982) pointed to the differences in political versus economic migration in terms of costs of return migration, and the resulting incentives for adaptation in the receiving country. Borjas found that wage differentials, as a proxy for labor market assimilation, decrease with both the years since initial migration and with acquiring of skills and human capital. If decreasing wage differentials are used as a proxy for assimilation, then the segmented labor market model is inaccurate for describing Hispanic migration to the United States, and planned behavior theories discussion of expectations may be more relevant.

Migration to the Southern United States

Migration to the South has been driven by economic expansion in the service and industry sectors of metropolitan areas in the South, and the resultant need for semi-skilled labor. This migration has been largely motivated by employment, such that apparent wage differentials overcame the strong pull of the benefits of migrating to traditional settlement areas. Given the long-lasting impact of economic conditions in the United States on job opportunities for migrants (see Stewart and Hyckak, 1984, p. 292), the economic expansion in the South has created a significant motivation for migration to the South as opposed to other areas of the United States. In the New Orleans area, the even greater demand for labor is even higher since Hurricane Katrina, such that job prospects could be even more appealing to migrants. However, Kochhar, in a 2006 report on Latino labor, finds that “there is no clear sign that Hurricane Katrina gave an unusual boost to employment in construction for Latino workers either in the South or in the nation at large between mid-2005 and mid-2006” (p. 24). Kochhar elaborates that an increased Hispanic populations in hurricane-affected areas resulted more from “Hispanic construction workers relocating from neighboring areas in the South” than foreign-born workers entering the area (p. 24). The overall trend of high rates of increase in foreign-born Hispanic employment than native-born Hispanic employment mentioned earlier in the same Latino labor report could contrast this conclusion, but may simply reflect diversification of the overall Hispanic labor force into fields other than construction.

Human Capital and Migration

Given that the data for this paper comes from surveys given to individuals seeking services from the Hispanic Business Resources and Technology Center, whose language courses and business seminars focus on increasing visitor's human capital, the effects of human capital on migration may be particularly significant to this data set. Stier and Tienda (1992) draw the conclusion that for migration motivated by differences in incomes or wages, not only do migrants self-select from higher education and skill level cohorts, but higher wages are associated with education, training and skills in the US. Some pre-migration human capital has less of an effect on wages than post-migration human capital (work experience), while other forms do not have a significant difference in their effect on wages between accumulation before and after migration (schooling). Only in enclaves is their significant incentive to avoid English-language training (through formal classes or prolonged exposure to English-speaking society) for those who do not yet have it. They also found that "language effects on wages are mediated by the prospects for securing a job in the first place" (Stier and Tienda, 1992, p.1303). Also highlighting the positive wage effect of skill accumulation, Borjas found that "most, if not all, wage differentials between races/ethnicities can be explained by differences in skills, further emphasizing the importance of skill accumulation" (1982, p. 344). This emphasis on skills and their effect on wages for migrants suggests that the neoclassical model suffers from its lack of differentiation between workers of different skill levels. The surplus labor, segregated labor market, and planned behavior theory models seem to compliment the importance of skills to migrant wages.

Gender and Migration to the United States

Given the potential restrictions on individual utility maximization in the household migration decision mentioned above, female motivations for migration may differ significantly from male motivations, and may reflect any constraints imposed upon them during the decision making process. Cerrutti and Massey found that within the household, “a husband’s migration is determined substantially by factors more relevant to employment (human and social capital), whereas the wife’s is related more strongly to family considerations (the prior migration of children, nieces, and nephews)” (2001, p. 192). Along with family ties, migration networks have a positive correlation with female migration.

After migration, Stier and Tienda found “little support for the claim that the labor supply of immigrant wives responds to intra-familial economic pressures” (1992, p. 1309). Time in the US did not increase the likelihood of labor force participation in their sample. Earlier immigrant wives participate less in the labor market than more recent immigrant wives. “This suggests that “pure” immigration effects on labor supply are transitory and quickly give way to other factors that shape market decisions” (p. 1305). Also, Enchautegui finds that “long-term nonwork decreases the propensity to migrate for women in each demographic group. Apparently, labor market detachment produces migration inertia” (1997, p. 546). Female migration appears to be motivated by family decisions and constraints rather than income differentials. Cerrutti and Massey caution against assuming that “that economic or household strategy models are the appropriate explanations for women’s behaviors. It may simply be that women’s decisions are closely constrained by patriarchal norms, whereby men ultimately determine whether and when wives should join them” (2001, p. 198). The migration decision for women must be contrasted with the labor force participation decision. When women migrate and are active in the labor

force, their economic activity is most likely the result of a decision to maximize household utility, though individual utility decisions cannot necessarily be observed in the act of migration.

Data and Analysis

New Orleans Hispanic Population


This paper uses HBRTC survey data supplemented with US Census Data, including the 2004 American Community Survey. Survey questions will be included in the appendix. This data was gathered between the Center's opening on March 13, 2006 and October 13, 2006, a period of seven months.

The HBRTC survey data has natural limitations resulting from the self-selection of visitors. Individuals seeking the services of a small business support center are not likely to be retirement age, as they will wish to live to implement their plans and to see return on their investments, so the sample may be skewed slightly younger than overall population. Also, these same individuals are less likely to be temporary migrants. While the human capital obtained at the Center can certainly be applied to other states and countries, the social capital cannot. Since many of the services offered at the HBRTC require a substantial time commitment over several months, there are numerous opportunities for significant social capital development that could increase the costs of out-migration from the New Orleans area.


Demographics

The arithmetic mean age of visitors to the HBRTC was 34.89 years, and the geometric mean was 32.99 years. As the difference suggests, there were many more visitors younger than


34, but a few 60 and 70 year old visitors skewed the data. The median age in New Orleans was 35.2 according to 2005 US Census data. Visitors to the center were 51.3% male and 48.7% female. Number of children was used as a proxy for family composition. 66.1% of Center visitors had children, 33.9% did not. Of the 66.1% who had children, the arithmetic mean number of children was 2.14 and the geometric mean was 1.8. The survey population was on average in their low-thirties, roughly the age of beginning new families or having young children, divided almost evenly between men and women (the difference between even split is not statistically significant, so the overall population could be perfectly evenly split). The high percentage of females in the sample population is higher than expected, given the literature on gender and migration, particularly for a small business center. This suggests a female migrant population that is active in the labor market. The majority of visitors had children, which defies the assumption of migrants as non-married and without children, however, in many cases these children may be from relationships since migration.



22.7% of men and 17.1% of women were under 24. 20.5% of men and 11.4% of women were between 25 and 29. 31.8% of men and 17.1% of women were between 30 and 34. 11.4% of men and 5.7% of women were between 35 and 39. 2.3% of men and 22.9% of women were between 40 and 44. 4.5% of men and 5.7% of women were between 45 and 49. 2.3% of men, and 14.3% of women were between 50 and 59. 4.5% of men and 5.7% of women were over the age of 60. Women were more dispersed throughout the age cohorts, and women had a higher mean age. If visiting the HBRTC is in and of itself considered a proxy for labor force participation, and the age limitations on female fertility are taken into consideration, the data implies that migration may begin as a family decision that later leads to labor market participation. The data for gender and children also supports this, because significantly more women than men had children.




55.2% of men had children, while 44.8% did not. 78.2% of women had children and 22.8% did not.




29.4% of visitors under the age of 24 had children, while 70.6% did not. 53.8% of visitors between 25 and 29 had children and 46.2% did not. 80% of visitors between 30 and 34 had children, while 20% did not. 57.1% of visitors between 35 and 39 had children and 42.9% did not. 88.9% of visitors between 40 and 44 had children, 11.1% did not. 100% of visitors between 45 and 49 had children. 75% of visitors between 50 and 59 had children, 25% did not. 75% of visitors over 60 had children, while 25% did not.

Country of Origin




The country of origin for the largest number of survey respondents was Honduras (47.1%), followed by Mexico (16.8%), and Nicaragua (13.4%), along with a smaller number of native-born US citizens (4.2% of visitors). There were also a limited number of visitors from Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Argentina, Cuba, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela (as well as Thailand and Vietnam). The high percentage of Hondurans implies the existence of a nativity enclave, which reflects the historical trends mentioned above.

Country of Origin and Gender



47.4% of both male and female visitors were from Honduras. 21.1% of men and 10.5% of women were from Mexico. 15.8% of men and 12.3% of women were from Nicaragua. 5.3% of men and 3.5% of women were born in the US. 1.8% of men and 5.3% of women were from Guatemala. 100% of the migrants from Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela were female. (Also the two visitors from non-Latin American countries who reported their gender were female.) 3.5% of men and 1.8% of women were from Brazil. 100% of visitors from Peru were male. 1.8% of both men and women were from Cuba and the same percentage of each were from El Salvador. The statistics on gender and country of origin support the assumption that New Orleans is the site of a Honduran migration network and nativity enclave. There are significantly less women than men in the Mexican and Nicaraguan nativity groups. This is not true for the Hondurans, which suggests that something is either lowering the costs or raising the benefits of migration to New Orleans relative to those of Mexican and Nicaraguan women. However, the number of women from non-major areas possibly conflicts with this, which

suggests that costs and benefits could differ for reasons other than a migration network. However, the number of individuals from the non-major countries is small overall, such that this trend may be a result of a small sample size for that cohort. There is no significant difference between the expected and observed relationship of having children and country of origin or between the expected and observed relationship of having children and time in the US.




68.6% of Honduran migrants had children and 31.4% did not. 65% of Mexican migrants had children, while 35% did not. 64.3% of Nicaraguans had children, 35.7% did not. 100% of US-born visitors had children. Of the remaining countries, 47.8% had children, while 52.2% did not.


Motivations

I used length of time in the US and having lived in other states or countries as proxies for permanent versus temporary migration. Time in US is a continuum variable—I cannot be certain that individuals who have been in the US for several years will stay in the US, let alone New Orleans, but the greater the period of time since initial migration, the lower the likelihood of return migration. Having lived in other locations than Louisiana is a good variable for examining temporary versus permanent migration, as individuals who are motivated by wage labor alone are not likely to choose to permanently reside in New Orleans (for reasons discussed below, in the economic data section), but also because those who have lived in states other than Louisiana or countries other than the US and their country of origin are more likely to place lower value on previously developed social capital, and as such are more likely to migrate elsewhere.


I also looked at responses to the question “what are your objectives for you interaction with the HBRTC?” The answer to this question illuminates individual motivations for improving personal human capital and competitiveness in the labor market. If migration is related to labor market factors, such as higher real per capita income, then these same factors that motivate individuals to visit the HBRTC, and thereby increase their expected wages, may have motivated them to migrate in the first place.



The majority of survey respondents had been in New Orleans prior to the Hurricane, but on average less than 5 years. This may reflect some self-selection by Center visitors, since well-established members of the Hispanic community might not feel the need for business training. Return migration is less likely for the majority of respondents that have children, suggesting that the Hispanic population in New Orleans is for the most part permanent, not temporary. However, while HBRTC visitors were dispersed throughout the time in US cohorts, frequency decreased with time and almost a third had been in the US between one and three years. One to three years is not a long enough period of time to suggest permanent migration, but other factors must be considered before the visitors to the HBRTC are described as temporary. Their short stay in the US may in fact be a result of their coming to the HBRTC for assistance, as more established individuals might have found the same resources elsewhere, or not need these resources at all. As mentioned in the beginning of the data section, the decision to use HBRTC services in and of itself expresses a degree of permanency in the visitors' migrations.



20.3% of men and 7.1% of women had been in the US for less than a year. 40.7% of men and 19.6% of women had been in the US for 1 to 3 years. 1.9% of men and 19.6% of women had been in the US for 3 to 5 years. 11.1% of men and 16.1% of women had been in the US for 5 to 7 years. 5.6% of men and 3.8% of women had been in the US for 7 to 9 years. 1.9% of men and 12.5% of women had been in the US for 9 to 11 years. 12.9% of men and 8.9% of women had been in the US for 11 to 20 years. 5.6% of men and 12.5% of women had been in the US for over 20 years. A higher percentage of men than women had been in the US between one and three years, and these visitors also tended to be in the lower age cohorts. These visitors may represent more traditional migration that is motivated by wage and per capita income differentials to seek temporary employment in the US.




This data shows that the likelihood of having children increases with time spent in the US—those who have been in the US for less than a year are more likely to not have children. All other time spent in the US cohorts are more likely to have children than not, and the probability of not having children generally declines with time in the US. Most likely, with a larger sample size this pattern would be even more pronounced. Such a trend implies that permanent migration is more positively correlated with having children than with not having children, but more research and data analysis needs to be done to confirm this. It is important to recognize that the migration of entire families carries with it a good deal more risk and economic cost than the migration of an individual, so many households may send over a single family member who sends remittances home, while in other cases individuals abstain from beginning a family until after the act of migration. If longer-term migrants are having families after

migration, or if entire families migrate after one family member establishes a household in the US, the services the Hispanic population of New Orleans will demand will be quite different if these same longer-term migrants leave households with children in their country of origin. The two situations are probably occurring at the same time, with migrants participating in the nativity enclave beginning families after migration, or migrating with their families, while other migrants, possibly more temporary, sending remittances home to their family.

69.1% of visitors had not lived anywhere other than Louisiana and their country of origin for more than six months, 28.5% had lived in other states, and 2.4% had lived in other countries. For the most part likelihood of having lived in another state or country decreased as time spent in the US increased, but the pattern was not perfect. This is most likely due to the sample size. It must also be noted that because survey respondents were choosing to receive training in business and employment skills, the group itself is self-selected, with those who intended to migrate only temporarily not visiting the Center. However, since the Center offers ESL classes, there is certainly the possibility that visitors utilizing these services might participate in out-migration to other areas of the US.


Time in US and Other Residences




Interestingly, time in US and having lived in other states does not seem to be negatively correlated, as one might expect if they were both good proxies for permanent versus temporary migration. While the sample size for visitors who had lived in other states or countries is far too small to draw conclusions from, it is clear the correlation is not sharply negative. This does not have to mean that either time in US or having lives in other states are poor proxies for permanent versus temporary migration. It is possible that the migrants that are motivated mostly by differences in real income per capita make up a significant portion of the visitors who have lived in other states, and that in the case of those visitors who have been in the US for less than a year, this subgroup has not yet had the opportunity to move elsewhere. This may be true for the one to three year cohort as well. It is also possible that having lived in other states would increase with time spent in the US if many migrants were initially motivated by differences in income per capita, but some factor, such as a nativity enclave or an increase in demand for labor, drove them to New Orleans later, after their initial migration to the United States. This group would not

necessarily be permanent residents of the city, it would depend on their motivations for making the internal migration to New Orleans, and whether these motivations were specific to the city or not.

The following two figures present the relationship between age and time in the US, broken into two graphs for easier reading. The first graph shows the frequency of time in the US under seven years for the surveyed population, according to age, while the second graph shows the frequency of time in the US over seven years.






As these graphs show, time spent in the US is positively correlated with age. It is significant to note that none of the migrants under the age of 24 had been in the US for more than seven years. This means that none of the visitors comprising this subgroup migrated as children or adolescents. Only a very small number of visitors—represented by the short red and green columns in the 25-29 age cohort—migrated as children. This could possibly be a result of self-selection by HBRTC visitors, the small sample size, or institutional constraints. This small number of former child-migrants supports the literature discussed above. The risk factors and economic costs associated with migrating with children, or of sending children to migrate independent of their parents, means that most migrants do not do so until they are at least in late adolescence.


In answering the question “what are your objectives for you interaction with the HBRTC?” 39.5% chose development, 17.4% chose finding employment, 19.8% chose opening or developing their own business, and 23.4% chose helping family. Visitors were allowed to choose more than one response. Most of the surveys were answered in Spanish, and “capitación” was listed in place of “capacitación” which means qualification or preparation, and was listed as development on the English survey. Many respondents corrected the word on the form themselves, and for simplicity’s sake this paper assumes that those who did not correct the mistake nevertheless were aware of the intent of the word. We did not ask visitors to elaborate on what they meant by choosing “development” or “family,” the two most commonly chosen objectives, both of which can be highly conceptual. Visitors who chose personal development were most likely referring to increasing the competitiveness of their labor or business, via new or improved skills, but they could also have been referring to enhanced social networking, or any other myriad objectives that might fall under the category of development. Helping ones family, as the Spanish text of the survey translates, is even more ephemeral. It could involve assisting with children’s schoolwork, bringing in additional income, facilitating household production (easing interactions with neighbors, landlords, and/or service providers), improving inter- or intra-family relationships, and/or any number of other things.

Objectives and Gender



Objectives were evenly distributed between the genders. Men and women almost equally listed “family” as an objective, suggesting that while initial migration may or may not be a family decision, with wives participating equally with their husbands, labor force participation is such a decision. The near equal percentages of men and women who listed business as an objective implies a higher level than expected of not only female labor force participation, but also of female business initiative.

Objectives and Children



Those visitors with children were equally as likely as those without to list “family” as an objective, but a lower percentage of those with children list “employment” as an objective, and a higher percentage of the same group list “business” as an objective. This could imply that those with children have motivations beyond wages, and wish to establish an income-generating source independent of their labor.


B. National Hispanic Population

According to Fry’s Statistical Portrait of Hispanics at Mid-Decade, the US Hispanic population was 59.8% native born and 40.2% foreign born in 2005. The HBRTC data differs greatly from this in that nearly all visitors were foreign-born. Those who were native-born were not asked which origin group they affiliate with.

Nativity	Pew	HBRTC	Standard Error	Z-Value

Foreign Born	0.402	0.957	0.0455	29.847
Native Born	0.598	0.0431	0.0455	12.198

The table above shows the most significant difference between the Pew Hispanic Center data and the HBRTC data—there are far more foreign born in the HBRTC sample. This has the potential to skew the result, if the foreign born population is significantly different than the national population, independent of distinctions between the national and New Orleans data. The Pew has data on the foreign born population's age and gender, which is compared later in the text with the overall Hispanic population's data on age and gender relative to that of the HBRTC data in order to see what potential impact this high percentage of foreign born in the sample might have on the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.




The majority of Hispanics (63.8%) were of Mexican origin, while 1.1% were Honduran, and 0.7% were Nicaraguan. This is different from the majority Honduran HBRTC sample.

Country of Origin	Pew	HBRTC	S.E.	Test 1	Pew-Foreign Born	HBRTC-Foreign Born	S.E.	Test 2
Honduras	0.0111	0.483	0.00974	-48.405	0.0197	0.505	0.0132	-36.725
Mexico	0.639	0.172	0.0446	10.458	0.645	0.180	0.0454	10.224
Nicaragua	0.00656	0.138	0.0075	-17.523	0.0113	0.144	0.0100	-13.271

As the table shows, this difference is significant and with regards to country of origin, the Pew data and the HBRTC data are radically different and do not represent identical populations. For a two-tailed test of difference at the ninety-five percent significance level, acceptable Z-values would fall between -1.96 and 1.96. None of the Z-values for the Honduran, Mexican, and Nicaraguan sample proportions fall within this range. The Honduran proportion exhibits the strongest degree of difference, then the Nicaraguan. Because nativity may be skewing the Pew's

majority native-born sample, the foreign populations of both samples were also compared. The magnitude of the Honduran Z-value decreases by almost twenty-five percent, as does the Nicaraguan test statistic, but the difference in the Mexican proportions does not appear to change substantially. While the Z-values continue to fall outside the range of acceptable values to accept the country of origin proportions as equal, comparing the foreign born populations as opposed to the overall populations does somewhat mediate the degree of difference for the Honduran and Nicaraguan proportions. It shows minimal effect on mediating the difference between the Pew and HBRTC Mexican proportions, most likely due to the large size of the Mexican proportion in both sets of Pew data.



As the chart above shows, the Pew data exhibits a similar trend to the HBRTC data, with females being more widely dispersed throughout the age cohorts, and with male having a slightly

lower median age. Out of concern for the potential impact that the differences in nativity between the two samples might have on this trend, the overall Pew data and the Pew data on the foreign born Hispanic population were both subjected to tests of difference against the HBRTC data. Data for individuals under the age of 15 was rejected, as such individuals are too young to legally be employed in the United States, and as such there was not a comparable population in the HBRTC data. The rejection of this data had a significant impact on the proportions within the age brackets for the Pew overall data, as nearly thirty percent of both the male and female sampled population is under age 14.

Age and Gender								
Male	Pew	HBRTC	S.E.	Test 1	Pew- Foreign Born	HBRTC- Foreign Born	S.E.	Test 2
15-24	0.240	0.227	0.0644	0.195	0.173	0.244	0.0591	-1.203
25-29	0.141	0.205	0.0525	-1.213	0.152	0.171	0.0561	-0.336
30-34	0.128	0.318	0.0504	-3.76	0.147	0.317	0.0553	-3.078
35-39	0.117	0.114	0.0484	0.0602	0.1364	0.122	0.0536	0.271
40-44	0.101	0.0227	0.0454	1.72	0.117	0.0244	0.0502	1.842
45-49	0.0799	0.0455	0.0409	0.843	0.0859	0.0488	0.0438	0.847
50-59	0.102	0.0227	0.0457	1.742	0.104	0.0244	0.0477	1.674
60-64	0.0302	0.0227	0.0258	0.29	0.0295	0.0244	0.0264	0.195
65 +	0.0610	0.0227	0.0361	1.06	0.0555	0.0244	0.0357	0.869
Female	Pew	HBRTC	S.E.	Test 1	Pew- Foreign Born	HBRTC- Foreign Born	S.E.	Test 2
15-24	0.226	0.171	0.0707	0.777	0.148	0.152	0.0619	-0.0528
25-29	0.123	0.114	0.0555	0.159	0.125	0.121	0.0576	0.0717
30-34	0.120	0.171	0.0548	-0.948	0.137	0.182	0.0599	-0.743
35-39	0.111	0.0571	0.053	1.007	0.133	0.0606	0.0591	1.223
40-44	0.101	0.229	0.051	-2.498	0.117	0.242	0.056	-2.239
45-49	0.0819	0.0571	0.0463	-1.151	0.0921	0.0606	0.0503	0.626
50-54	0.0642	0.0286	0.0414	0.859	0.0701	0.0303	0.0444	0.895
55-59	0.0495	0.114	0.0367	-1.766	0.0513	0.0909	0.0384	-1.033
60-69	0.0636	0.0286	0.0412	0.848	0.0598	0.0303	0.0413	0.715
70 +	0.0602	0.0286	0.0402	-0.561	0.0588	0.0303	0.0409	0.695

Using the same decision rule of rejecting all Z-values below -1.96 and above 1.96, the data shows that overall the Pew and HBRTC data presented proportions whose equality could not be rejected. For the overall male population, only the 30-34 cohort's equality was rejected with the HBRTC proportion significantly higher than the Pew proportion. All other male age cohorts shared significantly equal proportions between the HBRTC and Pew data. When nativity is considered and the foreign-born samples compared, the same overall equality is observed. Again, only the 30-34 year age group has a proportion significantly different between the two samples—the HBRTC proportion is greater than the Pew proportion. In the case of the 15-24 cohort's proportion, there is a sign change in the test statistic, along with a substantial magnitude change. While the proportions's equality cannot be rejected, the Z-value goes from very small, and positive, implying a slightly higher Pew proportion, to relatively large and negative, implying a substantially higher HBRTC proportion. This implies that the national foreign-born population has fewer members of the 15-24 cohort relative to the overall national population. For the lowest three age cohorts, the HBRTC foreign-born proportion is larger than that of the Pew, and for the upper six age cohorts the Pew foreign-born proportion is larger. The HBRTC foreign-born data is younger than the national foreign-born data.

In the overall female samples, only the 40-44 age cohort had overall proportions that were significantly unequal, with the HBRTC proportion larger than that of the Pew. The foreign-born samples required rejecting the equality of the same age cohort. Unlike the male age cohorts, the female age cohorts did not exhibit any consistency of sign in their test statistics, implying that the national and New Orleans samples were not significantly older or younger than one another, but that the sample with the larger proportion depends on which age cohort is being

examined. Some of the difference may be a result of the small HBRTC sample size, particularly relative to that of the national data.

In the Statistical Portrait of Hispanics at Mid-Decade, Fry recompiles and analyzes data from the American Community Survey (ACS) of 2005. One set of data that the ACS provides that Fry did not recompile for his Statistical Portrait is the breakdown of the foreign-born population by year of entry.

Foreign-Born Population by Sex, Year of Entry and Hispanic Origin Type: 2004 (numbers in thousands)						
Year of Entry	Total Hispanic		Hispanic Origin			
	Number	Percent	Mexican		Central American	
Total	16278	100	10638	100	2126	100
2000 or later	3259	20	2252	21.2	424	20
1990 - 1999	5947	36.5	4030	37.9	810	38.1
1980 - 1989	3909	24	2505	23.5	590	27.7
1970 - 1979	1881	11.6	1216	11.4	204	9.6
Before 1970	1282	7.9	634	6	98	4.6

Source: American Community Survey Data, 2004

In contrast to the HBRTC data, where the majority of respondents entered the US after 2000, the majority of ACS respondents arrived during the decade of the 1990s. Broken down further, by Hispanic origin, both the Mexican and Central American samples follow the ACS pattern, so the difference in time in the US between the two samples cannot be attributed simply to the differences in nativity. Central American is not broken down further into countries origin, so it is difficult to say for certain, but it appears that pull, not push, factors must be motivating the differences in average time in the US. At some point between 2000 and 2005, individuals who visited the HBRTC were more motivated to migrate to the United States than between 1990 and 1999.

Latin Growth in New Orleans, LA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)	1990	2000	Change
	52,563	58,545	11%

Central City	15,900	14,826	-7%
Suburb	36,663	43,719	19%

Suro and Singer's report on Latino Growth in Metro America describes the changes in the New Orleans Hispanic population. Between 1990 and 2000 the overall MSA's Hispanic population grew by 11%, but this includes a 7% decrease in the central city's population. Compensating for this loss is the increase in suburban New Orleans's Hispanic population. We do not know if the 7% leaving central city necessarily were part of the 19% increase in suburban New Orleans, but the overall trend was for suburban increase.

C. Economic Indicators

For the purpose of comparing what the demographic and motivational trends suggest about the motivations of Hispanic migrants to New Orleans with what economic data suggest, statistics on income and employment rates were gathered.

GDP Per Capita (USD PPP)	Year	Source
New Orleans	19,711	US Census Bureau
USA	41,800	US Census Bureau
Honduras	2,900	CIA World Factbook
Mexico	10,000	CIA World Factbook
Nicaragua	2,900	CIA World Factbook

The differences in income per capita suggest that wage and income differentials could play a substantial role in motivating migration. The lower income per capita in New Orleans compared to the rest of the United States suggests that something other than wage and income differentials must be increasing the benefits or lowering the costs of migration to New Orleans

relative to the costs and benefits of migration to elsewhere in the US. Because institutional factors in each country assure that wages do not equal marginal productivity of labor, it's difficult to tell from the data whether the New Orleans Hispanic population is better educated or more highly skilled than similar individuals in their country of origin, however, the decision to receive training at the HBRTC will have a direct effect on their income (according to Stewart and Hyclak's results).

Unemployment Rate (%)		Underemployment	Year	Source
New Orleans	11.8		2004	US Census Bureau
USA	6.9		2005	US Census Bureau
Honduras	28		2005	CIA World Factbook
Mexico	3.6	25	2005	CIA World Factbook
Nicaragua	5.6	46.5	2005	CIA World Factbook

While the level of underemployment is unknown, it is clear that overall employment is far higher in the overall United States. New Orleans's level of unemployment, from pre-Katrina data, is over seventy percent higher than the national rate. Because this data is not broken down by sector, we cannot be certain that information regarding sectors with higher than average employment rates did not motivate migrants to New Orleans. What is apparent is that based on strict unemployment rates as reported by each country's government, the level of Honduran migration is expected, given the differentials between Honduran and New Orleans unemployment rates, but Mexican and Nicaraguan migration requires that one factor in underemployment. Since the rate, but not the degree, of underemployment is provided, it is

difficult to judge whether one can argue that migration is in response to, and if it follows economic models, proportional to, unemployment differentials between regions.

V. Evaluation

Clearly, differences in income per capita play a role in migration, but the neoclassical model's assumptions do not hold—New Orleans does seem to have full employment currently, but this is a phenomenon of the reconstruction, and does not reflect the state of affairs when many of those surveyed first migrated to New Orleans. Also, the assumption of no surplus labor in the country of origin cannot be supported by this data, given the prevalence of un- and under-employment.

The data does not immediately support the surplus labor or the segmented labor market model, because it does not suggest that movement is from the agricultural to the modern sector. However, there is something to be said for differences in economies, and the role that unequal distribution of technology and capital plays in making less capital-rich countries not so much an “agricultural” sector as a less productive modern sector. It is conceivable from the data that migrants are moving to areas where their skills can yield greater productivity. However, this does not explain the entirety of migration, just a portion of the motivations.

The differences in income and job opportunities suggest that planned behavior theory should fit the New Orleans Hispanic population's migration. However, planned behavior theory is too vague for this to lead to any conclusions that are significantly different than those of the economic models. The data initially appears to completely contradict the information on gender differences and migration, given the higher percentage than expected of both female migrants

and migrants with children. This contradiction most likely comes from the lowered costs and increased benefits of the Honduran migration network in New Orleans.

The high percentage of Hondurans in the sample and the higher than expected frequency of females within the Hondurans surveyed point to the existence of a strong migrant network. The higher average age, low likelihood of having lived in another state, and significant percentage of visitors with children also support the application of a migration network model to the data. The benefits of a Honduran migrant network would explain why Hondurans migrate to New Orleans despite its lower real income per capita and higher unemployment rates than the rest of the United States. This is not to say that other migrant networks do not exist alongside the Honduran migrant network, nor is it to say that New Orleans is not a nativity enclave for other nationalities, the surveyed sample is too small to draw conclusions excluding either possibility. What can be discerned is that the migrant network is the best model for describing migration to New Orleans, though they may not be the exclusive force driving individuals.

Conclusions

This data stems from a single survey of self-selected sample of the New Orleans Hispanic population, and as such the conclusions drawn may not apply perfectly to the entire population. The economic models of migration that fixate on differences in wages or income motivating migration—the neoclassical, surplus labor, and segmented labor market models—present a partial picture of the motivations for migration to New Orleans, given the clear average wage and income differentials. Income alone is not a sufficient motivator for the degree of migration to New Orleans, nor for the demographic trends seen within the population. Models that attempt to incorporate other factors—the osmosis, recent basic trends, and planned behavior theory

models—do not generally yield significant conclusions due to the vague assumptions on which they are based. The New Orleans population appears to fit these models, but no valuable conclusions can be drawn about this fit. The most significant theory for the New Orleans Hispanic population is that of migration networks. The Honduran migration network in New Orleans lowers the costs and increases the benefits of migration. As a result, there are more migrants, more women, more families, a higher average age, and a lower likelihood of temporary migration in the New Orleans population than would be expected without the migration network.

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