

...With a Pan-American Umbrella

In the Western Hemisphere, a unique idea developed which encouraged the juxtaposition of the United States and Latin America. As a result of the geographical proximity between the two regions and the division between the 'Old' World with its European nations and the 'New' World with its fledgling nations, Pan-Americanism emerged during the late 1800s as an ideology which viewed the Western Hemisphere as a union of American nations which should be linked by prosperity and security. By pursuing key concepts such as democracy and stability, the two regions would mature alongside one another, a model of unity within the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans (Smith 47).

While such an ideology greatly appealed to numerous intellectuals from both the United States and Latin America, Pan-Americanism supporters quickly found their ideology linked to the growing efforts of the United States to establish political and economic hegemony over Latin America (Campos and Prevost ix). Under the pretext of liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico from the continued imperialistic efforts of the 'Old' World, the United States entered in 1898 into the Spanish-American War and ensured the independence of Spain's final colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Although the rhetoric presented by many of the supporters of the United States' entrance into the war emanated the democratic ideals of Pan-Americanism, the United States immediately assumed a 'guiding' role over the two newly-independent nations. With the incorporation of the Platt Amendment into the Cuban Constitution, anti-imperialist reactions emanated from Latin America due to the continued role of the United States' government in the domestic affairs of a nation which should have received not solely its independence but its sovereignty following its citizens' wars for independence (Smith 62, 66 – 8). The United States' role during and following the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico set the stage for the United States' understanding of Pan-Americanism during the 20th Century. For the United States, Pan-

Americanism is the belief that the political and economic hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere will allow for the development and progress of every Latin American nation which welcomes, or succumbs to, this hegemony. As described by David Sheinin, Pan-Americanism has become linked to the “U.S. agenda for political, strategic, cultural, ideological, and economic influence in the hemisphere; Pan Americanism has always been U.S. led, the friendly face of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere” (1). And yet, the United States’ actions under a Pan-American umbrella have continued to receive great criticism from Latin America. In order to understand the current comprehension of Pan-Americanism held by the United States and Latin America, one must first understand how the United States’ actions during the previous century, especially those publicized as Pan-American or beneficial to the ‘Americas,’ promoted or repudiated Pan-Americanism. This paper will first discuss how the United States’ role during the Cold War influenced the concepts of Pan-Americanism during the last half of the 20th Century. As a result of the bipolar contest between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, Latin America suffered from various unilateral interventions by the United States, challenging the benevolent Pan-American rhetoric proclaimed by the United States’ government and further defining the United States’ comprehension of Pan-Americanism. This paper will then discuss how the United States has pursued various attempts at free trade agreements, regional and bilateral, and anti-terrorism programs under the pretense of Pan-American development and success. Due to the conflict and disappointments associated with the pursuit of a free trade bloc spanning across the Western Hemisphere, Pan-Americanism has thus been associated with the United States’ quest for economic domination as well as the United States’ war – seemingly unilateral – with global terrorism and the United States’ linkages of anti-terrorism and security with Pan-Americanism. After having detailed some of the United States’ Pan-American efforts in the post-Cold War era, this paper will conclude with a discussion of how

the emergence of left-of-the-center political leaders throughout Latin America has openly challenged the United States' Pan-American hegemony. By briefly examining the efforts of these leftist leaders, this paper will take note of how these leaders' regional programs have given a more vocal voice to the Latin American defiance of United States' Pan-Americanism, observing that many of these challenges are the result of a Pan-Americanism which actually diverges from that defended by the United States.

World War II Hints

During the Cold War, the United States utilized Pan-Americanism in order to justify the continuation of its paternalistic hegemony throughout Latin America. The first hints of this approach to such relationships with its southern neighbors emerged during World War II. In its efforts to combat the spread of European fascism, the United States enlisted the support, both political and economic, of its Latin American neighbors. With military personnel from Mexico and Brazil serving alongside those of the United States, Pan-Americanism appeared as a shining example of international cooperation against foreign aggression and totalitarianism (McPherson 13). The United States deployed military advisors beginning in 1940 and established military bases following the 1941 Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor throughout Latin America (Sicker 99 – 100, 102 – 3). Although frequently described as a coordinated effort or as an example of Inter-American cooperation, these efforts actually represented how the United States still viewed Latin America as fledgling neighbors which required the leadership of its northern protector. The strategic importance of Latin America ensured that the United States would turn to its southern neighbors as vital points of defense and invaluable channels for transportation while the military personnel provided by Latin America remained under the leadership of United States' advisers (Sicker 97; Smith 106 – 7). Furthermore, the United States looked toward Latin America as a source of indispensable materials, such as rubber, tin, and agricultural goods, which

were necessary to the war effort, that effort which was dominated by the United States' leadership role (Sicker 103; Klein 197). In return for their support of the United States' programs, Latin American nations received great economic benefits from the United States, including the United States' assimilation of the region's diminished trade with Europe and assistance provided by the Lend-Lease programs (Smith 106 – 7).

The paternalistic protection provided by the United States during World War II demonstrated how the United States had placed itself as a guardian over Latin America in order to combat international threats like European fascism. Ultimately, the United States' Lend-Lease program proved to undermine those Pan-American ideals which were championed to defend it. Although United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had proclaimed the country's promise to protect the freedoms of democracy throughout the world, seventy percent of the economic aid provided by the Lend-Lease programs was directed at Brazil, a Latin American nation under a dictatorship (McPherson 20). Due to the strategic importance of its position and the vulnerabilities of its coastline, Brazil stood as the most important geostrategic country in South America (Smith 107). In contrast to Brazil's aid, the five republics of Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras received less than 10 percent of the resources provided under the program (Leonard 102). In spite of the United States' celebration of the spread of Pan-American democracy, the United States had sacrificed democratic freedoms for not only military support and economic resources utilized in the United States' efforts in World War II but internal security, a security which was guaranteed under the leadership of the Brazilian dictatorship. Tragically, this compromise provided the first allusion to what would become the icon of the United States' position during the Cold War. As Alan McPherson describes, the United States adhered to "traditional paternalistic images of Latin Americans as immature and unfit for self-government," and, as a result, "the Cold War breathed new life into

U.S. support for trustworthy dictatorships rather than the sometimes-messy insecurity of democracy” (21).

Into the Cold War

During the Cold War, the United States’ policies stood as a contradiction of its own Pan-American rhetoric. As the United States advocated the spread of democracy and freedom throughout Latin America, Latin Americans clearly received the message. From labor unions to democratic parties, countless demanded reform and democracy, challenged dictatorships, and proclaimed those freedoms championed by their northern neighbor (McPherson 21). Under Pan-American auspices, Latin Americans desired democracy and freedom. However, the United States reevaluated this Pan-American stance due to the Cold War. With the development of the Soviet atomic bomb and the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the onset of the Korean War in 1950, the United States began to view communism as a more imminent threat to its Latin American neighbors who were now being considered important allies in this fight. Due to the radicalization of the United States government’s policy, these factors thus set in motion the active inclusion of Latin America in the United States government’s vision of the Cold War (McPherson 23; Sicker 109). The United States’ officers and diplomats assigned to Latin America began to reflect the radicalization of Cold War foreign policy, for they lacked “lengthy Latin American experience,” and many believed that communists in Latin America must be working alongside the Soviet Union (Leonard 106 – 7). Furthermore, these officials’ anti-communist and paternal sentiments toward Latin America manifested themselves in foreign policy. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. officials saw the whole of Latin America as incapable of self-government, reflected in the writing of the ‘father of containment’ George Kennan after a tour in Latin America (McPherson 24; Pastor 228; Smith 119):

But where [democratic or self-government does] not exist, and where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too weak to absorb successfully the intensity of communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further communist successes. (Kennan 127)

As a result of the United States' fear of communism, the government placed greatest value in governments which would combat leftist insurgencies regardless of human rights violations and repression, sacrificing the democratic ideals of Pan-Americanism. Fearing a communist growth in Latin America which would undermine its political and economic hegemony, the United States provided Latin American governments with the tools to combat any seed of communism. Just as the United States had encouraged the spread of "Pan-American" democracy among Latin American governments, the United States was now sharing with those governments its counterinsurgency tools, especially counterinsurgency training for the eradication of any semblance of domestic communist threats (McPherson 20 – 2). As a result, the United States transformed its Pan-American call for democracy and freedom into a contradicting provision of limited individual freedoms. These freedoms, however, could not challenge Latin American dictatorships which the United States' anticommunist fears supported, despite any violation of democracy and human rights which arose (McPherson 20 – 2; Rosenberg 111).

The Coup in Guatemala

This sacrifice of Pan-American ideals and democracy for security through dictatorships and military regimes, the United States' position during the Cold War, manifested multiple times, beginning with the 1954 coup of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. Elected in 1945, Juan José Arévalo initiated various reforms, including labor codes and social security. Although these reforms were branded as 'communist' by Guatemalan elites, the United States refused to accept such a label until 1947 as its foreign policy felt the impact of the Cold War (Leonard 107 – 8;

Sicker 107). Elected with the promise to continue his predecessor's reforms, Arbenz and his administration did just that. Working alongside prominent communists, Arbenz nationalized foreign-owned lands and demanded limits to foreign investment, challenging the economic hegemony enjoyed by the United States-based United Fruit Company (UFCO) (McPherson 38; Leonard 107 – 8; Sweig 7). Due to the various connections between the UFCO and the United States government, including the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the UFCO appealed to its representatives and applied the 'international communist' label to Arbenz's government (Schlesinger and Kinzer 156 – 7). Although Arbenz was democratically elected, his attempts to reform his nation and limit the UFCO's economic power in Guatemala undermined the United States' vision of capitalism and the free market and defied the United States' economic and political hegemony in the country (McPherson 37 – 8). As a result, the United States turned first to the Tenth Inter-American Conference for hemispheric support, utilizing Pan-American rhetoric which was incorporated into the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention (Streeter 169):

The Tenth Inter-American Conference...[d]eclares: That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement extending to this Hemisphere...would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties. (Sicker 113)

Utilizing the 'communist' label upon Arbenz's government and the Declaration's Pan-American rhetoric, the United States then sponsored the 1954 coup in Guatemala. With the support of the United States, the Guatemalan state entered into a period of civil war which resulted in the implementation of extreme counterinsurgency tactics by the Guatemalan army. In 1999, the United Nations emphasized how, out of more than 40,000 civilian murders, those counterinsurgency tactics of the army were responsible for over 90 percent (Sweig 7 – 9). The

United States' actions in Guatemala, actions against a popularly elected government, epitomized its Pan-American vision. Latin America had to choose a side during the Cold War, and the United States would ensure that its southern neighbors made the correct choice. Although the United States had entered into the Cold War under a pretext of cooperation and Pan-Americanism, its actions in Guatemala signaled its singular stance (Leonard 95). The United States' actions against Arbenz's government provided the context for Cold War Pan-Americanism: the unity of the Americas, under the paternal leadership of the United States, against communist threats which challenged the political and economic hegemony of Latin America's 'protector.'

Castro's Revolution's Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America

While the United States had faced challenges to its first calls for U.S. Pan-Americanism, the political dominance which the United States enjoyed following World War 2 allowed for the exercise of this authority over Latin America. Pan-Americanism during the Cold War was defined by the conflict between the United States and any communist threats emanating from its neighbors to the south, its expected allies in the fight against communism (Campos, "From Panamericanism" 18). Throughout this period, the United States' views of Pan-Americanism, despite the social unrest its policies fomented throughout Latin America, never faltered (Streeter 173). When Fidel Castro's government in Cuba enacted a large commercial agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States quickly responded with economic and political pressures, ultimately culminating with the symbolic closing of the U.S. embassy in Havana (McPherson 48 – 9). Such an alliance between a Latin American nation and the Soviet Union served to further propel the United States on its mission against communism's further entrenchment into Latin America. As a result of a communist revolution which was ultimately politically and economically linked to the international communist threat, the United States reinvigorated its

anti-communist approach to Latin America (Scheman 23). Due to the United States' fears of communist threats in Latin America, Castro's 1958 Revolution thus ensured that the East-West Cold War perceptions would include Latin America (Mace and Thérien 39). In its crusades against Latin American 'communism,' the United States expanded upon its Pan-American rhetoric. From United States President John F. Kennedy, "... [the Latin American] nations are the product of a common struggle, the revolt from colonial rule. And our people share a common heritage, the quest for the dignity and the freedom of man," to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "those indissoluble ties of geography and history, of common culture and common interest, which have always bound our nations together," the United States government employed Pan-Americanism to justify its unilateral and interventionist approach in Latin America (qtd. in Streeter 168 – 9).

Economic Power in Brazil

In Brazil, the United States utilized its economic hegemony as the means to influence the political arenas in Latin America. When the Brazilian government of João Goulart expropriated part of the International Telephone and Telegraph, the United States quickly characterized Goulart's reform programs as it had those of Arbenz's government, labeling the government as 'communist.' As the CIA funded Goulart's opposition, the United States provided increased foreign aid and quickly revoked it from Goulart's government, demonstrating the economic power held by the United States and the government's understanding of how to leverage this power in Latin America (McPherson 62 – 3). In 1964, a coalition of military and civilian forces removed Goulart from power and elected General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco as the new Brazilian president, welcomed by the United States (Pastor 231). Although Castelo Branco and his successors would provide an example of U.S. supported bureaucratic authoritarian governments in Latin America as well as the repression and human rights violations which these

governments would utilize in order to combat communism, the government's support of the United States and foreign investment served the immediate needs of the United States, a trustworthy ally against communism (McPherson 62 – 3).

Military Force in the Dominican Republic

In 1965, the United States provided another example of its version of Pan-American unity. In the midst of the political divisions between pro- and anti-Rafael Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic following his assassination (which was directly supported during the Kennedy administration (Rabe 36 – 9)), Santo Domingo found itself caught in a civil conflict. After the assassination, the non-democratic regime which the United States encouraged was unable to provide civil stability and internal security against leftists which had justified the United States' support (Pastor 230 – 1). Under the pretext of defending United States nationals and property, the administration of United States President Lyndon B. Johnson deployed more than twenty thousand military personnel to the island after exaggerating the dangers of a communist threat to the state by Castro's government (McPherson 63 – 4). Such actions demonstrated the United States' Pan-American vision of Latin America. Although democracy was advocated as the symbol of U.S. democracy, the United States would only support those "democracies" which supported the United States' interests. Due to such military and economic interventions throughout Latin America during the Cold War, the United States' call of Pan-Americanism was recognized as the justification for the country's paternalistic control over the region in order to support its own interests and combat communism, undermining inter-American cooperation led by the United States (Scheman 16). Although the United States' Pan-Americanism did little to ameliorate the social inequity and political instability that characterized much of Latin America, the United States' administrations continued to ignore these

contradictions within Pan-Americanism and to pursue its fight against communism (Streeter 176 – 7).

The End of the Cold War, the Pursuit of Free Trade

With the end of the Cold War, the United States viewed its role as the paternal guardian of Latin America in a new context. Expanding upon its stance as the “haven” of democracy, the United States would now encourage free trade and internal security throughout Latin America, claiming that the two items were interlocked (Prevost and Weber 67). In order to pursue this end, the United States realized the opportunities presented to its future as a result of its hegemony in Latin America. Although the United States had spent over a century attempting to create a free market throughout Latin America which would favor the United States, the United States had only just acquired the geopolitical dominance necessary to obtain Latin America’s support of its agenda. The United States had pursued its agenda of free trade and “democracy,” yet the end of the Cold War ensured that the United States could devote greater resources and energy toward its goal of free trade within the Americas (Campos, “From Panamericanism” 18). The idea of a free trade bloc spanning the Western Hemisphere gained prominence with the implementation of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990 under the administration of George H.W. Bush (Shifter 278). In order to aid Latin America during the debt crisis, the EAI called for, among its many goals, free trade and foreign investment throughout the region, yet the true success of the program was its reception by Latin American leaders of the time for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States (Roett 217 – 8). With the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, the United States created one of the two largest trading blocs in the world, composed at the time of a population of more than 370 million and a total production of \$6 trillion and demonstrating the potential for Western Hemispheric free trade agreements with the United States. Due to the

success of these market openings between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the United States then pursued the creation of a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) initially in 1994 (Campos and Prevost xi). Signed by thirty-four chiefs of state from the Western Hemisphere during the first Summit of the Americas, the Partnership for Development and Prosperity demonstrated an important Pan-American union, calling for the implementation of the FTAA by 2005 (Castañeda 263). The FTAA would generate an enormous trade bloc of more than 800 million consumers and an economy of more than \$13 trillion while claiming that Latin America would benefit from expanded markets and new jobs (Angrisani 239; Robert 175).

Not surprisingly, the pursuit of the FTAA has been encouraged by the United States in terms of Pan-American unity. In order to pursue this end, the United States has claimed that free trade favors the creation of stronger, more prosperous, more democratic neighbors who are interlinked in their shared vision of the Americas (Mace and Thérien 41). The U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick demonstrated such ideologies in this support for the expansion of free trade throughout Latin America: “Today, as I look at the Americas, I see a driving purpose: a belief in democracy and freedom, and a rediscovery of the vision that motivated those who called for the first Pan-American Congress over 100 years ago” (qtd. in Ayerbe 73). Utilizing both the FTAA and NAFTA as an example of Pan-American growth through free trade, Zoellick stressed how: “Trade agreements such as NAFTA and the FTAA promote good governance by creating obligations for transparency in government and adherence to the rule of law” (qtd. in Ayerbe 74). In 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright utilized Simón Bolívar in order to justify free trade:

Simón Bolívar wanted the Americas to be measured not by her vast area and wealth, but “by her freedom and her glory.” Today, that vision is closer to reality than it has ever been. For as we meet...every government in the hemisphere is freely elected; every economy has liberalized its system for investment and trade. (qtd. in Ayerbe 78).

In pursuing free trade, the United States has linked Pan-American tenets with the opening of the markets throughout the Americas (Ayerbe 73 – 75).

The Contradictions of 'Pan-American' Free Trade

Although programs such as NAFTA and the FTAA have been hailed by the United States as models of Pan-American progress, one must also evaluate the ultimate benefits that the United States has or would receive due to the implementation of this Pan-Americanism (Hevia 241). While the United States has argued that NAFTA and the FTAA would provide for a broader market for all nations involved, the United States continued to limit Latin America's access to U.S. consumers, ensuring that these pro-market policies would do little to benefit Latin America (Berry 232). From blocking the imports of various Latin American products such as beef, steel, and tuna, the United States has defended its own producers' position in the United States, fearful of the challenge the lower prices offered by Latin American producers. Upon close observation, one discovers how the United States utilized its economic and political hegemony in order to pressure Latin America to engage in free markets, despite the obvious benefits that would be provided solely to the United States. Although the United States' foreign policy's movement away from direct intervention encouraged Latin America to rethink the United States' purpose in the region, the United States continued to utilize Pan-Americanism as the rhetorical support for its economic agenda (Starr 92 – 3, 89). Some utilized the increased cooperation between the United States and Cuba as a representation of a seemingly altruistic Pan-American attitude following the Cold War. However, as Jorge I. Domínguez stresses, the lack of a military or communist threat from the island with the departure of the Soviet Union's support served to encourage cooperation which yielded benefits on both sides, rather than the acceptance of Cuba's current government (205 – 8). Ultimately, FTAA is an opportunity for increased economic dominance on the part of the United States, which in its essence is a continuation of the Pan-

American view which the nation has championed since the outset of Pan-Americanism, while the limitations of the benefits of neoliberal economics imposed upon Latin America have been quite apparent (Sánchez-Egozcue and Bello 156; Campos, “From Panamericanism” 20; “From Neopan-Americanism” 19).

For Internal Security

Throughout the Cold War, the United States pursued numerous interventions in Latin America under the role as a defender of the region from the threat of communism. As seen in the United States’ involvement in the Marxist insurgency and paramilitary counterinsurgency in El Salvador, the United States placed itself as the figurehead of the status quo, of the right-of-the-center governments which provided little or no challenge to the United States’ economic and political hegemony in Latin America. However, the growth of centrist democracies throughout Latin America and the end of the Cold War provided new opportunities for the United States to pursue a Pan-American agenda in Latin America. During the 1980s and the early 1990s, the United States did not see the emergence of these centrist democracies as a challenge to the United States’ hegemony in the region. Rather, the United States utilized its hard power to support these new democracies. In Haiti, the Clinton administration, with the support of an Organization of American States embargo and a United Nations mandate, utilized the threat of force in order to restore the democratically-elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his position, representing a significant departure in the United States’ foreign policy toward Latin America during the Cold War (Shifter 279; Valenzuela 320). In what resembles a reversal of the United States’ foreign policy toward Latin America during the Cold War, the United States only deployed its military forces and directly intervened in order to ensure fair elections and to prevent military coups in Latin America. However, this reversal was the outcome of these democracies’ preferences for market-oriented economies, capitalist economies which encouraged

free trade (Paarlberg 38 – 9). During the Cold War, the United States had utilized all of its resources, economic, political, and military, to encourage the opening of Latin American markets in the face of state-sponsored socialism or state control. With the reduction in leftist revolutions and the removal of the Soviet “threat,” the United States had emerged as the economic victor, ensuring its economic hegemony in Latin America. With such hegemony, the United States began to rely less upon its hard power and military interventionism as the tools of influence over Latin America. The United States implemented a new foreign policy in Latin America which favored democracy and human rights, a foreign policy which more closely resembled those Pan-American tenets it had championed throughout the Cold War but failed to ensure. In this context, the United States appeared to withdraw from its unilateral approaches in Latin America in favor of regional cooperation with regards to both diplomacy and economics (Starr 77 – 8, 80; Choi 61; Shaw 159). As a result of the outgrowth of centrist democracy and the lack of any challenge to the United States’ hegemony in the region, the United States’ celebrated Latin America’s Pan-American progress and withdrew much of its military from the region (Paarlberg 39 – 40).

Although the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the possibility of a communist threat in Latin America, the United States has continued to serve as the paternal guide for Latin American security (Treto 58). As the Cold War ended, the United States continued to fund and support counterinsurgency programs in order to combat revolutionary and Marxist threats. From Peru’s Sendero Luminoso to Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and M-19, the United States has utilized its dominance in Latin American in order to combat these groups and generate a military and political presence in the region (Campos and Prevost x). Counterterrorism has appeared as the focal point of the United States’ security efforts in the Americas (Olsen 54). After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States

presence in Latin America as the leader in the fight against global terror is evidenced by Plan Colombia and the establishment of various military contacts in Latin America, many of which simply being renewed with the changes since the Cold War. By funding counterinsurgency campaigns and providing military resources and troops to be utilized in the fight against what has been termed as ‘narcoterrorism,’ the United States has increased its influence in the Andean region while pursuing what it has labeled as a Pan-American security effort. Although Plan Colombia was originally generated in order to combat the Pan-American threat of drugs, the United States has continued to fund the program utilizing the war against terrorism and narcoterrorism as justification (Bagley and Tokatlian 220; Castañeda 264 – 5). In Paraguay, the United States has pursued, with great criticism from throughout the region, the deployment of military forces in Paraguay’s military bases in an effort to protect Paraguay and the Triple Border region from the threat of terrorism (Prevost 2 – 3, 5 – 6). Claiming that terrorists threats are deriving from Venezuela, Colombia, and the Panama Canal Region, the United States is pursuing a Pan-American defense strategy, seen in its presence as the coordinator of these efforts in order to protect Latin America from external, as well as internal, threats (McPherson 2). Although the United States has been criticized for utilizing counterterrorist programs in order to strengthen alliances in the Western Hemisphere and establish political unions, the United States has continued to build upon its counterterrorist programs, as evidenced by the expansion of Plan Colombia to include terrorists and insurgents (Chavez 97, 103; Castañeda 264 – 5).

Free Trade is Security for the Americas

Furthermore, the United States has adamantly linked free trade with security. In the United States National Security documents and strategies, the United States has repeatedly connected free trade with national security, as in the United States National Security Strategy of 2002, “free market and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy” (qtd. in

Moreno 161). The emergence of the anti-neoliberalism ‘populist’ Hugo Chavez as the President of Venezuela has strained the relations between the country and the United States due in great part to his own Pan-American rhetoric against the free market pursuits of the United States (Vanden 190; Shaw 167). In 2006, the National Security Strategy was expanded to address the threat that governments such as Chavez’s posed toward the security of the United States as a result of their refusal to adhere to free trade:

Countries in the Western Hemisphere must be helped to the path of sustained political and economic development. The deceptive appeal of anti-free market populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the Hemisphere’s poorest in cycles of poverty (qtd. in Olsen 61).

The association between free trade and security under the umbrella of Pan-Americanism demonstrates how the United States has ensured that its own pursuits are justified as beneficial to the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

The Left-of-the-Center ‘Challenge’

Although the United States enjoyed considerable economic and political influence following the Cold War, the emergence of left-of-the-center political leaders in Latin America is offering new challenges against the United States’ ‘Pan-American’ measures. From Chile to Argentina to Brazil to Uruguay to Venezuela to Bolivia, Latin America has seen the rise of leftist, or what the United States has termed as the “Pink Tide,” which has challenged the United States’ hegemonic role in Latin America. From the indigenous programs of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela to the labor movements supported by Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva of Brazil, the new Latin American left has emerged as political leaders who do not rely exclusively and unquestioningly upon the United States’ paternal and Pan-American guidance over Latin America (Sweig 163 – 4). From popular – frequently negatively labeled as populist by the United States – leaders such as Chávez to successful political parties such as the PFA in Uruguay,

the United States has found itself facing great political challenges due to the loss of the economic and political hegemony enjoyed during the previous decade (Campos, "From Panamericanism" 19). Chávez's demands for the extradition of Luis Posada Carilles to Venezuela in order to face charges of terrorism related to the bombing of a Cuban airliner in 1976 were quickly refused by the United States. Although the United States challenged the extradition by noting how Posada would most likely face torture, the claim was contrasted with the actions of the United States in the Middle East. Because the United States had allowed for terrorist suspects to be sent to East European nations to possibly suffer torture, the United States faced great contradictions which undermined the United States' position as the paternal authority over Latin America (Prevost 3). The dramatic loss of political influence due to the United States' wars on terror and in Iraq is greatly evident among the Latin American left, validated with Latin American skepticism of United States' reports of South and Central America's serving as recruiting grounds for Al-Qaeda (Valenzuela 324; Mares 107).

Pan-Americanism or "Latin Americanism?"

This Latin American left has not only challenged the United States' version of Pan-Americanism but has pursued its own programs of Pan-Americanism. Historically, Argentina and Brazil had faced great international tensions as a result of the infamous rivalry held by the two nations. With the emergence of the Latin American left, Brazil and Argentina have pushed aside their rivalries in order to pursue renewed efforts which celebrated international cooperation not only between the two nations but the whole of South America. Due in great part to the leadership of Da Silva, Venezuela has found a welcoming trading bloc in MERCOSUR which allows Chávez's government to invest the nation's petroleum revenues in Latin America (Herz 169 – 70). Under MERCOSUR, the most industrialized centers in South America have been brought together in order to pursue free trade in South America without providing numerous

concessions to the United States (Amayo 115). Chávez has also emerged alongside Castro in efforts to create Latin America projects which utilize Venezuela's petroleum reserves in order to finance the initiatives, many of which have combated illiteracy in Venezuela and provided new markets for Latin American projects (Sweig 164 – 5). The United States' opinion of Chávez was made evident following the 2002 failed coup of the Venezuelan president. Despite the uncertainty of the event, the United States quickly proclaimed its support of the opposition's temporary government. However, upon the revelation that the coup had actually failed, the United States suffered humiliation while losing some of its Pan-American reputation among its Latin American neighbors (Starr 103).

Against United States' Free Trade

In contrast to the economic and political hegemony which the United States exercised in the early 1990s to begin the FTAA, the 21st Century began with the United States' lacking the same influence. As a result, the United States has faced great challenges in restarting talks concerning the FTAA. From the Latin American left, leaders have refused to enter into formal agreements of free trade with the United States for fear of creating Latin American dependency on the United States while the United States continues to enjoy the economic benefits of free trade (Starr 78 – 9). Due to the United States' promises of the economic benefits provided by free trade and the economic improvements seen under NAFTA, NAFTA actually served as an inspiration for the creation of MERCOSUR (McPherson 114). With the success of MERCOSUR and the decrease of hegemony enjoyed by the United States, the FTAA has found itself losing the support it held in the early 1990s. While Brazil had first entered the FTAA discussions in order to defend its position in MERCOSUR and Latin America, the stall of FTAA negotiations has appeared to discourage any multilateral pursuits of the proposal. Instead, the United States has attempted to create support for FTAA by entering into bilateral agreements with individual Latin

American nations yet receiving much criticism from the Latin American left, especially from Brazil and those nations who continue to support MERCOSUR over the FTAA (Starr 97 – 9; Campos, “From Neopan-Americanism” 37; Prevost and Weber 102). Ironically, the United States’ attempts to pressure Latin America to endorse the FTAA has served only to increase Latin American solidarity against the United States’ pressures and look towards other markets, including China and MERCOSUR (Sánchez-Egozcue and Bello 144). The greatest challenge to emerge from the Latin American left has been the criticism of the Washington Consensus which the United States had encouraged Latin America to adopt. In turning towards MERCOSUR and reinventing their own economies, Latin America has discovered how the FTAA and free trade rules do not seem to coincide with the security agenda promised by the United States. Rather, these nations have supported the view that the free trade endorsed by the United States merely serves to create the best opportunities for corporations, promoting the social inequality and poverty which authorities have linked to the economic and political instabilities associated with Latin America (Prevost and Weber 67, 69). As a result, the United States’ free trade attempts are being associated with its own interests rather than the desire to better Latin America under a Pan-American guise.

For Security or for Trade?

The Latin American left has also brought a unified challenge against the counterterrorist programs the United States has initiated in the region. While the United States has claimed its efforts toward a military presence in Paraguay will serve to provide Latin America with security from terrorist actions, the Latin American left has emerged as a vocal opponent of these attempts. With the emergence of leftist governments in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil which do not provide the same unchallenging support for the United States as was provided during previous governments, especially those which were defined as bureaucratic authoritarian, these three

governments have provided opposition to many of the United States' policies in the region. With Paraguay remaining as the only country in the area which provides great support for the United States, leftist governments are viewing the United States protection of the Triple Border Region as merely an initiative to provide for a staging ground for United States military forces in the event of a military intervention in one of these leftist countries. Although the United States has continued to claim that its intentions are to provide Pan-American security against international terrorism in region which serves as a channel for terrorist activities, the United States has failed to produce any concrete evidence of these terrorist activities despite the demands of these countries. Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil have also claimed the United States is utilizing the military cooperation between the United States and Paraguay in order to create a stronger commercial alliance between the two. As a result, Paraguay would have little interest in playing a greater role in MERCOSUR, undermining the progress of the inter-American trading bloc (Prevost 5 – 6). Due in great part to the challenges and solidarity offered by Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, those actions which the United States has claimed to be in the service of a Pan-American vision are being questioned by Latin America in order to determine whether the programs truly serve the needs of the region.

Conclusion

As the ideology of Pan-Americanism was consistently utilized by the United States in order to pursue its own agenda of achieving economic and political hegemony in Latin America, Pan-Americanism faced great criticism from those who questioned the government's paternal and frequently interventionist attitude toward the region. The actions implemented by the United States, ranging from direct military intervention to economic leverages, have regularly been associated with Pan-Americanism in order to justify the United States' position. As a result, the tenets of Pan-Americanism seemed to develop in the same context as the goals of the United

States. As the United States “defended” Latin America from communism, Pan-Americanism also took an anti-communist agenda. Those Pan-American concepts which were celebrated by Latin American revolutionaries such as Simón Bolívar and intellectuals such as José Martí were a contrast against United States’ Pan-Americanism. With the emergence of the Latin American left, there have been new initiatives on the part of Latin America to rethink Pan-Americanism in the face of United States’ hegemony. While Chávez has championed in his rhetoric the pursuit of a Bolivarian Pan-American idea, Da Silva has created programs which appear to bring Latin America together, despite the criticism delivered by the United States against such programs for including Chávez’s government. With the seeming repetition of United States’ Pan-American activities in Latin America, the new leadership in Latin America is looking toward some of the original proponents of Latin American unity, such as Bolívar and Martí, in order to develop a Pan-Americanism which is apart from that pursued by the United States.

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