

**Past the Politics of Black & White:**  
*Understanding Black-Latino Coalitions in the New South\**

**Matthew T. Wooten**

[mtwooten@gmail.com](mailto:mtwooten@gmail.com)

Masters Candidate in Latin American Studies  
Lozano Long Institute for Latin American Studies  
University of Texas at Austin

As presented at the Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association (ILASSA) Annual Student Conference, University of Texas at Austin, February 7-9, 2008

\*Please do not cite or reprint without the permission of the author.

Table of Contents

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| LIST OF TABLES .....   | 2    |
| LIST OF FIGURES .....  | 3    |
| CHAPTERS   |      |
| 1 INTRODUCTION .....   | 4    |
| -Talking about Black and Brown .....   | 4    |
| -Structure for Analysis .....  | 7    |
| 2 BLACK-LATINO CONFLICT IN THE US .....  | 8    |
| -Black, White, and Brown: Race Politics and<br>the Roots of Conflict .....                           | 8    |
| -Instances of Racial and Political Division .....  | 9    |
| -Explaining Conflict .....   | 13   |
| - Conflicts and Coalitions:<br>Previous Literature and Theoretical Backdrop .....                    | 15   |
| 3 IN THE SOUTH, NOTHING IS BLACK & WHITE ANYMORE .....   | 22   |
| -The <i>Nuevo</i> South and Its Implications .....   | 23   |
| -A Departure from Black and White .....  | 28   |
| 4 THE CASE OF GEORGIA .....  | 32   |
| -African-American Power and the Civil Rights Legacy .....  | 232  |
| - <i>La Nueva Georgia</i> .....  | 34   |
| -Regional Differences .....  | 35   |
| -Case 1, The Capitol:<br>Contemporary Politics and Struggles in Metro Atlanta .....                  | 37   |
| -Case 2, Down South:<br>Race and Religion in South Georgia Communities .....                         | 45   |
| -Case 3, The University City:<br>Organized Labor and Multiracial Coalitions in Athens, Georgia ..... | 49   |
| 5 ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION:<br>COALITIONAL IMPLICATIONS IN GEORGIA .....                                | 56   |
| -Political Leadership & Race-Based Coalitions .....  | 56   |
| -Issue-Based Coalitions .....  | 59   |
| -The Role of Religious Institutions .....  | 61   |
| -Conclusory Remarks .....  | 65   |
| 6 WORKS CITED .....  | 68   |
| 7 APPENDIX .....   | 75   |

## LIST OF TABLES

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Table 1: Table 1: Racial Composition of the South, 1990-2005 .....  | 24   |
| Table 2: Racial Composition in the South, By State, 1990-2005 ..... | 25   |
| Table 3: Latinos in the South, By Origin, 2005 .....                | 28   |
| Table 4: Regional Comparison of Race, 1990-2005 .....               | 75   |
| Table 5: Race in the South, By State, 1990-2005 .....               | 55   |
| Table 6: Union Membership in the South (In Text) .....              | 28   |
| Table 7: Union Membership in the South, by State, 2006 .....        | 78   |
| Table 8: Race in Georgia, By Region .....                           | 36   |
| Table 9: Race in the Atlanta MSA, By County, 2000 .....             | 80   |
| Table 10: Race in Central Georgia, By County, 2000 .....            | 81   |
| Table 11: Race in North Georgia, By County, 2000 .....              | 82   |
| Table 12: Race in South Georgia, By County, 2000 .....              | 83   |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Figure 1: US Population in 1966, by Race and Ethnicity .....    | 75   |
| Figure 2: US Population in 2006, by Race and Ethnicity .....    | 75   |
| Figure 3: Race in the South, 1990-2005 .....                    | 77   |
| Figure 4: Evangelical Churches in the United States, 2006.....  | 28   |
| Figure 5: Union Membership in the South, 2006 back to 1964..... | 79   |
| Figure 6: Georgia's Regions .....                               | 37   |

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line. I pray you, then, receive my little book in all charity, studying my words with me, forgiving mistake and foible for sake of the faith and passion that is in me, and seeking the grain of truth hidden there.

-W.E.B. Du Bois. *The Souls of Black Folk*

### Talking about Black and Brown

The product of great migrations and expropriations, the diverse and dynamic nature of the United States' contemporary social landscape continually presents scholars with a wealth of conflicts and histories that demand analysis. Of all aspects in US society, however, the challenges associated with the idea of race have perhaps provided the United States with its most distinct historical trajectory. Indeed, the history of the United States has been thoroughly marked by and defined along the lines of race: visible, pervasive demarcations which W.E.B. Du Bois once boldly labeled "the problem of the Twentieth Century."<sup>1</sup> From its native societies to its earliest settlements, economic growth founded on slave labor to its Civil War, the upheaval caused by the Industrial Revolution to the politics of the Civil Rights Era, the very elements of contemporary culture, society, and national identity in the United States are born out of a tumultuous legacy of social change fed through its veins of class and race. And nowhere does this legacy hold truer than in the American South.

Conflict, social unrest, and the economic disparities arising from conditions of racial inequality continue to hold an important position in American political discourse. Given the

---

<sup>1</sup> Du Bois, 1

steady influx of millions of Latin Americans into the United States throughout the past 20 years, debate over the place of recently arrived Latinos has often taken center stage as U.S. politicians and citizens have argued about immigration reform, immigrants' access to basic social services and public goods, and the cultural implications about the residence of a largely unskilled, Spanish-speaking population. Yet, there is an important aspect of Latino immigration that is often overlooked, and has only recently gained attention from scholars and the media. Even when Latinos became the largest racial minority in the US during 2003, very few people were talking about the growing rift between African-Americans and Latinos in the US. There is, however, an emerging sense of urgency surrounding the relationship between the Black and Latino communities in the US as they vie for access to similar social and public goods, and as members of both communities have many times found themselves the victims of interracial violence. Even more surprising is the fact that almost no one is speaking about the question of Black-Latino relations within the context of the Southern United States, where- according to the conclusions drawn in current literature- one might theorize that there is the greatest potential for conflict.

The purpose of this analysis is not to argue about why Black and Latino communities have often found themselves at odds with one another, nor to incite worries about the potential for conflict between the two groups in the Southeastern US. The reasons for conflict between the groups are very clear, and it seems nonproductive to concentrate on the negativist, divisive nature of this issue. Instead, this paper aims to understand Black-Latino relations within the Southern United States, and analyze if, where, and how Blacks and Latinos will be able to find common ground. How will Black-Latino relations in the South reveal themselves to be different than in other regions in the United States? Is there a racially neutral space where Blacks and

Latinos will be able to fight collectively, cooperatively against their shared obstacles to social justice and economic progress?

### Structure for Analysis

A discussion which ultimately aims to explore possibilities for cooperative race relations and intergroup reparation requires an extensive amount background analysis before making any conclusory remarks. First, this paper will provide a discussion about the changing social climate around Latino immigration to the United States, the interracial conflicts which have resulted from these changing conditions, and examine how other scholars have interpreted both conflict and coalitional possibilities between the Black and Latino communities. Second, this paper will attempt to understand the nature of Black-Latino relations within the Southeastern United States, specifically highlighting the unique nature of Black-Latino relations in a place marked by both a strong, historical, Black-White binary political climate as well as the largest growth of Latino population in the U.S. during the past 15 to 20 years. Third, in order to provide a context for further discussion and analysis, it will highlight the significance of Georgia using current happenings in the state to provide a number of insights for the examining of the potential problems and possibilities for Black-Latino coalitions in the South. In particular, the paper will divide the State regionally for discussion, examining Metropolitan Atlanta through the lens of political debate and the role of religious institutions surrounding the question of immigration; the role of local conflict and community-based organizations in a number of South Georgia communities; and the emergence of multiracial coalitions and an organized labor movement out of Athens, Georgia.

Thus, this analysis will attempt to answer important questions posed earlier about the existence of racially or politically neutral space for Blacks and Latinos to fight towards common

goals. After examining the potential role of race-based political coalitions, labor unions, and religious institutions, I theorize that- while race based political coalitions will continue to be viable for political elites in the African-American and Latino communities- long-term coalitions between the two groups will be possible only through a combination of similar class-based, policy-oriented objectives for which race could be a useful tool. However, such coalitional possibilities must be tempered by the fact that widening economic disparity between the two groups could reveal them to be quite different social and political actors in the South, particularly when considering the important influence of the Protestant and Evangelical Church.



## CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND: BLACK-LATINO CONFLICT IN THE US

### Black, White, and Brown: Race Politics and the Roots of Conflict

For most people living in the United States, the presence of Latino immigrants within contemporary domestic society no longer comes as a surprise. Latinos officially became the largest racial minority in the U.S. in 2003, and have continued to expand rapidly both in terms of their numerical and cultural presence. While in 1966, Blacks numbered 22.3 million and Latinos 8.5 million, in 2006 they numbered 38.7 million and 44.7 million, respectively.<sup>2</sup> These estimates, however, may not adequately account for the number of undocumented Latino immigrants currently in the US; as of March 2005, the Pew Hispanic Center provided a conservative estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants in the US, citing that somewhere between 10.7 and 11.5 million immigrants were in the United States without proper legal documentation.<sup>3</sup> To be sure, the United States' demographic landscape has undergone a dramatic shift, and the presence of a new minority "majority" has altered the ways in which politicians, minority groups, and society at-large will have to interact. It is precisely the changing cultural and racial landscape of the United States, though, which demands that the significance of these recent shifts be examined.

It is frequently cited that Blacks and Latinos have much to gain through coalitional partnerships. Both groups arguably share a common and continuing history of oppression and social strife in society. These similarities are well-articulated by Gary Segura and Helena Alves Rodriguez in their article "Comparative Ethnic Politics in the United States: Beyond Black and

---

<sup>2</sup> Pew Hispanic Center, "From 200..." See Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> Pew Hispanic Center, "Estimates..."

White,” when they remind their readers that Latinos and African-Americans share a number of circumstances in the United States, many of which could be interpreted as relevant to coalition building. Amongst these factors are “education and income levels significantly below the national averages, with all of the attendant correlates, such as lower home-ownership rates, higher than average unemployment rates, higher likelihood of being victimized by both violent and nonviolent crime, and often significant residential segregation in inner cities...”<sup>4</sup> The two groups are, as noted by Karen Kaufmann, also “economically disadvantaged relative to whites; both experience substantial discrimination in housing, education, and employment; and both advocate for enlarging the social welfare state.”<sup>5</sup>

Because of what many view as common ground in U.S. society, scholars have often pointed to the seemingly obvious possibility of and potential benefits for the two groups from political coalitions between Blacks and Latinos. The presumption of a natural Black-Latino political alliance is then founded on the logic that both African-Americans and Latinos “perceive they are discriminated against in the political system,” and are “thus likely to form a coalition to attempt to gain control over government or a fair share of policy benefits.”<sup>6</sup>

### Instances of Racial and Political Division

Despite what many assume would be common ground for Blacks and Latinos, the two groups have often found themselves at odds with one another. Before discussing how scholars have interpreted the ways in which Blacks and Latinos have interacted or how grounds for political alliance have been conceptualized, it is important to draw attention to the nature of some of the conflicts which have arisen around the United States. To begin with, in his book *The*

---

<sup>4</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 385

<sup>5</sup> Kaufmann, 199

<sup>6</sup> Meier et al, 400

*Presumed Alliance*, California lawyer and Chicano activist Nicolás C. Vaca highlights a handful of historical political and violent conflicts between Blacks and Latinos which have had a profound impact on relations between the two groups in places such as Los Angeles, Compton, Miami, Houston, and New York.

One of the most potent political divisions between the two groups can be seen during the 2001 Mayoral race in Los Angeles, when Blacks and Latinos found themselves pitted against one another. While Latino voters supported the Latino candidate, Antonio Villaraigosa, the Black community overwhelmingly supported the white candidate, James K. Hahn, whose family had long ago established a good relationship with L.A.'s African-American community. In fact, Hahn received popular support amongst both white and black voters, was endorsed publicly by key African-American figures such as Magic Johnson and Congresswoman Maxine Waters, and eventually won the mayoral race.<sup>7</sup> Although Villaraigosa would be elected mayor in LA's subsequent mayoral elections of 2005, bolstered this time by popular support amongst the Black community<sup>8</sup>, the political battle between Hahn and Villaraigosa during 2001 seemingly drove a sharp political wedge between the two communities. Both the Black and Latino communities of L.A. have had a long historical tradition in the city; the revealed potential tensions between the two communities provide evidence of a prolonged competition for political voice and power, as well as the central fact that each group has its own distinct set of policy objectives. Whatever conditions of shared economic and social conditions can be found between the two groups, they were clearly not sufficiently significant to draw them together under a common candidate, telling us that race-based political coalitions cannot be taken for granted.

---

<sup>7</sup> Vaca, 87

<sup>8</sup> Bernal, *Latinos and African Americans form base...*

Vaca also points to an interesting instance of political conflict in Miami, where- despite African American's historical political presence dating back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century<sup>9</sup>- massive Latino immigration between the years of 1959 and 1980 completely changed the local political landscape. By the mid-1980's, Miami's largely Cuban-American population had established itself as the dominant force in the city's economic, social, and political life. In 1980, "riots broke out in Liberty City after an all-white jury acquitted four white police officers charged with the beating death of...a black insurance executive." In 1982, a conflict between a Cuban-American police officer and an African American man resulted in riots.<sup>10</sup> In 1989, the murder of a black man by a Latino police officer set off three days of rioting in the City. Perhaps the most interesting story about Black-Latino conflict in Miami, though, took place in 1990 when the Cuban-American community objected to a visit by Nelson Mandela, who was planning to speak about his efforts to fight against apartheid in South Africa. Mandela, who had only recently been released from prison, was not welcomed by the Cuban community because of his stated support for Fidel Castro's anti-apartheid position. Miami's mayor and a number of City Council members blocked all efforts at establishing a resolution honoring Mandela, and while Mandela spoke during his visit, Miami riot squads stood by while Latinos and Blacks argued on the street. The Black and Latino communities have continued to be pitted against one another throughout the 1990's, and the Black community feels both excluded from public discourse and discriminated against by Miami's Latino population.<sup>11</sup>

Compton, California is another city in which Vaca cites a history of conflict, but one which displays a reversal of roles from those revealed in Miami. In Compton, the African-

---

<sup>9</sup> In 1910, Blacks represented 42 percent of Miami's residents. In 1960, whites constituted 80, blacks 15, and latinos 5 percent of the population, respectively.

<sup>10</sup> Vaca, 116

<sup>11</sup> Vaca, 108-126

American community leaders have monopolized political life, the local school board, and control over the use of public resources- despite the rapid growth of Compton's Latino community. In a place where Blacks control every seat on the local school board, Latinos have struggled to ensure that the needs of their children and community are met. The 2001 Houston mayoral election also presented an interesting situation. Although the political leanings of Houston's Latino community were more closely allied with those of the Democratic party, 71 percent of Latinos voted for a conservative Latino candidate, Orlando Sánchez, instead of the incumbent Lee P. Brown, a highly qualified African-American and Democrat. Seemingly in order to vote for "one of their own," Latinos ignored the incentives to vote for a Black candidate whose policies more clearly represented their immediate social and economic interests.

Vaca's examples are extraordinarily useful in shedding some light onto why Black-Latino relations have not always been easily decipherable. In the few examples cited above, conflict has been rooted neither in the actions nor stances of one particular group. At times, Blacks have refused to share political power with Latinos, and during other times Latinos have abandoned party politics and the needs of the Black community. Vaca's examples are not the only instances of conflict, though, and they primarily represent significant tension between the two groups within the setting of large elections or city politics. There continue to be a number of examples highlighting how Black-Latino conflict is playing itself out at a local level across the US, manifesting itself at the local level in both political and more overtly aggressive forms.

Tales of violence conflict between Blacks and Latinos have frequently been covered by the media since 2000. Although the following examples do not provide an exhaustive list of instances of conflict, they represent the types of stories often told. For example, in the Summer of 2004, over 17 Latino men were beaten by young African-American men in Plainfield, New

Jersey, a crime seemingly committed with little motive other than that of racial hate.<sup>12</sup> On November 8<sup>th</sup> of 2005, interracial fighting broke out between hundreds of Black and Latino students outside of Wilmer Amina Carter High School in Rialto, California, forcing the lockdown of 1,700 students, and prompting a large community meeting between African-American and Latino parents discussing the roots of the local conflict.<sup>13</sup> In Tifton, Georgia, during October of 2005, six Mexican men died after two black men robbed, beat, and shot them in their home.<sup>14</sup> In January of 2007, evidence of Black-Latino conflict was once again brought to public attention when members of the Los Angeles Latino gang shot a 14 year-old African-American girl named Cheryl Green. Escalating Black-Latino gang rivalry in nearby Los Angeles neighborhoods pushed LA Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa to renew a promised crackdown on gang activity related to hate-crime.<sup>15</sup>

### Explaining Conflict

Thus, for all of the reasons which suggest that Blacks and Latinos would reveal themselves to be natural political allies, conflict between the two groups has continued to arise in towns and cities throughout the United States. Although the examples provided above reveal Black-Latino relations in the US to be both complex and multidimensional, the explanation for continual conflict between these two groups is reasonably clear.

From the examples of conflict seen above, it is easy to tell that it is not the growth of the Latino population alone which has fueled conflict between Blacks and Latinos, but instead deals more directly with the results of such growth: increased levels of competition between the two groups for jobs requiring unskilled labor and access to basic social goods such as education,

---

<sup>12</sup> Buchanan

<sup>13</sup> Buchanan

<sup>14</sup> Three Charged in Deaths...

<sup>15</sup> Archibold, New York Times, Jan 17, 2007.

healthcare, and a political voice. Despite whatever shared interests may exist, the roots of conflict are centered in “competition over jobs, educational resources, housing, and political power,” which often place Latinos and Blacks in opposition to one another, a division which presents obstacles to political alliances or collective action in the name of the shared interests they are presumed to have.<sup>16</sup>

The shifting dynamics of minority politics in the United States also play a role in the conflict because Blacks have claim to a history as the central minority group in the United States, one which has made a great deal of headway with respect to obtaining political rights for all minorities in the country. Due to the dominance of their size as a minority group and representation in national politics, African Americans once served as the primary voice in debates surrounding issues of race and inequality as pertained to national politics. There is no doubt that African Americans played the central role in the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s, during which Blacks not only provided key leaders, but also the organizational structure to insert a minority voice into American political discourse, through groups such as the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.<sup>17</sup> Throughout the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s, African Americans helped reshape American political discourse by either establishing or collaborating with major coalitions in large cities throughout the United States.<sup>18</sup>

Today, however, Blacks can no longer claim preeminence as the largest minority voice, and instead have been forced to share or compete to be heard in all arenas of public life. In areas throughout the nation, conflicts have resulted over educational resources for local school districts. Blacks claim that Latinos steal jobs, and feel that recently arrived Latinos do not

---

<sup>16</sup> Kaufmann, 199

<sup>17</sup> Vaca, 62

<sup>18</sup> Jackson et al, 277

adequately respect or understand the long legacy of African-Americans' fight for civil liberties; they have often seen "Latinos and their growing numbers as a threat to their social, economic, and political benefits."<sup>19</sup> It has frequently been cited that White employers prefer to hire and feel more comfortable with Latinos than Blacks. Furthermore, "Latinos do not view African-Americans as an oppressed group in the same way other Americans may view them."<sup>20</sup> As pointed out by Gary Segura and Helena Alves Rodriguez in their article "Comparative Ethnic Politics in the United States: Beyond Black and White," the fact that many Latino immigrants lack U.S. citizenship also complicates the way established US minorities view them and detracts from their perceived legitimacy as they seek "inclusion in the American polity and to society resources."<sup>21</sup> As stated by Nicolas Vaca, "at the end of the day, political power translates into economic and social opportunities, of which there are only so many."<sup>22</sup>

### Conflicts and Coalitions: Previous Literature and Theoretical Backdrop

Now that this paper has examined how and why Blacks and Latinos have often found themselves in conflict, it is important to move to the question of coalitional possibilities between the two groups. Karen Kaufman of UCLA points out the important fact that "notwithstanding the apparently rational incentives for minority coalition building, there is little evidence of formal or even informal coalitions between the nation's two largest minority groups..."<sup>23</sup> Avoiding an analysis which could be viewed as purely anecdotal requires a more theoretical foundation for analyzing the relationships between African Americans and Latinos; as seen above, simple, optimistic assumptions about the two groups' natural alliance would lead to an analysis founded

---

<sup>19</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 387

<sup>20</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 387

<sup>21</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 378

<sup>22</sup> Vaca, xi

<sup>23</sup> Kaufmann, 199



on a mound of contradictory examples. There are six different perspectives on minority coalition building between Blacks and Latinos which deserve to be discussed, as they collectively represent a broad look at how scholars have analyzed the issue at hand. In order to lay a theoretical foundation for analysis, this paper will now examine each of the principal viewpoints which exist regarding the possibility of Blacks and Latinos forming a political alliance. In order to incorporate these theoretical ideas into the context of actual events, this paper will eventually return to their central arguments when analyzing happenings in Georgia.

The argument of Nicolás C. Vaca is perhaps the most straightforward within all previous literature. This paper has already discussed what Vaca called the “presumed alliance,” the idea that the two groups ought to “get along,” and a notion which he has viewed as flawed. Drawing from the conflictual, often contradictory relationship between Blacks and Latinos, he stresses the problem pointed out by Karen Kaufmann, and he directly states that one shouldn’t assume that there is any basis for Latino-Black coalitions. Pointing to the inconsistent relationships between the two groups in cities with established populations of Latinos, he notes that “for each analysis that finds that Latinos and Blacks have a ‘natural’ basis for mutual support because of a common history of suffering and oppression, there are others that find great antipathy between the two groups.”<sup>24</sup> What Vaca points out is remarkably important, because he questions – despite what is often suggested- whether the histories of Blacks and Latinos are so similar after all; furthermore, even if they do share common veins, these similarities should not be presumed to serve as a legitimate foundation for political alliances. He stresses that “that few formal or even informal coalitions exist between these two disenfranchised groups because they,” quite simply, “should not be presumed political allies.”<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Vaca, 186

<sup>25</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 386

Rejecting Vaca's sense of the general impossibility of any consistent foundation for coalition building, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres not only hold that minority coalitions are possible, but will be effective only if they are organized through the idea of race. In their book *The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy*, they reason that minority leaders should organize coalitions "around political issues that are explicitly race specific," they suggest that such race-based coalitions are essential because "racial minorities are less likely to respond to calls for coalition building...if their leaders do not first speak to them about matters that relate to their racial experiences."<sup>26</sup> Only under the idea of race, according to their argument, will it be feasible to bargain collectively and work collaboratively for their common interests.<sup>27</sup> Guinier and Torres would suggest that common experience of Blacks and Latinos is an important element to address for the two groups to understand one another, and they must first come to terms with the idea of race before any meaningful political coalition building will ever become possible.

Whereas Guinier and Torres suggest that minority race status and the discrimination which accompanies it can serve as a common, unifying factor for Blacks and Latinos, Jackson, Gerber, and Cain argue that, although there are possibilities for coalition between Blacks and Latinos, such coalitions will only be able to take shape through the elite political class within each minority group. Drawing off one of the earliest studies which examined how the presence of Blacks and Latinos affected one another, McClain and Karnig's article "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition," which was the first to highlight the competition which takes place between the two groups in urban spaces which they jointly occupy,<sup>28</sup> Jackson, Gerber, and Cain found that sentiments between the two groups "may be shaped by the daily

---

<sup>26</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 387

<sup>27</sup> Guinier and Torres

<sup>28</sup> McClain and Karnig, 535-536, 542

interactions these groups have...proximity diminished good relations between racial and ethnic groups. Rather than providing people with opportunities to interact and develop feelings of common community and destiny, proximity introduced the possibility of tension and conflict...”<sup>29</sup> Within such settings they found that “more affluent blacks preferred coalitional political strategies with other minority groups while poorer, less educated Blacks preferred non-coalitional strategies,” suggesting that elite community leaders of each group are the key to cohesive coalition strategies.<sup>30</sup>

Although her argument differs from that of Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, Karen Kaufmann’s article “Cracks in the Rainbow” highlights the important role that Black and Latino leaders play in promoting a sense of “group communality.” She argues that coalitions between the two groups are more likely to occur if each group first develops a common identity within itself. Kaufmann writes that because “a strong sense of Latino communality corresponds with higher levels of affinity toward African-Americans,” it follows that “Latinos who see much in common between themselves and the larger Latino collective are more likely to feel close to blacks as well.” In her argument, she necessarily notes the important differences within Latino populations, prodding her readers to recognize Latinos as a diverse group amongst themselves. Latino opinion towards blacks, she finds, differs by nationality, and although general “Latino acculturation also contributes to black affinity,” it does so in a much less substantial way than the question of nationality. She finds that, *ceteris paribus*, groups such Puerto Ricans and Dominicans believe they have more in common with African Americans than do people from

---

<sup>29</sup> Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, 291-292

<sup>30</sup> Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, 291

Mexico and Central America, drawing the important conclusion that “inter-nationality differences suggest both opportunities and barriers for future Latino/black alliances.”<sup>31</sup>

Kaufmann has thus argued that the common social conditions of Blacks and Latinos provide them with a rational basis for forming political alliances, and that such alliances will be bolstered by a sense of intra-national communality within the U.S. Latino Population. She, however, also discusses an important element which is often overlooked when asking questions about minority alliances when she asks her readers to remember that white political leaders and voters also may impact the possibilities for Black-Latino coalitions. For many Whites, Latinos are often viewed more favorably as potential coalition partners than African-Americans, especially in urban policy environments. In those places where white political voice is diminishing relative to growing minority voices, Kaufmann makes the noteworthy assessment that “Latinos are increasingly being courted by white leadership in search of a coalition.”<sup>32</sup>

While Kaufmann brings up the important elements of heterogeneity within the US Latino population and the often overlooked role of Whites when talking about minority relations, Kenneth Meier et al argue that Blacks and Latinos have the strongest basis for political coalitions through shared policy goals or common objective circumstances. By noting the difference between “scarce or zero-sum outcomes,” like public office or employment, and “common outcomes as public goods,” like public policies or higher wages, they argue that conflict has often arisen when Blacks and Latinos are focused on zero-sum goods. They write that “no form of sharing...can accommodate two groups with claims on specific resources.” Instead, they argue, coalitions become possible when the two groups have common policy objectives, which

---

<sup>31</sup> Kaufmann, 208

<sup>32</sup> Kaufmann, 208

are not zero-sum and can provide mutual benefits for both groups.<sup>33</sup> Their arguments are significant because they reinforce the notion that possibilities exist with respect to “an appropriate way to restructure the political agenda involving questions of race and ethnicity.”<sup>34</sup>

Claudine Gay of Harvard University was the first scholar to highlight the importance of including the notions of class and economic status in considering the possibilities for a minority coalition between Blacks and Latinos, an idea which is in many ways an extension of Meier’s argument that coalition between the two groups must be based on objective circumstance and have common policy goals. Gay’s article, “Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes toward Latinos,” examines how the relative economic position of Blacks and Latinos impacts the attitudes of the former towards the latter. She highlights the fact that the booming Latino population has often completely altered the “residential experiences” of established African-American communities in the United States, and argues that economic inequalities and competition between blacks and Latinos fuel the negative attitudes of the former towards the latter.<sup>35</sup> Her research reveals that Blacks are more likely to “harbor negative stereotypes about Latinos,” “be reluctant to extend to Latinos the same policy benefits,” and “view black and Latino economic and political interests as incompatible” when they live in areas where Latinos are more affluent relative to Blacks.<sup>36</sup> She writes that “the greatest threat to intergroup comity may not be that blacks and Latinos increasingly live side by side, but that they do so at a time of declining economic fortunes for large segments of the black population.”<sup>37</sup> Gay thus calls for scholars to remember the important place of economic and class issues alongside those of race, because beyond the role that competition plays in sparking conflict

---

<sup>33</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 387

<sup>34</sup> Meier et al, “Conflict and Cooperation...,” 408

<sup>35</sup> Gay, 994

<sup>36</sup> Gay, 983

<sup>37</sup> Gay, 995

between the two groups, economic inequality between the two groups can serve as a substantial barrier to coalition formation.

Thus, when examining the South, it is important to consider the question of whether we should assume that Blacks and Latinos have any basis for political alliance suggested by Vaca; the potential of race-based coalitions suggested by Guinier and Torres; the role of Black and Latino political elites as advocated by Jackson, Gerber, and Cain; the importance of recognizing heterogeneity within the US Latino population, their sense of communality, and the potential place of Whites within future political coalitions, as discussed by Kaufmann; the idea that successful coalition building between Blacks and Latinos must be based on common policy objectives, as argued by Meier et al; and, finally, the role of economic inequalities between Blacks and Latinos as an obstacle to political alliance, as noted by Gay. It is not likely that all of the abovementioned perspectives will adequately represent the nature of Black-Latino relations in the South, but they will certainly serve as important reference points for examining the way African-Americans and Latinos are interacting within the realm of Southern politics and society. After discussing the changing social landscape of the Southern United States, this previous literature regarding the coalitional possibilities for Blacks and Latinos will serve as the theoretical foundation for analysis. The potential for Latinos and Blacks to form alliances, as evidenced by this literature, will depend largely upon the way the two groups interact politically, socially, and economically.

### CHAPTER 3 IN THE SOUTH, NOTHING IS BLACK AND WHITE ANYMORE

Although a large amount of literature has been written about conflict between African-Americans and Latinos in the US, particularly within places like California, Texas, and Florida, most states in the South cannot be easily compared with examples used for previous scholarly research. Cities like Atlanta and Charlotte differ greatly from places like Los Angeles and Miami. The expansive rural landscape which characterizes parts of Alabama and South Georgia are quite different from Compton, California and New Jersey. All of the aforementioned states and cities have a long history of Latino presence, and additionally, much of the research examining conflicts and much of the theory used to evaluate the relationship between Black and Latino communities has been established within the context either highly concentrated urban environments or places where Latinos have an established political voice. Although the South has its share of large cities, expansive metropolitan areas, racial diversity, Latino growth, historical racial conflict, and the sociopolitical environment of places like Georgia, North and South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee require that scholars think about the South differently than they have for cases in South Florida, Texas, and California. The fact that there has been relatively little dialogue about the dynamics of Black-Latino relations in the South is the driving impetus behind this paper, and it is important to now shift towards understanding the interaction between these two groups within the context of the South.

## The *Nuevo* South and Its Implications

In the years immediately following the establishment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) the United States began to experience substantial demographic changes with respect to its Latino population. While the primary purpose of the IRCA was to enforce stricter control at the border and impose sanctions on employers hiring undocumented immigrants, Congress also provided amnesty for the 2.4 million Mexican immigrants who could provide documentation proving that they had been working and residing in the US for over five years. While it is widely known that the IRCA did little to curb illegal immigration into the United States, especially after the adverse effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spread throughout the Mexican countryside, it is important to note that internal migration also contributed to regional shifts in Latino population. In fact, California had a net loss of 363,000 Latinos during the 1990's as a result of internal migration. The coupled effect of economic crisis in Mexico and Latino migration within the United States would, over a 20-year period, prompt millions of Latinos to settle throughout the US. While the growth of the Latino population has been impressive throughout the entire nation during the past 20 years, it is the South which has experienced more dramatic growth than any other region.<sup>38</sup>

The most impressive growth of the Latino population occurred, roughly, between the years of 1990 to 2000. Many Southern states went from having an almost nonexistent Latino population to a booming presence during this single decade. During this period, states like Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina reported Latino population growth figures of 325 percent, 230 percent, and 426 percent, respectively, while other states experienced significant levels of growth as well. Between the years of 2000 and 2005, American Community Survey estimates suggest that Southern states have continued to see high growth figures, although they are less

---

<sup>38</sup> Mohl, 69



significant than those from the 1990's. States such as Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee all experienced over 20 percent Latino growth from 2000 to 2005. In total, the 15-year period between 1990 and 2005 reveals an extraordinary shift in the racial composition of the South.<sup>39</sup> Every state in the Southeast except for Louisiana experienced at least 160 percent growth, while states like Georgia and North Carolina experienced growth levels of 473 percent and 594 percent, respectively.<sup>40</sup> Thus, while in 1990 Latinos represented less than 1 percent of the total state populations of all Southern states with the exception of Georgia and North Carolina,<sup>41</sup> by 2005, they had established themselves as an important foundation of the Southern economy and culture.<sup>42</sup>

**Table 1: Racial Composition of the South, 1990-2005**

| Racial Composition of the South, 1990-2005 |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
|--|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------|------------|
|  | Alabama   | Florida    | Georgia   | Kentucky  | Louisiana | Mississippi | North Carolina | South Carolina | Tennessee | Texas      |
| <b>1990</b>                                |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| Total                                      | 4040587   | 12937926   | 6478216   | 3685296   | 4219973   | 2573216     | 6628637        | 3486703        | 4877185   | 16986510   |
| White                                      | 2975797   | 10749285   | 4600148   | 3391832   | 2839138   | 1633461     | 5008491        | 2406974        | 4048068   | 12774762   |
| Black                                      | 1020705   | 1759534    | 1746565   | 262907    | 1299281   | 915057      | 1456323        | 1039884        | 778035    | 2021632    |
| Latino                                     | 24629     | 1574143    | 108922    | 21984     | 93044     | 15931       | 76726          | 30551          | 32741     | 4339905    |
|  |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| <b>2000</b>                                |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| Total                                      | 4,494,228 | 16,377,967 | 8,309,792 | 4,087,199 | 4,521,540 | 2,866,738   | 8,160,635      | 4,055,620      | 5,756,524 | 21,388,916 |
| White                                      | 3,159,110 | 10,609,756 | 5,193,371 | 3,642,088 | 2,826,070 | 1,741,493   | 5,709,320      | 2,679,236      | 4,553,588 | 11,121,317 |
| Black                                      | 1,162,189 | 2,375,222  | 2,369,427 | 308,614   | 1,457,805 | 1,035,627   | 1,756,931      | 1,192,592      | 947,161   | 2,429,966  |
| Latino                                     | 61,297    | 2,827,702  | 463,653   | 65,088    | 117,551   | 42,693      | 403,742        | 102,256        | 132,691   | 6,961,140  |
|  |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| <b>2005</b>                                |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| Total                                      | 4442558   | 17382511   | 8821142   | 4058633   | 4389747   | 2824156     | 8411041        | 4113961        | 5810590   | 22270165   |
| White                                      | 3153627   | 13341532   | 5516920   | 3646690   | 2795263   | 1716444     | 6005471        | 2774429        | 4625715   | 16021256   |
| Black                                      | 1144330   | 2613628    | 2571396   | 292012    | 1425685   | 1030075     | 1765698        | 1174488        | 954287    | 2442350    |
| Latino                                     | 99040     | 3414414    | 625028    | 69702     | 123066    | -           | 533087         | 135041         | 172704    | 7903079    |
|  |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| <b>Latino Growth</b>                       |           |            |           |           |           |             |                |                |           |            |
| 1990-2005                                  | 302.13%   | 116.91%    | 473.83%   | 217.06%   | 32.27%    | N/A         | 594.79%        | 342.02%        | 427.49%   | 82.10%     |
| 1990-2000                                  | 230.09%   | 79.63%     | 325.67%   | 196.07%   | 26.34%    | 167.99%     | 426.21%        | 234.71%        | 305.27%   | 60.40%     |
| 2000-2005                                  | 21.62%    | 20.75%     | 34.81%    | 7.09%     | 4.69%     | N/A         | 32.04%         | 32.06%         | 30.16%    | 13.53%     |

Source: 1990 and 2000 Data, US Census; 2005 Data, American Community Survey

<sup>39</sup> See Appendix for Graphic Representation

<sup>40</sup> See Table 1, "Racial Composition of the South, 1990-2005," for precise numbers.

<sup>41</sup> The higher 1990 figures for Georgia and North Carolina can be explained largely because they were the first two Southern states to experience large influxes of Latinos. If one examined data for 1985, for example, Latino numbers are similar to those of Alabama, South Carolina, and Tennessee in 1990.

<sup>42</sup> See Table 2, "Racial Composition in the South, By State, 1990 -2005."

Table 2: Racial Composition in the South, By State, 1990-2005

| Racial Composition in the South, by State, 1990-2005 |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
|--|---------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------|--------|
| 1990   | Alabama | Florida | Georgia | Kentucky | Louisiana | Mississippi | North Carolina | South Carolina | Tennessee | Texas  |
| White Total %  | 73.65%  | 83.08%  | 71.01%  | 92.04%   | 67.28%    | 63.48%      | 75.56%         | 69.03%         | 83.00%    | 75.21% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 0.61%   | 12.17%  | 1.68%   | 0.60%    | 2.20%     | 0.62%       | 1.16%          | 0.88%          | 0.67%     | 25.55% |
| Black Total %  | 25.26%  | 13.60%  | 26.96%  | 7.13%    | 30.79%    | 35.56%      | 21.97%         | 29.82%         | 15.95%    | 11.90% |
| 2000   |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
| White Total %  | 70.29%  | 64.78%  | 62.50%  | 89.11%   | 62.50%    | 60.75%      | 69.96%         | 66.06%         | 79.10%    | 52.00% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 1.81%   | 17.27%  | 5.58%   | 1.59%    | 2.60%     | 1.49%       | 4.95%          | 2.52%          | 2.31%     | 32.55% |
| Black Total %  | 25.86%  | 14.50%  | 28.51%  | 7.55%    | 32.24%    | 36.13%      | 21.53%         | 29.41%         | 16.45%    | 11.36% |
| 2005   |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
| White Total %  | 70.99%  | 76.75%  | 62.54%  | 89.85%   | 63.68%    | 60.78%      | 71.40%         | 67.44%         | 79.61%    | 71.94% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 2.23%   | 19.64%  | 7.09%   | 1.72%    | 2.80%     | N/A         | 6.34%          | 3.28%          | 2.97%     | 35.49% |
| Black Total %  | 25.76%  | 15.04%  | 29.15%  | 7.19%    | 32.48%    | 36.47%      | 20.99%         | 28.55%         | 16.42%    | 10.97% |

Source: 1990 and 2000 Data, US Census; 2005 Data, American Community Survey

Census data further reveals that the diversity of Latinos in the South in terms of national origin is distinct from states where Latinos can claim a longer historical presence. Take, for instance, three states which have long been characterized by a large Latino population: Texas, California, and Florida. Due to their proximity, economic ties, and overlapping history with Mexico, the Latino population in Texas and California is predominately of Mexican origin. In 2005, 83.3 percent of all Latinos in Texas were of Mexican origin, as was 82.7 percent of the Latino population in California. Although Latinos in Florida come from a wide array of places, as discussed in the examples provided by Nicolás Vaca in the previous chapter, Cubans have claim to the dominant political voice.<sup>43</sup> In contrast, in no Southern state does a single nationality represent more than two-thirds of the total Latino population.<sup>44</sup> Places such as Georgia and North Carolina are marked by high percentages of people throughout certain Central and South American countries.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Vaca, 112-116

<sup>44</sup> Mohl, 72-73

<sup>45</sup> See Table 3, “Latinos in the South, By Origin, 2005,” for a more detailed breakdown of the South’s Latino population by national origin

Table 3: Latinos in the South, By Origin, 2005

| Percentage Latino      | Latinos in the South, By Origin, 2005 |            |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------|--------|
|                        | Alabama                               | California | Florida | Georgia | Kentucky | Louisiana | Mississippi | North Carolina | South Carolina | Tennessee | Texas  |
| Latino                 | 100.0%                                | 100.0%     | 100.0%  | 100.0%  | 100.0%   | 100.0%    | N/A         | 100.0%         | 100.0%         | 100.0%    | 100.0% |
| Mexican                | 63.0%                                 | 82.7%      | 15.6%   | 66.8%   | 67.3%    | 34.1%     | N/A         | 66.6%          | 62.2%          | 65.9%     | 83.3%  |
| Puerto Rican           | 6.6%                                  | 1.2%       | 18.9%   | 7.4%    | 7.4%     | 7.3%      | N/A         | 7.7%           | 10.3%          | 6.7%      | 1.1%   |
| Cuban                  | 1.8%                                  | 0.7%       | 29.3%   | 3.0%    | 5.2%     | 8.0%      | N/A         | 1.9%           | 1.5%           | 3.4%      | 0.4%   |
| Dominican              | 0.2%                                  | 0.1%       | 3.6%    | 0.7%    | 1.7%     | 0.6%      | N/A         | 0.9%           | 0.9%           | 0.4%      | 0.1%   |
| Central American       | 15.7%                                 | 8.0%       | 10.5%   | 9.9%    | 7.5%     | 27.5%     | N/A         | 12.2%          | 10.8%          | 12.4%     | 4.3%   |
| Costa Rican            | 0.1%                                  | 0.1%       | 0.5%    | 0.4%    | 0.0%     | 0.6%      | N/A         | 1.0%           | 1.5%           | 0.7%      | 0.1%   |
| Guatemalan             | 11.0%                                 | 2.5%       | 1.7%    | 2.8%    | 3.4%     | 3.9%      | N/A         | 2.9%           | 2.8%           | 3.4%      | 0.6%   |
| Honduran               | 1.3%                                  | 0.5%       | 2.6%    | 1.8%    | 0.6%     | 15.0%     | N/A         | 3.2%           | 3.4%           | 4.4%      | 0.9%   |
| Nicaraguan             | 0.6%                                  | 0.6%       | 3.4%    | 0.5%    | 0.5%     | 3.2%      | N/A         | 0.5%           | 0.1%           | 0.5%      | 0.2%   |
| Panamanian             | 1.2%                                  | 0.2%       | 0.7%    | 1.0%    | 1.6%     | 1.3%      | N/A         | 0.5%           | 1.5%           | 1.0%      | 0.1%   |
| Salvadorean            | 1.5%                                  | 3.7%       | 1.4%    | 3.3%    | 1.1%     | 2.4%      | N/A         | 3.8%           | 1.1%           | 2.0%      | 0.1%   |
| Other Central American | 0.0%                                  | 0.4%       | 0.2%    | 0.2%    | 0.4%     | 1.1%      | N/A         | 0.3%           | 0.3%           | 0.2%      | 0.1%   |
| South American         | 5.1%                                  | 1.9%       | 15.7%   | 6.8%    | 4.0%     | 4.9%      | N/A         | 5.1%           | 7.2%           | 4.3%      | 1.2%   |
| Bolivian               | 0.7%                                  | 0.1%       | 0.2%    | 0.1%    | 0.0%     | 0.2%      | N/A         | 0.0%           | 0.3%           | 0.2%      | 0.0%   |
| Chilean                | 0.1%                                  | 0.2%       | 0.6%    | 0.2%    | 0.5%     | 0.4%      | N/A         | 0.2%           | 0.1%           | 0.4%      | 0.0%   |
| Columbian              | 1.7%                                  | 0.4%       | 6.9%    | 3.1%    | 2.3%     | 1.0%      | N/A         | 1.8%           | 2.7%           | 1.6%      | 0.5%   |
| Ecuadorian             | 0.2%                                  | 0.2%       | 1.2%    | 0.5%    | 0.2%     | 0.6%      | N/A         | 0.7%           | 0.6%           | 0.2%      | 0.1%   |
| Paraguayan             | 0.1%                                  | 0.0%       | 0.0%    | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%      | N/A         | 0.0%           | 0.0%           | 0.2%      | 0.0%   |
| Peruvian               | 1.4%                                  | 0.5%       | 2.3%    | 1.0%    | 0.7%     | 0.7%      | N/A         | 1.1%           | 1.2%           | 0.8%      | 0.2%   |
| Uruguayan              | 0.5%                                  | 0.0%       | 0.4%    | 0.3%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%      | N/A         | 0.1%           | 0.1%           | 0.1%      | 0.0%   |
| Venezuelan             | 0.5%                                  | 0.1%       | 2.4%    | 0.6%    | 0.1%     | 1.4%      | N/A         | 0.5%           | 1.0%           | 0.5%      | 0.1%   |
| Other SA               | 0.0%                                  | 0.1%       | 0.2%    | 0.2%    | 0.2%     | 0.0%      | N/A         | 0.3%           | 0.1%           | 0.1%      | 0.1%   |
| Other Latino           | 7.7%                                  | 5.5%       | 6.5%    | 5.4%    | 6.8%     | 17.6%     | N/A         | 5.6%           | 7.1%           | 7.0%      | 9.5%   |
| Spaniard               | 0.6%                                  | 0.6%       | 0.9%    | 0.5%    | 0.8%     | 3.1%      | N/A         | 0.3%           | 1.1%           | 1.6%      | 0.6%   |

The coupling of Latinos’ relatively recent arrival to the South and their diversity in terms of national origin presents a situation which is unique. The lives of the Latinos who have recently arrived in the South are largely marked by unskilled jobs and low-wage work in the agricultural, meatpacking, construction, carpet, restaurant, and service industries.<sup>46</sup> However, as Raymond Mohl points out in his article “Globalization, Latinization, and the Nuevo New South,” while many perceive that Latinos have primarily settled in smaller, rural towns to work in the agricultural and poultry processing industry, a large percentage have also migrated into urban areas. This latter style of settlement represents a break from *bracero* and migrant worker patterns of fifty years prior, and represents the arrival of Latinos into all spaces in the South. The nature of Latino settlement has also meant that, relative to other states, Latinos in the South have had- until recently- few political representatives or allies.

<sup>46</sup> Mohl, 62

Raymond Mohl also underlines the high likelihood that census statistics vastly understate the actual presence of Latinos in the South. In Memphis, Tennessee, for example, the 2000 census cited a Latino population of 23,000; however, local experts claim that the number is closer to 100,000. Charleston, South Carolina, provides another example; local leaders assert that the city's Latino population is over 50,000, while the census cites only 13,000. The same holds true for Mississippi as a whole; while the census data cites a Latino population of only 39,500, the actual number is probably over 100,000.<sup>47</sup> For the millions of undocumented Latinos immigrants in the South, their legal status is significant because it complicates their ability to voice themselves and their concerns publicly. Resultantly, Latinos now constitute a powerful cornerstone of the workings of the Southern economy while remaining largely excluded from public discourse.

Before discussing the historical presence of African Americans in the South and some of the perspective of new Latinos in the South, it is important to point out that the South also presents a number of other differences which make it distinct from other regions. Among its distinct characteristics is the strong presence of evangelical and Pentecostal churches throughout the South.<sup>48</sup> Another important difference which deserves to be noted is the South's historical dearth of organized labor and workers unions when compared with other regions of the United States. In no states are more than 10 percent of people employed under union contact, and in the majority of states, less than 5 percent of all workers are members.<sup>49</sup> While union membership is present in for people employed in the public sector, very few people in private sector are under a union contract.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Mohl, 73-74

<sup>48</sup> Association of Religion Data Archives. See Figure 4 on the following page

<sup>49</sup> Union Membership and Coverage Database, see Table 6 in Text, as well as Table 7 and Figure 5 in the Appendix.

<sup>50</sup> Union Density Estimates by State. See Figure 5 in the Appendix.

Figure 4: Evangelical Churches in the United States, 2006




Table 6: Union Membership in the South, 2006

| Union Membership in the South, by State, 2006              |        |            |           |           |      |      |
|--|--------|------------|-----------|-----------|------|------|
| State  | Obs    | Employment | Members   | Covered   | %Mem | %Cov |
| Alabama  | 1,903  | 1,930,249  | 170,113   | 193,988   | 8.8  | 10.0 |
| Florida  | 7,303  | 7,675,747  | 396,958   | 497,350   | 5.2  | 6.5  |
| Georgia  | 3,802  | 3,973,751  | 175,802   | 229,688   | 4.4  | 5.8  |
| Kentucky   | 2,479  | 1,752,214  | 172,106   | 196,338   | 9.8  | 11.2 |
| Louisiana  | 1,541  | 1,676,436  | 107,008   | 121,163   | 6.4  | 7.2  |
| Mississippi  | 1,428  | 1,064,772  | 60,044    | 77,593    | 5.6  | 7.3  |
| North Carolina   | 3,530  | 3,809,761  | 125,627   | 155,114   | 3.3  | 4.1  |
| South Carolina   | 2,232  | 1,775,394  | 58,655    | 74,288    | 3.3  | 4.2  |
| Tennessee  | 2,392  | 2,549,584  | 152,962   | 174,002   | 6.0  | 6.8  |
| Texas  | 8,785  | 9,750,865  | 476,209   | 575,809   | 4.9  | 5.9  |
| <b>Total</b>   | 35,395 | 35,958,773 | 1,895,484 | 2,295,333 |      |      |
| <b>Average</b>   |        |            |           |           | 5.8  | 6.9  |
| <a href="http://www.unionstats.com">www.unionstats.com</a> |        |            |           |           |      |      |

### A Departure from Black and White

When Latinos began arriving in the South during the past 20 years, they came to a region with a distinct history of race politics and relations. States which have seen the largest Latino growth over the past 10 to 15 years, such as Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas, are also home to a legacy of Black-White race politics and the memory of the Civil Rights movement led by the

South's influential African-American community. Kevin Kruse writes in that "in the cities of the post-war South, the larger demographic presence of African Americans meant that both the pressure for racial residential transition and the political clout of the black community were much stronger" than elsewhere in the nation.<sup>51</sup> As a result of this history, as well as their presence in sheer numbers, African Americans have long claimed an important political and social voice in the South. In 1990, African Americans represented over 25 percent of the population in Alabama, 27 percent in Georgia, 31 percent in Louisiana, 36 percent in Mississippi, 22 percent and 30 percent in North and South Carolina, respectively.<sup>52</sup> That the African-American community is larger in the South than in other regions has not, however, changed the fact that Blacks in the South, like throughout the nation, have faced continued discrimination post civil-rights, that their wages are much lower relative to Whites', and that they continue to struggle for equal access to basic social goods. The steady growth of the Latino community in a place with a particular legacy of Black-White politics, where African Americans have often been denied an equal place in society and relegated to unskilled, low-pay work, has challenged African Americans' claims in a place which had had once called their own, and consequently presents an environment of potential conflict. Given the arguments in previous literature about why and where Black-Latino conflict has arisen, one might theorize that racial conflict has the potential to be more marked in the South than anywhere else in the United States.

Like elsewhere in the nation, Blacks in the South have often stated a clear resentment towards Latinos. Unlike elsewhere in the nation, the demographic landscape in the South has seemingly shifted overnight. An infamous article in the *Charlotte Post* written by Artellia Burch, "When Worlds Collide," written after a series of interviews within the African American

---

<sup>51</sup> Kruse, 13-14

<sup>52</sup> See Table 5 in the Appendix

community of Charlotte, provides a powerful insight what is perceived to be the reaction of many African-Americans in the South. Burch reports that a 30 year-old computer technician stated, about Latinos, that “I definitely think they are people to fear...They travel in packs. They like to play stupid acting as if they don't understand English when you know they do... They could be plotting to kill you and you would never know it...And another thing. They are taking over. They're taking all of our jobs. Slowly but surely...” Another man, according to Burch, stated that “We shouldn't fear them just because they outnumber us... Just because someone multiplies like a rabbit doesn't mean you should fear them. They need to fear us.”<sup>53</sup> Such isolated commentary cannot be interpreted as wholly representative of the African-American population at-large; however, it does reflect the skepticism embedded in the attitudes of many Blacks who view Latinos as a threat to their economic stability and political position.

On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that many Latinos are arriving to the South with established prejudices towards Blacks. In a recent study by Paula McClain et al, based on surveys done in Durham, North Carolina, she found that Latinos generally identify more with whites than African Americans and, further, that residential proximity reinforces Latinos' negative perceptions of African Americans. According to the study, 58.9 percent of Latinos interviewed felt that “few or almost no blacks are hard-working,” 32.5 percent thought that “few or almost no blacks are easy to get along with,” and 56.9 percent stated that “few or almost no blacks could be trusted.” Furthermore, almost 79 percent of Latinos felt that they have more in common with Whites than with Blacks.<sup>54</sup> According to the same study, Blacks actually held more favorable feelings towards Latinos than vice-versa. Roughly 72 percent of blacks thought Latinos to be hard-working, and 42.8 percent believed that Latinos were easy to get along with.

---

<sup>53</sup> Burch, “When Worlds Collide.”

<sup>54</sup> Duke, “Latino Immigrants Come to US with Negative Stereotypes...”

Nearly half of all Blacks interviewed felt that they had more in common with Latinos than with Whites.<sup>55</sup>

As for the roots of Latinos' prejudice, McClain et al cited the racial hierarchies within interviewed Latinos' countries of origin, which is Mexico for the vast majority, as a significant influence upon their attitudes. They further compared the attitudes of new Latinos in the South to those of "the Chinese in Mississippi in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century" and the "Cubans in Miami in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century," meaning "identification with whites, distancing themselves from blacks, and feeling no responsibility to rectify the continuing inequalities of Black Americans." It is important to note, however, that McClain found that Latinos tended to have hold fewer negative stereotypes about African Americans when they felt a sense of "linked-fate" to other Latinos; that is, as has already been described in Kaufmann's article, that what happens to one groups of Latinos also affects them.<sup>56</sup> Clearly, the new social politics which are emerging in the South are also not defined along clear lines of race or identity; Blacks and Latinos in the South cannot be assumed to be political allies. In *La Voz Latina*, William Pleasant, an influential activist in the community of Savannah, Georgia, wrote an editorial which clearly articulates the problem many are thinking about. He writes that, "since 1865, the traditional political and cultural dialogue has failed to resolve the bloody conflict between Blacks and whites in Savannah- it always sputters and sizzles at the edge of every question. There is no reason to believe that it can make even a dent in what will be a growing conflict between newly arrived Latinos and Blacks over scarce social and economic resources in the region. But we do know that fear and bewilderment between peoples serve as poor launch pads for social collaboration."<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Duke, "Latino Immigrants..."

<sup>56</sup> Duke, "Latino Immigrants."

<sup>57</sup> Pleasant, "Savannah in Black and Tan."



## CHAPTER 4 THE CASE OF GEORGIA

In all of the ways the South is described as different from other regions in the United States, the State of Georgia serves as an exemplar. With respect to historical race politics, African-American political power, Latino population growth, and other factors such as religion and organized labor, Georgia provides an appropriate backdrop upon which to examine the nature of Black-Latino relations in the South. After examining Georgia's background as a state where African Americans represent a significant social force, this paper will proceed to discuss Georgia's regional differences, current political happenings in with respect to Latino political power and immigration legislation, and recent developments involving anti-immigrant mobilization and violence between Black and Latino communities.

### African-American Power and the Civil Rights Legacy

Firstly, it is important to mention the historical political presence in African-Americans in Georgia and Atlanta, where the Black population and its political voice is "larger and stronger than anywhere else."<sup>58</sup> Kevin Kruse states that, in contemporary history, there has been, "no clearer source of African-American strength in the modern South than in Atlanta."<sup>59</sup> Atlanta was a city which heavily contributed to the civil rights movement, as powerful leaders at the center of the Blacks' fight for racial equality and social justice called Atlanta their home. Amongst these figures were W.E.B. Du Bois, James Weldon Johnson, Walter White, Andrew Young, Joseph

---

<sup>58</sup> Kruse, 12

<sup>59</sup> Kruse, 14

Lowery, Vernon Johnson, as well as Martin Luther King Sr. and his son Martin Luther King Jr.<sup>60</sup> A number of African-American organizations, most notably the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), were established in Atlanta. With respect to the politics of segregation during the Civil Rights Era, Kruse further writes that the “relative failure of racists in Atlanta was not due to their lack of commitment to the cause, but because the black population they challenged was both larger and stronger than those in the North.”<sup>61</sup> African-Americans’ newly gained legitimacy in Southern political life was accompanied by the “White Flight” phenomenon- during which the majority of Atlanta’s white population fled desegregation laws by moving from the city into the surrounding suburbs. The economic development of Atlanta, which has seen the transformation Atlanta into a rapidly expanding metropolitan area from the 1970’s onward, has since been centered on race politics; upper-middle class whites control the political and social landscape in the suburban areas surrounding the City of Atlanta, which has principally remained in the hands of Atlanta’s African-American political elite.

Within the City of Atlanta, African Americans have established themselves as the dominate voice in the city’s political life. Since Maynard Jackson’s historical election in 1973 as the first African-American mayor of Atlanta, the city has continued to elect Black mayors. Jackson was succeeded by Andrew Young, Bill Campbell, and, more recently, Shirley Franklin. In many ways, the city has been able to overcome its image as the bastion of segregationist conflict, pushing economic development and public relations campaigns proclaiming Atlanta to be a city “too busy to hate,” drawing in international attention as the host of the 1996 Olympic Games, and continuing to hold the position of the economic center of the New South. In fact, the 2003 ING Gazelle Index, which measures confidence and expectations of African American

---

<sup>60</sup> Kruse, 14

<sup>61</sup> Kruse, 13

CEO's, overwhelmingly identified Atlanta as the best metropolitan area and Georgia as the best state for fast growing Black businesses to relocate.<sup>62</sup> In state-level politics, of the 180 Representatives and 56 Senators in the Georgia State Assembly, there are currently 12 African American Senators and 38 Representatives, representing the largest Black caucus in the United States.<sup>63</sup> Amidst this center of African American power, though, there has never been an African American governor of Georgia. This is explained by the fact that, although the Black community retains political control of the City of Atlanta, political attitudes in the state on the whole are more diverse and political control often is in the hand of leaders in the White community. These factors are important to note because it must be understood that, within the South, Georgia in particular has always been strongly characterized by a clear black-white dichotomy in the state's sociopolitical arena.

### *La Nueva Georgia*

The fact that African Americans continue to represent the largest racial minority in Georgia is unlikely to change soon, but the state has, undeniably, experienced some of the most significant growth of Latinos in the United States, second only to North Carolina. What is more, as of 2000, Georgia had the fastest growing undocumented Latino population of any state in nation.<sup>64</sup> While in 2000, the US Census cited 435,000 Latinos in Georgia, a more likely estimation for 2000 is over 800,000, which would have represented roughly 10 percent of the state's population at the time. If one estimates that the population estimates are equally misquoted today, it might be the case that the 625,000 Latinos reported for 2005 could easily

---

<sup>62</sup> ING, Gazelle Index. 48.6 percent of Black CEOs base their companies out of the South and 27.1 percent stated that Atlanta, Georgia, was the best location for black-owned businesses. If asked what their preferred state for relocation would be, 20.3 percent preferred Georgia; 8.9 percent, Florida; 4.9 percent, Texas; and 4.6 percent, North Carolina. Survey Taken 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2003.

<sup>63</sup> Georgia Legislative Black Caucus, 2007

<sup>64</sup> Bixler, Hispanic Population...

signify a Latino population of more than 1 million, well-over 10 percent of the total state population.<sup>65</sup>

The first wave of Latinos to come to Georgia primarily arrived to Gainesville and Dalton, Georgia, two cities with particular industrial concentrations in North Georgia. In Gainesville, the city which once legitimately claimed to be the “Poultry Capitol of the World,” the Latino population surged as an increasing demand for chicken at the national and international level pushed the poultry industry to recruit workers from Mexico. By 2000, Latinos accounted for over 20 percent of Gainesville’s population, as they numbered more than 27 thousand. In 2002, Gainesville city schools reported that Latino children represented 47 percent of their student makeup.<sup>66</sup> Large numbers of Latinos also came to Dalton, Georgia, where roughly three quarters of the US domestic product of carpet is produced in over 120 factories: a large percentage of the \$11 billion annual sales of the US carpet industry. Like in Gainesville, Latinos in Dalton represent over 20 percent of the population, or 20 thousand people, according to official figures. Local experts in Dalton, however, claimed in 2000 that it was more likely that they numbered somewhere around 45 thousand.<sup>67</sup>

### Regional Differences

Happenings in Gainesville and Dalton, the two most commonly cited places with respect to extraordinary Latino growth in Georgia, represent population shifts in the Northern part of the state; however, in order to characterize the state better for analysis, the regional differences in Georgia with respect to race should be noted. North Georgia, on the whole, differs greatly from other regions of the state in that it is principally composed of a large White population, with

---

<sup>65</sup> See Table

<sup>66</sup> Mohl, 76-77

<sup>67</sup> Patton and Parker, 284

small African-American and Latino populations. On average, in the counties of North Georgia, African Americans compose around 6.3 percent of the total population, while the White population represents almost 86 percent. This separates the Northern part of the state from other regions such as the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), as well as from the counties of Central and South Georgia. In the Atlanta MSA, Whites compose only 55.9 percent of the total population, while African Americans represent 31.6 percent of the population. Atlanta also has a large, politically active Asian population, which represented almost 4 percent of Atlanta's population in 2000. Counties throughout Central Georgia are similarly characterized by larger African American communities, averaging 34.4 percent in Central counties. In the Southern counties, African Americans account for 33.6 percent of the total population.<sup>68</sup> Thus, despite the fact that much has been written about Latinos in Dalton and Gainesville, and that Latinos represent a larger proportion of the population in North Georgia as compared to elsewhere, this analysis will concentrate instead on happenings within the three other regions: South Georgia, the Atlanta MSA, and Central Georgia.<sup>69</sup> The Northern part of the state provides interesting examples of conflicts and interaction between Georgia's White and Latino communities, but do not present much evidence related to this paper's central theme.


Table 8: Race in Georgia, By Region

| Race in Georgia, By Region, 2000 |                   |        |         |         |        |        |         |       |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|---------|--------|--------|---------|-------|
| Region                           | Total             | Latino | White   | Black   | Native | Asian  | Haw/Pac | Other |
| <b>Atlanta</b>                   | 3566988           | 250267 | 1995725 | 1128337 | 6323   | 130949 | 1204    | 7277  |
|                                  |                   | 7.0%   | 55.9%   | 31.6%   | 0.2%   | 3.7%   | 0.0%    | 0.2%  |
| <b>Central</b>                   | 1724622           | 46295  | 1041897 | 593347  | 4072   | 19634  | 933     | 1917  |
|                                  |                   | 2.7%   | 60.4%   | 34.4%   | 0.2%   | 1.1%   | 0.1%    | 0.1%  |
| <b>North</b>                     | 1330222           | 84648  | 1136999 | 83446   | 3496   | 9420   | 378     | 843   |
|                                  |                   | 6.4%   | 85.5%   | 6.3%    | 0.3%   | 0.7%   | 0.0%    | 0.1%  |
| <b>South</b>                     | 1564621           | 54017  | 954040  | 526335  | 3779   | 11510  | 763     | 1238  |
|                                  |                   | 3.5%   | 61.0%   | 33.6%   | 0.2%   | 0.7%   | 0.0%    | 0.1%  |
| Source:                          | U.S. Census, 2000 |        |         |         |        |        |         |       |

<sup>68</sup> See Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 in the Appendix for a detailed breakdown of Race in Georgia at the County-Level. All data comes from the 2000 US Census.

<sup>69</sup> See Figure 6

Figure 6: Georgia's Regions



### Case 1, The Capitol: Contemporary Politics of Immigration in Metro Atlanta

Atlanta, as already mentioned, is a center for African American power, although not one inexperienced in dealing with international and multicultural issues. The city's own diversity and struggles for racial equality have served as a testament to its ability to overcome such obstacles, as has its leaders' involvement in international issues. One early instance in which Latinos were thrust onto the stage of debate surrounding the arrival of Latinos in Georgia was in 1986, when City Council member Barbara Ashar, Mayor Andrew Young, and Coretta Scott King fought to let refugees from wars in Guatemala and El Salvador find a safe haven in Georgia.<sup>70</sup> King said at a conference that, "were he alive today, I know Martin would say, now is the time to join hands

<sup>70</sup> Green, Atlanta a City of Refuge?

together and lift up a common torch of liberty. I know he would ask us all to accept the tired, to liberate the poor... ”<sup>71</sup>

The arrival of Latinos in Atlanta, however, has not always been met with the same level of enthusiasm as in the case of Martin Luther King’s wife or former UN Ambassador Andrew Young. This was the case in 2001, when Black legislators in Georgia blocked efforts to include “Hispanics” in the state’s definition of minority, claiming that Latinos constituted a language group, not a racial one. In blocking this measure, Black leaders threatened to exclude Latinos from a law which would give a tax break of up to \$6000 US per year to companies hiring minority contractors.<sup>72</sup> During this time, Atlanta Journal Constitution columnist Cynthia Tucker wrote that “some African-American leaders have responded to the growing political influence of Latinos by circling the wagons to keep the newcomers out...Those black lawmakers fear competition. But that sort of narrow-minded effort won’t work in the long run.”<sup>73</sup> Georgia’s last Democratic governor, Roy Barnes, pushed for the bill to eventually be adopted; however, African-American leaders’ initial unwillingness to recognize Latinos as a legitimate minority voice reflected their desire to preserve the established political voice which their community had long fought for.

Like most domestic metropolitan areas during the past 25 years, Atlanta has continued to redefine itself in economic, geographic, and social terms. It has experienced substantial metropolitan expansion from 1950 to the present, and is now very different from the past in demographic and geographic terms. While in 1980 it consisted of 15 counties employing less than a million people, in 2005 it included the 28 counties surrounding the Atlanta city limits and employed almost 2.25 million people. The flow of manufacturing, wholesale trade, and

---

<sup>71</sup> United Press International. “Mrs. King asks acceptance of involuntary immigrants”

<sup>72</sup> Bixler, A1

<sup>73</sup> Tucker, B10

transportation jobs from the City has frequently forced City residents- who are on average poorer and more likely to be black- have been forced to commute into the surrounding metropolitan area for employment. Data from the Census Bureau shows that less than half of the City's employed residents work inside the city, which implies that most City residents are commuting outside the city in order to find work.<sup>74</sup> Losses in manufacturing jobs over the past 15 years have been largely replaced by retail trade, and food & accommodation services, which offer less pay than those jobs lost. Life for city residents has been significantly more difficult than for many people in the Atlanta area, as they have also been confronted with significantly higher unemployment levels than in the rest of the Atlanta MSA.<sup>75</sup> In 1987, 27.5 percent of city of Atlanta residents were below the poverty line.<sup>76</sup> In 1990, blacks in the City of Atlanta had an average income of \$24,700, while the average income of whites was \$96,700. Furthermore, 32 percent of blacks in the same year were living in conditions of "extreme poverty."<sup>77</sup> In 2000, almost 25 percent of Atlanta city residents were still below the poverty line, while the state average was only 13 percent.<sup>78</sup> Thus, while the Atlanta MSA and Georgia have continued to see a large amount of economic growth, Atlanta city residents have largely been excluded from its benefits.

Amidst regional Latino growth, Atlanta has continued to be a city which is racially segregated in terms of where people reside. Over 70 percent of the areas' Black community lives on the south end of Atlanta,<sup>79</sup> while a large number of Latinos reside along Buford Highway, in Gwinnett County, and in the Chamblee-Doraville area. It is not the case, however, that Latinos will always remain segregated from the rest of Atlanta's urban community. Indeed, over the past

---

<sup>74</sup> U.S. Census Bureau. American Factfinder

<sup>75</sup> Keating (2001, 37-39)

<sup>76</sup> Dedman, For the destitute...

<sup>77</sup> Clayton, "Race, Class and Status in Atlanta..."

<sup>78</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Quickfacts

<sup>79</sup> Clayton, "Race, Class and Status in Atlanta"



10 to 15 years, Atlanta's Latino population has gradually moved into those neighborhoods within the City of Atlanta which have –since “White Flight” began taking place 30 years ago- traditionally been regarded as places mostly occupied by African-Americans. Whereas in 1980, the US Census counted only 594 Latinos in the City of Atlanta, the official count was almost 25 thousand in 2007.<sup>80</sup> For the 12 City of Atlanta Districts, although Latinos often represented only 5 or 6 percent of the population, their arrival into spaces traditionally occupied by Blacks is significant because it represents a new residential experience in Atlanta's urban areas. Although Latinos and Blacks continue to be concentrated in separate areas of Atlanta, they are now beginning to share all spaces in the city.<sup>81</sup>

One of the most significant places to which Latinos now belong is Georgia's political arena. In 2002, Senator Sam Zamarripa- a former aide for both Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young- became the first Latino Senator elected to the Georgia State Legislature. In the same year, Latinos Pedro Marin and David Casas were elected to the State House of Representatives. In 2003, alongside Dekalb County State Court Judge Tony del Campo, they collectively founded the Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials (GALEO), an organization which, according to Marin, has since sought to “empower the Hispanic community in the democratic process in Georgia.”<sup>82</sup> When, in 2003, it became official that Latinos had surpassed Blacks as the largest racial minority in the United States, Tisha Tallman, regional counsel for the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) Atlanta office said in 2003 that “the numbers signal to policymakers, legislators, and elected officials that we are growing and that we are a group to contend with.”<sup>83</sup> Senator Sam Zamarripa, however, was quick to point out that Latinos do not

---

<sup>80</sup> Clayton, “Race, Class, and Status in Atlanta”

<sup>81</sup>

<sup>82</sup> PR Newswire, “GALEO is Launched...”

<sup>83</sup> Rodriguez, Latinos Surpass

represent a homogenous, unified group in Georgia; instead they represent a group coming from diverse national and ethnic backgrounds.<sup>84</sup> Highlighting the willingness of Georgia's Latino political leaders to work together with African-American leaders, Zamarripa stated that "the South is historically black-white. It is the center of civil rights. Hispanics are new. We have a lot of work to do in educating our black colleagues. This issue will not go away."<sup>85</sup>

Indeed, in Georgia, the issue of Latino immigration has only escalated over the past decade. In where the national legislative body has failed to address the need for comprehensive immigration reform, political tension surrounding the question of immigration in Georgia have taken an important place in the Atlanta area, manifesting itself in the arrival of anti-immigration legislation, radical anti-immigrant groups, as well as protests from the Latino community regarding the state-level political measures which have targeted. In terms of direct political resistance to undocumented Latino immigrants, the State General Assembly – since 2004 – has attempted to construct a series of bills which put pressure on undocumented workers. Through new Homeland Security legal provisions, the state legislature passed Senate Bill 529 (SB529) in 2006, representing one of the nation's most comprehensive measures at the state level against persons without proper identification as well as their employers. In 2007, the Georgia Legislature aims to pass 12 new pieces of proposed legislation and/or resolutions whose principle effect would be to immobilize undocumented immigrants in Georgia. For instance, Senate Bill 15 (SB15) would increase penalties for driving without a license, and further requires that Latinos detained for driving without proper documentation to be reported to the Department of Homeland Security. Another newly introduced measure which would coincide with SB 15 is SB 25, which would mandate one to five years imprisonment and fines of up to \$5,000 dollars for

---

<sup>84</sup> Rodriguez, Latinos Surpass

<sup>85</sup> Bixler, A19

anyone using false documents.<sup>86</sup> House Resolution (HR) 127 would urge the United States Congress to halt birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants, while House Bill (HB) 21 would prohibit state agencies, counties, and cities from printing official documents in any language other than English.<sup>87</sup>

Outside the formal political system, Georgia is now home to a number of radical anti-immigration groups such as the Minutemen, an anti-immigrant vigilante group, who held their first Georgia meeting in Oconee County.<sup>88</sup> Beyond the arrival of the Minutemen, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported in February of 2007 that the Ku Klux Klan has identified Georgia as a central state for organization around the issue of immigration. The KKK has had a recent surge of activity according to the ADL, because it “believes that the US is drowning in a tide of non-white immigration...and is vigorously trying to bring this message to Americans concerned or fearful about immigration.”<sup>89</sup> During 2005 through the present, the KKK has held numerous protests in Georgia, including Gainesville and Ellijay, Georgia, against undocumented-immigrants and Latinos.

Amidst these anti-immigration measures, both Black and Latino leaders have worked with one another to address the central human rights issues surrounding the immigration debate. After African-American state legislators temporarily stopped the bill which had aimed to broaden the term minority to include Latinos, the Reverend Jesse Jackson spoke in Atlanta alongside Latino leaders to denounce such efforts, saying to the two groups, “we must coalesce.”<sup>90</sup> During the summer of 2006, the Latino community of Atlanta shut down thousands of businesses by participating in the “*Sí Se Puede!*” marches preceding the passing of SB 529. At

---

<sup>86</sup> Feagans, Bills aim to tighten clamps...

<sup>87</sup> Feagans, Bills aim to tighten clamps...

<sup>88</sup> Feagans, Minutemen march far from the border

<sup>89</sup> Klu Klux Klan Rebounds...

<sup>90</sup> Grantham and Bixler, H4

the march, African-American legislators such as Kasim Reed spoke to tens of thousands of Latinos, reaffirming that many African-American leaders understood the protests as a call for human rights considerations with respect to new anti-immigrant legislation. Later in 2006, Reverend Joseph Lowery, Civil Rights Leader and President of the SCLC spoke during Hispanic Heritage Month to declare the need for both groups to understand one another and seek common goals, but also stressing that “immigrants must seek to understand the long and bloody road that blacks have traveled from slavery to expanded, yet incomplete avenues of opportunity.”<sup>91</sup> He also stated that Blacks should “exercise sensitivity, compassion, fairness and a sense of justice” about immigration and discrimination towards Latinos.<sup>92</sup> At the national level, the NAACP, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), MALDEF, and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) began a national campaign to begin working together in cities such as Atlanta.<sup>93</sup> The recognition of common struggles between the political leaders of the African-American and Latino communities is significant because it represents a departure from the often conflictual relations between Black and Latino leaders in cities such as Miami and Compton. Both Latino and African-American leaders have expressed the need for each group to work at understanding each other’s perspective, but in all represents a promising basis for political coalition.

Beyond the measures taken by African-American and Latino leaders, churches in Atlanta has often served as an institution willing to change in order to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of new Latinos in Georgia. Mary Odem’s groundbreaking article “Our Lady of Guadalupe in the New South,” examined how the Catholic Church has worked to provide Latinos with ties to their homeland culture while providing assistance with becoming incorporated into US society. Churches like the Misión Católica de Nuestra Señora de Las

---

<sup>91</sup> Miranda, “A Call for Understanding...”

<sup>92</sup> Poole, “Lowery: Latinos, Blacks need to unite.”

<sup>93</sup> Poe, F1, F6

Americas in Doraville have provided services beyond all things religious, often working as community centers where Latinos can attend English as a Second Language (ESL) courses, speak to people about employment opportunities, and learn about how to work with new immigration policies.<sup>94</sup> About churches in the same area, Manuel Vasquez writes that, “like the African Americans who preceded them, Doraville’s newest residents, who face multiple forms of discrimination, turn to churches not only for refuge but also for places that provide the space and symbolic and material elements with which to engage a public sphere from which they are often excluded.”<sup>95</sup>

New Birth Missionary Baptist Church, a predominately African American church with around 25,000 members, serves as a particularly striking example of how the church has opened up to Latinos. In January of 2007, New Birth’s leader, Bishop Eddie L. Long crossed the historical line of racial segregation within the South’s churches by working to start “New Birth *Latino*.” In the past, New Birth had offered headphones which broadcasted the service in Spanish; however, Spanish services now take place in its own sanctuary in Spanish.<sup>96</sup> Thus, it is not only the Catholic Church- with which the majority of newly arrived Latinos were affiliated with in their home countries- that is working with the growing Latino community. New Birth reveals an instance of an African American church recognizing the needs of Latinos, while hundreds of other Protestant and Evangelical churches traditionally affiliated with the White community have also opened their doors.

---

<sup>94</sup> Odem, 47

<sup>95</sup> Vasquez, *Globalizing*, 148

<sup>96</sup> Varela, *Embracing Latin Atlanta*

## Case 2, Down South: Community, Race, and Religion in South Georgia

South Georgia is a region which represents a different political and economic foundation for Black-Latino relations than Atlanta. It is in the southern part of the state that a number of violent acts between Blacks and Latinos have occurred, and also presents a number of instances of the impact of immigration politics in the South. By examining the way the town of Stillmore, Georgia was impacted after a series of Immigration Control and Enforcement (ICE) raids in local poultry processing plants, it become easier to understand the economic and social significance of the Latino community in South Georgia industry and society. Latinos often play a central role in local economies, but also in local civic and religious institutions.

Unlike the remainder of the state, South Georgia provides a number of clear instances of racial tension and violence enacted between the Black and Latino communities. Storing large quantities of cash savings in their homes due to the difficulty of opening bank accounts in the United States, undocumented Latinos have often become the victims of crime, often committed by African-Americans. In 2005, over a series of months, over 20 in-home robberies targeting undocumented Latinos took place in Tift, Colquitt, and Cook Counties, all important counties in Georgia in terms of agricultural production in which many Latinos are employed. Official Census figures state that around 3000 Latinos live in Tift and 4500 in Colquitt, though the numbers are probably much higher, as a single large farm can require the help of hundreds of field laborers. During these robberies, over six Mexican immigrants were killed and six others wounded by three young black people.<sup>97</sup> In November of 2006, during one weekend, over eight Latinos were robbed at gunpoint during three separate incidents committed by black men. Outside Moultrie, Georgia, Latino owned stores have also been targeted by local blacks during

---

<sup>97</sup> “Three charged in deaths of six immigrants in Georgia”

2006.<sup>98</sup> Many people in the Latino communities of these towns, frightened by the series of events, have begun thinking about leaving these South Georgia communities for other towns. Pointing out the potential impact of such actions, Kim Martinez, one of the robberies' victims said about the local Mexican population that "they work hard to send money back to their families in Mexico. If these people leave here, what are the farmers going to do?"<sup>99</sup>

Even if isolated events, these happenings across South Georgia have reflected the types of tensions which have manifested themselves in the local Black and Latino communities. Perhaps these tensions can be explained by tensions surrounding job competition- or simply the fact that undocumented Latinos are often viewed as "easy prey" because they are unwilling to report crimes committed against them in fear of deportation, but they certainly represent a break from the violence associated with the close urban quarters seen in LA and Miami. Black and Latino communities are largely residentially segregated in South Georgia counties, although they share public spaces during school and work. A number of towns present an interesting picture of how Latinos have impacted the South Georgia social landscape over the past two decades. The dynamic revealed in places such as Stillmore in Emanuel County, Willacoochee and Pearson of Emanuel County, and Dooly County reveal a diversity of economic and social relationships, largely revealing the fact that community relations between Blacks and Latinos are largely dependent upon local actors and economic factors in those communities.

In Stillmore, Georgia, a small town in Emanuel County whose population is only around 1000 people, the Crider poultry processing plant had been the center of the local economy for more than 30 years. As the local cotton industry and the local railroads lost their importance from during the 1950's through the 1970's, chicken processing became the main source of

---

<sup>98</sup> "Robber hits Hispanic store..."

<sup>99</sup> "Investigators: Georgia Slayings targeted..."

employment. During the mid-1990s, however, the local African-Americans who once represented almost all of the plant's labor force were displaced by Latino workers who had begun arriving in search of employment in the local poultry industry. This trend was stopped in its tracks, however, when, over Labor Day weekend in 2006, as part of a national effort to crack down on undocumented immigrants, a series of ICE raids surrounding the Crider Inc. chicken processing plants detained over 120 undocumented immigrants. Overnight, the Crider plant "lost 75 percent of its mostly Hispanic 900-member work force."<sup>100</sup> Short on labor, the Crider plant began using promises of higher wages to actively recruit African-Americans for the first time in almost two decades, many of whose distant residence forced them to live in Crider dormitories or travel from over two hours away. Higher wages attracted hundreds of new workers, but were not sufficient to fill the plant with people willing to work grueling 15 hour shifts; the wage rate, after all, had only gone from \$6.75 to \$7.75 per hour.<sup>101</sup> As employment in the plant was less than half of its former level, the Crider plant even began busing in convicted felons from a prison in Macon, as well as homeless people, to work in its processing lines.<sup>102</sup> Most recently, they have begun bringing in Laotian Hmong immigrants from Minnesota and Wisconsin to fill the local void.<sup>103</sup> Months after the raids, the Crider plant was still unable to completely replace workers lost, a condition which now threatens the permanent closure of the Crider plant.

Two towns in Atkinson County, Willacoochee and Pearson, also provide interesting insights into how two South Georgia communities' Black and Latino populations are working together. In Atkinson County, Latinos represent 21 percent of the population, while Blacks now represent only 19 percent. Roughly 36 percent of Latinos are considered to be in poverty,

---

<sup>100</sup> Perez and Dade

<sup>101</sup> Bynum, "Immigration Raids leave Georgia town bereft..."

<sup>102</sup> "Felons, homeless men fill poultry plant jobs"

<sup>103</sup> Perez and Dade



compared to 31 percent of Blacks.<sup>104</sup> In the first, one can find an instance of how the friendship of two local pastors has sparked an attempt at ensuring that each community understands one another. Rachael Swarns of the New York Times, who wrote a number of articles dealing with the multiracial nature of South Georgia, writes about Willacoochee that, “in a town where neighborliness is entrenched, blacks and Hispanics often treat one another warily,” particularly with regards to the disparities in employment which are often seen between the two groups. With respect to local tensions, however, Reverends Harvey Williams, who is African-American, and Atanacio Gaona, who is Latino, have been working between their respective churches to communicate to their communities that “Blacks and Hispanics should be allies in the struggle to overcome discrimination and economic adversity,” in spite of the fact that “interethnic unity is often hard to come by.”<sup>105</sup>

Atkinson County’s youth, however, provide a different picture about the way Blacks and Latinos are interacting as compared to the relationship between adults in the African-American and Latino communities. At Atkinson County High School in Pearson, students have achieved in remarkable amount of cultural and racial openness. In a high school which is 50 percent White, 25 percent Latino, and 22 percent Black, both the homecoming king and queen in 2006 were Latinos. The arrival of Latinos has not gone without local tensions, but the type of social interaction which characterizes the school challenges the notion that the points of diversity and proximity always lend themselves to localized frustrations and conflicts. For Atkinson County High School students, regardless of the tensions found in their communities at large, their school is not a place where such severe problems exist. In the Atkinson County community, however, where jobs and opportunities are hard to come by, many students cannot claim to remain part of

---

<sup>104</sup> Swarns, “A Racial Rift That Isn’t Black and White”

<sup>105</sup> Swarns, “A Racial Rift That Isn’t Black and White”

such an environment. The graduation rate at Atkinson High was only 47 percent for Latinos and 36 percent for Blacks, as compared with 62 percent for Whites.<sup>106</sup>

### Case 3, The University City: Athens, Organized Labor, and Multiracial Coalitions

Athens, Georgia, is the location of the state's oldest university, the University of Georgia, established in 1785 through a large land grant. Although recognized as the home of a vibrant music, cultural, and academic "scene" surrounding the university, the Athens-Clarke County (ACC) area suffers from vast social inequalities. It provides a number of examples for examining the basis for race-based and issue-oriented coalitions between Black and Latino communities in the South.

High levels of poverty mark Athens not only as one of the poorest counties in the state, but one of the nation's areas of persistent poverty. The ACC poverty rate is 28.3 percent, making it the 8<sup>th</sup> poorest county in the State of Georgia, whose average poverty rate is 13 percent. If measured at 150 percent of the poverty threshold, a bar which many recognize as a more accurate number by which to measure poverty, almost 40 percent of Clarke County residents would be classified as "poor." Local poverty is further exaggerated by high levels of teen pregnancy and high school dropouts. Whereas Georgia's average high school graduation rate is 69.4 percent, it is only 60.5 percent in Athens-Clarke County.<sup>107</sup> Supreme Court Judge Steve Jones note that roughly 70 percent of all students in ACC public schools live below the \$20,000 poverty line, as do almost 40 percent of households headed by Black and Latino women.<sup>108</sup>

As is true throughout most of Georgia, much of this poverty is concentrated in the African American and Latino communities of Athens, whose average income is significantly

---

<sup>106</sup> Swarns, "The Latino South: Hispanic Teenagers Join Southern Mainstream"

<sup>107</sup> Partners for a Prosperous Athens, "A Profile of Athens-Clarke County..."

<sup>108</sup> Black and Brown Bridges, Speech by Judge Steve Jones

lower than the White community's. At 3.4 percent, the unemployment rate in Athens is low relative to the state average; however the jobs held by many ACC residents do not provide adequate wages and benefits. Although the University of Georgia is the area's largest employer, other service producing occupations represent 54.2 percent of all employment in the ACC area. 12.5 percent of all employment is accounted for by the "food manufacturing" industry, whose average wages are – at \$7.99 per hour – well below the area average of \$14.63. Food manufacturing employers in Athens, such as the Tyson and Gold Kist poultry processing plants located in the city, employ large numbers of local Latinos and Blacks.<sup>109</sup>

Recently the Athens community has actively responded to these questions of local poverty and inequality. In 2006, community leaders formed Partners for a Prosperous Athens (PPA), which aims to "break the cycle of poverty" by addressing education, wage, access to health services, and teen pregnancy issues.<sup>110</sup> The Athens community has further provided examples of intercultural and cross-ethnic coalition building through recent events. For example, in February 2007, the Athens Latino community hosted a celebration honoring Black History Month, inviting members from both communities to celebrate the contributions of leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. Through this program, community members Umberto Mendoza- a local musician from Mexico- and Peter Croffie- an African American leader in the 4H community-outreach program in Athens- provided an example of expanded understanding between the two communities seen almost nowhere else. Additionally, in April 2007, the Latin American and Caribbean Studies Institute (LACSI) and the African American Studies Institute (AASI) of the University of Georgia jointly hosted a conference called "Black and Brown Bridges: Building Successful Partnerships Among African-Americans and Latinos in the New

---

<sup>109</sup> Partners for a Prosperous Athens, "A Profile of Athens-Clarke County..."

<sup>110</sup> Partners for a Prosperous Athens, "About"

South,” which gathered Black and Latino community leaders from throughout Georgia to discuss the need for coalition building between the two groups. Superior Court Judge Steve Jones, who is also the chair of the PPA, spoke about seeing past race in order to focus on pressing socioeconomic issues such as wages, education, and equitable economic growth. Former State Senator Sam Zamarripa, whose efforts in Atlanta have already been discussed, highlighted the importance of overcoming fear through open communication between the two communities and embracing the changing, multiethnic face of “the New America.” Reverends Harvey Williams Jr. and Atanacio Gaona, whose story was highlighted in the New York Times article mentioned above, spoke about their relationship as South Georgia ministers attempting to overcome racial barriers in the small town of Willacoochee.<sup>111</sup>

All of these elements reveal an opening dialogue in the Athens community, at least amongst its civic leaders. It is the story on the ground, though, which is the most telling. In 2006, the Economic Justice Coalition (EJC) and the Coalición Somos America (CSA) were formed in an effort to work for a “living wage” in Athens and build community alliances with the local Latino community. They have also recently allied themselves with the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union to organize workers within the Athens Clark County area poultry plants.

The strategy which the UFCW, EJC, and CSA are developing is based on the centrality of the Black and Latino communities in organizing the local poultry plant workers. In order to discuss their ideas and garner support for a union contract, these organizations are planning a number of community meetings and “*celebraciones*.” Aware of the fact that the Blacks and Latinos in Athens generally live in separate areas of Athens, and that they hold many separate concerns, the first number of meetings will not initially unify Blacks and Latinos into the same

---

<sup>111</sup> *Black and Brown Bridges*

meeting, but instead address their separate interests before gradually bringing the two groups together. In the initial meetings with Latinos, the organizations plan to concentrate the discussion on immigration education and how the UFCW can provide legal support for both documented and undocumented workers. In meetings with the African American community, they plan to focus on questions about wages, workers rights under union contract, and the importance of allowing Latino workers to be members in order for their poultry plants to work towards effective contract negotiation. The dynamics of the relationships between the groups involved in this effort reflect a number of coinciding interests, for which the organizations hope race will become a useful tool in promoting a sense of communality between the two communities.

Although not as prevalent as other areas of the nation, the South is not new to the UFCW, who- before the arrival of Latinos- maintained union contracts in many food processing plants throughout Georgia, including the plants in Athens and Stillmore. The UFCW claims, however, that over the past 20 years, they have “lost touch” with workers in many Southern plants. Blacks, who once represented a majority of union plant workers, now serve as the minority due to the growing presence of Latinos in food processing industries. As stated by Harley Shaiken, director of UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies, “It’s a sea change from the early 1990’s when immigrant labor was viewed by many as the enemy of organized labor...Now labor recognizes the reality of 12 million undocumented people in this country and the complexity of how to regularize that.”<sup>112</sup> The UFCW realizes that its survival in the South within many industries –such as chicken and hog processing- depends on their ability to bring Latino workers in as members. Indeed, its efforts in Athens are not isolated; since 2005, the UFCW have successfully unionized poultry plants in Russellville, Alabama, and Morristown, Tennessee. Appealing to many Latinos complaints of long hours, low pay, abuse from plant management,

---

<sup>112</sup> Williams, “Unions Spilt on Immigrant Workers.”

and an inability to speak out because of their immigrant status, the UFCW has had a wide appeal for Latino workers in other parts of the South.<sup>113</sup> The UFCW has able to recruit new members, regardless of their immigrant status, due to the fact that it is an international union. They claim not to be interested in “where you come from, but your rights as a worker once employed.”<sup>114</sup> The UFCW is further able to protect and lobby for undocumented workers’ wages and benefits because the employer, by hiring and reporting all of their workers, is *de facto* stating that their employees have been hired lawfully.<sup>115</sup> For the UFCW, whether or not plant workers are documented becomes irrelevant with respect to their willingness to bring all workers into their membership.

For the Economic Justice Coalition and the Coalición Somos America, which are working to raise wages for local workers and improve treatment of Latino workers (both day-laborers, or *jornaleros*, and wage workers), the UFCW provides an institutional framework within which to meet their goals. Linda Loyd, the director of the Economic Justice Coalition and a veteran community organizer in the African American community, works primarily for a “living wage” for all workers, and believes that the UFCW is in the best interest of the Black community. The Latino-Outreach arm of the EJC is aiming to work through established community networks, most centrally the local Hispanic churches, to educate local Latinos about how to best protect themselves from future immigration raids, as well as the benefits of organizing with the UFCW. For many newly arrived Latinos in Athens- much like in Atlanta- the churches serve as a social base upon which their community can discuss common concerns and connect to a number of cultural elements which remain central in their lives even after immigrating into the United States. By utilizing both Evangelical and Catholic Church’s local

---

<sup>113</sup> Greenhouse, “Union Organizers at Poultry Plants in the South...”

<sup>114</sup> Road Map Meeting, UFCW and EJC

<sup>115</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center, Poultry Workers Rights

community networks, the EJC believes it will be possible to inform and mobilize the large majority of the Latino community in support of a new contract with the UFCW.

It is not yet clear how employers will respond to efforts at establishing new contracts within these plants. Presumably, by hiring a large number of Latinos, they remain interested in retaining them as employees. Furthermore, it does not seem to be in their interest to challenge the immigrant status of their own employees. After all, they have supposedly hired them legally. Nor is it apparent how the poultry plants will be impacted by these efforts to organize the Latino and Black workers. It does not appear to be by sheer coincidence that the majority of the plants raided over the past two years in the Southeast have been unionized plants, many of which were under the aegis of the UFCW. The Crider plant raided in Stillmore, for example, whose devastating effects were discussed above, was a plant which had been under a contract initiated by the UFCW. In July of 2007 when SB 529 goes into effect, how will these plants and the communities whose lives are wrapped up in them be affected? Will the very public efforts at unionizing the plans with both undocumented and documented workers draw additional attention from ICE, and if so, how will the UFCW be able to protect their undocumented workers from being detained and deported? It can provide legal support and education about how to resist arrest in the case of an ICE raid, but, ultimately, Latinos without proper documentation are left on their own.

The concerns mentioned above certainly pose challenges to the effective organization of local workers in the Athens area poultry plants. The case of Athens, Georgia, however, is clearly one in which community leaders in both the Black and Latino communities are interested in working together against low wages, questions of local poverty, and social inequality. Multiple Black-Latino-White coalitions already exist in Athens, and they are currently active in pursuing

common objectives. If these community networks and leaders can successfully change local wages and policy, or mobilize hundreds of poultry plant employees across racial lines to organize for common wage and workers' rights issues, this college town community will serve as a potent example of how and why racial and cultural barriers can be dismantled in the South order to change common conditions related to poverty and class.



CHAPTER 5  
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION:  
COALITIONAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH

The case examples from Atlanta, multiple towns in South Georgia, and Athens provide a number of perspectives on how Black-Latino relations are playing themselves out in the New South. Political leaders in both the African American and Latino communities have revealed themselves to be important allies for race-based issues, and happenings in Athens, Georgia, provide an insight into how Blacks and Latinos have organized around class-based issues. Coupled with the expanding economic role of Latinos in the New South, however, the growing popularity of the Protestant church in Latino society has the potential impact of distancing many Latinos from the possibility of minority coalitions with African Americans.

Political Leadership & Race-Based Coalitions

Elite political and social actors from Black and Latino communities in the South have shown that race-based coalitions between community leaders are possible, as seen in the case of Atlanta, Willacoochee, and Athens. Although McClain and Karnig had suggested that, “in cities with a black majority or plurality, where Hispanics are likely to compete with blacks for representation, there may be less of a foundation upon which to build coalitions,” the case is not as such in Atlanta.<sup>116</sup> Despite hesitations of the established African American elites, Latino and Black politicians and leaders are forming successful partnerships between the two communities. Alliances between leaders of African American organizations, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Latino organizations, such as the Georgia Association of Latino

---

<sup>116</sup> McClain and Karnig, 543

Elected Officials, have effectively used race as a means by which to support common legislative and local political goals. At the local, state, and national level, Black and Latino leaders have continued to proved one another useful allies in fighting for minority rights and policy changes on a larger scale, with respect to issues such as affirmative action, immigration law, and state/national level social policy. In Athens and South Georgia communities, local community leaders are organizing together in order to combat local poverty issues as well as the roots of local conflict. Such partnerships, however, appear to be largely made possible by the fact that these two elite groups currently view themselves as necessary allies in a political system which continues to be dominated by upper-middle class whites.

The type of political organization taking place amongst Black and Latino leaders, however, does not always represent either community at large, which frequently works at low wages and lives in relative conditions of poverty throughout Georgia. Employment and wage tensions, as already discussed, have generally been at the heart of problems between Black and Latino communities. Jackson, Gerber, and Cain had also suggested that “rather than providing people with opportunities to interact and develop feelings of common community and destiny, proximity introduced the possibility of tension and conflict.”<sup>117</sup> Latinos and Blacks who constitute the lower-middle and working class in Georgia, though, remain more segregated in terms of residence than do Blacks and Latinos in other large cities such as Miami and Los Angeles. Latinos’ arrival into some spaces of Georgia, though, has provided its share of frustration of Whites towards Latinos, as the former complain of the changing face of their residential areas such as Chamblee and Doraville, as well as in North Georgia cities such as Dalton and Gainesville. The general separation of the Black and Latino communities throughout Georgia has probably contributed to the dearth of political and violent tensions between the two

---

<sup>117</sup> Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, 291-292

groups, consequently adding to their leaders' ability to work together towards common policy goals, strengthen minority rights, and provide a foundation for a working relationship between the two communities in Georgia. The fact that Latinos' physical presence is not stagnant, though, might lead some researchers to pose questions about how Blacks and Latinos will relate as Latinos continue to move into spaces traditionally occupied by African Americans, as in Atlanta. The fact that African American and Latino leadership has had many years to adopt common community and policy objectives, though, potentially represents an important cohesive bond between the two communities as African Americans and Latinos gradually attempt to share residential and political space in Georgia.

Happenings in Georgia, particularly with respect to Atlanta's urban landscape and political life, are consistent in some ways with the findings of Jackson, Cain, and Gerber, who suggested that minority coalitions would be possible only through the elite political class of each group.<sup>118</sup> Additionally, in line with the argument of Guinier and Torres, these alliances have generally been founded on the idea of race. Most organization which has taken place between the African American and Latino communities has been managed by Latino figures such as Sam Zamarripa, Jerry Gonzalez, Teodoro Maus (the former Mexican consul in Atlanta), as well as African American leaders such as Joseph Lowery, Representative Kasim Reed, and Jesse Jackson. When working for policies which benefit people of color, or fight against policies which work against them, the idea of Black-Brown communality has been a central component of these leaders' grounds for cooperation, an idea which was central to Kaufmann's argument about the foundation of minority coalitions. To argue that minority political coalitions are possible *only* through elite political leadership, however, is to ignore emerging examples in Georgia of community-level cooperation between African Americans and Latinos.

---

<sup>118</sup> Jackson, Gerber, and Cain, 291-292

## Issue-Based Coalitions

Whereas happenings in Atlanta reflect the role of Black and Latino leaders in organizing around race-based issues, recent happenings in Athens, Georgia can be seen as an example of how African Americans and Latinos have organized around class-based issues. Although initially concentrated in the planning of local community leaders, efforts at organizing local poultry plants through civic organizations and local churches present an instance of how Black and Latino communities can form cooperative coalitions around issues such as wages, protection against discrimination and abuse in the workplace, and other basic community needs such as public services. The nature of the leadership involved in Athens' Economic Justice Coalition, Partners for a Prosperous Athens, and Coalición Somos America, however, is not comparable to the elite status of politicians, community leaders, and national figures involved in minority coalition building out of Atlanta; students, professors, local community organizers, and community members of all walks of life and colors are involved in the efforts to raise local wages, improve the quality of public goods, and promote workers' rights in local poultry plants.

The nature of community organization taking place in Athens supports the argument of Kenneth Meier et al, who asserted that the strongest basis for coalitions between the Black and Latino communities is through shared policy goals and common social circumstances. As opposed to those public goods with "scarce or zero-sum outcomes," Meier has argued that "common outcomes as public goods," such as public policies or higher wages, provide noncompetitive objectives which are in the interest of both groups. Efforts made by the Economic Justice Coalition, United Food and Commercial Workers, and the Coalición Somos America in Athens poultry plants provide a powerful example of how both African American and Latino communities are able to come together around class and issue-based issues.

Efforts at organizing around class issues might also be aided by the nature of the Latino community in the South, whose diverse national composition- according to Karen Kaufmann- makes it more likely that Latinos develop a sense of group communality with Blacks. In Georgia, no dominant or established national group maintains a disproportionate share of Latinos' political voice in Georgia, as the Latino population throughout the South is more diverse than other regions. In Atlanta, Athens, and towns throughout South Georgia, although the Latino community has generally remained residentially segregated from African American and White communities, there is little division amongst Latinos with respect to national origin. Although national identity remains an important element of their lives, there is a sense that a person becomes a "Latino" when one arrives to the United States. That no large Chicano or established group resides in the Southeast most likely reinforces this notion. According to Karen Kaufmann, coalitions between Latinos and other minority groups are more likely if Latinos develop a sense of common identity amongst themselves, consequently providing a more concrete sense that they are "in the same boat" as many African-Americans with respect to social and class issues. If sound, her argument provides further support for the creation of alliances at the community level around specific class-based issues.

The basis for cooperation of Latinos and Blacks around class-based issues, however, is dependent upon the continued existence of such shared concerns. Relative to African Americans, Latinos daily represent a larger economic force in terms of their purchasing power. In 2007, Latinos will pass African Americans as the most powerful minority consumer group, with an estimated buying power of \$863.1 billion dollars, whereas Blacks will represent only \$847 billion, meaning that Latinos will now represent almost 9 percent of the total consumer market in the United States. Tremendous growth in the Latino purchasing power in Georgia and the rising

affluence of Latinos relative to Blacks, has the potential to promote alliances with the white middle class which is socially conservative, especially when viewed through the lens of religious change amongst Latinos in the South.<sup>119</sup>

### The Role of Religious Institutions

Churches, both Catholic and Protestant, will continue to serve as important institutions in the Black and Latino communities, and will continue to represent areas for cooperation between Black and Latino communities while their class-based issues remain similar. The lack of direct confrontation or rivalry thus far has seemed to provide a number of openings for social interaction, particularly through the network of churches which dot the urban, suburban, and rural landscape of Georgia. In South Georgia communities where violent conflict has become an issue, churches like those of Pastor Williams and Pastor Gaona have worked against misconceptions which Blacks and Latinos might hold about one another. While the Catholic Church has acted as an important provider of basic social goods for Latinos, such as adult education classes, community centers, and assistance with questions of healthcare and settlement, Evangelical and Protestant churches have also begun accepting and recruiting large numbers of Latinos. The case of New Birth Missionary Baptist Church is an important example of how churches have fully incorporated the Latinos into their institutional structure, hiring Latino pastors and attempting to incorporate Latino some elements of Latinos' worship style into their church services. The New Testament Church further serves as an interesting example of how the African American community has reached out to the burgeoning Latino community. Largely white, Protestant churches, though, have also been active in accommodating the growth of the Latino community.

---

<sup>119</sup> Turner, "Hispanics set to surpass blacks in buying power."

In 2006, Marcos Witt, the pastor of the Latino ministry at Lakewood Church in Houston, the largest protestant church in the United States, said about Latinos that “there is a huge move to evangelicalism...In the next five or ten years, it’s going to absolutely explode.”<sup>120</sup> According to the Pew Hispanic Center and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, although over 65 percent of Latinos currently identify themselves as Roman Catholics, 15 percent of Latinos identify themselves as “born-again or evangelical Protestants” and even 54 percent of Latino Catholics consider themselves to be “charismatic Christians.”<sup>121</sup> This trend is politically significant, as evangelical and protestant Latinos are typically against both gay marriage and abortion, and support the idea that one’s religious faith should play an active role in public life. Catholic Latinos also generally hold socially conservative positions on questions of gay marriage, health care, and the role of government services; however, Latino evangelicals, according to the Pew Forum, are “significantly more conservative than Catholics on social issues, foreign policy issues and even in their attitudes toward the plight of the poor.”<sup>122</sup> Sixty-three percent of Latino Protestants voted for George W. Bush in 2004, whereas only 31 percent of Latino Catholics did so.<sup>123</sup>

When combined with shifting economic disparities between the Black and Latino communities, especially with respect to growing affluence of Latinos relative to Blacks, Protestant growth within the Latino communities in the South could prove itself to problematic with regards to coalition building with African Americans. Despite recent efforts by churches like New Birth, within the South, the church has historically served as a force for both segregation and assimilation. . In the past, the church has served as a force of segregation

---

<sup>120</sup> Thousands of Hispanics...

<sup>121</sup> Pew Forum, *Changing Faiths*, 5

<sup>122</sup> Pew Forum, *Changing Faiths*, 6

<sup>123</sup> Thousands of Hispanics...

between Blacks and Whites, particularly in the 1950's and 1960's in Atlanta, when the political debate surrounding segregation was at its height.<sup>124</sup> As noted by Manuel Vasquez, this trend has continued until today. He writes that, "as throughout the South, residents continue to use their churches as the places in which they negotiate change and solidify patterns of segregation."<sup>125</sup> In both Black and White Churches, many Latino congregations tend to remain segregated from the primary congregation.<sup>126</sup> The language barrier between many recently-arrived Latinos and the Black and White congregations can largely be understood as the current cause of said segregation; however, it will be interesting to see how these dynamics of social life within the church will shift as Latinos grow more acculturated and incorporated into mainstream Southern society, as will most probably occur as Latinos remain part of Southern social fabric over subsequent generations.

On average, Catholics represent less than 60 percent of third-generation Latinos in the United States.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, many Protestant churches in the South are encouraging its members to help Latinos assimilate into mainstream US society. This "assimilationist" perspective is reflected in an article written by William McKenzie for the Atlanta Journal Constitution. He wrote "You can offer all the good economic reasons why America needs immigrants, but some people will never hear them because they can't get past the cultural part. What would help them is seeing others help immigrants become part of the American mainstream. If evangelicals want to take that one on, it's also a way they can broaden their agenda and benefit the culture."<sup>128</sup> Thus, Southern Protestant churches have the potential role of pushing the correlated values of individualism and sociopolitical conservatism, further providing

---

<sup>124</sup> Kruse, 15

<sup>125</sup> Vasquez, *Globalizing*, 148

<sup>126</sup> Pew Forum, 6

<sup>127</sup> Turner, "Hispanics set to surpass blacks in buying power"

<sup>128</sup> McKenzie, "Evangelicals can lend hand to immigrants."



an ideological foundation for an easy political or social alliance between Latinos and White, Southern conservatives.

If Latinos do not have the same socioeconomic problems as Blacks, coalitional possibilities for the two groups could erode. The case of Miami provided an important insight into how a Latino community- when it feels no economic or social ties to the Black community- has removed itself from political alliances with the African American community, and is an example of Latinos' disinterest in associating with Blacks in the case that they have perceive no common ground. An advocate of conservative social values, fiscal prudence, and other Weberian values, the South's white, protestant church serves as a potential force for further distancing established Latinos and Blacks. If the findings of Claudine Gay and Paula McClain in 2006 are accurate, a growing gap between the economic status of Latinos and Blacks, coupled with racist attitudes imported from Latin American society, have the potential to erase desires on the part of Latinos to form coalitions with African Americans.

Thus, a central threat to coalitional possibilities between Blacks and Latinos could be the rising socioeconomic status of Latinos coupled with Evangelical and Protestant growth in the same community. Given Latinos' economic trends, as well as the attitudes towards race in the White and Latino communities, the protestant, evangelical, and traditionally conservative church in the South could provide Latinos with a route of upward social and racial mobility in Southern society. Strictly in terms of racial attitudes, both Latinos and Whites are more interested in promoting alliances between one another than with African Americans.<sup>129</sup> If the most important factors for coalitions between Blacks and Latinos are class-based issues, a growing economic discrepancy between Latinos and Blacks should only diminish such possibilities. Such a situation poses important questions about the future of minority politics in the South. Would Latino

---

<sup>129</sup> Duke, "Latino Immigrants..."

conservative social values coupled with higher economic status push this group to isolate/separate itself from the African American community? What would such a division mean for the South's African American communities in the long run?

### Conclusory Remarks

As compared to other regions in the United States, the arrival of Latinos into the Southern United States poses its share of differences and challenges with respect to minority coalition building. Some of the South's unique factors will prove themselves useful for the construction of minority coalitions. The fact that violence or direct political confrontation has not erupted is a positive factor with respect to building coalitions between Blacks and Latinos, as is the working relationship between many Latino and African-American political leaders. The fact that Latinos have no dominant national voice or long-established Latino community also promotes a sense of "Latino communality," which provides many Latinos with a better understanding of the class and social issues shared with many African Americans. Also, in those places where Black and Latino political objectives are similar, race could prove itself to be a useful, unifying factor in the South.

As has been discussed, though, race alone isn't sufficient for the creation of successful minority coalitions. Many people in African-American communities throughout the South are concerned that Latinos will somehow weaken the political voice for which Blacks have struggled. Recently arrived Latinos many times bring social, religious, and racial attitudes from their home countries which are not helpful in the construction of successful coalitions. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to assume that the perspectives or socioeconomic position of either group will remain stagnant. Current research shows that Latinos arriving in the South are a dynamic group, within which many people are cutting ties to the Catholic Church and becoming part of Protestant and Evangelical institutions, establishing long-term social roots in the South,

and becoming more affluent relative to African Americans. The fact that many Latinos and Blacks are currently in a similar social and economic position is likely to change. That Latinos would necessarily form political alliances with Blacks is not predetermined; for second and third generation Latinos, it seems just as likely that they could become political allies with Southern Whites. Another possibility is that many Latinos will simply “vote brown,” as has been the case in many of the states where Latinos have long established residence. Over time, as Latinos become more diverse in social and economic terms, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Latinos will even find divisions amongst themselves along lines of class and race, as often exist in the countries from which they come. There is little evidence that any constant factor exists which would provide a consistent, long-term basis for coalition building between Latinos and Blacks. This potential for Latino distancing from African Americans, instead, highlights the importance of a continued push for policies which provide economic improvement and social services for all people in the South regardless of race. The South’s community leaders and policymakers must continue to recognizing racial inequality and the continued social exclusion of minority groups in the south as problems which are deeply rooted.

As long as both groups have a reason to organize around common issues surrounding labor and wage rights, as well as access to public goods in which there is common interest, race can be useful in initially overcoming barriers both amongst Black and Latino leaders; yet, such common factors are not guaranteed to exist forever. At the most intrinsic level, cooperation between two groups requires that each group believe that it is in its interest to work together, whether those goals be related to the politics of race, workers’ rights, wages, or state elections. Segura and Rodriguez clearly articulated this position when they wrote that “America’s minority groups will cooperate if, at the mass or elite level, they perceive that it is in their interest to

cooperate – and not otherwise.”<sup>130</sup> While some may view Black-Latino coalitions in a positive light, the dynamics of contemporary Southern society provide no reason to view such alliances as given. The New South is certainly a place which continues to be injected with change, and the phenomenon of immigration will undoubtedly continue to alter the way race, class, and society must be analyzed. Its differences from other regions provide a sense of possibility for cooperative race-relations which have not been seen in other places, but alliances on the basis of race cannot fully represent the diversity which exists within such a multiethnic, modern region which continues to become a more vital element of both the domestic and international community. Southern society and its race politics have changed; the South is moving past the politics of Black and White.

---

<sup>130</sup> Segura and Rodrigues, 388-389

## Bibliography/Works Cited

- “African-Americans and Latinos for a Community without Discrimination.” Georgia Latino News. October 31, 2006.
- “Felons, homeless men fill poultry plant jobs.” Associated Press, found in USA Today Online. [www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-26-poultry-plant\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-26-poultry-plant_x.htm). November 26, 2006.
- “Investigators: Georgia Slayings targeted ‘ready-made’ victims.” Associated Press, found on USA Today online edition. [www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-10-01-georgiakillings\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-10-01-georgiakillings_x.htm) October 1, 2005.
- “Ku Klux Klan Rebounds With New Focus on Immigration, ADL Reports.” February 6, 2007.
- “Thousands of Hispanics becoming evangelicals.” Cox News Service, found in the Atlanta Journal Constitution. Friday, March 25, 2005.
- “Three charged in deaths of six immigrants in Georgia.” Associated Press, found in the USA Today, online edition. [www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-10-05-georgia-deaths\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-10-05-georgia-deaths_x.htm). October 10, 2005.
- Alvarez, Gabriela. “The Corpses of three Hispanics causes uncertainty in Macon.” *Mundo Hispanico*.
- Amado, Maria Luisa. Mexican Immigrants in the Labor Market. The New Americans, Recent Immigration and American Society Series. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing. 2006.
- Archibold, Randal C. “Racial Hate Feeds a Gang War’s Senseless Killing.” New York Times. January 17, 2007.
- Association of Religion Data Archives, Maps and Reports. [www.thearda.com](http://www.thearda.com) . 2006.
- Bartley, Numan V. The Creation of Modern Georgia. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press. 1990.
- Bastian, Jean-Pierre. La Mutación Religiosa de América Latina: Para una sociología del cambio social en la modernidad periférica. Fondo de Cultura Económica: México. 2003.
- Berkowitz, Bill. “Right and Left Ask, Who Would Jesus Deport?” Inter Press Service News Agency.
- Bixler, Mark. “Hispanic Population Booming: Dramatic increase has sparked friction with blacks, some demographers say.” Atlanta Journal Constitution. March 8, 2001. A1, A19.

*Black and Brown Bridges: Successful Partnerships between African Americans and Latinos in the New South.* Georgia Center for Continuing Education, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia. Hosted by the Latin American and Caribbean Studies Institute (LACSI) and the Institute for African American Studies (IAAS) of the University of Georgia. April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007.

Branch, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63.* New York: Touchstone. 1988.

Buchanan, Susy. "The Rift: Evidence of a divide between blacks and Hispanics mounting." *Intelligence Report, Summer 2005.* Southern Poverty Law Center

Burch, Artellia. "When Worlds Collide: Blacks have reservations about influx of Hispanic Immigrants." Charlotte Post. Found at <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3ad314cb52e1.htm>

Bynum, Russ. "Immigration raids leave Georgia town bereft, stunned." Associated Press, found in *Seattle Times* online edition. September 16, 2006. [www.seattletimes.com](http://www.seattletimes.com)

Clayton Jr., Obie "Race, Class and Status in Atlanta: How Racial and Ethnic Migration is Changing the City." Presented at *The City of Atlanta: Recent Trends and Future Prospects.* A Conference Sponsored by the Dan E. Sweat Chair in Education and Community Policy. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Friday, February 23, 2007.

*Coalition Somos America.* General Meeting. Latin American and Caribbean Studies Institute Building, University of Georgia. Tuesday, February 6, 2007.

Danna, Nick. "Robber hits Hispanic store in Omega Monday." *The Moultrie Observer.*

Dart, Bob. "Immigration raids strike 4 metro sites..." *The Atlanta Journal Constitution.*, [www.ajc.com](http://www.ajc.com) February 23, 2007.

Dedman, Bill. "For the destitute, homes are scarce and beyond reach." *Atlanta Journal Constitution.* August 16, 1987. A1,10-11.

DeHart, Garrett. *Fighting 529.* Documentary Movie. <http://www.galeo.org/fighting529.php>

Dreher, Rod. "Immigration: Church loses way." *Dallas Morning News.* February 23, 2007.

Du Bois, W.E.B. *The Souls of Black Folk.* New York: BARTLEBY.COM, 1999. <http://www.bartleby.com/114/100.html>

Duke University, News and Communications. "Latino Immigrants Come to the US with Negative Stereotypes of Black Americans, New Study Shows." Monday, July 10, 2006. [www.dukenews.duke.edu/2006/07/racialpolitics.html](http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2006/07/racialpolitics.html)

- Economic Justice Coalition*. General Meeting. Action Incorporated Building. 594 Oconee Street, Athens, Georgia. February 22, 2007.
- Elliot, James R. and Ryan A. Smith. "Race, Gender, and Workplace Power." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 69, No. 3. (June, 2004), pp. 365-386.
- Feagans, Brian. "Bills aim to tighten clamps on illegals: Across the board: Voting, driving, document fraud among measures." *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*. February 11, 2007.
- Feagans, Brian. "Minutemen march far from border." *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*. February 27, 2007.
- Fears, Darryl. "Union Tries to Unite Blacks, Latinos: Workers at Meatpacking Plant Must First Overcome Distrust." *Washington Post*. Monday, July 24, 2006; A04
- Fink, Leon. *The Maya of Morganton: Work and Community in the Nuevo New South*. 2003. UNC Press.
- Gay, Claudine. "Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes toward Latinos." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 982-997.
- Gonzalez, Jerry. "Georgia and the Latino Wave." *La Vision de Georgia*. July 20, 2004.
- Grantham, Russell and Bixler, Mark. "Jackson Group Stresses Unity with Hispanics." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. March 10, 2001. H4.
- Green, Connie. "Atlanta a City of Refuge? Despite Federal Opposition, 8 on council seek a sanctuary bill." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, D1-2. September 1, 1986
- Greenhouse, Steven. "Union Organizers at Poultry Plants in South Find Newly Sympathetic Ears." *New York Times*. September 6, 2005.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/06/national/06labor.html>
- Gregory, Wilton D. "Humanizing the Immigration Debate." Archdiocese of Atlanta, Immigration Symposium. Immigration: The Facts, The Challenges, and the Moral Response. Monday, December 4, 2006. <http://www.archatl.com/archbishops/gregory/writings/2006/12.04.06-immigration.html>
- Guinier, Lani and Gerald Torres. *The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy*. Harvard University Press. 2002.
- Hurt, Charles. "Immigration debate gets religious." *The Washington Times*. January 8, 2007.
- ING. *ING Gazelle Index*. 2003. <http://www.gazelleindex.com/>

- Jackson, Byran O., Elisabeth R. Gerber, and Bruce E. Cain. "Coalitional Prospects in a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes toward Other Minority Groups." *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 2. (June, 1994), pp. 277-294.
- Jenkins, Alan. "Bridging the Black-Immigrant Divide." TomPaine.com. February 20, 2007.
- Kaplan, Erin Aubry. "Outsiders on immigration: Blacks lose clout as many refuse to join debate." Los Angeles Times. January 22, 2007.
- Kaufmann, Karen M. "Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions." *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 2. (June, 2003) pp. 199-210.
- Keating, Larry. Atlanta: Race, Class and Urban Expansion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2001.
- Kruse, Kevin M. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2005.
- Lavender, Rick. "Minuteman group finds its footing: Border control corps holds first meeting." The Gainesville Times. December 12, 2006.
- Lewis, Donald M (ed.) Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2004.
- Livermore, Christian. "GSU focuses on economics of undocumented workers." *Savannah Morning News*. November 3, 2006.
- McClain, Paula D. and Albert K. Karnig. "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2. (June, 1990), pp. 535-545.
- McKenzie, William. "Evangelicals can lend hand to immigrants." Atlanta Journal-Constitution, originally written for the Dallas Morning News. December 22, 2006.
- Meier, Kenneth J., Paula D. McClain, J.L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. "Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 3. (September, 2004), pp. 399-409.
- Miranda, Eugenia. "A call for understanding at collaboration between African Americans and Latinos." Atlanta Latino. October 19, 2006.
- Miranda, Eugenia. "Religious leaders unite under one cause." Atlanta Latino. December 7, 2006.



- Mohl, Raymond A. "Globalization, Latinization, and the Nuevo New South" in Cobb, James L. and Stueck, William, Globalization and the American South. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. 2005. pp. 66-99.
- Murphy, Arthur D., Colleen Blanchard, and Jennifer A. Hill (eds). Latino Workers in the Contemporary South. Southern Anthropological Society Proceedings, No. 34. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press. 2001.
- Odem, Mary E. "Our Lady of Guadalupe in the New South: Latino Immigrants and the Politics of Integration in the Catholic Church." *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Vol. 24, Issue 1 (Fall, 2004), pp. 26-57.
- Oxford, John. "More Hispanics targeted..." Moultrie Observer. November 14, 2006.
- Patton, Randall L. and Parker, David B. Carpet Capital: The Rise of a New South Industry. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. 1999.
- Perez, Evan and Corey Dade. "An Immigration Raid Aids Blacks – For a Time: After Latinos Flee, Factory Shifts to Locals." *The Wall Street Journal*. January 17, 2007.
- Peterson, Anna; Vásquez, Manuel; and Williams, Philip eds. Christianity, Social Change, and Globalization in the Americas. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 2001.
- Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. "Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion." 2007.  
<http://pewforum.org/surveys/hispanic/hispanics-religion-07.pdf>
- Pew Hispanic Center. "Estimates of the Unauthorized Migrant Population for States based on the March 2005 CPS." April 26, 2005. [www.pewhispanic.org](http://www.pewhispanic.org)
- Pew Hispanic Center. "From 200 Million to 300 Million: The Numbers behind Population Growth." October 10, 2006. [www.pewhispanic.org](http://www.pewhispanic.org)
- Pleasant IV, William. "Savannah in Black and Tan: 'Once upon a time, there were no Latinos...'" *La Voz Latina* (Savannah, Georgia).
- Poe, Janita. "African-Americans, Latinos seek to build coalition." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. July 14, 2006. F1, F6.
- Poe, Janita. "Budding Coalition: Hispanic growth suits city's black neighborhoods." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. September 24, 2003. F1, 3, 6.
- Poole, Sheila. "Lowery: Latinos, blacks need to unite." *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*. October 12, 2006.

PR Newswire. "Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials – GALEO – is Launched by Leading Georgia Hispanic Representatives," found in HispanicBusiness.com <http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=13342>. Oct 29, 2003.

*Road Map Meeting*. Economic Justice Coalition, United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), and the Coalition Somos América. Thursday, March 29, 2007. Action Inc., Athens, GA.

Rodriguez, Yolanda. "Latinos surpass blacks as largest minority." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. A1, pg. 9. January 22, 2003.

Sánchez Walsh, Arlene M. Latino Pentecostal Identity: Evangelical Faith, Self, and Society. New York: Columbia University Press. 2003.

Segura, Gary M. and Helena Alves Rodrigues. "Comparative Ethnic Politics in the United States: Beyond Black and White." *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 9, 2006. pp. 375-395.

Smith, Ryan A. and James R. Elliott. "Does Ethnic Concentration Influence Employee's Access to Authority? An Examination of Contemporary Urban Labor Markets." *Social Forces*, Vol. 81, No. 1, September 2002, pp. 255-279.

Southern Poverty Law Center. "Poultry Workers' Rights: Know Your Rights." *Legal News*, 2007. [www.splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?aid=12](http://www.splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?aid=12)

Stevens-Arroyo, Anthony M. "The Latino Religious Resurgence." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 558, Americans and Religions in the Twenty-First Century (July, 1998). pp. 163-177.

Summers, Al. "Demonstration attracts more law, onlookers than Klansmen: No trouble reported." *Time Courier*. November 23, 2006.

Swarns, Rachel L. "A Racial Rift that Isn't Black and White." *New York Times*. October 3, 2006.

Swarns, Rachel L. "The Latino South: Hispanic Teenagers Join Southern Mainstream." *New York Times*. December 31, 2006.


Talhelm, Jennifer. "Raids in 6 States may be largest ever." *Associated Press*. December 12, 2006.

*The City of Atlanta: Recent Trends and Future Prospects*. A Conference Sponsored by the Dan E. Sweat Chair in Education and Community Policy. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Friday, February 23, 2007.

- Tucker, Cynthia. "Latino Growth a Wake-Up Call for Black Folks." *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. March 18, 2001. B10.
- Turner, Dorie. "Hispanics set to surpass blacks in buying power." Associated Press. September 1, 2006.
- Union Density Estimates by State, 1964-2005. Compiled by Hirsch, Barry T. and Macpherson, David A. <http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats/>
- Union Membership and Coverage Database. Compiled by Hirsch, Barry T. and Macpherson, David A. <http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats/>
- United Press International. "Mrs. King asks acceptance of involuntary immigrants," in the *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, July 6, 1986, A6.
- Vaca, Nicolás C. The Presumed Alliance: The Unspoken Conflict between Latinos and Blacks and what it means for America. Harper Collins- Rayo. 2004
- Varela, Anna. "Embracing Latin Atlanta: New Birth launches weekly Spanish service." *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*. January 27, 2007.
- Vasquez, Manuel A. and Marie F. Marquardt. Globalizing the Sacred: Religion Across the Americas. Rutgers University Press: New Jersey. 2003.
- Williams, Krissah. "Unions Split on Immigrant Workers." *Washington Post*. Saturday, January 27; D01.

## APPENDIX


Figure 1: US Population in 1966, by Race and Ethnicity



Source: Pew Hispanic Center estimates.

Note: Race groups are for persons not of Hispanic Origin. API refers to Asian and Pacific Islander

Figure 2: US Population in 2006, by Race and Ethnicity




Source: Pew Hispanic Center estimates.

Note: Race groups are for persons not of Hispanic Origin. API refers to Asian and Pacific Islander. Persons of multiple races assigned to single races using a hierarchical method.

Table 4: Regional Comparison of Race, 1990-2005

| <b>Race, Regional Comparison, 1990-2005</b>                           |                                   |            |             |             |
|---|-----------------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
|   |                                   | 1990       | 2000        | 2005        |
| <b>Northeast</b>  |                                   | Northeast  | Northeast   | Northeast   |
|   | Total                             | 50,809,229 | 54,897,691  | 52,924,571  |
|   | White                             | 42,068,904 | 39,889,783  | 40,400,549  |
|   | Black                             | 5,613,222  | 6,124,099   | 5,944,448   |
|   | Latino                            | 3,754,389  | 5,677,569   | 5,840,941   |
|   | American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut | 125,148    | 286,001     | 143,660     |
|   | Asian or Pacific Islander         | 1,335,375  | 2,375,577   | 2,602,028   |
|   | Other race                        | 1,666,580  | 544,662     | 3,083,398   |
|   |                                   |            |             |             |
| <b>Midwest</b>  |                                   | Midwest    | Midwest     | Midwest     |
|   | Total                             | 59,668,632 | 65,481,140  | 64,140,232  |
|   | White                             | 52,017,957 | 53,082,973  | 53,105,936  |
|   | Black                             | 5,715,940  | 6,741,643   | 6,419,814   |
|   | Latino                            | 1,726,509  | 3,347,133   | 3,756,348   |
|   | American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut | 337,899    | 648,284     | 377,347     |
|   | Asian or Pacific Islander         | 768,069    | 1,416,217   | 1,463,273   |
|   | Other race                        | 828,767    | 244,890     | 1,800,989   |
|   |                                   |            |             |             |
| <b>South</b>  |                                   | South      | South       | South       |
|   | Total                             | 85,445,930 | 102,195,495 | 104,558,812 |
|   | White                             | 65,582,199 | 66,912,739  | 75,389,361  |
|   | Black                             | 15,828,888 | 19,229,677  | 19,543,176  |
|   | Latino                            | 6,767,021  | 12,199,837  | 14,334,439  |
|   | American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut | 562,731    | 1,114,726   | 717,547     |
|   | Asian or Pacific Islander         | 1,122,248  | 2,304,143   | 2,483,539   |
|   | Other race                        | 2,349,864  | 434,373     | 4,697,606   |
|   |                                   |            |             |             |
| <b>West</b>   |                                   | West       | West        | West        |
|   | Total                             | 52,786,082 | 66,190,112  | 66,754,522  |
|   | White                             | 40,017,010 | 38,292,405  | 46,437,548  |
|   | Black                             | 2,828,010  | 1,395,689   | 3,055,131   |
|   | Latino                            | 10,106,140 | 16,435,260  | 17,938,975  |
|   | American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut | 933,456    | 1,395,689   | 1,118,990   |
|   | Asian or Pacific Islander         | 4,047,970  | 6,231,706   | 5,922,975   |
|   | Other race                        | 4,959,636  | 546,720     | 7,716,608   |
|   |                                   |            |             |             |
| Source: 1990 and 2000 Data, US Census; 2005 American Community Survey |                                   |            |             |             |

Figure 3: Race in the South, 1990-2005



Source: 1990 and 2000 Data, US Census; 2005 Data, American Community Survey

Table 5: Race in the South, By State, 1990-2005

| Racial Composition in the South, by State, 1990-2005 |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
|--|---------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------|--------|
| Year   | Alabama | Florida | Georgia | Kentucky | Louisiana | Mississippi | North Carolina | South Carolina | Tennessee | Texas  |
| 1990   |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
| White Total %  | 73.65%  | 83.08%  | 71.01%  | 92.04%   | 67.28%    | 63.48%      | 75.56%         | 69.03%         | 83.00%    | 75.21% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 0.61%   | 12.17%  | 1.68%   | 0.60%    | 2.20%     | 0.62%       | 1.16%          | 0.88%          | 0.67%     | 25.55% |
| Black Total %  | 25.26%  | 13.60%  | 26.96%  | 7.13%    | 30.79%    | 35.56%      | 21.97%         | 29.82%         | 15.95%    | 11.90% |
| 2000   |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
| White Total %  | 70.29%  | 64.78%  | 62.50%  | 89.11%   | 62.50%    | 60.75%      | 69.96%         | 66.06%         | 79.10%    | 52.00% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 1.81%   | 17.27%  | 5.58%   | 1.59%    | 2.60%     | 1.49%       | 4.95%          | 2.52%          | 2.31%     | 32.55% |
| Black Total %  | 25.86%  | 14.50%  | 28.51%  | 7.55%    | 32.24%    | 36.13%      | 21.53%         | 29.41%         | 16.45%    | 11.36% |
| 2005   |         |         |         |          |           |             |                |                |           |        |
| White Total %  | 70.99%  | 76.75%  | 62.54%  | 89.85%   | 63.68%    | 60.78%      | 71.40%         | 67.44%         | 79.61%    | 71.94% |
| Latino Total %                                       | 2.23%   | 19.64%  | 7.09%   | 1.72%    | 2.80%     | N/A         | 6.34%          | 3.28%          | 2.97%     | 35.49% |
| Black Total %  | 25.76%  | 15.04%  | 29.15%  | 7.19%    | 32.48%    | 36.47%      | 20.99%         | 28.55%         | 16.42%    | 10.97% |


Source: 1990 and 2000 Data, US Census; 2005 Data, American Community Survey

Table 7: Union Membership in the South, by State, 2006

| Union Membership in the South, by State, 2006 |                     |              |                  |                |                |            |             |
|---|---------------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------|-------------|
| State   | Sector              | Obs          | Employment       | Members        | Covered        | %Mem       | %Cov        |
| <b>Alabama</b>                                | <b>Total</b>        | <b>1,903</b> | <b>1,930,249</b> | <b>170,113</b> | <b>193,988</b> | <b>8.8</b> | <b>10.0</b> |
| Alabama                                       | Private             | 1,572        | 1,598,093        | 74,085         | 84,733         | 4.6        | 5.3         |
| Alabama                                       | Public              | 331          | 332,156          | 96,028         | 109,255        | 28.9       | 32.9        |
| Alabama                                       | Priv. Construction  | 127          | 137,685          | 4,225          | 6,118          | 3.1        | 4.4         |
| Alabama                                       | Priv. Manufacturing | 331          | 333,373          | 29,133         | 30,921         | 8.7        | 9.3         |
| <b>Florida</b>                                | <b>Total</b>        | <b>7,303</b> | <b>7,675,747</b> | <b>396,958</b> | <b>497,350</b> | <b>5.2</b> | <b>6.5</b>  |
| Florida                                       | Private             | 6,276        | 6,601,617        | 154,150        | 195,509        | 2.3        | 3.0         |
| Florida                                       | Public              | 1,027        | 1,074,130        | 242,807        | 301,841        | 22.6       | 28.1        |
| Florida                                       | Priv. Construction  | 656          | 693,484          | 21,783         | 24,044         | 3.1        | 3.5         |
| Florida                                       | Priv. Manufacturing | 466          | 488,743          | 11,818         | 16,903         | 2.4        | 3.5         |
| <b>Georgia</b>                                | <b>Total</b>        | <b>3,802</b> | <b>3,973,751</b> | <b>175,802</b> | <b>229,688</b> | <b>4.4</b> | <b>5.8</b>  |
| Georgia                                       | Private             | 3,171        | 3,325,181        | 113,806        | 141,743        | 3.4        | 4.3         |
| Georgia                                       | Public              | 631          | 648,570          | 61,996         | 87,945         | 9.6        | 13.6        |
| Georgia                                       | Priv. Construction  | 268          | 286,866          | 11,965         | 11,965         | 4.2        | 4.2         |
| Georgia                                       | Priv. Manufacturing | 482          | 496,978          | 32,266         | 40,746         | 6.5        | 8.2         |
| <b>Kentucky</b>                               | <b>Total</b>        | <b>2,479</b> | <b>1,752,214</b> | <b>172,106</b> | <b>196,338</b> | <b>9.8</b> | <b>11.2</b> |
| Kentucky                                      | Private             | 2,042        | 1,446,092        | 122,219        | 133,924        | 8.5        | 9.3         |
| Kentucky                                      | Public              | 437          | 306,122          | 49,887         | 62,414         | 16.3       | 20.4        |
| Kentucky                                      | Priv. Construction  | 136          | 99,534           | 10,560         | 11,810         | 10.6       | 11.9        |
| Kentucky                                      | Priv. Manufacturing | 368          | 262,427          | 40,188         | 42,683         | 15.3       | 16.3        |
| <b>Louisiana</b>                              | <b>Total</b>        | <b>1,541</b> | <b>1,676,436</b> | <b>107,008</b> | <b>121,163</b> | <b>6.4</b> | <b>7.2</b>  |
| Louisiana                                     | Private             | 1,283        | 1,409,658        | 65,575         | 74,068         | 4.7        | 5.3         |
| Louisiana                                     | Public              | 258          | 266,778          | 41,432         | 47,095         | 15.5       | 17.7        |
| Louisiana                                     | Priv. Construction  | 123          | 140,306          | 10,388         | 11,364         | 7.4        | 8.1         |
| Louisiana                                     | Priv. Manufacturing | 148          | 167,572          | 31,003         | 33,472         | 18.5       | 20.0        |
| <b>Mississippi</b>                            | <b>Total</b>        | <b>1,428</b> | <b>1,064,772</b> | <b>60,044</b>  | <b>77,593</b>  | <b>5.6</b> | <b>7.3</b>  |
| Mississippi                                   | Private             | 1,144        | 857,930          | 34,890         | 42,852         | 4.1        | 5.0         |
| Mississippi                                   | Public              | 284          | 206,841          | 25,155         | 34,741         | 12.2       | 16.8        |
| Mississippi                                   | Priv. Construction  | 77           | 59,431           | 1,875          | 1,875          | 3.2        | 3.2         |
| Mississippi                                   | Priv. Manufacturing | 268          | 202,730          | 17,014         | 22,788         | 8.4        | 11.2        |
| <b>North Carol</b>                            | <b>Total</b>        | <b>3,530</b> | <b>3,809,761</b> | <b>125,627</b> | <b>155,114</b> | <b>3.3</b> | <b>4.1</b>  |
| North Carol                                   | Private             | 2,938        | 3,180,923        | 57,781         | 71,513         | 1.8        | 2.2         |
| North Carol                                   | Public              | 592          | 628,837          | 67,846         | 83,601         | 10.8       | 13.3        |
| North Carol                                   | Priv. Construction  | 281          | 310,313          | 2,855          | 2,855          | 0.9        | 0.9         |
| North Carol                                   | Priv. Manufacturing | 539          | 574,428          | 17,761         | 22,936         | 3.1        | 4.0         |
| <b>South Car</b>                              | <b>Total</b>        | <b>2,232</b> | <b>1,775,394</b> | <b>58,655</b>  | <b>74,288</b>  | <b>3.3</b> | <b>4.2</b>  |
| South Carol                                   | Private             | 1,816        | 1,449,420        | 31,842         | 33,216         | 2.2        | 2.3         |
| South Carol                                   | Public              | 416          | 325,975          | 26,813         | 41,072         | 8.2        | 12.6        |
| South Carol                                   | Priv. Construction  | 159          | 134,372          | 3,662          | 3,662          | 2.7        | 2.7         |
| South Carol                                   | Priv. Manufacturing | 384          | 303,059          | 8,540          | 9,226          | 2.8        | 3.0         |
| <b>Tennessee</b>                              | <b>Total</b>        | <b>2,392</b> | <b>2,549,584</b> | <b>152,962</b> | <b>174,002</b> | <b>6.0</b> | <b>6.8</b>  |
| Tennessee                                     | Private             | 2,024        | 2,156,099        | 67,418         | 76,198         | 3.1        | 3.5         |
| Tennessee                                     | Public              | 368          | 393,485          | 85,545         | 97,804         | 21.7       | 24.9        |
| Tennessee                                     | Priv. Construction  | 180          | 189,906          | 2,942          | 2,942          | 1.5        | 1.5         |
| Tennessee                                     | Priv. Manufacturing | 379          | 396,452          | 32,618         | 35,271         | 8.2        | 8.9         |
| <b>Texas</b>                                  | <b>Total</b>        | <b>8,785</b> | <b>9,750,865</b> | <b>476,209</b> | <b>575,809</b> | <b>4.9</b> | <b>5.9</b>  |
| Texas   | Private             | 7,320        | 8,166,978        | 230,574        | 264,971        | 2.8        | 3.2         |
| Texas   | Public              | 1,465        | 1,583,887        | 245,634        | 310,838        | 15.5       | 19.6        |
| Texas   | Priv. Construction  | 683          | 778,026          | 14,710         | 15,756         | 1.9        | 2.0         |
| Texas   | Priv. Manufacturing | 915          | 1,031,799        | 61,010         | 66,946         | 5.9        | 6.5         |

Union Membership and Coverage Database. Compiled by Hirsch, Barry T. and Macpherson, David A. <http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats/>

Figure 5: Union Membership in the South, 2006 back to 1964



Union Membership and Coverage Database. Compiled by Hirsch, Barry T. and Macpherson, David A. <http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats/>



Table 9: Race in the Atlanta MSA, By County, 2000

| ATLANTA MSA              | Region  | Total   | Latino | White   | Black   | Native | Asian  | Hawa/<br>Paci | Other |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|--------|---------------|-------|
| Clayton County, Georgia  | Atlanta | 236517  | 17728  | 82637   | 120816  | 545    | 10562  | 126           | 513   |
| Cobb County, Georgia     | Atlanta | 607751  | 46964  | 417947  | 112924  | 1156   | 18417  | 192           | 1706  |
| DeKalb County, Georgia   | Atlanta | 665865  | 52542  | 214685  | 358381  | 964    | 26483  | 256           | 1674  |
| Douglas County, Georgia  | Atlanta | 92174   | 2640   | 69965   | 16978   | 272    | 1075   | 17            | 107   |
| Fayette County, Georgia  | Atlanta | 91263   | 2582   | 74820   | 10383   | 173    | 2183   | 21            | 133   |
| Forsyth County, Georgia  | Atlanta | 98407   | 5477   | 90820   | 426     | 200    | 771    | 10            | 50    |
| Fulton County, Georgia   | Atlanta | 816006  | 48056  | 369997  | 361018  | 1148   | 24635  | 261           | 1599  |
| Gwinnett County, Georgia | Atlanta | 588448  | 64137  | 394164  | 76837   | 1057   | 42180  | 211           | 1099  |
| Henry County, Georgia    | Atlanta | 119341  | 2692   | 95550   | 17435   | 245    | 2062   | 45            | 162   |
| Newton County, Georgia   | Atlanta | 62001   | 1157   | 46007   | 13690   | 131    | 444    | 9             | 70    |
| Rockdale County, Georgia | Atlanta | 70111   | 4182   | 50967   | 12670   | 166    | 1339   | 36            | 100   |
| Spalding County, Georgia | Atlanta | 58417   | 947    | 38435   | 18076   | 121    | 388    | 10            | 39    |
| Walton County, Georgia   | Atlanta | 60687   | 1163   | 49731   | 8703    | 145    | 410    | 10            | 25    |
| Total Atlanta MSA        |         | 3566988 | 250267 | 1995725 | 1128337 | 6323   | 130949 | 1204          | 7277  |
| County Average, MSA      |         |         | 7.0%   | 55.9%   | 31.6%   | 0.2%   | 3.7%   | 0.0%          | 0.2%  |

U.S. Census, 2000

Table 10: Race in Central Georgia, By County, 2000

| CENTRAL GEORGIA               | Region  | Total   | Latino | White   | Black  | Native | Asian | Hawa/<br>Paci | Other |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Baldwin County, Georgia       | Central | 44700   | 607    | 23920   | 19324  | 79     | 442   | 3             | 37    |
| Bibb County, Georgia          | Central | 153887  | 2023   | 76262   | 72503  | 255    | 1632  | 35            | 92    |
| Burke County, Georgia         | Central | 22243   | 316    | 10336   | 11285  | 49     | 51    | 3             | 12    |
| Butts County, Georgia         | Central | 19522   | 277    | 13366   | 5601   | 72     | 50    | 4             | 6     |
| Carroll County, Georgia       | Central | 87268   | 2243   | 69258   | 14177  | 206    | 532   | 16            | 111   |
| Chattahoochee County, Georgia | Central | 14882   | 1551   | 8181    | 4353   | 101    | 249   | 62            | 33    |
| Clarke County, Georgia        | Central | 101489  | 6436   | 62895   | 27496  | 164    | 3162  | 41            | 172   |
| Columbia County, Georgia      | Central | 89288   | 2313   | 72438   | 9917   | 262    | 2985  | 71            | 140   |
| Coweta County, Georgia        | Central | 89215   | 2797   | 68867   | 15935  | 183    | 608   | 13            | 78    |
| Crawford County, Georgia      | Central | 12495   | 301    | 9037    | 2970   | 39     | 21    | 2             | 19    |
| Emanuel County, Georgia       | Central | 21837   | 745    | 13663   | 7253   | 27     | 44    | 1             | 12    |
| Glascock County, Georgia      | Central | 2556    | 12     | 2309    | 212    | 6      | 0     | 0             | 0     |
| Greene County, Georgia        | Central | 14406   | 420    | 7481    | 6356   | 32     | 36    | 9             | 15    |
| Hancock County, Georgia       | Central | 10076   | 54     | 2141    | 7820   | 16     | 9     | 0             | 2     |
| Harris County, Georgia        | Central | 23695   | 260    | 18444   | 4597   | 82     | 118   | 4             | 5     |
| Heard County, Georgia         | Central | 11012   | 116    | 9580    | 1181   | 34     | 11    | 7             | 18    |
| Houston County, Georgia       | Central | 110765  | 3363   | 76391   | 27181  | 352    | 1727  | 67            | 174   |
| Jasper County, Georgia        | Central | 11426   | 236    | 7964    | 3096   | 24     | 18    | 1             | 17    |
| Jefferson County, Georgia     | Central | 17266   | 259    | 7215    | 9663   | 21     | 27    | 1             | 16    |
| Jenkins County, Georgia       | Central | 8575    | 287    | 4766    | 3437   | 10     | 18    | 4             | 4     |
| Johnson County, Georgia       | Central | 8560    | 78     | 5307    | 3131   | 11     | 10    | 1             | 1     |
| Jones County, Georgia         | Central | 23639   | 169    | 17649   | 5490   | 39     | 125   | 4             | 14    |
| Lamar County, Georgia         | Central | 15912   | 172    | 10683   | 4806   | 42     | 59    | 1             | 14    |
| Laurens County, Georgia       | Central | 44874   | 529    | 28199   | 15417  | 80     | 361   | 12            | 44    |
| Lincoln County, Georgia       | Central | 8348    | 81     | 5321    | 2857   | 30     | 7     | 4             | 3     |
| Macon County, Georgia         | Central | 14074   | 364    | 5184    | 8337   | 26     | 82    | 0             | 9     |
| Marion County, Georgia        | Central | 7144    | 413    | 4182    | 2410   | 22     | 7     | 7             | 18    |
| McDuffie County, Georgia      | Central | 21231   | 284    | 12795   | 7909   | 38     | 68    | 7             | 3     |
| Meriwether County, Georgia    | Central | 22534   | 191    | 12579   | 9467   | 71     | 52    | 11            | 15    |
| Monroe County, Georgia        | Central | 21757   | 281    | 15150   | 6015   | 67     | 74    | 6             | 6     |
| Morgan County, Georgia        | Central | 15457   | 248    | 10619   | 4385   | 21     | 51    | 1             | 12    |
| Muscogee County, Georgia      | Central | 186291  | 8372   | 90668   | 80720  | 618    | 2789  | 249           | 297   |
| Oconee County, Georgia        | Central | 26225   | 833    | 23112   | 1653   | 40     | 373   | 11            | 14    |
| Oglethorpe County, Georgia    | Central | 12635   | 174    | 9817    | 2476   | 22     | 30    | 5             | 9     |
| Peach County, Georgia         | Central | 23668   | 998    | 11654   | 10682  | 66     | 77    | 8             | 21    |
| Pike County, Georgia          | Central | 13688   | 167    | 11350   | 2019   | 29     | 51    | 0             | 3     |
| Putnam County, Georgia        | Central | 18812   | 407    | 12471   | 5603   | 36     | 125   | 8             | 13    |
| Richmond County, Georgia      | Central | 199775  | 5545   | 88660   | 98584  | 506    | 2949  | 228           | 361   |
| Schley County, Georgia        | Central | 3766    | 89     | 2462    | 1169   | 8      | 3     | 0             | 0     |
| Talbot County, Georgia        | Central | 6498    | 82     | 2354    | 3974   | 14     | 18    | 1             | 3     |
| Taliaferro County, Georgia    | Central | 2077    | 19     | 787     | 1251   | 1      | 1     | 0             | 6     |
| Taylor County, Georgia        | Central | 8815    | 163    | 4847    | 3736   | 9      | 16    | 0             | 1     |
| Treutlen County, Georgia      | Central | 6854    | 79     | 4463    | 2253   | 4      | 18    | 0             | 4     |
| Troup County, Georgia         | Central | 58779   | 1004   | 38261   | 18650  | 84     | 340   | 10            | 55    |
| Twiggs County, Georgia        | Central | 10590   | 112    | 5784    | 4589   | 21     | 11    | 3             | 2     |
| Upson County, Georgia         | Central | 27597   | 327    | 19271   | 7675   | 67     | 102   | 6             | 11    |
| Warren County, Georgia        | Central | 6336    | 51     | 2483    | 3755   | 11     | 8     | 0             | 0     |
| Washington County, Georgia    | Central | 21176   | 134    | 9620    | 11233  | 35     | 55    | 2             | 11    |
| Wilkes County, Georgia        | Central | 10687   | 212    | 5758    | 4591   | 20     | 25    | 4             | 2     |
| Wilkinson County, Georgia     | Central | 10220   | 101    | 5893    | 4153   | 20     | 7     | 0             | 2     |
| Total Central                 |         | 1724622 | 46295  | 1041897 | 593347 | 4072   | 19634 | 933           | 1917  |
| Central County Average        |         |         | 2.7%   | 60.4%   | 34.4%  | 0.2%   | 1.1%  | 0.1%          | 0.1%  |

U.S. Census, 2000

Table 11: Race in North Georgia, By County, 2000

| NORTH GEORGIA             | Region | Total   | Latino | White   | Black | Native | Asian | Hawa/<br>Paci | Other |
|---------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Banks County, Georgia     | North  | 14422   | 493    | 13256   | 459   | 38     | 87    | 8             | 3     |
| Barrow County, Georgia    | North  | 46144   | 1460   | 38543   | 4456  | 119    | 1000  | 15            | 27    |
| Bartow County, Georgia    | North  | 76019   | 2524   | 65644   | 6558  | 192    | 381   | 20            | 59    |
| Catoosa County, Georgia   | North  | 53282   | 621    | 51013   | 661   | 159    | 370   | 10            | 15    |
| Chattooga County, Georgia | North  | 25470   | 537    | 21776   | 2840  | 19     | 25    | 4             | 35    |
| Cherokee County, Georgia  | North  | 141903  | 7695   | 127618  | 3483  | 420    | 1127  | 32            | 123   |
| Dade County, Georgia      | North  | 15154   | 137    | 14685   | 96    | 67     | 56    | 4             | 1     |
| Dawson County, Georgia    | North  | 15999   | 254    | 15429   | 57    | 57     | 51    | 5             | 6     |
| Elbert County, Georgia    | North  | 20511   | 489    | 13505   | 6305  | 39     | 50    | 6             | 6     |
| Fannin County, Georgia    | North  | 19798   | 130    | 19312   | 22    | 88     | 47    | 1             | 1     |
| Floyd County, Georgia     | North  | 90565   | 4983   | 71674   | 11984 | 204    | 834   | 43            | 63    |
| Franklin County, Georgia  | North  | 20285   | 187    | 18064   | 1786  | 35     | 50    | 2             | 11    |
| Gilmer County, Georgia    | North  | 23456   | 1815   | 21287   | 51    | 81     | 35    | 18            | 3     |
| Gordon County, Georgia    | North  | 44104   | 3268   | 38642   | 1511  | 90     | 225   | 11            | 23    |
| Habersham County, Georgia | North  | 35902   | 2750   | 30486   | 1551  | 89     | 664   | 30            | 5     |
| Hall County, Georgia      | North  | 139277  | 27242  | 98942   | 9900  | 331    | 1820  | 29            | 80    |
| Haralson County, Georgia  | North  | 25690   | 143    | 23799   | 1387  | 62     | 84    | 1             | 18    |
| Hart County, Georgia      | North  | 22997   | 196    | 18087   | 4430  | 34     | 122   | 1             | 9     |
| Jackson County, Georgia   | North  | 41589   | 1249   | 36314   | 3197  | 72     | 397   | 1             | 14    |
| Lumpkin County, Georgia   | North  | 21016   | 728    | 19381   | 306   | 198    | 75    | 14            | 16    |
| Madison County, Georgia   | North  | 25730   | 507    | 22713   | 2165  | 44     | 70    | 6             | 28    |
| Murray County, Georgia    | North  | 36506   | 2006   | 33890   | 191   | 94     | 89    | 4             | 3     |
| Paulding County, Georgia  | North  | 81678   | 1398   | 73188   | 5634  | 212    | 324   | 22            | 84    |
| Pickens County, Georgia   | North  | 22983   | 467    | 21897   | 292   | 84     | 52    | 6             | 12    |
| Polk County, Georgia      | North  | 38127   | 2921   | 29684   | 5073  | 68     | 118   | 7             | 27    |
| Rabun County, Georgia     | North  | 15050   | 683    | 14023   | 118   | 50     | 57    | 0             | 5     |
| Stephens County, Georgia  | North  | 25435   | 250    | 21673   | 3029  | 62     | 145   | 19            | 26    |
| Towns County, Georgia     | North  | 9319    | 67     | 9159    | 12    | 14     | 29    | 0             | 1     |
| Union County, Georgia     | North  | 17289   | 153    | 16837   | 94    | 41     | 40    | 3             | 3     |
| Walker County, Georgia    | North  | 61053   | 565    | 57336   | 2300  | 172    | 165   | 13            | 48    |
| White County, Georgia     | North  | 19944   | 311    | 18804   | 432   | 80     | 95    | 18            | 6     |
| Whitfield County, Georgia | North  | 83525   | 18419  | 60338   | 3066  | 181    | 736   | 25            | 82    |
| Total North               |        | 1330222 | 84648  | 1136999 | 83446 | 3496   | 9420  | 378           | 843   |
| Northern County Average   |        |         | 6.4%   | 85.5%   | 6.3%  | 0.3%   | 0.7%  | 0.0%          | 0.1%  |

US Census 2000

Table 12: Race in South Georgia, By County, 2000

| SOUTH GEORGIA              | Region | Total   | Latino | White  | Black  | Native | Asian | Hawa/<br>Paci | Other |
|----------------------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Appling County, Georgia    | South  | 17419   | 792    | 13053  | 3398   | 28     | 51    | 1             | 4     |
| Atkinson County, Georgia   | South  | 7609    | 1290   | 4760   | 1477   | 23     | 9     | 0             | 3     |
| Bacon County, Georgia      | South  | 10103   | 342    | 8068   | 1562   | 14     | 28    | 0             | 7     |
| Baker County, Georgia      | South  | 4074    | 111    | 1889   | 2038   | 9      | 0     | 1             | 2     |
| Ben Hill County, Georgia   | South  | 17484   | 800    | 10818  | 5673   | 31     | 49    | 0             | 5     |
| Berrien County, Georgia    | South  | 16235   | 384    | 13761  | 1843   | 42     | 47    | 13            | 14    |
| Bleckley County, Georgia   | South  | 11666   | 107    | 8505   | 2865   | 11     | 102   | 3             | 7     |
| Brantley County, Georgia   | South  | 14629   | 152    | 13712  | 579    | 20     | 13    | 1             | 3     |
| Brooks County, Georgia     | South  | 16450   | 505    | 9303   | 6429   | 35     | 38    | 1             | 8     |
| Bryan County, Georgia      | South  | 23417   | 465    | 19138  | 3272   | 69     | 174   | 16            | 22    |
| Bulloch County, Georgia    | South  | 55983   | 1052   | 37998  | 16000  | 60     | 456   | 15            | 47    |
| Calhoun County, Georgia    | South  | 6320    | 189    | 2388   | 3726   | 9      | 4     | 0             | 0     |
| Camden County, Georgia     | South  | 43664   | 1585   | 31975  | 8719   | 195    | 429   | 32            | 70    |
| Candler County, Georgia    | South  | 9577    | 882    | 6028   | 2576   | 12     | 26    | 3             | 2     |
| Charlton County, Georgia   | South  | 10282   | 81     | 7014   | 2990   | 39     | 35    | 6             | 3     |
| Chatham County, Georgia    | South  | 232048  | 5403   | 125802 | 93463  | 517    | 3992  | 128           | 311   |
| Clay County, Georgia       | South  | 3357    | 32     | 1282   | 2009   | 4      | 9     | 1             | 0     |
| Clinch County, Georgia     | South  | 6878    | 54     | 4713   | 2019   | 27     | 8     | 0             | 3     |
| Coffee County, Georgia     | South  | 37413   | 2550   | 24701  | 9629   | 98     | 204   | 9             | 14    |
| Colquitt County, Georgia   | South  | 42053   | 4554   | 27252  | 9812   | 77     | 89    | 8             | 19    |
| Cook County, Georgia       | South  | 15771   | 485    | 10526  | 4565   | 24     | 62    | 5             | 3     |
| Crisp County, Georgia      | South  | 21996   | 382    | 11778  | 9511   | 28     | 148   | 7             | 17    |
| Decatur County, Georgia    | South  | 28240   | 905    | 15800  | 11227  | 59     | 86    | 4             | 3     |
| Dodge County, Georgia      | South  | 19171   | 248    | 13142  | 5623   | 34     | 42    | 4             | 6     |
| Dooly County, Georgia      | South  | 11525   | 537    | 5161   | 5679   | 17     | 49    | 11            | 5     |
| Dougherty County, Georgia  | South  | 96065   | 1292   | 35794  | 57521  | 192    | 544   | 25            | 74    |
| Early County, Georgia      | South  | 12354   | 152    | 6159   | 5901   | 23     | 23    | 7             | 5     |
| Echols County, Georgia     | South  | 3754    | 739    | 2688   | 252    | 43     | 3     | 0             | 1     |
| Effingham County, Georgia  | South  | 37535   | 531    | 31493  | 4853   | 112    | 168   | 9             | 30    |
| Evans County, Georgia      | South  | 10495   | 625    | 6333   | 3439   | 9      | 32    | 0             | 6     |
| Glynn County, Georgia      | South  | 67568   | 2019   | 46566  | 17711  | 155    | 406   | 32            | 56    |
| Grady County, Georgia      | South  | 23659   | 1222   | 14954  | 7074   | 185    | 72    | 1             | 5     |
| Irwin County, Georgia      | South  | 9931    | 202    | 7102   | 2555   | 6      | 32    | 1             | 2     |
| Jeff Davis County, Georgia | South  | 12684   | 651    | 9992   | 1904   | 23     | 56    | 0             | 6     |
| Lanier County, Georgia     | South  | 7241    | 126    | 5122   | 1845   | 35     | 26    | 3             | 6     |
| Lee County, Georgia        | South  | 24757   | 300    | 20203  | 3823   | 60     | 208   | 3             | 11    |
| Liberty County, Georgia    | South  | 61610   | 5022   | 27244  | 26025  | 279    | 1053  | 254           | 199   |
| Long County, Georgia       | South  | 10304   | 870    | 6678   | 2429   | 63     | 58    | 25            | 16    |
| Lowndes County, Georgia    | South  | 92115   | 2447   | 55992  | 31128  | 305    | 1081  | 37            | 104   |
| McIntosh County, Georgia   | South  | 10847   | 99     | 6607   | 3971   | 40     | 32    | 3             | 3     |
| Miller County, Georgia     | South  | 6383    | 44     | 4456   | 1845   | 11     | 2     | 5             | 0     |
| Mitchell County, Georgia   | South  | 23932   | 491    | 11746  | 11423  | 41     | 61    | 8             | 8     |
| Montgomery County, Georgia | South  | 8270    | 271    | 5684   | 2251   | 6      | 16    | 2             | 3     |
| Pierce County, Georgia     | South  | 15636   | 357    | 13425  | 1691   | 34     | 25    | 8             | 5     |
| Pulaski County, Georgia    | South  | 9588    | 270    | 5932   | 3249   | 21     | 32    | 12            | 4     |
| Quitman County, Georgia    | South  | 2598    | 13     | 1351   | 1213   | 5      | 1     | 0             | 1     |
| Randolph County, Georgia   | South  | 7791    | 92     | 3016   | 4609   | 27     | 12    | 9             | 4     |
| Screven County, Georgia    | South  | 15374   | 147    | 8182   | 6923   | 19     | 40    | 1             | 4     |
| Seminole County, Georgia   | South  | 9369    | 347    | 5734   | 3224   | 15     | 17    | 0             | 0     |
| Stewart County, Georgia    | South  | 5252    | 79     | 1926   | 3201   | 12     | 9     | 0             | 0     |
| Sumter County, Georgia     | South  | 33200   | 891    | 15672  | 16196  | 73     | 193   | 6             | 10    |
| Tattnall County, Georgia   | South  | 22305   | 1883   | 13218  | 6988   | 24     | 64    | 4             | 8     |
| Telfair County, Georgia    | South  | 11794   | 215    | 6993   | 4515   | 3      | 23    | 0             | 3     |
| Terrell County, Georgia    | South  | 10970   | 136    | 4101   | 6614   | 22     | 31    | 3             | 4     |
| Thomas County, Georgia     | South  | 42737   | 734    | 24875  | 16497  | 116    | 172   | 14            | 26    |
| Tift County, Georgia       | South  | 38407   | 2944   | 24092  | 10695  | 66     | 372   | 8             | 5     |
| Toombs County, Georgia     | South  | 26067   | 2310   | 17226  | 6237   | 44     | 119   | 0             | 5     |
| Turner County, Georgia     | South  | 9504    | 244    | 5315   | 3868   | 14     | 31    | 0             | 3     |
| Ware County, Georgia       | South  | 35483   | 688    | 24434  | 9907   | 62     | 166   | 11            | 23    |
| Wayne County, Georgia      | South  | 26565   | 1013   | 19838  | 5333   | 58     | 114   | 0             | 8     |
| Webster County, Georgia    | South  | 2390    | 66     | 1186   | 1123   | 2      | 0     | 0             | 0     |
| Wheeler County, Georgia    | South  | 6179    | 219    | 3866   | 2045   | 7      | 5     | 0             | 4     |
| Wilcox County, Georgia     | South  | 8577    | 139    | 5299   | 3091   | 8      | 14    | 1             | 0     |
| Worth County, Georgia      | South  | 21967   | 240    | 14999  | 6482   | 77     | 47    | 2             | 8     |
| Total South                |        | 1564621 | 54017  | 954040 | 526335 | 3779   | 11510 | 763           | 1238  |
| Southern County Average    |        |         | 3.5%   | 61.0%  | 33.6%  | 0.2%   | 0.7%  | 0.0%          | 0.1%  |

US Census 2000