The New Elite Paradigm: A Critical Assessment

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THE NEW ELITE PARADIGM: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

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In a series of recent works Burton, Field, and Higley have sought to establish a new elite paradigm and to develop out of it theories of substantial explanatory power. They have so far provided critical evaluations of previous elite theory and proposals for its systematization and development (Field and Higley 1980; Burton and Higley 1987a; Field et al. 1988a), broad accounts of relationships between types of national elites, elite transformations, and political stability or instability since 1500 (Field and Higley 1985; Higley and Burton 1988), and fuller accounts of two types of elite transformation: elite settlements in England, Sweden, Colombia, and Venezuela (Burton and Higley 1987b) and “two-step” transformations in France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany since World War II (Field et al. 1988b). While the range claimed for the analytical power of the paradigm is very broad, it is of particular relevance to Latin Americanists both because it is presented in principle as a general framework for the understanding of the origins of political stability or the lack of it, and because two of the four cases of elite settlements, and the only two to have occurred in the twentieth century, are taken from Latin America. Significant statements of the character and implications of the paradigm have appeared in previous working papers in this series, and this paper offers an assessment of the paradigm as it currently stands, and a brief comment on its Latin American dimensions.

Recognizing and seeking to remedy serious problems in classical elite theory as developed by Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, they advance the cause of their new elitist paradigm over pluralist and Marxist rivals, as capable of filling the gap resulting from the current absence of a dominant paradigm in political sociology (Burton and Higley 1987a: 235–236). They intend to proceed, following a suggestion made by Zuckerman (1977), by developing out of this paradigm theories of wide explanatory power. Contentions regarding the inevitability of elites, the variability of elites, and the interdependence of elites and nonelites are explored and refined, and some broad general claims are advanced. Within this framework, specific global-historical
comparative explanations relating to political stability and the emergence of democracy are advanced and systematically tested against available historical evidence. The central claims made are that fundamental explanations for global patterns of political stability or instability and for the emergence of preconditions for democracy are themselves political rather than social, economic, cultural, or "social structural"; and specifically that these explanations are related to national elite states and transformations.

Three possible elite states are described: ideologically unified, consensually unified, and disunified; a fourth state, partially or imperfectly unified, appears on occasions (see Field and Higley 1980: 39–41, 1985: 7–8) and seems now to be subsumed as the first step in the two-step transformation. Ideological unity is ascribed to “totalitarian” regimes (Field and Higley 1985: 7–8; Burton and Higley 1987b: 297) but neither the concept nor specific cases are discussed or developed at length; disunity is held to be the original state of virtually all national elites, and the generic condition or modal pattern historically and today (Higley and Burton 1988: 3–14). Transformation from elite disunity to consensual unity is held to be an essential precondition for political stability and lasting democratic transitions (Field and Higley 1980: 117; Higley and Burton 1988: 9). Three historical routes for this transformation are identified: (1) special colonial legacies where consensus is achieved prior to national independence; (2) elite settlements, where elites negotiate a sudden and deliberate compromise; and (3) two-step transformations, where first a consensually oriented bloc gains stable majority electoral support, and subsequently a radical minority abandons its distinctive ideological position and adheres to the consensus achieved by its adversaries (Higley and Burton 1988: 24; Field et al. 1988b: 5–6).

These successive works represent a substantial and developing theoretical effort, aimed at reestablishing the classical elite paradigm on a new and superior basis. I intend to offer here a critique of this new paradigm, recognizing as its progenitors do that many of its elements are no more than provisionally sketched in, and concentrating upon what appear to me to be fundamental weaknesses. I shall argue that there are problems of ambiguity and potentially serious tautology in key definitions and in the relationships between them; that the account given of conditions for initial elite transformation is deficient; that issues of internal elite structure and relations and mechanisms for the maintenance of elite consensus and rule are
unexplored; that on their own evidence, the elite settlements identified do not fulfill the condition of elite consensus as defined; that where elite transformations occur they are best seen as midpoints in broader processes of change rather than as fundamental starting points; and, finally, that when the consequences of these several failings are assessed, the central contentions of a fairly straightforward Marxist paradigm are confirmed, and shown to have far greater explanatory power than this born-again rival.

Definitions

According to the most recent statement of the central proposition of the new elite paradigm, “A disunified national elite . . . produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian or democratic forms over various intervals. A consensually unified national elite . . . produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy . . . if economic and other facilitative conditions permit” (Higley and Burton 1988: 2). National elites are defined as “persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national outcomes regularly and substantially” (ibid.: 4). This expands slightly upon an earlier definition of elites as “simply people who are able, through their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously” (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296; see also Field and Higley 1980: 20). A national elite is defined as “consensually unified” when “its members (1) share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to a ‘restrained partisanship’ and (2) participate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction which provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central decision-makers” (Higley and Burton 1988: 4); it is defined as disunified when “its members (1) share few or no understandings about the proprieties of political conduct, and (2) engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries” (ibid.: 5).

It should be noted here in passing that an early statement of the theory actually denies that elite structure and behavior can be observed or measured fully, and therefore proposes to treat the “construct” of elite unity as stemming from an “observable” episode of origination of such a state (Field and Higley 1985: 2–3). No
reasons are given for the assumption that the originating act is easier to verify empirically than the state of elite unity itself: it is one thing to propose a “construct” and use it as a basis for predictions regarding independent “observables,” and quite another to claim, as Field and Higley do, that the coming into existence of a particular phenomenon is observable, even though that same phenomenon itself is not (ibid.: 10). In any case, doubts about the empirical verification of a state of elite unity do not prevent the listing of numerous specific characteristics of such a state (ibid.: 7), nor, as we have seen, the subsequent provision of a clear definition. Nor has the same principle been applied to the issue of finding observable empirical referents for stability and instability, so any scientific principle that is held to be involved has not been applied consistently. It seems that what was then being asserted, and what remains central to the paradigm, is that historical episodes of elite transformation to unity can be identified (by evidence of sudden or phased movement toward commitment to agreed procedural norms, and effective access, in recent definitions), and that once achieved, elite unity, and hence political stability, is never lost. The original act, in other words, is sufficient evidence for the continuing state. This very bold claim is discussed further below.

Proceeding further with the basic definitions advanced, a political regime is said to be unstable “whenever government executive power is subject to irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force” (Higley and Burton 1988: 8). However, it is added immediately that in some cases (Uruguay from 1904 to 1973, Chile from 1932 to 1970–71, France from 1875 to 1940) that this definition would not cover, there may nevertheless be “an underlying condition of elite disunity”; therefore, the authors propose, “for a lasting democratic transition to occur, the national elite must first be transformed from disunity to consensual unity” (ibid.: 9).

This rider is significant, and its consequences require detailed exploration. The shift from “political stability” to “lasting democratic transition” obscures the fact that an alternative approach is being proposed here to the identification of political instability, to cover awkward cases: a regime is now to be considered politically unstable unless an identifiable elite transformation to consensual unity has taken place; in the absence of evidence of such a transformation, “the analyst should presume that the elite remains disunified, and the regime remains unstable” (ibid.: 10).
This move renders the initial statement that a disunified elite produces a series of unstable regimes tautological and unfalsifiable. At the same time, it clearly violates Burton and Higley’s statement elsewhere, advanced specifically to overcome the problem of circularity of argument, that “criteria for classifying elites and outcomes must be independent and tied to distinct observables” (Burton and Higley 1987a: 230). For this requirement to be met in a way that supports the theory, a definition of political instability must be provided, with its own independent referents, which plausibly fits cases where no elite transformation to consensual unity has been identified, while excluding those where such a transformation is claimed to have taken place.

At first sight, this evident difficulty with regard to unstable regimes might not appear to weaken the theory as a whole, as this concentrates in the main on the consequences of changes in elite states from disunity to consensual unity. As an early paper argues, “The basic hypothesis is . . . that changes in the states of national elites . . . precede and bring about changes in political stability and instability” (Field and Higley 1985: 2). As the changes of interest are those to stability and potentially to democracy, and as our authors find no clear historical cases of movement from consensual unity to disunity, it seems appropriate to read them as only advancing the single claim that where an elite transformation to consensual unity has taken place, political stability and a strong tendency for democracy will ensue.

Even here, though, the concession made with regard to the independent identification of political instability causes a problem. If long periods of apparent stability can mask an underlying instability in regimes where no prior elite transformation has occurred, then the mere fact of apparent stability in regimes where such an elite transformation is alleged to have taken place cannot be taken as independent evidence in support of the theory. In other words, until the question of independent criteria for the identification of political instability short of regime overthrow is clarified, we have no independent criteria for the identification of political stability of the kind that is created by consensual elite unity. This in turn suggests two separate lines of inquiry. The first concerns the issue of falsifiability. The second relates to the relationship proposed between elite transformation to consensual unity and political stability; a close examination of this relationship now will provide a basis for a later assessment of its plausibility and possible explanatory power. In view of the methodological stand the authors take, the issue of
falsifiability is an important one. It is also clear that the authors of the new paradigm are willing to be judged by the plausibility of the relationships they propose, and the use they make of the empirical evidence available to them, to support the central falsifiable proposition they advance.

If we turn our attention to the question of what would constitute unequivocal evidence of a breakdown of political stability, we find a clearly falsifiable and nontautological claim of quite sufficient significance to make the theory advanced well worthy of close consideration. In their definition of political instability, Higley and Burton disallow both “a high incidence of political violence in the form of revolts, riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions” and “frequent changes in the makeup of governing coalitions and cabinets” as indicators of instability. These criteria are rejected “because nearly all regimes at various times would qualify on one or both counts” (a significant point to which I shall return). They therefore settle on the definition given above — “subject to irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force” (Higley and Burton 1988: 8). It therefore seems correct to construe them here as proposing that a regime should be judged stable when it is not subject to such expected, attempted, or actual seizure.

Taking into account the difficulty noted above, we would regard the theory as definitely falsified, in part or in whole, if events that qualified as transformations to consensual elites were followed anywhere by regime seizure by force, and seriously weakened by good evidence of expected or attempted seizures by force following such events. However, the theory would not be substantiated by continuing stability as it appears to be defined. In other words, we should take as the central contention the specific claim that where an identifiable elite transformation to consensual unity has taken place, and in the absence of defeats in international warfare (Field and Higley 1985: 11), regime breakdown through seizure by force will never occur. We have already seen that this is implied in the treatment of elite unity. We should further note, lest this should still seem too bold a claim to hold our authors to, that in view of their difficulty over the independent identification of a state of instability (and the corresponding difficulty regarding stability), if they are not saying this, they are not saying anything.

The theory as it stands would be refuted, then, if regime breakdown occurred in England, Sweden, Colombia, or Venezuela, all of which have been identified as cases of elite settlement; or in Mexico, Spain, Austria, or Costa Rica, if evidence is
found of qualifying elite settlements there, as has been tentatively suggested (Burton and Higley, 1987b: 298); or in France, Italy, Japan, or West Germany, where two-step transformations have been identified, or in Belgium, Denmark, or Norway, where it is suggested that they have taken place. In addition, it would be refuted if clear cases of elite settlement could be found, fitting the definition advanced as well as any of the cases thus far identified, in countries that have since suffered seizure of power by force. As yet, as the authors acknowledge, little attention has been paid to negative cases, although a case has recently been made in brief for the absence of an elite settlement in France in 1875 (Higley and Burton 1988: 20–22). It would presumably also be greatly weakened if evidence could be found of successive elite settlements in any single country, as this would suggest that such settlements are not the once-and-for-all events they are claimed to be.

Given the manner in which the theory is set up, and the problems discussed above, the issue of falsifiability is an important one. An issue of equal importance concerns the plausibility of the key relationships proposed, and the quality of the evidence brought forward to support them. With this in mind, let us now turn to a fuller examination of the relationship proposed between elite consensus and political stability. We have already noted some difficulty over the identification of stability, and discovered in passing that it is not held to be incompatible with “a high incidence of political violence in the form of revolts, riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions.” We may proceed further by bringing the definitions of “elite” and “consensual elite” together. This provides us with a description of a consensual elite as one in which persons, who are able by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind to affect national outcomes regularly and substantially, share a largely tacit consensus amounting to a “restrained partisanship” and enjoy relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most effective decision makers.

There is an apparently minor issue of ambiguity here, which must be noted, in the failure to specify the inclusion of all such persons. Were it in doubt that such is the intention, the issue would be a major one, as the door would be opened to future instability arising from the actions of excluded elites. But the reference to elites as “a nation’s top leadership in all sectors” and the reference back at the same point to an earlier definition (from Field and Higley 1973: 8) of national elites as encompassing “all those persons capable, if they wish, of making substantial political trouble for
high officials . . . without being promptly repressed” seem to put the issue beyond doubt (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296).

Now, where all persons capable of causing serious trouble enjoy access and are committed to restrained partisanship, it may seem to follow automatically that political stability will result, as there is little scope or motive for the forcible overthrow of the regime; indeed, Higley and Burton comment that “it follows that, once this type of national elite is created, and so long as it persists, forcible seizures of government power by one or another discontented faction will not occur” (Higley and Burton 1988: 5). But when this claim is further examined, and set in the context of the argument as a whole, it is clear that very substantial claims are being made. First of all, we must take the claim to be not simply that all elites are concerned, but also that only elites, defined as “a nation’s top leadership in all sectors,” are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially, at least to the extent of forcibly overthrowing the regime. Otherwise, consensual elite unity would not rule out regime overthrow. The ability of elites to affect national outcomes is, in other words, fundamentally different in character to that of nonelites. In a separate discussion, Burton and Higley make clear their commitment to a theory that allows elites and nonelites “an important measure of independence in determining specific political outcomes,” and endorse the view that “to govern and to perpetuate their statuses, elites must appeal to and mobilize nonelite support” (Burton and Higley 1987a: 232–233). This is consistent with an earlier discussion (Field and Higley 1980: 19–20) that confines the roles of nonelites to setting broad limits to elite action, rather than independently bringing about particular outcomes. As yet the issue of elite-nonelite interdependence has not been introduced directly into the recent detailed discussions of elite transformation and its consequences, and we must assume that whatever its implications, elite consensus is sufficient to remove the possibility that nonelite action might bring down a regime, or even, presumably, cause it “serious trouble.” Second, it is claimed that such consensually unified elites have in fact come into being in identifiable historical episodes, either as consequences of particular forms of colonial rule, or as a result of the sudden and deliberate reorganization of elite relations through “elite settlements,” or through a more graduated two-step transformation. Third, and most significant, it is claimed that once such an elite consensus has been reached, it will outlive the particular individuals who made it, and
project political stability indefinitely into the future. In the following section I shall explore these claims further.

To conclude this section, which is concerned only with the basic definitions upon which the paradigm rests, I examine in detail the relationship between the definitions of consensual elites and political stability, of which the most interesting feature is not any apparent circularity, but almost the reverse — the striking disproportionality between the two.

The disproportionality in question is between political stability as an absence of expected, attempted, or actual regime overthrow, and elite consensus as embracing all persons capable of regularly and substantially affecting national political outcomes. Burton and Higley variously define elites as including “top position-holders in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organizations and movements in a society” (Higley and Burton 1988: 4), and as “a nation's top leadership in all sectors — political, governmental, business, trade union, military, media, religious, and intellectual — including both ‘establishment’ and ‘counterelite’ factions” (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296). Considered in isolation, this is an acceptable, indeed a conventional definition; but it sits uneasily alongside the related treatment of political stability as definitively terminated only by regime seizure by force, and thus calls into question the plausibility of the proposed relationship. The ability to affect national political outcomes regularly and seriously is one thing, and the ability to mount a credible threat to overthrow a regime is quite another. For political stability to be assured, why require the consensus of all elites in a position to affect national outcomes seriously? Why is the consensus of only those elites in a position to mount such a credible threat not sufficient? Conversely, if one occurrence of forcible overthrow is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of consensus, why should the elite groups in question need the ability to affect national outcomes regularly, as well as seriously? It seems that the stipulation of an ability to affect national outcomes seriously is too permissive, while the stipulation of an ability to do so regularly is too restrictive, once the issue of regime seizure by force is brought into the picture. If we turn our attention to specific elite sectors, it may be admitted at once that the military is not the only group able to overthrow a regime, if it is also accepted that the ascription of such an ability to other elite groups (for example, the clergy in Iran) raises unanswered questions about elite-nonelite relations. But it seems unduly
permissive to propose a definition that allows all the elite groups identified an equal ability in this regard, and fails to enquire into possible relationships between them. There is a substantial distance, in other words, in terms of probable actors and of degree, between regular and serious effects upon national outcomes, and regime overthrow. Ambiguity thus arises from the unwillingness of the authors to differentiate among the various sectors of the elite. Considerable further ambiguity arises from the fact that riots, revolts, strikes, and mass demonstrations are all pronounced compatible with political stability arising out of elite consensus.

An obvious query concerns the scale of such action that is possible without some substantial expectation of regime overthrow arising; a more significant query prompts itself with regard to the scale compatible with any credible assertion that elite consensus still exists. It may seem reasonable, for particular purposes, to define political stability in such a way that permits riots and revolts; it does not seem reasonable to link such a definition without further discussion to countries dominated by consensual elites of the kind described.

The root cause of the difficulty here seems to lie in the polarization of elite types as "consensually unified" or "disunified," respectively. Between the sharing of a largely tacit consensus amounting to restrained partisanship on the one hand and the sharing of few or no understandings about the proprieties of political conduct on the other there lies a vast space, as there does between a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction, and limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries, respectively. Such a degree of polarization might seem appropriate for the construction of ideal types, but it provides a very blunt instrument for the classification of existing elites, and their linking to the likelihood of regime overthrow. Furthermore, by committing themselves to classify all actually existing historical elites (leaving aside the separate cases of ideological unity) as one or the other, and abandoning the category of partial unity en route in the process, Burton, Field, and Higley themselves create the need to pinpoint dramatic transformations from one to the other. On practically any rough empirical assessment, a substantial number of elites would be located between these two poles, thus converting it into a continuum; what is more, many elites would move back and forth over time, without necessarily either achieving the state of bliss of consensual unity, or experiencing breakdown.
It is of course vital, for the proponents of the new elitist paradigm, to insist on polar opposites in the real world, as against a continuum, or their argument for the origins of political stability, and the whole paradigm as presently constructed, immediately collapses. But it appears to rest upon an undefended transmutation of ideal types into real world typological categories, and to overlook the space between the two types in question. Their inability to distinguish clearly between political stability and instability, in spite of the extreme gulf they perceive between disunified and consensually unified elites, gives us reason to be suspicious of this procedure. So does the disparity between their definitions of elite consensus and political stability, respectively. So, indeed, does their reluctance to inquire in any systematic manner into possible direct empirical referents of elite unity. It appears, then, that many of the fundamental and distinctive claims of the paradigm are of questionable validity. As we have seen, though, its progenitors attach particular importance to their ability to identify original episodes of elite transformation to consensual unity. To a large extent it is upon this that the theory rests. In the circumstances, we should examine very closely the claims made for such episodes, and it is to the most elaborated of those, elite settlement, to which I now turn.

**Elite Settlements**

Elite settlements are defined as “relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements.” They are initially claimed to have two main consequences: the creation of peaceful competition in accordance with the norms of restrained partisanship, and the generation of regimes in which “forcible power seizures no longer occur and are not widely expected” (Burton and Higley 1987b: 295). In a subsequent account the second of these consequences is said to follow from the first, and the procedural consequence of restrained partisanship is supplemented by a substantive consequence also touched upon elsewhere in the earlier article: assured access to decision making which over time allows elites to achieve their most basic aims (Higley and Burton 1988: 5). I take it, therefore, that elite settlements have both procedural and substantive consequences for participating elites, and that political stability follows. I shall argue here that the account provided of the origins of elite settlements is inadequate, that the settlements described do not
fulfill the conditions required for the creation of consensual elites, and that an account of mechanisms for the maintenance and periodic renegotiation of elite consensus is required, but not given.

In their full discussion of elite settlements, Burton and Higley are not only concerned to establish such settlements as distinct forms of major political change; they also seek to advance "a particular theoretical view" of them, contending "that (1) elite settlements are the result of relatively autonomous elite choices and thus cannot be predicted or explained in terms of social, economic or cultural forces; (2) the consensually unified elite structure created by a settlement constitutes the primary basis for subsequent political stability; which (3) is a necessary condition for the emergence and sustained practice of representative democratic politics" (Burton and Higley 1987b: 304). These are large claims, and I shall examine the first two in some detail. First of all, we may deal with the issue of prediction. Clearly, the analysis provided by Burton and Higley is no more able to predict elite settlements than any that might be based upon social, economic, or cultural forces. The settlements they discuss come at the end of periods of costly and inconclusive conflict, which begin to threaten elite supremacy, and are precipitated by particular crises; but it is nowhere argued that this combination of circumstances serves to predict elite settlement. Nor could it be, as these precipitating circumstances are as common historically as elite settlements are rare, and even in the cases where the latter occur, there is no saying why they come at a particular point in the course of conflict, or as a consequence of a particular crisis. Indeed, the very stress upon such settlements as the outcome of sudden and autonomous elite choices seems to reintroduce an unfortunate element of determinism.

Similar considerations apply to the explanation provided for elite settlements. This is conducted purely in terms of the motives elites have and the autonomy they enjoy from pressure from nonelites. As a consequence of costly and inconclusive conflict "elites are disposed to compromise if at all possible" (Burton and Higley 1987b: 298). But as we have already learned that frequent, costly, and presumably inconclusive conflict is the generic condition of disunified elites, we are bound to ask why all elites are not so disposed, and why elite settlements are not the norm, rather than the exception. This in turn directs our attention to a further question, essential to any coherent explanation, and directly begged by the phrase "disposed to compromise if at all possible" (emphasis mine). When is it possible for elites who may wish to
compromise to do so? One answer is given: when they are not unduly constrained by
pressure from nonelites. But, first, such a situation is held to be characteristic of
countries at a relatively low level of socioeconomic development, on which grounds
no historical cases can be ruled out; and, second, it is specifically stated that the four
countries examined were experiencing "levelling tendencies," suggesting that in these
cases pressure from below was growing rather than declining. Pressure from below
and its relative absence both seem to serve as explanations.

The most curious feature of the explanation, however, is that no account at all is
taken of the nature of the substantive interests of elites, although, as we have seen, it
is assumed that after the settlement, those interests are assured. It is argued at one
point that "all four national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy from mass
followings and pressures. Elite factions and their leaders could compromise on
questions of principle without strong pressures to stand firm" (ibid.: 301). This
implies that followers have principles, but elites do not; and it must further imply
either that elites have no substantive interests, or that such interests do not enter into
or impede settlements: if only followers will relinquish their commitments to specific
outcomes, elites are free to negotiate binding settlements among themselves. This is
entirely implausible, yet, to repeat the point, at no point in any of the discussion of
elite settlements are the various substantive interests of participating elites considered.

To summarize, no adequate explanation is provided for the ability to achieve elite
settlements. The general "explanation" given does not differentiate the four
paradigmatic cases from others in which disunified elites existed, and simply assumes
the absence, or automatic resolution, of fundamental conflicts over substantive
issues. Indeed, Burton and Higley acknowledge that their approach has not allowed
them "to sort out and look for causal connections between the various social,
economic, cultural and political forces that may affect elite settlements" (ibid.: 304).
They cannot at the same time claim to have advanced an explanation for elite
settlements. At most they can claim to have identified such settlements, and provided
a partial description of them. The same admission, incidentally, points to a further
ambiguity, with regard to the role they are actually claiming for political explanation.
At times it appears to be a sufficient alternative to other types of explanation; at times
it appears as the principal element in a broader explanation; and at times (as here) it
appears a necessary element in a broader explanation, but of indeterminate weight.
Equally, the absence of any development of the theory in this direction throws serious
doubt on the claim that such settlements should be viewed as primary, fundamental or causally prior events, giving rise to consensual unity and political stability. As yet, there is no reason to reject the view that such settlements are possible though by no means inevitable consequences of the prior elimination of serious social and economic sources of elite disunity.

A second issue concerns the extent to which the elite settlements described actually fulfill the conditions required for the generation of consensual elites. I shall argue that they do not. First of all, they are not comprehensive, for the obvious reason that those elites ruling at the time of the settlement were excluded. Second, no attempt is made to demonstrate that the settlement included all other elites. The initial definition advanced specifically refers to a sudden and deliberate reorganization of relations between previously warring elite factions. A true elite settlement, therefore, should presumably be struck between currently warring factions, in and out of power, not between factions previously hostile and currently out of power who combine to regain it. Again, Burton and Higley specifically note that these settlements were not comprehensive, pointing to the need to “distinguish between the initial, basic settlement and its subsequent consolidation” (ibid.: 299).

Burton and Higley here acknowledge empirically that the ousted rulers and other groups were initially excluded, but fail to admit to the necessary consequences for their theory. The first is that these are as much “two-step” transformations as any others. This in turn requires detailed attention to the “second step” that completes the settlement. No such detail is given, and if it were, that step would be revealed to consist, as often as not, of confirmation of exclusion, rather than incorporation. The second is that if these settlements were not comprehensive, their unique character as sudden and deliberate negotiation of hitherto divisive differences incorporating all elites and thus ensuring political stability dissolves, and they become difficult to distinguish from myriads of other successful broad alliances against unsatisfactory ruling regimes through history. This weakness is compounded by the fact that no attempt is made to establish that all other elites were involved; on the contrary, considerable emphasis is given to the point that those engaged in negotiation were primarily leading politicians from previous regimes. On the authors’ own account, only political elites were involved in England, Sweden, and Colombia, and only political and business leaders in Venezuela. It seems, then, unless further evidence can be provided, that these “elite settlements” were neither comprehensive nor
suddenly concluded. It is clear that significant and fairly unusual acts of sudden and deliberate compromise between some previously contending elite factions took place, but not that consensually unified elites as defined elsewhere were created by these acts. On the crucial issues of acceptance of procedural norms, restrained partisanship, and effective access, only the scantiest details are given, necessarily as regards effective access, as no evidence is offered as to the substantive interests of the elites involved.

A third issue, which is not addressed at all, concerns the mechanisms by which elite settlements once achieved might be projected into the future. Even if historical episodes could be found that satisfied the criteria for elite transformation to full consensual unity, one might reasonably ask for some such explanation, as it is clearly crucial to the argument regarding the link between consensual unity and political stability. Otherwise we are in a nebulous terrain akin to that of postrevolutionary socialist society, where the previous conflicts over politics have miraculously given way to the humdrum "administration of things." It is ironic that a paradigm put forward as a competitor to Marxism should reproduce so entirely one of its admitted weaknesses. In fact the failure to provide any account of such mechanisms is more than a reparable omission. It is the consequence of a gross contradiction, which becomes apparent when the static and dynamic treatments of elite consensus are compared. Consensual unity is said to be characterized by tacit consensus on the rules of the game, and effective access. Yet over time the rules of the game cease to command general support, and are often changed, sometimes in an atmosphere of considerable conflict and dissent. Equally, the constituent elements of the subscribing elites change, as a result not only of the admission of new sectors, but also of the downgrading or elimination of old ones. If the rules of the game can cease to command a consensus, and change, and if effective access can be lost, then there is no once-and-for-all settlement at all, but a continual process of negotiation among changing elite groups, jointly commanding more or less comprehensive support, some rising and some falling through history, and sharing a greater or lesser degree of consensus over time. The authors of the new paradigm cannot address this issue, for if they did the logic of their argument would collapse.

A brief examination of the recent description of "two-step" transformation to consensual elite unity confirms the arbitrary use of the basic definitions discussed above, and reveals an even more arbitrary approach to the question of identification of
the achievement of elite consensus. The most striking feature of the discussion of the two-step transformation is that it entirely reverses the analytical procedure followed previously and reflected in the discussion of elite settlements. Elsewhere the argument has rested in the final analysis upon the identification of moments of elite transformation, to the extent, as we have seen, that in the absence of such a transformation we are advised to assume that apparent stability is still precarious. Here, though, the authors simply take political stability as given, then set themselves the task of finding evidence of elite movement to consensual unity. They open their paper with the statement that “few students of comparative politics would dispute the assertion that France, Italy, Japan and West Germany are today stable democracies” (Field et al. 1988b: 1). They then trace two-step transformations in their chosen countries. In this account, strikes, protest actions and the emergence of neo-fascism are seen as evidence of elite disunity in Italy in the 1950s (ibid.: p. 10), although we have already seen that strikes and protest actions are not taken as evidence of loss of elite unity in countries that have achieved it, and although the emergence of dissident intellectual movements and left-wing terrorism in the late 1970s is held to have prompted rather than disconfirmed elite transformation to consensual unity in the same country. Communist support for antiterrorist legislation prompts the comment that “this overt defence of existing institutions by the core component of the formerly disaffected elite camp should be viewed as the second of the two steps by which the Italian national elite was transformed from disunity to consensual unity” (ibid.: 15). The use of evidence here suggests that whenever proof of unity or disunity, or stability or instability is required, it will always be found. Furthermore, the approach here confirms that consensual unity does not require the assent of all elites, and it inaugurates a new flexibility with regard to empirical evidence of achieved elite consensus.

Taking the four cases together, the first step to consensual unity is found in center and right-wing cooperation under De Gaulle in France between 1958 and 1962; the formation of the Moro-led Christian Democrat–Socialist coalition in Italy in 1963; the outcome of the war, or perhaps Adenauer’s coalition-building between 1949 and 1953, in West Germany; and perhaps the 1955 formation of the LDP in Japan, but more likely the emergence of centrist factions between 1960 and 1964, and the shift of the LPD to the center. The second step, which completes consensual unity, is identified as the electoral triumph of the Socialists in France in 1981; the elite front
against terrorism in Italy in 1979; perhaps the period between the 1959 Bad Godesberg program and the 1961 elections in West Germany, but more suitably the 1966 Grand Coalition; and perhaps by the evolution by the mid-1980s in Japan of the JSP to a position where it was no longer an antisystem party. The mere recital of the varied phenomena is evidence enough that the qualifications for the certification of unified elites are now so varied, and so permissive, that the attempt to apply any rigorous test has been abandoned, and few countries would fail to offer some qualifying evidence. By the structure of the argument, which now infers consensual unity from scholarly consensus on stability, then describes a gradual and multifaceted move toward a significant degree of consensus, then seeks to select two turning points to serve as the two steps that will justify the model, the authors are admitting in practice that the achievement of elite consensus is a gradual and incomplete process, and a matter of degree rather than abrupt transformation. They are also coming very close to arguing that it is political stability that can be unerringly identified, and that what preceded it must therefore have been the achievement of consensual elite unity. Thus, the method through which elite settlements were explored is reversed. In the first case, elite settlements are initially identified, and it is then argued that what followed was political stability; in the second case, political stability is identified first, and it is then argued that what preceded it were transformations (in two stages in this case) to elite unity.

The problems arising from the inconsistency of treatment of elite settlements and two-step transformations, respectively, are compounded by the discriminatory treatment accorded to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The first two are cited as cases of two-step transformations, with Denmark's occurring between 1901 and 1935, and Norway's between 1884 and 1935. Sweden, on the other hand, having experienced an "elite settlement" in the early nineteenth century, is deemed to have been stable thenceforward, and presumably not to have required further settlements or elite transformations. Yet, events in Sweden in the 1930s appear to have followed a pattern rather similar to those in Denmark and Norway. In 1932 a period of intense partisan rivalry ended with an electoral alliance in the "cow trade" between the Agrarian Party and the Social Democrats. This was followed, in 1938, by the Saltjobaden agreement, in which labor, business, farmers, and government negotiated a comprehensive pact that set the course of Swedish social democracy for over a generation.
As Gourevitch comments, the 1932 electoral arrangement preceded similar developments in Denmark and Norway. He further provides, in his brief but analytically acute account of the period, good reason to doubt the adequacy of the general approach adopted by the new elite theorists. First, he underlines the significance of the national and international economic context, asserting that internationally oriented firms only accepted the fundamental compromise after 1936, helped by the beginnings of recovery, and that likewise farmers could accept the policy compromises of the period for the longer term in view of their own improved conditions from the same period. Second, he sketches out a quite different dynamic from that proposed in the two-step transformation: in this case, the final push to comprehensive settlement was given by the failure of the Agrarian Party to form a government alone, and its coming to terms with the fact that the Social Democrats could not be excluded. Here, then, conditions of crisis after 1930 were met with a conditional alliance between conservatives and moderating radicals, with the latter able to establish a majority and win over conservative recalcitrants in conditions of economic recovery that made the basic compromise sketched out in the depression years acceptable as a fundamental policy orientation. The Swedish case in the 1930s therefore casts doubt on the validity of the distinction between these three Scandinavian cases, or at least upon the alleged efficacy of Sweden's first elite settlement. It also strongly suggests that the prescribed dynamic of the two-step transformation may be too reductionist, in its elimination in practice of substantive social and economic issues from consideration, and too determinist in its imposition of a rigid path to the completion of the two-step process. To summarize, the development of the two-step transformation reverses the earlier logic of the paradigm, and reinforces the doubts raised by its definitional structure, and the treatment of elite settlements.

New Elitism Versus Old Marxism

One of the most insistent claims made by the proponents of the new elite paradigm is that it stands ready to fill the vacuum created by the weakened hold of pluralist and Marxist alternatives. This is linked to an equally consistent emphasis upon the causal priority attached to elite transformations to consensual unity in the achievement of political stability. Thus, Burton and Higley seek to shift attention "from the
establishment of democratic institutions to the empirically distinct, causally prior, circumstances and actions of elites” (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296), and to “postulate a causal relationship between elites and regimes, in which elite structure is viewed as logically and factually prior to regime stability” (Higley and Burton 1988: 9). Where such formulations are advanced in the context of a stated preference for political over “social structural” types of explanation, it allows the impression to emerge that a distinctively political analysis is being advanced. In this section, I shall argue that despite occasional appearances, and apparent claims, to the contrary, the break made with “social structural” explanations is only partial. What is more, an examination of the partial character of the break will reveal a heavy reliance upon class-based explanation, and suggest that as it stands at present, the new elitist paradigm is distinguished from Marxism only by its arbitrary refusal to inquire at all into the areas where the competing approaches might be evaluated.

Although the new elite theorists argue that elite transformations to consensual unity are essentially political acts, and are causally prior to both political stability and to possible eventual transitions to democracy, they do not in fact deny that elite transformations themselves may have social structural antecedents. Instead, they declare themselves agnostic as to their possible causality (above, p. 13). The consequences of this stance are seen most clearly in Burton and Higley’s account of the elite settlement of 1688–89 in England. They refer to Moore’s argument that the civil war gave rise to government by a “committee of landlords,” and Skocpol’s contention that it “established the dominance of the landed upper class over the monarchy,” they then state that “from our perspective, Moore and Skocpol are certainly right that the events of the seventeenth century secured upper-class dominance of the English political regime. But unlike them we think the crucial development in this process was the settlement fashioned by previously disunified, mainly upper-class elite factions in 1688–89.” Thus, more than anything else, “the unification of predominantly upper-class elite factions via a sudden and deliberate settlement secured upper-class control of the regime . . .” (Burton and Higley 1987b: 302).

There are several features worthy of comment here. First, the authors do not reject a class analysis. On the contrary, whatever the full array of elite sectors they might identify elsewhere, they are willing to reduce them to class forces here. Second, they locate elite settlement within a broader process, asserting only that the
settlement itself was the crucial step. Third, the assertion that settlement was the crucial step is affirmed, but not defended. Fourth, it comes at the end of the process, rather than originating it. Fifth, beyond the acceptance of the view that upper-class dominance was achieved through the civil war, no attempt is made to ascertain the substantive interests of the groups involved in elite settlement, or the extent to which those elites and their interests may have been reshaped during and after the years of civil war, and prior to the eventual settlement. It seems doubtful, therefore, that elite settlement has been shown to be causally prior to the achievement of political stability in any sense that validates a political over a social structural analysis; at most it suggests that there is a political dimension to be taken into account. What is more, there is neither any challenge, nor any addition, to fairly crude class analysis. The authors do claim at one point that they “find few indications that in arranging settlements elites were mainly reflecting broader social or economic or cultural forces.” But this claim is entirely innocuous. It is not inconsistent with the view that they were setting up a system that would allow them to advance and protect their own interests in the future; indeed, this is the very alternative immediately proposed: “Rather, the settlements apparently grew out of deliberate, relatively autonomous elite choices among an array of possible strategies for protecting their diverse factional interests” (ibid.). Once again, then, the argument faithfully reflects the refusal to inquire into the nature of elite interests, and the possible bases for their conciliation. In any case, a political settlement could eventually ensue some considerable time after intraelite social and economic conflicts had been resolved, and that may well be the case here. In fact, no defense is mounted at all against an explanation that seems entirely consistent with the facts as presented: that elite settlement, though by no means inevitable, was only possible because of the reordering of class forces that came about during and after the civil war. The process of unification may have culminated in the settlement to which so much importance is attached, but it did not consist solely of that settlement. On the contrary, it was a protracted, multifaceted one in which the resolution of fundamental social and economic sources of conflict arguably merits explanatory priority. Perhaps it does not, but as Burton and Higley do not enter into the argument, which must be a crucial one if we are to discriminate between their paradigm and possible “social structural” rivals, we cannot accept that they have done more than state, and restate, their own faith in this regard.
Further doubt is cast upon the extent to which a robust alternative to a class-based paradigm is being offered by the fact that the only substantive explanation offered for the impetus to elite transformation to consensual unity is itself class-based. Beyond pointing to a sequence of protracted and inconclusive conflict followed by a major political crisis, Burton and Higley argue, as we have seen, that acts of elite settlement were preceded and in part prompted by “the unleashing of leveling social revolutionary tendencies” in civil wars in England and Colombia, and “indications of the potential for leveling tendencies to take control” in Sweden and Venezuela (ibid.: 298). It seems, therefore, that they are receptive to the suggestion that all confirmed cases of elite settlement can be explained as the negotiation of dominant class unity in response to a threat from below. Here, again, we are handicapped in our evaluation of the underlying argument by the fact that the presentation of the cases of elite settlement depends upon a “borrowed” class analysis for the English case, while no other is examined in detail. We may only say, therefore, that as it stands, the paradigm offers at best a supplement to class analysis, rather than an alternative to it.

If we look elsewhere, though, we find much stronger evidence of the superiority of a clearly Marxist paradigm, largely provided by Burton and Higley themselves. We have already noted that while the treatment of elite settlements gives some consideration to the inevitability and variability of elites, it has yet to specify the significance of elite-nonelite interdependence. The discussion of this third topic elsewhere throws considerable light on the relation of the new elitist paradigm to a Marxist alternative, and inadvertently confirms the force of the criticisms offered here with regard to the failure to inquire into the substantive basis, or lack of it, for elite unification. In their extended discussion of elite-nonelite interdependence, Burton and Higley suggest that Pareto’s musings on the subject should be modified by bringing his own recognition of the importance of material interests more to the fore, and modifying the latter “so as to incorporate the generally Marxian idea that an individual’s politically relevant interests and inclinations are rooted in his or her location in the social division of labour” (Burton and Higley 1987a: 234). This leads them to reaffirm a three-way characterization of nonelites laid out earlier (Field and Higley 1980: 21–35), and to argue, as noted above, that the balance between different nonelite types that results constrains elite options by setting broad limits to the kinds of support to which they can appeal. In what follows, they venture further to suggest that “in any relatively bureaucratized society, the social division of labor is
great enough to ensure that nonelite interests and inclinations are themselves conflicting, usually, but not always, along the lines of the class-based conflicts that Marxian theory depicts" (ibid.: 235).

This approach to the understanding of nonelites is interesting enough in itself. It is most significant, however, for what is not said, in that the same criterion is not applied to the analysis of elites. If nonelites are to be approached through their locations in the social division of labor, and if the conflicts between them are to be assumed to be usually class-based, what justification is there for declining to analyze elites in the same way? The treatment given to nonelites here (significantly, improving on the original elitist analysis by introducing thoroughly Marxist concepts, rather than showing that a Marxist analysis can be bettered by introducing concepts from elitism) strongly reinforces the argument that the failure to inquire at all elsewhere into the substantive interests of elites reflects the lack, in the elitist paradigm, of any alternative approach to the identification of those substantive interests.

The approach adopted is saved from transmutation into a fully fledged Marxist analysis only by treating elites, unlike nonelites, as lacking substantive interests, and by calling an arbitrary halt to the analysis of key historical episodes at the moment of political unification, by declining to inquire too closely into what has gone before. This brings us directly to the secret at the heart of the new elite paradigm. It achieves its balancing of political and social structural factors in the explanation of political change by arbitrarily treating the attitudes and orientations of nonelites as entirely determined by their location in the social division of labor, and those of elites as entirely unconstrained by any such factors. Nonelites are autonoma, driven by an iron structural determinism, and providing arenas for elite choice not by exercise of their own free will, but as passive vessels of predetermined orientations. Elites enter the political arena free of any given interests or social and economic ties, and have the ability, if they will, to maintain a degree of consensus among themselves sufficient to perpetuate their elite status and privileges. Thus, "the paradigm holds that the essential choices of politics are elite choices because non-elite orientations are fairly firmly fixed by the basic circumstances of different kinds of work in the four levels of development" (Field and Higley 1980: 47). Recent developments of explanatory theory out of the paradigm have faithfully reflected this arbitrary polarization of choice and determinism, and should be seen as embodying a set of ideologically
charged assumptions, rather than exploring the complexities of processes of political change in the real world.

**Conclusion**

The new elite theorists argue that political stability can only be secured through elite transformation to consensual unity, characterized by agreement on procedural rules, and by effective access. They identify and describe in detail elite settlements and two-step transformations as two of the three historical forms such elite transformations have taken, special colonial legacies being the third. They further contend that once such transformations have taken place, political stability is secured, and transitions to enduring democracy become possible. And they present these arguments as being explanatory theories of the kind that are essential if their new elitist paradigm is to win general acceptance. I have argued, in response, that (1) they do not provide a clear distinction between political stability and instability, independently of their identification of elite states; (2) they improperly seek to allocate historically existing elites to polar opposite ideal types, as “unified” or “disunified,” ignoring possible intermediate categories or the case for a continuum along the dimension of unity; (3) they consequently generate significant disproportionality between the concepts of consensual elite unity and political stability; (4) they do not inquire sufficiently into the character of different elite sectors, and the relations between them; (5) they do not examine at all the substantive interests of elite sectors, and the changes in them that might precede the achievement of consensual unity or help to explain its absence; (6) they are therefore unable to explain the success, as opposed to the motivation, of elites seeking consensual unity; (7) they provide no basis for their claim that once achieved, procedural consensus and effective access will be maintained indefinitely, and in particular (8) they are unable to account for changes in procedural rules and elite structure after transformations to consensual unity; (9) their accounts of elite settlements do not conform to the definitions of such transformations, as they are neither comprehensive, nor suddenly achieved; (10) the logic of explanation employed with regard to elite settlements is unceremoniously reversed in the treatment of two-step transformations, and (11) in those two-step transformations the identification of the successive steps is essentially arbitrary; (12) the completion of two-step transformations is claimed for Denmark and Norway in the 1930s, in which
case Sweden also clearly qualifies, and the case for the finality of the original elite settlement falls; (13) where specific explanations are advanced they are generally class-based and in some cases taken directly from Marxism; and (14) where class-based or social structural explanations are rejected, it is on the basis of a prior refusal to enter into the necessary debate on points of substance, rather than on the basis of the advancing of superior explanations consistent with the new paradigm advanced. Finally, (15) the paradigm relies ultimately upon a parceling out of structural determinism and voluntarism that allows elites to make entirely unconstrained political choices, while ascribing to the situations of nonelites a degree of determinism that would put the most vulgar of Marxists to shame. For all these reasons, I question the larger claims made with regard to the rehabilitation of elite theory, and its superior claims over rival approaches.
NOTES


2In fact, Field and Higley (1980, p. 41) leave open the question of whether consensually unified elites will succeed in managing the conflicts arising out of postindustrialism ("Level 4 society"). But the distinction between levels of development is not incorporated into later statements of the theory, and if the qualification is maintained it follows, first, that some explanation is required for the ability of elite consensus to handle some nonelite configurations but not others, as elite consensus elsewhere appears sufficient in itself; and, second, that most Western democracies can no longer be considered politically stable as a consequence of elite consensus: the recent cases of two-step transformation would have to be deemed to have passed into political stability and immediately out of it again. At the very least, the qualification would require that the scope of the theory be restricted to bureaucratically organized societies until they pass into postindustrialism. I am assuming, therefore, that the relationship between elite consensus and political stability is seen as holding at Level 4.

3For a relevant discussion, and some pointers as to the form such an analysis might take, see the section on “institutional persistence” in Krasner (1988). Krasner draws upon Stinchcombe (1968) to emphasize the need for an explanation of “how institutions persist over time, even though their environments may change” (ibid., p. 81). His insistence that accounts of originating events also require “an examination of how preexisting structures delimit the range of possible options” is equally relevant, and equally reveals the paucity of the “explanatory” focus adopted here.

4Thus, the successive extensions of the franchise in England/Great Britain and Sweden would appear to require individual detailed examination. It is relevant also to note that in December 1988 an elite movement entitled “Charter 88” was launched in Britain, protesting the increasingly authoritarian character of the government, and calling, among other things, for a bill of rights, proportional representation, the replacement of the House of Lords with a democratic, nonhereditary second chamber, and the placing of “all agencies of the state under the rule of law.” Its founding charter argues that “the events of 1688 only shifted the absolute power of the monarch into the hands of the parliamentary oligarchy,” and reflects considerable dissent in Britain with the “rules of the game” as they stand at present. For details, see New Statesman and Society, 2 December 1988, pp. 10-11.

5Elsewhere, and in a different context, the need for political settlements between and within nations to be “negotiated over and over again” is strongly emphasized (Field and Higley 1980: 95). It is not clear why the considerations advanced there are judged irrelevant to the broader issue here.

6See P. Gourevitch (1986), pp. 131-134. Gourevitch comments that of all his case studies (of responses to economic crisis in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States after 1873, after 1929, and in the 1980s), “the accommodation in Sweden was the most explicit piece of social bargaining among social forces in any of our five countries for any of our three periods” (ibid., p. 134).
REFERENCES


