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INTRODUCTION: Throughout the western hemisphere, the period between 1740 and about 1840 represented a new phase in the history of imperialism. It was, perhaps, the most important century in the history of the Americas. Colonial societies everywhere started to manifest some profound differences between themselves and their metropolises, to give themselves some form of identity.¹ This identity might have been, in the words of Max Savelle, the germinating seeds of a form of nationalism, although the concept of the national state more properly belongs to the nineteenth century.² Beginning with the British military surrender at Yorktown in Tidewater, Virginia, in the fall of 1781, and continuing after the main Spanish royalists reluctantly laid down their arms at Ayacucho high in the cold and windswept Peruvian Andes in 1824, groups of Americans began to carve out political states from once far-flung, universal empires. These new states did not immediately constitute nations, but they formed the geographical preconditions for the intensification and cultivation of the identities and sensibilities which would, sometime during the nineteenth century, develop into a full-fledged nationalism.³ In any case, it seems important to understand and separate the essentially political and military activities of state formation from the emergence of the complex sentiments associated with the development of nationalism.

Such clarification between the goal of creating a state and the goal of establishing the nation is essential in understanding the nature of Cuban nationalism and the manifest reluctance to create a political state. The origins of Cuban nationalism can be traced alongside its parallel mainland manifestations during the eighteenth century. Similar economic interests, similar political sensibilities, and similar geographical self-consciousness to other elites such as those found in Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Williamsburg, Mexico City, or Quito—existed in Havana or Santiago de Cuba. Yet Cubans—or more precisely, the dominant class of Cubans—refused to opt for state formation when their colonial Hispanic brethren on the

mainland established a number of independent states during the first decades of the nineteenth century.

The rush to create new polities and the development of a type of political discourse involving the nature of the state and the legitimacy of the new governments blurred the essential difference between state formation and national consciousness-raising during the nineteenth century. In Latin American history, that too is a very important century, because it signified the break-up of the Spanish American Empire.⁴ The political consequences of this essentially political disintegration denoted an overt manifestation of state formation and its corollary, the rise of nationalism. Throughout the nineteenth century, then, one distinguishes the shattering and reforming of political states masking a strong tendency toward localization, Creolization, and Americanization of the previous colonial societies.⁵ The process appears quite clearly in the case of Cuba during the nineteenth century.⁶

In Latin American historiography both the language and the ideas of artificial state formation and the sense of nationalism appear to belong to the nineteenth century, where a long tradition of scholarship and *pensador* reflections have bounded it with the three great revolutions—the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution—the French invasion of Spain, and the intellectual restlessness caught up in the multiple *-isms* of the nineteenth century: in conservatism, liberalism, Comtian positivism, social Darwinism, anarchism, and Marxism. Indeed, this intellectual restlessness coincides with the rise of nationalism in Europe, and the articulation of a set of ideas that linked nationalism to the subordination of the individual to a political state—a state that incorporated four unities: religion, language, history, and culture.⁷ But however nationalism was examined, it was tied inextricably to political independence and self-determination.⁸ Nationalism constituted a self-aware community seeking its geographical territory—presumably one to which it had some prior claim.

But this relationship of nationalism and political independence simply could not be reconciled with the case of Cuba—as indeed, it could not be reconciled in the case of any of the emergent American states. Cuba of the nineteenth century demonstrated no overriding unities, and no irresistible will to forge its own political state before 1868.

Within the context of Spanish American political decolonization, Cuba was a rather late participant, only breaking free from the empire in 1898. Indeed, the

nationalist struggle—in the sense of a separatist civil war—did not begin in Cuba until 1868 as a peripheral offshoot of the Glorious Revolution in Spain.⁹ That was the Ten Years' War, which began with the famous *Grito de Yara* on October 10, 1868, on the middle-sized sugar estate of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes (1819–1874), *La Demajagua*, in Manzanillo, of what was then called Oriente province. The Ten Years' War petered out with the Pact of Zanjón in 1878, but was followed by a short, sporadic, futile military engagement, called *La Guerra Chiquita*, in late 1878–79. While threats and pronouncements were made in the following years, it was not until the Cuba-Spanish-American War of 1895–98 that Spain lost its last American colonies, and Cuba gained a sort of political independence.¹⁰

It was quite clear that political independence had to be separated from the question of nationalism to understand better the nature of Latin American nationalism. Moreover, only by doing so will it be possible to trace the origin of Cuban nationalism, and, by extension, all the other manifestations of nationalism in the Americas.¹¹

In 1750 the great, significant transformation of the Cuban society had not yet occurred. Politically, economically, and socially, the Cuban society was a colonial and dependent society, although undergoing some increased pace of change, and on the verge of the radical transformations associated with the capture of Havana by the English in 1762, and the extensive reforms of Charles III, beginning in 1764.¹² By 1840 the society had achieved a high degree of economic autonomy, self-consciousness, and political importance far beyond its geographical size. By 1840 Cubans of all sorts were articulating ideas about the future of their society and their culture.¹³ Above all, by 1840 the railroad was already introduced into Cuba—the first state in Latin America to have a railroad, and more than a decade before the first Spanish railroad from Madrid to Aranjuez operated.

This study has two objectives. First, it traces the extent of personal wealth in Cuba, and examines the web interconnecting wealth, political power, and the sense of nationalism that developed in Cuba during the early nineteenth century, and eventually manifested its political denouement between 1868 and 1898. This is really an examination of the way in which the great families accumulated and retained their wealth.

Second, it is necessary to trace the developments in local society and culture, as well as examine the changing political and economic relationship between the Spanish metropolis and its Caribbean colony during the period.

Both these objectives are intrinsically related to the expressions of nationalism in Cuba during the nineteenth century. Cubans, after all, in trying to define themselves positively, began by stipulating what they were not: they were not Spaniards. They called themselves *criollos*, as did all other aspiring Spanish-American nationalists.

The term *Creole* can be quite confusing and has been employed with varying definitions in the literature. In this paper, the term *Creole* is not used as some sociolinguists would: as a derivative of something European, as in a language where the vocabulary remains European and the grammar is freely employed such as *patois* or *papiamento*, or French and English Creole, or pidgin English. Nor does it connote visions of French colonists in early Louisiana undergoing a nativizing experience.¹⁴ Nor does it fully coincide with the definition put forward by Edward Brathwaite in *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770–1820*, which admits "some kind of colonial arrangement with a metropolitan European power, on the one hand, and a plantation arrangement on the other; and where the society is multiracial but organized for the benefit of a minority of European origin."¹⁵ In Spanish American usage, a creole connotes anything—person, plant, or animal life—that is of local origin as distinct from that which is introduced from outside the region.

Throughout this study, then, Creoles are regarded generally as those persons born in the Americas who have established their roots there and seek to forge their destinies in their local environment. Like Hawkeye in James Fenimore Cooper's novel *The Last of the Mohicans*, published in 1826, Creoles possess—or think they possess—an accumulated experience that affords them a better understanding of their environment than their metropolitan or expatriate cousins. Moreover, Creoles are willing to identify with their new environment and to establish local patterns of social hierarchy. No longer do they wish to find social fulfillment in the metropolis.

But since I am using the term in a cultural and political sense, I have expanded it to include not only those born in the Americas—in this case in Cuba, specifically—but those who have married into the group and have otherwise acculturated to the extent that they identify their interests with those of the locals rather than those of their metropolitan cohorts.¹⁶

When this Creole self-consciousness manifests itself in political identification, then I assume a case of local nationalism.¹⁷

If this is correct, then there is no doubt that, contrary to what the Trinidadian historian and former Prime Minister, Eric Williams, said in his *From Columbus to Castro: A History of the Caribbean*¹⁸—the Castro Revolution was a belated attempt by Cuba to catch up with the nationalist movement elsewhere in the Caribbean—Cuban nationalism was already alive and well during the early nineteenth century.

Indeed, I maintain that the spirit of nationalism was every bit as alive in Cuba in 1800 as it was in the United States in 1776, or as it was in those mainland Spanish American territories that fought for, and won, their independence between 1808 and 1826. The Cuban sense of nationalism was stronger in 1800 than anywhere else in the Caribbean with the possible exception of French Saint-Domingue, then in the throes of the revolution that was to create the independent state of Haiti in 1804.¹⁹ And Haiti represented the most thorough revolutionary change throughout the Americas before the twentieth century.

The main question, of course, is why if Cuban nationalism was so mature in 1800 did it fail to manifest this fulsomeness in political independence before 1898?

The answer, I think, has to do with the nature of the Cuban elite, their relationship to the land, with the economic base in sugar and slavery, and with the demographic structure of a society groping to establish itself within the Atlantic community in what R. R. Palmer has justifiably called, "The Age of the Democratic Revolutions."

In the nineteenth century the Cuban elite simply could not risk a democratic revolution. And indeed, given the age in which they lived, they could not afford any sort of revolution at all. Revolution jeopardized the social and economic structure that the Cubans were then constructing. A revolution threatened, directly or inadvertently, to end with the abolition of slavery thereby curtailing the agricultural revolution on which they based their political and economic importance.

The evolution of this extraordinary self-consciousness may be examined in three interrelated aspects: economy, society, and politics.

ECONOMY: Between 1750 and 1840 a series of transformations took place in the Cuban economy. An intrinsic part of the reforms of Charles III was the economic revitalization of the overseas empire as a prelude for converting the system from a

patrimonial monarchy to a national monarchy, with the overseas territories merely distant provinces—a concept that the French use today for their Antillean departments.

The first intendant in Cuba was Ambrosio Funes Villalpando Abarca de Bolea, the Count of Ricla.²⁰ He arrived in 1763, and immediately set about reinforcing the defenses of the island. The Morro castle, partly destroyed by the English, was restored and enlarged. Two new fortifications, *Atares* and *La Cabaña* were built, as well as an arsenal to replace the old one destroyed by the departing English forces. The authorities divided the city of Havana into *barrios*, or districts. Each *barrio* had a *comisario de barrio*, appointed by the town council from among the most distinguished residents. It was during this period, too, that a formal, organized system of street names was introduced to Havana, and the deliberate reorganization of the city for purposes of effective military defense began.²¹

Although the status of *ciudad* dated from the Real Cedula of December 20, 1592, Havana was, until well into the eighteenth century, no more than a *gran aldea* with a growing population. The construction of the later eighteenth century initiated the transformation to the elegant, delightful and impregnable city that endured until the twentieth century. Urban beautification and renovation especially marked the administrations of Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursua (1766–1771) and Felipe de Foncesviela y Ondeano, the Marqués de la Torre (1771–1777). The Marqués de la Torre introduced proper urban planning, built the Alameda de Paula, the docks, and wharves and began the construction of an elegant palace for the Captains General (completed in 1792). In addition, he designed the Prado, the *Plaza de Armas*, and the expansive *Paseos Extramuros*, as well as widened the streets throughout the capital city. A booming private construction accompanied the public construction. The more established citizens began to construct ample town homes of grand designs, double-storied with verandahs, patios, and entrances of elaborately decorated and hand-carved mahogany or marble. Indeed, some of the most architecturally imposing of the currently neglected palaces of Old Havana date from this period.²² By the end of the eighteenth century when the imposing peripheral wall was completed, Havana, with its parks, plazas, fountains, and wide avenues, ranked among the most beautiful of American port cities.

Another activity that derived considerable impetus from the increased concern for security and commerce during the eighteenth century was shipbuilding.²³ With its extensive hardwood forests close to a number of natural harbors, Cuba had been a

major center of activity for Spanish shipbuilding since the early seventeenth century. With the scarcity of hardwood in Iberia, the importance of Havana was enhanced, especially as it was designated the major port for assembling the *flotas* that connected Spain and the New World. Shipbuilding ceased during the brief English capture of Havana (1762–63), but construction resumed in 1765 and production increased. Of the 112 ships built at Havana between 1724 and 1796, some 67 date after 1764. More important, the warships tended to be larger, carrying twice the number of guns as those built earlier in the century.²⁴ Obviously, the emphasis on larger vessels with more cannons on board was a response to the bellicose age and the advance in maritime technology which accompanied the extensive naval engagements involving the English, French, Spanish, and, after 1776, the Americans. Nevertheless, the construction of non-military vessels, especially the *ganguiles* (fishing boats?) in 1775 and 1791 and the *pontones* (warehouse vessels) of 1782 and 1791 reflected improvements and expansion of maritime commercial activity through the port of Havana, and the enormous expansion of commerce.

The frenzy of new construction, reconstruction, and overall reorganization in the 1760s and 1770s created some inconveniences and disruptions in the city. The heavy demand for labor spurred a rapid population growth. A large influx of workers from Spain (along with the increased military personnel), and prisoners and slaves from the mainland and the interior of the island all converged on the city.²⁵ The historian Fernando Portuondo estimates that at one stage about four thousand men were employed full time on military fortifications alone.²⁶ The main fort at Havana kept supplies for 5,650 men during peacetime, and twice that number during wartime.²⁷ One consequence of the rapidity of this population explosion was a temporary scarcity of food in Havana. The high demand for construction material, especially bricks, and for wheat flour, encouraged North American traders to penetrate the Cuban market with impunity, and eventually forced the Spanish government to recognize and legitimize the trade, as Linda Salvucci illustrates in her dissertation and articles.²⁸ This North American connection, once legally recognized, expanded considerably. In 1779 Spain further authorized open trade with the rebellious colonies under the guise of neutrality, but with the expectation of hurting her old nemesis, Great Britain. Juan de Miralles was sent secretly to Williamsburg and Philadelphia, where he established a business partnership with Robert Morris (signer of the Declaration of Independence and financial wizard of George Washington) with two

boats plying regularly between Philadelphia and Havana.²⁹ The establishment of legal commerce with the United States of America opened the path for their eventual commercial hegemony in Cuba. Yet the Spanish could not do otherwise. Neither Spanish agricultural production nor Spanish shipping was adequate for the demands of the reduced empire.³⁰ Moreover, Spain derived considerable benefit from the collection of the *alcabala*, or sales tax, on legal trade.³¹

If some good citizens of Cuba complained about the changes, the food scarcity, and the general administrative confusion after 1764, they were quick to recognize the tangible benefits that the commercial and administrative reforms brought. Communications between Cuba and Spain took a quantum leap with the establishment of a monthly mailboat between Havana and La Coruña. The old commercial monopoly of the port of Cádiz and the *Real Compañía Mercantil de la Habana* effectively ceased to exist as a number of Spanish ports—Sevilla, La Coruña, Santander, Barcelona, Málaga, Valencia, and Alicante—gained concessions to trade directly with Cuba.

This opening of trade did not destroy the importance of Cádiz in the Iberian-American trade system.³² Time had produced useful traditions and organizational contacts for Cádiz merchants, and they continued to play a dominant role in the imperial trade well into the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the proportional decline of Cádiz was significant. In 1775 Cádiz handled 80 of the 169 ships trading between Spain, the Canary Islands, and Havana, or 47.3 percent of the volume. La Coruña handled 30 vessels, or 17.75 percent. Málaga handled 19 ships, or 11.2 percent. Barcelona accounted for 15 ships, or 8.89 percent. Santander accounted for 11 vessels, or 6.5 percent. The other mainland Spanish ports—Gijón, Alicante, and Valencia—handled 8 ships or 4.7 percent, while the Canary Islands accounted for 6 ships, or 3.5 percent of the trade (see Table 2). Even when all ships serviced at Havana are included, Cádiz still accounted for a respectable 17.7 percent, the highest by far for any Spanish port.³³

By 1778 the Spanish Crown expanded the number of Cuban ports accessible to Spanish shipping in accordance with the privileges prevailing in Havana since 1764. Santiago de Cuba, Trinidad, and Batabanó on the southern Cuban coast became open, or free, ports. Later more Cuban ports on the northern coast were added to the list of international free trade ports: Nuevitas in 1784, Matanzas in 1793, and Remedios in 1796.

New ports indicated increased commercial activity. But new towns such as Pinar del Rio, Güines, and Jaruco also arose, with increased opportunities for land speculation and wealth acquisition.³⁴ The old towns, of course, expanded both in area and population.³⁵

By 1775 the population of Havana had mushroomed to about 75,000, or approximately 44.0 percent of the total island population of 172,000. With 450 annual sailings, Havana was already one of the busiest ports in the Americas. Its total of 169 ships ranked below the number for La Guaira on the Venezuelan coast in 1793, but far above the combined total for the other major Venezuelan ports. The Havana trade pattern was also more diversified than any other Spanish or Spanish American port. For example, while Cádiz handled 47.3 percent of the Havana ships in 1775, it handled 68.5 percent of the larger number trading with La Guaira in 1793.

By 1775 Havana was already a hub of international commerce. The metropolis, Spain, accounted for only 37.5 percent of its legal shipping.³⁶ Mexico, an important trading partner, and the source (until 1807) of the *situados*, the capital that virtually subsidized local administrative costs, accounted for 24.4 percent of all Havana's maritime activity. At the same time, important links were being forged with North American ports such as Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York.

The *situados* were an important source of development capital, amounting to more than 108 million pesos between 1766 and 1785.³⁷ Although it is extremely difficult to calculate the impact that this particular influx of capital had, it seems reasonable to assume a catalytic effect on local commercial growth.

The economic expansion brought Cuba into contact with a broader network of ideas and activities than those emanating from Spain. Some of these ideas encouraged some Cubans to begin to think of their island and their interests in ways that emphasized the separate identity of the island, and that eventually led to a divergence of views on the nature of empire. The articulation of this view constituted a form of Creole economic nationalism, most frequently expressed through the economic societies and the *consulados*.³⁸

The economic societies and the consulados were official organs of the Creole and Spanish oligarchy. Nevertheless, they eventually became useful instruments for the exercise of public office in the interest of private families. This could be illustrated by the composition of the Havana consulado, set up at the urging of Francisco de Arango y Parreño and the Conde de Casa Montalvo on April 4, 1794. Both Arango

and Casa Montalvo were prominent members of the Cuban planter class. Casa Montalvo ended up as vice-president of the junta, although death cut short his service the following year. Arango became the chief legal officer, or *sindico*, and maneuvered his brother, Ramón de Arango, into being accountant. When Ramón died two years after the establishment of the consulado, Francisco had another brother, Ciriaco de Arango, nominated over a number of other qualified applicants.³⁹ It is possible to argue that Arango merely served the interests of his class, and that he was as strong a hispanophile as any *peninsular* in the service of the Crown. But he continually put the interests of his class above those of the empire, siding consistently with the Cuban planter class against the tobacco monopoly (*la factoria*) and the imperial tendency toward neo-mercantilism.⁴⁰

Class interests, however, could not remain narrowly confined. Cubans themselves, even while defining their interests, articulated ideas about a common identity that transcended class and that clearly differentiated between themselves and their metropolitan advocates. They produced a number of newspapers and *memorias* to reflect, and in some cases to shape, a sort of common public opinion that—as in the case of the young José Antonio Saco—landed them in jail or attracted a sentence of exile as potential political subversives.⁴¹

SOCIETY: One consequence of the tremendous and dramatic transformation of Cuban society during the period was the diversification of the occupational opportunities and the accentuation of segmentation and cleavages. The establishment of new towns with new people provided new opportunities for local individuals to enter into the arena of local politics. The confusing state of the Cuban land system meant that litigation between small townfolk—usually using the *cabildo*—and large landowners was long and difficult.⁴²

In 1793 some Indians from the town of Jiguani complained that their lands had been illegally confiscated by some wealthy families of Bayamo and Santiago de Cuba. The situation was complicated by the fact that the original donations of land were made in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the catastrophic decline of the Indian population in subsequent years had left vacant lands that were successfully "denounced" by individuals or incorporated into municipal common property.⁴³ In 1794 the priest Carlos del Rey brought legal action against the *cabildo* of Guanabacoa, once a predominantly Indian town, for encroaching on his land and subdividing part of

it in a general *repartimiento*.⁴⁴ The lands in dispute once pertained to the Indians of the town of Guanabacoa, but since the Indians had either died or intermarried with Spaniards, the original *mercedes* had lapsed. Apparently the *vecinos*, mainly cattle ranchers, had used the property as ill-defined communal lands until the grand distribution of 1788. That *repartimiento* awarded 1,063 lots to residents of the town, not necessarily to *vecinos*. Included among the recipients were 367 women (34.5 percent of all recipients) and two lots to three free coloreds. Del Rey charged that the *cabildo* had wantonly distributed land including land belonging to him, some 10 *caballerías* (about 333 acres) of his 67 *caballería* (2,231-acre) estate. The Indians did not deny that at some time in the past the land was granted to the Convent of San Antonio in return for instruction of the locals. But they defended their action on two ingenious legal grounds that won some sympathy in court. In the first place they claimed a breach of contract. The priests had not provided the education and therefore forfeited their right to the land. As such the *cabildo* was free to redistribute it in any manner it wished. The second argument was far more troublesome to the entire landed elite of Cuba. For the Guanabacoans charged that Carlos del Rey was not a resident or *vecino* of Guanabacoa, and therefore had no right to *mercedes* of lands within the jurisdiction of the town.

Within the formal jurisdiction of the town, however, were a great number of the haciendas of the great families of Havana, including Doña Michaela Bacalao, Don Gabriel de Castro Palomino, Doña Theresa Ambulodi, and the Condesa viuda de Macuriges. Through the *Consulado* of Havana they filed briefs as friends of the plaintiff in late 1797, some three years after the case had first been sent to Spain.⁴⁵ Although I have not been able to find the legal outcome of the case, it is almost certain that the *cabildo* did not succeed. The arguments of the *Consulado* were that del Rey and others lived in Havana, but paid taxes on their land, including levies by the *cabildo*, in Guanabacoa—and such cases were clear threats to the use of property and threatened the future economic development of the island. The Cuban elite had come to the rescue of one of its members, and it made clear the obstacles that the pattern of landholding and land use presented to the economic development of the colony. Other cases such as this forced the Crown to abolish usufructal tenure in 1816.⁴⁶ Both the elite and the economy were then expanding dramatically.

Along with an economically vibrant society went a class confident of its abilities and comfortable in its relationship to power and status. This was the Cuban

elite of the later eighteenth century: families such as the Arango y Parreño, de las Casas, Montalvo, O'Farrill, Calvo de la Puerta, Peñalver, Beltrán de Santa Cruz, Barreto, Zayas Bazan, Mateo Pedroso, Herreras, Nuñez del Castillo, Recio de Oquendo, and Kindelán.⁴⁷ These families demonstrated the common eighteenth century pattern of intermarriage and overlapping participation in church, bureaucracy, economy, and military.

POLITICS: The Cuban Creole elite intersected the political process at two levels. At the first level they participated in the imperial bureaucracy that was expanding considerably after the wide-ranging reforms beginning in 1763. Cuba became the experimental garden for the type of political reforms that were later transferred to the mainland, often with modifications. This level has been well treated by Allan Kuethe in his wonderful study, *Cuba, 1753-1815. Crown, Military and Society* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).

The second level was that of staff positions at the level of local town councils and other minor local offices, or established boards such as the *consulado*. These were extremely important positions for exploiting public office for private ends and were commonly used to acquire, expand, consolidate private wealth and political power.⁴⁸

The idea of public service, altruistically unrelated to the pursuit of private ends, was alien to the times. Families found that their overlapping connections in the army, the church, and the bureaucracy were extremely useful attributes, especially when the appeal to the various *fueros* of these organizations could enable them to avoid debt or embarrassment.⁴⁹

High incidences of these overlapping were found among the Creole elite families of Cuba. For example, at least nine of the seventeen members of the Havana City Council in 1762 were related by marriage or kinship. Pedro Beltrán de Santa Cruz and Miguel Calvo de la Puerta, the two *Alcaldes ordinarios*, were cousins as well as brothers-in-law. Sebastian and Gabriel Peñalver, *regidores* (aldermen), were father and son.

Jacinto Tomás Barreto, the Head of the Havana Rural Constabulary (or *Alcalde Mayor de la Santa Hermandad*), was married to the daughter of Sebastian Peñalver, and therefore was the brother-in-law of Gabriel. Barreto was also the first cousin of Mateo Pedroso—one of the two *Regidores perpetuos* (permanent alderman), along with Pedro Beltrán de Santa Cruz—the multimillionaire Havana merchant, planter, and

entrepreneur. And Barreto's first wife was a sister of Cristobal Zayas Bazan, the *síndico* (receiver of fines).

This pattern of relationship, common in the Havana town council, was characteristic of the elite. The Montalvo family, which came to Cuba in 1734, married into the Ramirez, O'Farril, Chacón, Arango, and Pedroso families by 1800. Mateo Pedroso (1719–1800), of whom we have made mention, had fourteen children, sufficient for distribution among the Herreras, the Recio de Oquendo, O'Farrill, and Chacón families. Pedroso's ancestors served with the Inquisition in Cuba; and his father was for many years the municipal treasurer—perhaps the public basis for his private wealth. The same intermarrying could be established for the Arangos, the Herreras, the Calvo de la Puerta, or any of the other great families.

These families acquired titles with their wealth and established *mayorazgos* in Cuba, and continued to play a role in Cuban politics during the nineteenth century.⁵⁰ Indeed, by 1840, Cuba boasted thirty-four Marquesses and thirty-two Counts—three of whom were Grandees of the Spanish Realm. Yet, their identification was with Cuba, rather than with Spain, as the pattern of marrying cousins, nieces, nephews, and uncles indicated. Many of them considered themselves to be Cubans, not Spanish; and while they may have supported Spanish government in Cuba their support was premised on the conviction that it served their ends better than any of the possible alternatives. And indeed, not many of these families left Cuba after its political independence in 1898.

For the elite to demonstrate nationalist rather than oligarchic sentiments, however, they had to think and act on behalf of a broader constituency than their relatives and their class. This is not very easy to establish for the uppermost members of the Cuban elite. Nevertheless, I think that sufficient evidence exists to illustrate how ideas of collective self-consciousness expanded among Cubans and percolated downward from the elite to the public at large. Elsewhere in my writings I have referred to this as a sense of *patriachiquismo*, the sensibility of belonging to a little fatherland, a strong local identification—in short, a nationalism without a nation state.⁵¹ Essentially, this was the gradual awareness of Cubans that their interests were different from those of Spain, and while they might remain colonial subjects, this self-consciousness militated against their remaining Spanish.

This awareness may be deduced in a number of ways. It was the type of evidence from observations as simple, but as important, as the titles of newspapers

and broadsheets. During the period it is possible to see a significant shift in the titles and the content of newspapers. Until the end of the eighteenth century, these local publications in Cuba were called, as they were in Spain, *Las Noticias*, *El Tiempo*, *Revista*, or the simple, generic term, *periódico*.

The first newspaper in Havana was started in 1724 under official auspices by the Conde de Ricla, then the Captain-General of Cuba. Despite its sponsorship, and the fact that it carried important official news, *La Gaceta de la Habana*, as it was called, folded shortly after publication. Soon thereafter, another paper emerged, probably the mouthpiece of the Havana elite, called *El Pensador*. Already one can detect a change in attitude. By the early nineteenth century, newspapers began to have different titles, *El Americano*, *Diario de la Habana*, *El Español Libre*, *El Amigo de la Constitución*, *El Amante de sí mismo*, or *El Habanero*, published out of Philadelphia by the exiled priest, Felix Varela y Morales. Varela described himself in 1821 as "*Un hijo de la libertad, un alma americana* (A son of liberty, an American spirit)".⁵²

One may also note that in September 1822 the young José Antonio Saco published a piece in the new *Gaceta de la Habana* under the pseudonym "*Amigo del Orden*" in which he defined himself not only as a constitutional liberal, but also as an American who expected to be in charge in his own house.⁵³ This seems like a patent manifestation of Cuban self-interest in constitutionalism at the time, and probably reflects the separation of the Spanish and Cuban identities.

The same observation could be made about the names of haciendas: from a preponderance of saints' names to a plethora of secular names. In the earlier eighteenth century, the names of saints prevailed: *Santa Teresa*, *Santa María*, *Santa Rita*, *Santa Isabel*, *La Concepción*, *El Salvador*, and *San Francisco*. By the early nineteenth century the names were *Unión*, *Flor de Cuba*, *La Esperanza*, *Aurora*, *Amistad*, *Dos Hermanos*, *La Gran Azucarera*, and other such secular names.⁵⁴ (Needless to say, given the strong Roman Catholic persuasion, saints' names would remain a popular choice until the Castro Revolution.)

By separating the issue of nationalism from the political creation of the state, the problems of the nineteenth century become much clearer. If in Cuba nationalism appeared before the state, it might be possible to show that on the mainland—including in the United States—the state appeared before the full manifestation of a sense of nationalism. By comparing Cuba with the events on the mainland (including the United States) it should be possible to delineate the rise of nationalism and the

disintegration of imperial structures. It also demonstrates the importance of the series of interrelated changes that took place during the eighteenth century throughout the Americas.

TABLE 1: SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GUNS</u>
1724	Warship	San Juan	50
1725	"	San Lorenzo	50
1726	"	San Jerónimo/El Retiro	50
	Packet Boat	San Antonio/Triunfo	16
1727	Warship	Nra. Sra. De Guadelupe El Fuerte	60
	Frigate	Sta. Barbara/La Chata	22
1728	Warship	San Dionisio/El Constante	54
1730	Packet Boat	El Marte	16
	"	El Jupiter	16
	Warship	Nra. Sra. Del Carmen	64
1731	"	San Cristobal/Segundo Constante	60
1733	"	San José/El Africa	60
1734	"	Nra. Sra. Del Pilar/Europa	60
1735	"	Nra. Sra. De Loreta/Asia	62
	Frigate	Sta. Trinidad/Esperanza	50
	"	San Cristobal/Triunfo	24
1736	Warship	Nra. Sra. De Belen/America	62
1737	Frigate	Santa Barbara/Estrella	24
1738	Warship	Santo Cristo De Burgos/Castilla	60
	"	Santa Rosa De Lima/Dragón	60
	Frigate	Nra. Sra. De Guadalupe/Bizarra	50
1740	Warship	San Ignacio/Invencible	70
	"	Nra. Sra. De Belen/Glorioso	70

TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GUNS</u>
1743	Warship	Nra. Sra. Del Rosario/Nueva España	70
	"	San José/Nuevo Invencible	70
1745	"	Jesus María Y José/Nuevo Conquistador	64
	"	Sta. Teresa De Jesus	64
1746	"	San Francisco De Asis/Nueva Africa	70
1747	Frigate	Santa Rosalia/Flora	24
	Warship	San Lorenzo/Tigre	70
1749	"	San Alejandro/Felix	80
	"	San Pedro/Rayo	80
1750	"	San Luis Gonzaga/Infante	70
	"	Santiago El Mayor/Galicia	70
	"	Santa Barbara/Princesa	70
1757	Brigantine	Santa Teresa/Triunfo	16
1758	Frigate	Santa Barbara/Fenix	18
	Brigantine	San Carlos/Cazador	18
1759	Warship	San Eustaquio/Astuto	60
1760	Packet Boat	San Blas/Volante	18
1761	Frigate	Nra. Sra. De Guadalupe/Fenix	22
	Schooner	San Isidro	14
	Warship	San Genaro	60
	"	San Antonio	60
	Brigantine	San José	14
1765	Warship	San Carlos	80

TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GUNS</u>
1765	Schooner	San Julian	16
	Warship	San Fernando	80
1766	Schooner	San Joaquin	16
	Warship	Santiago	60
	Schooner	San Lorenzo	16
1767	"	San Antonio De Padua	16
	"	Santa Clara	10
	"	Santa Isabel	10
	Warship	San Luis	80
	Schooner	Santa Rosalia	16
1768	Packet Boat	San Francisco De Paula	18
1769	Warship	San Francisco De Paula	70
	"	Santísima Trinidad	112
	"	San José	70
1769	Schooner	San José	12
1770	"	Nra. Sra. De Loreto	12
	Frigate	Santa Lucia	26
	Chavequin(?)	El Caiman	30
1771	Warship	San Rafael	70
	"	San Pedro Alcantara	62
1772	Brigantine	San Juan Bautista	12
	"	San Francisco Xavier	12
	Schooner	Santa Elena	12
	Packet Boat	San Carlos	18

TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GUNS</u>
1773	Warship	San Miguel	70
1775	"	San Ramon	60
	Fishing Boat(?)	[Ganguil] San Julian	-
	"	San Salvador De Orta	-
1776	Frigate	Sta. Agueda	46
	Brigantine	Sta. Catalina Mártir	10
1777	Frigate	Sta. Cecilia	46
1778	"	Sta. Matilde	46
	Schooner	Sta. Teresa	12
	Frigate	Nra. Sra. De La O.	40
1780	"	Sta. Clara	40
	Warship	San Cristobal/Bahama	70
	Brigantine	El Pajaro	16
	Schooner	El Viento	14
1781	"	El Viento De Barlovento	-
1782	Packet Boat	Borja	14
	Warehouse Ship	San Pedro	-
	"	San Pablo	-
1786	Warship	San Hipolito/Mexicano	114
	"	Conde De Regla	114
	Frigate	Guadelupe	40
1787	Warship	Real San Carlos	114
	Frigate	La Catalina	44
1788	Warship	San Pedro Alcantara	64

TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GUNS</u>
1788	Frigate	Nra. Sra. Las Mercedes	40
1789	Warship	San Hermenegildo	120
1790	Brigantine	San Carlos/Volador	18
	Warship	Soberano	74
	Frigate	Minerva	14
	Brigantine	El Saeta	18
1791	Warehouse Ship	No. 1	-
	"	No. 2	-
	Fishing Boat	[Ganguil] No. 1	-
	"	(?) [Ganguil] No. 2	-
	"	" No. 3	-
	"	" No. 4	-
	Warship	El Infante Don Pelayo	74
	Frigate	Ceres	40
1792	"	Gloria	44
1793	Warship	Los Santos Reyes/Principe Asturias	120
1794	Brigantine	San Antonio	18
1796	Frigate	Sta. Ursula/Anfitrite	44

Source: Compiled from Antonio J. Valdes, Historia de la Isla de Cuba (Madrid, 1813; New Edition, Havana: UNESCO, 1964) pp. 284-289

TABLE 2: MARITIME TRADE THROUGH HAVANA, 1775

<u>PORT</u>	<u>NO. OF SAILINGS</u>	<u>% TOTAL</u>	<u>% SPANISH TOTAL</u>	<u>% AMERICAN TOTAL</u>
A. Spain	169	37.5	100.0	-
La Coruña	30	6.6	17.8	-
Cadiz	80	17.7	47.3	-
Santander	11	2.4	6.5	-
Barcelona	15	3.3	8.9	-
Gijon	2	0.4	1.2	-
Malaga	19	4.2	11.2	-
Alicante	5	1.1	3.0	-
Valencia	1	0.2	0.6	-
Islas Canarias	6	1.3	3.6	-
B. The Americas	281	62.4	-	100.0
Campeche	37	8.2	-	13.2
New Orleans	49	10.8	-	17.4
Kingston, Jamaica	16	3.5	-	5.7
Barbados	4	0.9	-	1.4
Vera Cruz	53	11.8	-	18.9
Maracaibo	4	0.9	-	1.4
Puerto Rico/Sto. Domingo	43	9.6	-	15.3
Tampico	18	4.0	-	6.4
Cartagena	29	6.4	-	10.3
Omoa	7	1.6	-	2.5
Coatzacoalcos	2	0.4	-	0.7
La Guaira	8	1.8	-	2.8

TABLE 2: (cont'd) MARITIME TRADE THROUGH HAVANA, 1775

<u>PORT</u>	<u>NO. OF SAILINGS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SPANISH TOTAL</u>	<u>AMERICAN TOTAL</u>
St. Eustatius	4	0.9	-	1.4
Others	7	1.6	-	2.5
Total Sailings	450			

Source: Archivo General de Indias. (Seville). Santo Domingo. Legajo
 1520. Año de 1775. Relación de las embarcaciones que han
entrado en y han salido del puerto de La Habana.

TABLE 3: CENSO DEL AÑO DE 1774

	Blancos	HOMBRES					Blancos	MUGERES					Total general
		LIBRES		ESCLAVOS				LIBRES		ESCLAVAS			
		Mulatos	Negros	Mulatos	Negros	Total		Mulatas	Negras	Mulatas	Negras	Total	
Habana.....	26,331	3,982	2,093	685	13,242	45,433	17,061	3,297	2,473	369	6,985	30,185	75,618
Santiago de las Vegas....	717	86	23	10	164	1,000	593	69	30	5	112	809	1,809
San Felipe y Santiago....	582	50	44	6	728	1,410	499	44	25	154	722	2,132
Filipinas.....	995	285	18	26	299	1,623	652	195	21	8	118	994	2,617
Isla de Pinos.....	31	15	3	1	20	70	4	2	1	1	8	78
Santa Maria del Rosario..	1,080	32	113	114	362	1,701	894	31	92	7	173	1,197	2,898
Guanabacoa.....	2,639	157	230	32	2,392	5,450	1,594	119	161	15	659	2,548	7,998
Jaruco.....	243	11	1	84	339	168	10	19	197	536
Matanzas.....	1,163	99	75	10	505	1,852	854	84	73	5	381	1,397	3,249
Total.....	33,781	3,817	2,600	884	17,796	58,878	22,319	3,851	2,876	409	8,602	38,057	96,935
Remedios.....	1,044	113	90	35	282	1,564	1,052	98	117	38	216	1,521	3,085
Santa Clara.....	3,071	468	363	250	327	4,479	2,539	284	177	198	426	3,624	8,103
Trinidad.....	1,736	199	248	102	611	2,896	1,784	219	231	83	401	2,718	5,614
Santi-Espiritus.....	2,951	429	196	146	536	4,258	2,682	475	237	103	510	4,007	8,265
Principe.....	4,061	417	430	267	1,936	7,111	4,293	517	746	299	1,372	7,221	14,332
Total.....	12,863	1,626	1,327	800	3,692	20,308	12,350	1,593	1,502	721	2,925	19,091	29,399
Bayamo.....	3,305	1,533	325	244	930	6,337	2,690	1,680	485	287	771	5,913	12,250
Baracoa.....	691	618	103	50	101	1,563	310	209	71	41	28	659	2,222
Holguin.....	1,036	144	124	41	102	1,447	570	224	55	78	66	993	2,240
Cuba.....	3,900	2,463	1,472	1,499	2,632	12,966	2,625	1,449	700	670	964	6,408	19,374
Total.....	8,932	4,758	2,024	1,834	3,765	22,313	6,195	3,562	1,311	1,076	1,829	13,973	36,286
Total general.....	55,576	10,201	5,951	3,518	25,253	101,495	40,864	9,006	5,689	2,206	13,356	71,121	172,620

Source: Ramon de la Sagra, Historia económico-política de la isla de Cuba (Havana: Araza y Soler, 1831)

Note: The correct general total should be 171,620.

TABLE 4: CENSO DEL AÑO DE 1792

	Blancos	<u>HOMBRES</u>					Blancos	<u>MUGERES</u>					Total general
		LIBRES		ESCLAVOS				LIBRES		ESCLAVAS			
		Mulatos	Negros	Mulatos	Negros	Total		Mulatas	Negras	Mulatas	Negras	Total	
Habana y arrabales.....	12,274	2,481	1,944	251	6,864	23,814	11,263	2,911	2,464	231	10,624	27,493	51,307
Santiago de las Vegas....	1,127	57	38	27	1,061	2,310	1,156	63	43	36	1,131	2,429	4,739
San Felipe y Santiago....	601	35	19	5	522	1,182	497	43	19	7	205	771	1,953
Filipinas.....	1,353	533	59	27	360	2,332	1,035	501	61	17	246	1,860	4,192
Isla de Pinos.....	50	3	1	3	17	74	8	8	82
Santa Maria del Rosario..	1,291	30	238	30	312	1,901	1,257	46	219	37	438	1,997	3,808
Guanabacoa.....	3,278	327	244	125	1,878	5,852	3,259	400	282	149	1,783	5,873	11,725
Jaruco.....	503	9	8	...	140	660	425	3	7	...	69	504	1,164
Matanzas.....	1,945	266	406	160	996	3,773	1,473	224	2	111	633	2,443	6,216
Partidos del campo.....	21,066	2,038	1,800	640	15,860	41,404	14,440	1,460	1,520	690	6,340	24,450	65,854
Total.....	43,488	5,779	4,757	1,268	28,010	83,302	34,813	5,651	4,617	1,278	21,469	67,828	151,130
Remedios.....	2,248	432	538	271	965	4,454	2,315	4,042	516	286	690	7,849	12,303
Santa Clara.....	4,141	767	388	352	370	6,018	2,645	666	426	380	340	4,457	10,475
Trinidad.....	2,612	1,143	766	309	1,440	6,270	2,274	1,262	878	425	502	5,341	11,611
Santi-Espiritus.....	2,375	1,036	699	260	1,285	5,655	2,055	1,127	811	397	454	4,841	10,496
Principe.....	7,214	971	793	988	4,605	14,571	7,402	763	717	736	3,329	12,947	27,518
Total.....	18,590	4,349	3,184	2,180	8,665	36,968	16,691	7,860	3,348	2,224	5,312	35,435	72,403
Bayamo.....	3,732	2,712	179	1,680	1,634	9,937	3,119	1,287	1,547	2,213	1,701	9,867	19,804
Baracoa.....	490	585	16	20	69	1,180	396	604	109	21	56	1,186	2,366
Holguin.....	2,007	377	151	165	234	2,934	2,021	394	134	164	190	2,903	5,837
Cuba.....	3,992	2,043	1,079	456	3,043	10,613	4,220	2,245	1,145	466	2,072	10,148	20,761
Total.....	10,221	5,717	1,425	2,321	4,980	24,664	9,756	4,530	2,935	2,864	4,019	24,104	48,768
Total general.....	72,299	15,845	9,366	5,769	41,655	144,934	61,260	18,041	10,900	6,366	30,800	127,367	272,301

Source: same as Table 3

NOTES

1. There is quite an impressive literature on this theme. See, for example, Jack P. Greene, "Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study," in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, edited by Nicolas Canny and Anthony Pagden, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 213-266; Sacvan Berkovitch, *The Puritans Origins of the American Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

2. Max Savelle, "Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review*, vol. 67, no.4 (July 1962), pp. 901-923.

3. Locating the origins of nationalism in the Americas has been a far from easy task. See Judith A. Wilson, "My Country Is My Colony: A Study in Anglo-American Patriotism, 1739-1760," *The Historian*, vol. 30 (1967-68), pp. 333-349; Paul A. Varg, "The Advent of Nationalism, 1758-1776," *American Quarterly*, 16 (1964), pp. 169-181; and John Murrin, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity," in *Beyond Confederation. Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, edited by Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1987). For an excellent review of American historiography, see John M. Murrin, "Political Development," in *Colonial British America. Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*, edited by Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 408-456. I want to thank Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan for useful clarifications on this subject, as well as the above and other references.

4. John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Norton, 1973); Jorge I. Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty. The Breakdown of the Spanish-American Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).

5. Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolutions: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*. 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); and his *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution*, edited by Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman (Charlottesville, Va.: United States Capitol Historical Society, 1983); and Franklin W. Knight, "Patterns of Colonial Society and Culture: Latin America and the Caribbean, 1494-1804," *South Atlantic Urban Studies*, vol. 2 (1978), pp. 3-23.

6. Franklin W. Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970); Hugh Thomas, *Cuba. The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Roland T. Ely, *Cuando reinaba su majestad el azúcar* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamérica, 1963); Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *El ingenio, Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar*, 3 vols. (Havana: Ciencias Sociales, 1978), esp. vol. 3. Also Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, 1980. Some of the intellectuals involved in the early nineteenth century may be glimpsed in Sheldon B. Liss, *Roots of Revolution. Radical Thought in Cuba* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), pp. 1-23.

7. The intellectual origins of European nationalism, however, go further back than the nineteenth century. As early as the period of the New Monarchies during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a number of statesmen were trying to provide a rational justification of the supremacy of the state over the individual. But these crystallized during the eighteenth century, during the Enlightenment, with the *philosophes* such as Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). See, especially, the *Social Contract*, which advocates the subordination of the individual will not only to the general will, but also to the common good to which all societies must aspire. Of course, Jacques Lafaye traces the roots of Mexican nationalism to the development of the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe. See his *Quetzalcoatl and Guadalupe. The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531-1813*, translated by Benjamin Keen, with a foreword by Octavio Paz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976; first published, Paris, 1974).

8. Hence the proliferation of nationalist movements in the nineteenth century in Italy, Ireland, and Germany.

9. See, *La revolución de 1868: Historia, pensamiento y literatura. Antología y selección*, edited by Clara Lida and Iris Zavala (New York: Las Américas, 1970).

10. The story is quite familiar, and the bibliography extensive. A very good account is Louis A. Perez, Jr., *Cuba between Empires, 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).

11. The nature of the nationalism manifested in the wars of independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century may be followed in Brian R. Hamnett, *Revolución y contrarrevolución en México y en el Perú: Liberalismo, realeza y separatismo, 1800-1824* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980); J. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Norton, 1973); Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, 1980; Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Timothy E. Anna, *The Fall of Royal Government in Mexico City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978); Timothy E. Anna, *The Fall of Royal Government in Peru* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979); K. R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies. Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); A. J. R. Russell-Wood, ed., *From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

12. See Levi Marrero, *Cuba: Economía y Sociedad*, vol. 8 (Madrid: Playor, 1980); John Robert McNeill, *Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Allan Kuethe, *Cuba, 1753-1815. Crown, Military and Society* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986); Allan J. Kuethe and G. Douglas Inglis, "Absolutism and Enlightened Reform: Charles III, The Establishment of the Alcabala, and Commercial Reorganization in Cuba," *Past and Present*, no. 109 (November 1985), 118-143; Allan J. Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, "The Esquilache Government and the Reforms of Charles III in Cuba," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gessellschaft Lateinamerikas*, vol. 19 (1982), 117-137.

13. The technological transformation may be followed in Manuel Moreno Fraguinals, *El Ingenio*, 3 vols. (Havana: Ciencias Sociales, 1978); or Knight, *Slave Society*, 1970.

14. For the complex situation in Louisiana, see Virginia Domínguez, *White by Definition. Social Classification in Creole Louisiana* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986), esp. chap. 4.

15. Edward Brathwaite, *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. xiv-xv. Note that Brathwaite is speaking specifically of Jamaica, and the phrase "in some kind of colonial arrangement" is, in his text, a quotation from Richard Adams, "On the Relation between Plantation and Creole Cultures," in *Plantation Systems of the New World* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1959), p. 73

16. Into this category would fall someone like Julián Zulueta (1814-1878), born in Alava, Spain, who came to Cuba in 1832 virtually penniless. He acquired a great fortune, married a Cuban cousin, was Mayor of Havana, and eventually returned to Spain where he was made Marqués of Alava and a Grande of the Realm. Zulueta, however, is not considered among my Creole families.

17. I am not unaware of the problems inherent in discerning the manifestations of nationalism. I have, however, followed the notions illustrated in Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), and *National Consciousness, History & Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Orest Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). I am grateful to Marta Petruszewicz for bringing Weber's book to my attention.

18. Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro. The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 479

19. See David Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint-Domingue, 1793-1798* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)

20. *Archivo General de Indias* (Seville). Santo Domingo. Legajo 1211. *Papeles varios recogidos de la testamentaria del Conde de Ricla, 1748-1786*.

21. The activities of the Conde de Ricla may be followed in Jacobo de la Pezuela, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico de la Isla de Cuba*. 4 vols. (Madrid: Mellado, 1863-1866). See also, Antonio J. Valdés, *Historia de la isla de Cuba, y en especial de la Habana* (Orig. published 1813; reprinted 1876; new edition, Havana: UNESCO, 1964), pp. 157-158.

22. It should be noted that the Cubans, with international assistance, are undertaking a major renovation of most of Old Havana, and that by 1992, much of the region will have been restored to its former appearance. See *La Habana*, photographs by Manuel Méndez Guerrero, text by Antonio Nuñez Jiménez and Carlos Venegas Formias (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1985).

23. G. Douglas Inglis, "The Spanish Naval Shipyard at Havana in the Eighteenth Century," in *New Aspects of Naval History. Selected Papers from the 5th Naval History Symposium*. Edited by the Department of History, U.S. Naval Academy (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 47-58.

24. See Valdes, *Historia*, pp. 284-289; also, *The Urban Development in Latin America, 1750-1820*, edited by Richard Morse et al. (Stanford: Center for Latin American Studies, 1971), pp. 81-87.

25. *A.G.I.* (Seville), Santo Domingo, leg. 1211, año de 1774. Despite the population increase, the demand for labor, especially for the military fortifications, consistently exceeded supply, thereby occasioning frequent requests from the Captains General for more manpower.

26. Fernando Portuondo, *Historia de Cuba* (La Habana: Ministerio de Educación, 1965), p. 214.

27. *A.G.I.* Santo Domingo, leg. 1217. *Instrucción reservada del rey*. For details on the military preparedness of Havana during the period, see Kuethe, *Cuba, 1753-1815*, 1986.

28. Linda K. Salvucci, "Development and Decline: The Port of Philadelphia and Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1823," unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1985. See also her "Anglo-American Merchants and Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1807," in Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds., *The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760-1819* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 127-133 and 214-217;

29. *A.G.I.* Santo Domingo, leg. 1598. Juan de Urriza al José de Galvez, September 10, 1778.

30. John Fisher, *Commercial Relations between Spain and Spanish America in the Era of Free Trade, 1778-1796* (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, 1985).

31. *A.G.I.* Santo Domingo, leg. 1215. Cuba. Real cédula de 16 de Julio de 1770.

32. Antonio García-Baquero Gonzales, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano)* 2 vols. (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1976); Manuel Nunes Dias, *El Real Consulado de Caracas (1793-1810)* (Caracas: Academia Nacional, 1971), pp. 345-346.

33. The figures for Havana are derived from *Archivo General de Indias* (Seville). *Sección de Santo Domingo*, leg. 1520, año de 1775. *Relación de las embarcaciones que han entrado y han salido de la Habana*. The figures for La Guaira are from Dias, *Real Consulado*, p. 343.

34. *A.G.I.* (Seville), *Sección de Ultramar*, leg. 171, Guines, 1774. *A.G.I.* Santo Domingo, leg. 1602, Jaruco. *Archivo Histórico Nacional* (Madrid), *Sección de Gracia y Justicia*, leg. 1606.

35. G. Douglas Inglis, "Historical Demography of Colonial Cuba, 1492-1780," unpublished PhD dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1979.

36. *A.G.I.* (Seville), *Sección de Santo Domingo*, leg. 1520, año de 1775. Illegal trade continued to be a significant part of Cuban commercial activity up to the nineteenth century. One indication of this trade may be gauged from the inordinately high proportion of shipping done with New Orleans. In 1775 New Orleans ranked third behind Cádiz and Vera Cruz with 49 vessels, or 10.8 percent of Havana port shipping for the year. Even more suspicious is the large number of vessels sailing to and from New Orleans "in ballast." See *A.G.I.* (Seville) Santo Domingo, Leg. 1520, año de 1775. *Relación de las embarcaciones que han entrado y han salido del puerto de la Habana*.

37. Julio Le Riverend, *Historia económica de Cuba (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1971)*, pp. 86-88, 90-122.

38. Peter James Lampros, "Merchant-Planter Cooperation and Conflict: The Havana Consulado, 1794-1832," unpublished PhD dissertation, Tulane University, 1980. See also Robert J. Shafer, *The Economic Societies in the Spanish World, 1763-1821* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958); Eduardo Arcila Farías, *El real consulado de Caracas* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1957); Louisa Hoberman, "Merchants in Seventeenth Century Mexico City: A Preliminary Portrait," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 57, no. 3 (August 1977), pp. 479-503.

39. *A.G.I.* (Seville) Santo Domingo, leg. 2193. The furor over this appointment can be followed in Lampros, "The Havana Consulado," pp. 76-79.

40. See Francisco Ponte Domínguez, *Arango Parreño. El estadista colonial* (Havana: Editorial Trópico, 1937); also Stanley J. Stein, "Caribbean Counterpoint: Vera Cruz vs Havana. War and

Neutral Trade, 1797-1799," in *Geographie du capital marchand aux Ameriques, 1760-1860*, edited by Jeanne Chase (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1987), pp. 21-44.

41. Larry Jensen has skillfully used these sources in his superb study of the early nineteenth century, *Children of Colonial Despotism: Press, Politics and Culture in Cuba, 1740-1840* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988).

42. *A.G.I.* (Seville) *Santo Domingo*. Legajo 1601. Expediente sobre deslinde y repartimiento de tierras en la Isla de Cuba.

43. For a number of Indian claims to land see *A.G.I.* (Seville), leg. 1618-1622. "Denouncing" was the legal formula by which land was declared to be free of occupancy and therefore subject to redistribution by Crown or municipality. After 1816 such lands could be bought in fee simple.

44. *A.G.I.* (Seville) *Santo Domingo*, leg. 1600. Presumably this was the general repartimiento of 1778.

45. *A.G.I.* (Seville) *Santo Domingo*, leg. 1600.

46. *A.G.I.* (Seville) *Santo Domingo*, leg. 1618 and leg. 1601, Alejandro O'Reilly al Secretario de Estado, 20 de junio de 1819.

47. Much of the information on the selected Cuban families derives from Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Mallén, *Historia de familias cubanas*, vols. 1-6 (Havana, 1940-50), vol. 7 (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1985); Hugh Thomas, *Cuba. The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Levi Marrero, *Cuba: Economía y Sociedad*, 13 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1971-1987), especially vols. 9-13, subtitled *Azúcar, ilustración y conciencia (1763-1868)*.

48. *A.G.I.* (Seville) *Santo Domingo*, leg. 444, 445, 446, 447, 449, and 511. The Cisneros and Agramonte purchases of public office can be found in legajo 444; the Calvo de la Puerta in legajo 446; the Ayala, Cisneros, and Carrion families in 447; the Abreu in legajo 449.

49. See Kuethe, *Cuba*, pp. 57-62.

50. The *mayorazgo* was an entailed estate inherited by primogeniture.

51. Franklin W. Knight, *The Caribbean. The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (New York: Oxford, 1978), pp. 132-133.

52. Cited by Agustín A. Roman in foreword to *El Habanero. Padre Félix Varela Morales* (Miami: Revista Ideal, 1974), p. ii.

53. Saco was born in 1797 in Bayamo, studied at the San Carlos seminary under Félix Varela (1788-1853), then the outstanding Cuban thinker of the period, and was agitated by the liberal political reforms taking place in Spain in 1820-21.

54. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *El Ingenio. Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar*, 3 vols. (Havana: Ciencias Sociales, 1978).