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Urbanization, Migration, and Development

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INTRODUCTION

Commentators have, for some years, drawn attention to the social and economic ills that could arise from over-urbanization in developing countries (Gugler, 1988). These forebodings appeared premature in the 1970s when cities in many parts of the developing world grew economically, and when the benefits of this growth trickled down even to the poorest urban inhabitants (Roberts, 1978; Gregory, 1986). I suspect that this period of optimism is now over, and in this paper, I explore the possibility that urbanization in developing countries now, at last, faces its crisis. Such forecasting is risky since current difficulties may prove short term, but I wish to raise certain research and policy issues that have been overlooked by stressing the continuities with the past.

The basis for my claim that a watershed has been reached is two current preoccupations in the literature on urbanization and development. The first is with the transformation in the world economy, in which markets for capital, for commodities, and for labor, previously fragmented by national boundaries, are increasingly integrated on an international scale, resulting in a new international division of labor (Frobel et al., 1980; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). The second is with interpreting national and even city-level urban processes in terms of this evolving world system, its inter-dependencies and division of labor (Timberlake, 1985, 1987).

The transformation in the world economy is based, it has been argued, on supranational financial agencies, on microprocessor-based technologies that facilitate the coordination of production and of service delivery on a world-wide scale, and on the evolving role of the multinational corporation in internationalizing production as well as consumption patterns (Canak: 1989: 10-13). Developing countries are drawn into the new division of labor, but their place within it is ambivalent. Some become locations for export industries, on the basis of their comparative advantage in low labor costs and high degrees of control over labor; but these opportunities are limited by new, flexible production technologies in the core countries that are reconcentrating production in new and old regions of the developed world (Schoenberger, 1988).

This ambivalence fosters an approach to underdevelopment that is sharply different from the "developmentalist" policies previously dominant: instead of state-directed economic intervention aimed at promoting industrialization and modernization, economic liberalism dominates international trade policies and policies advocated for the internal economies of underdeveloped countries. One of the major mechanisms by which this pattern of integration affects urbanization is through the financial dependence of developing countries on developed countries. Loans are tied to policy requirements that severely limit the capacity of the governments of developing nations to intervene in urbanization and ameliorate its negative consequences. These loans are tied to austerity measures that, as Walton and Ragin (1989) argue,
affect urban populations most harshly.

Such developments suggest that urbanization in developing countries is occurring in a significantly different context in the present period to that which prevailed as recently as the early 1970s. I will focus on Latin America, contrasting the contemporary phase of urbanization with that dominated by import-substitution industrialization (ISI). The ISI phase of urbanization in Latin America refers to the period of rapid urban growth from approximately the 1930s to the 1970s. National development policies promoted industrialization through tariffs and subsidies, with the aim of supplying the domestic market and reducing dependency on the export of primary products.

By limiting myself to Latin America, I will not be able to take proper account of the diversity of patterns of contemporary urbanization in developing countries. This diversity is linked, in part, to differences in the histories of their integration into the world system. Other developing countries have been, for instance, less committed to ISI, resulting in marked differences in timing and levels of urbanization. In the first section, therefore, I consider briefly the diversity of patterns of urbanization in developing countries, suggesting ways in which these differences are likely to affect their "responses" to the new order.

I will then consider some of the contributions made by world system theory to understanding urbanization in developed and developing countries (which, following that theory's convention, will be called core and non-core). Drawing in a general way on these insights, I will look at the current spatial restructuring of urban systems in non-core countries and at the changes in patterns of migration, in labor markets, and urban social organization.

THE PATTERN OF URBANIZATION IN NON-CORE COUNTRIES

My aim in this section is to show the diversity of patterns of urbanization in non-core countries. I also explore, in a very preliminary way, the factors that account for this diversity and that are likely to temper the impact of the new economic order on non-core countries.

The classifications I use are based on contrasts in the timing and mode of incorporation into the world economy. These two variables provide a preliminary understanding of the key historical experiences affecting urbanization, particularly varieties of agrarian transformation. Five types of incorporation can be identified from among the geographical groupings in Table 1, though they are purely suggestive, needing further analysis at the level of individual countries to assess variations in timing and mode of incorporation.

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2 This demarcation is heuristic, since changes in the world economy are gradual and cumulative. The financial restructuring occasioned by the oil 'crises' of the early 1970s, however, appears to be a turning-point in development policies.

3 The distinctions developed by world system theory are between core, semi-periphery and periphery (Kentor, 1985). Since I will not distinguish between semi-periphery and periphery, I follow the convention of using non-core to include both semi-periphery and periphery.
TABLE I.

ANNUAL RATES OF URBANIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 1950–1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Growth Rates:</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
<th>Type 3</th>
<th>Type 4</th>
<th>Type 5</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperate South America^a</td>
<td>1.1 2.2 5.5 0.8 1.1 2.8 1.7 2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tropical and Middle America^b</td>
<td>0.7 1.8 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.8 1.4 3.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.5 1.5 0.1 1.7 0.9 2.7 1.7 3.3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia^c</td>
<td>0.4 1.1 0.5 1.7 1.1 2.6 1.9 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa^d</td>
<td>1.6 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tropical Africa^e</td>
<td>84.3 68.1 20.6 25.2 42.1 23.6 26.3 65.3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia^f</td>
<td>39.1 34.3 27.2 25.9 30.9 6.2 29.7 53.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>69.8 62.6 51.4 61.7 69.3 49.8 56.6 39.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>84.3 68.1 20.6 25.2 42.1 23.6 26.3 65.3</td>
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% in Urban Agglomerations, 1985^1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Urban growth due to Natural increase 1950–90^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69.8 62.6 51.4 61.7 69.3 49.8 56.6 39.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

a. Temperate South America includes Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.
b. Tropical and Middle America are the other countries of South America, Central America and Mexico.
c. Southern Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
d. North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.
e. Tropical Africa is all of Africa excepting North Africa and Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland).
f. Southeast Asia includes Burma, East Timor, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Brunei.

1. Agglomerations are capital cities and cities with 2 million inhabitants or more in 1985. Figures are the proportion of the urban population of each area who live in such cities.
2. This is the proportion of urban growth accounted for by vegetative population growth.


The first type includes those areas that were incorporated earliest and through the most radical restructuring of rural social relationships and show the highest levels of urbanization, and initially high but declining rates of urbanization, namely the various areas of Latin America (see Table I).

The second of these types is the early incorporation of countries, such as China and India, that had well-developed internal markets, but whose economies were not fundamentally restructured by incorporation into the world system. In both these countries, internally generated economic changes were slow and colonialism or, in the case of China, neo-colonialism brought no radically new sets of social and economic
relationships (Raza et al., 1981; Skinner, 1977). Both the rates and levels of urbanization are low.

The experiences associated with the third type, those fitting the countries of North Africa, are similar since they, too, were incorporated early and without fundamental restructuring, and rates of urbanization are low. The contrast with China and India is that, lacking large internal markets, countries of this type have been heavily dependent on external trade, resulting in moderately high levels of urbanization, associated with an old urban culture (Abu-Lughod, 1980: 30-51).

The fourth type is of relatively early incorporation, with uneven restructuring, resulting in "islands" of export agriculture or mining amidst subsistence cultivation. The countries of Tropical Africa and South-east Asia fit this type, though to varying degrees. The level of urbanization is low, but the rate of urbanization is high. (For more detailed accounts, see Gugler and Flanagan [1977] and Hart [1987] for Africa; Armstrong and McGee [1985:88-110] and Nemeth and Smith [1985] for Asia.)

The fifth type also shows high rates of urbanization. It is the most recent form of incorporation into the world system, that associated with the political economy of the cold war. These are the "new" Asian countries, of which South Korea is the example in Table 1, that became significant locations of foreign investment in the 1950s and 1960s. Their rapid transformation is closely linked to two phenomena: considerable economic and military aid and their proximity to Japan, as the latter seeks markets and outlets for investment (Nemeth and Smith, 1985: 197-204; Deyo, 1986).

The consequences of different development histories reach beyond the demographic components of contemporary urbanization. Types of historical experience are also significant in forming the social actors in urban development. As Henderson (1986) argues, it is the nature of the state and the balance of social forces within it that, in practice, mediate the impact of the world system on urban development. Non-core countries vary widely in the developmental priorities of their governments with respect, for instance, to housing and urban welfare provision, partly because of variations in the relative strength of the various class groupings that affect these priorities.

Two variables are crucial, and I introduce them to indicate the need to further differentiate the types outlined above. One is the centralization of the state and its capacity to administer its territory in the face of centrifugal forces, such as regionalism. The other is the strength of the "challenge" that the state faces from the emerging urban classes -- the working class and also the middle classes.

The contrast between Latin America and South Korea is instructive in this respect. The Latin American states have been independent nations for over a century but centrifugal forces, generated by regionally-based economic interests, have been strong, though that strength varies considerably from country to country. South Korea, in contrast, was born as a highly centralized state inheriting the traditions of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy and, because of an early and radical agrarian reform that destroyed regional agrarian elites, had weak centrifugal forces with which to contend (Kang, 1989). The challenge that the Latin American states have faced from the urban classes, however, has been stronger than in the case of
South Korea. Most Latin American countries acquired substantial urban populations earlier than did South Korea, and in some, such as Argentina and Brazil, industrialization had already massed workers in urban factories by the 1940s (Roberts, 1978: Chapter Three).

South Korea industrialized later, with substantial rural to urban migration. The urban classes in South Korea, then, are more "immature" than those of most Latin American countries. In face of a strong state, they have, until recently, been unable to organize to obtain better conditions of work and pay (Deyo, 1986). In contrast, in most Latin American countries, labor has played a major role politically and the state has, though to different degrees, coopted the various urban classes through subsidies, union organization, and welfare provision. Pearson (1986) points out that this difference between Latin America and the industrial "tigers" of Asia helps explain why Latin American countries, with some exceptions, are not chosen as sites for export assembly industry based on cheap and usually feminine labor.

The shaping of current responses by the different types of historical experience is by no means determined, since the limits set on state and class formation are broad ones and other factors, such as natural resources and size of a country, need to be considered. All these countries are part, however, of the same world system and it is to the exploration of the present logic of that system that I now turn.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND URBANIZATION

Various studies have shown the implications of the current transformation in the world system for urbanization at the core (Noyelle and Stanback, 1984; Sassen-Koob, 1985; Hill, 1986; Hill and Feagin, 1987; Feagin, 1988). Multinational corporations operate a global strategy in which their various divisions are divided spatially: headquarters in one city, regional headquarters in another, and manufacturing or service delivery plants in yet other cities. Corporations operating a world strategy have no strong commitment to place, relocating different divisions according to the most cost-effective strategy -- where certain types of labor are cheaper, are more available, or where favorable tax or other concessions are obtained. In this way, the strategies of the automobile corporations change the face of Detroit, displacing factories from the central areas and renewing them as corporate headquarters (Hill, 1986). These corporate strategies make the uses of urban space more volatile than in the past, with the processes most intense in such world cities as New York or Los Angeles, followed by second-level cities such as Houston or Detroit (Soja, 1986, 1987; Feagin, 1988; Sassen-Koob, 1988).

The effects on labor markets are equally systematic, resulting in different occupational structures between cities at different levels of the hierarchy. Those of the "world" cites, such as New York or London, and particularly those of their centers, tend to polarize between well-paid professional and technical jobs, mainly concentrated in producer services, and low-paid unskilled jobs in personal service occupations, "sweat-shop" manufacturing, and domestic out-work. Manual jobs with intermediate pay in manufacturing or
clerical jobs, such as those in data processing, are displaced to smaller towns or suburban locations (Sassen-Koob, 1988; Noyelle and Stanback, 1984; Noyelle, 1987: 108-109).

Some studies of urbanization in non-core countries have also looked at how the world system and its processes affect the urban hierarchies and internal urban processes of individual countries (London, 1980; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Nemeth and Smith, 1985). The major focus, however, has been on cross-national comparisons. Variables associated with non-core position, such as degree of multinational penetration, have been shown to correlate positively with rapid urban growth and with employment concentration in the tertiary sector, and negatively with economic growth (London, 1987; London and Smith, 1988; Bradshaw, 1987). In these studies, the impact of external economic dependency is shown, following Lipton (1977), to affect urbanization and development mainly through intermediate, internal processes. These include patterns of investment that disrupt the agrarian structure, resulting in "urban bias" and producing an over-inflated tertiary sector.

Useful as these studies are, they need to take into account the shift in the world system context produced by the ending of the ISI phase and the emergence of the new phase of economic liberalism. The economic dependency associated with the ISI period is different in one essential respect from that of the present period. ISI created economic dependency through the investments of multinationals and the use of imported technology, but it was inward-looking and aimed basically at the development and exploitation of the internal market. This difference between an economic dependency based on internal and fragmented markets and the current one based on integrated world markets has significant implications for the key actors in urbanization.

In the ISI period, the state, because of the relative weakness of local capital, becomes an active agent in urban development by taking a major role in creating economic infrastructure. Urban bias is likely to be strongest in the ISI phase. Urban bias created the basis for the populist coalitions between state, the urban classes, and industrial capital, whether foreign or local. The urban middle and working classes were junior partners in these coalitions but, compared to the rural population, they received substantial benefits in health and educational services and through food and other subsidies. States in different countries handled these issues in widely differing ways, and the effective participation of the new urban classes varied widely also, as shown by the contrast between the relative strength and independence of trade unions in Argentina, for example, with their subordination in Brazil (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969: 120-21). State employment grew rapidly as a proportion of all non-agricultural employment and it was concentrated in the major cities of the periphery, with state employees often being privileged contractually and through welfare benefits.

The current period brings a significant change in the role of the state at the periphery. Less able to attract private or government loans from core countries and under pressure from international financial organizations to reduce public spending, peripheral states retrench employment and move to liberalize
internal markets, reducing tariffs on imports, privatizing state-owned companies and reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The private sector, though less capable of taking an independent political stance than in the core because of the weakness of domestic capital and the strength of foreign capital, gains greater independent power. In the ISI period, domestic capital often allied with foreign multinationals, supplying them with goods and services, and both benefited from state intervention and from the expansion of the internal market (Evans, 1979). In the export phase, the possibilities of cooperation are potentially greater since, in alliance with foreign capital, a domestic entrepreneur can penetrate markets in the core as well as internal ones. The state remains important to these developments, providing the incentives to foreign investment and ensuring that the social and economic environment encourages private initiative, through deregulating labor and reducing government expenditures. Citizens continue, as in the ISI period, to play a much greater role in shaping urban space than they do in core countries. Much of the housing and basic urban amenities are secured by self-help and reciprocity and not by state and market. The relationship between the state (and whoever controls it) and the citizenry becomes, however, potentially more conflict-ridden as urban subsidies are reduced and both the welfare and employment roles of the state are attenuated (Walton and Ragin, 1989).

In the following sections, I look in greater detail at the implications of this change for urbanization in the context of the world system, beginning with its consequences for spatial restructuring.

URBAN DIVERSIFICATION

One of the major likely consequences of the new order, as Portes (1989) indicates, is the gradual decline of urban primacy, where it has been pronounced, and the growth of intermediate-size cities. In the ISI period, the concentration of population and of industrial activity was heavy, since industries located close to their major markets and the jobs created reinforced concentration (Browning, 1972). Today the proportion of the urban population who live in major cities is high throughout the developing world. Figures for Latin America illustrate the trend: whereas 35 percent of the urban population of the region lived in the major urban agglomerations in 1940, this figure had increased to 38.6 percent by 1980, having reached its high point in 1970 (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989). In Latin America, the concentration of the urban population in the large urban agglomerations diminished from 1970 to 1980 and there was a corresponding growth of intermediate cities of over 100,000. The increasing importance of "intermediate" cities in Latin America is, in part, an inevitable consequence of the high levels of urbanization because the existing urban agglomerations need unusually high rates of growth if they are to maintain their relative predominance within the urban population. Thus, in Mexico, in which the index of primacy dropped between 1970 and 1980, the large urban agglomerations (Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey) grew faster in all the decades between 1940 and 1980 than those cities that had more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1980.
In South Korea, in contrast, where the ISI phase was brief and development has been led by export industrialization, the urban hierarchy is much flatter, with Seoul's predominance offset by the steady growth of specialized industrial cities (Kang, 1989).

This broadening of the urban hierarchy is both encouraged by and encourages the new international division of labor. Many non-core countries now have a range of cities with sufficient population and adequate infrastructure to support export industrialization. Since the new industries do not serve the internal market, they often locate away from the existing major cities, seeking export points, whether ports or borders, or "green field" sites. Other cities grow as service centers for agricultural export zones and some, such as Hermosillo, in Mexico, combine both service and export manufacturing functions.

The existing metropolitan centers specialize as centers for regional corporate headquarters and for producer services of various kinds. For example, in the two major cities of Brazil -- São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro -- employment generated by these services showed the fastest rates of growth of any sector, rising from approximately 4.9 percent of total non-agricultural employment in 1960 to 8.3 percent in 1980.4 Similar tendencies are present in Mexico City and Buenos Aires (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989). The relative location of manufacturing jobs also changes, so that, for instance, the concentration of industrial employment in Mexico City declined by 1980 while the concentration of producer service employment increased.

There are significant differences, however, with the urban restructuring of core countries. First the forces making for restructuring, such as investment capital looking for high returns, are weaker. Though cities in non-core countries are subject to a speculative urban renewal similar to that occurring in Houston or Los Angeles, the impact of this renewal is feebler, leaving many central low-income neighborhoods undisturbed, and others half reconstructed (Batley, 1983). Second, regional development is more uneven than in core countries. There are likely to be severe limits to the role that manufacturing exports can play in promoting growth, due to competition between non-core countries and to protectionism at the core (Marshall, 1989). Export-oriented industry, even in countries such as Mexico that are heavily involved in such industrialization, often accounts for a minority of employment and stimulates the development of a relatively small number of cities.

In this situation, there is some indication of another type of urban specialization -- that of cities that provide a basic subsistence for their inhabitants through income opportunities in small-scale, craft-type manufacturing, and in traditional services such as commerce, domestic service and other personal services. These cities serve as places of refuge for a rural and small town population for whom the agrarian structure no longer provides sufficient income opportunities for household subsistence. An example is the

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4 These figures are taken from the Brazilian population censuses of 1960 and 1980 and are based on states, not cities.
contrast between the northern Brazilian city of Fortaleza, in which, in 1980, 41 percent of employment was informal, concentrating in traditional services, craft workshops, and domestic service, and São Paulo in which informal employment was only 20 percent of the total (Telles, 1988: Table 2.4).

The general implications for the spatial restructuring of cities are various. The tendencies toward the spatial segregation of different classes of the population noted for the ISI period are halted and, in some cases, reversed as an impoverished middle class seeks cheap accommodation in low-income neighborhoods, and low-income residents cling to the niches they have developed, close to centers of work. Compare the analysis of the polarization of class and space by Portes and Johns (1989), with Portes's (1989) subsequent re-evaluation which emphasizes the heterogeneity of responses -- in some cities polarization and in others less segregation. Thus, within countries, the pattern of regional development becomes both more uneven and more heterogeneous. The predominant contrast of the ISI period -- that between dynamic metropolitan centers and stagnant small towns and villages -- is less marked.

The main contrasts now are between types of cities and the income and living opportunities they offer. This is an important factor in the increasing predominance of inter-urban migration discussed later. It is also likely to diversify further the bases for urban politics. Populations, as I will suggest in a later section, may now be increasingly politically mobilized by the fact of urban residence and the austerity conditions imposed by the new international order. Their politics, however, are likely to be differentiated by urban conditions.

A final implication of current spatial restructuring is that there is likely to be a growing divergence in the patterns of urbanization between non-core countries. ISI promoted a certain convergence in urbanization: some countries followed the pattern earlier, and some later; some at high levels and some at relatively low levels, but the emerging shape of the urban system was similar as were the problems associated with the cities -- whether massive squatter settlements or widespread informal economic activities. By contrast, countries can be left out of the new order if they are not sufficiently attractive locations for foreign investment, thus resulting in divergence from those that have found their niches.

Within Latin America, for example, Mexico is securely incorporated into the new order because of its proximity to the United States, its range of natural and human resources, and its institutional stability. There seems little possibility that Peru can find a similar place in the new world order, despite its long history of incorporation in the old, gained through exporting primary products and through ISI.

The comparison of recent patterns of urbanization in both countries shows some of the consequences of this divergence. In Mexico, the degree of urban population concentration in the major agglomerations declined from 1970 to 1980, but in Peru this concentration continued to increase so that by 1980, Peru had 41.1 percent of its urban population in Lima-Callao (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989: Table 2). Non-agricultural employment in Peru has become increasingly divided between informal jobs (35.9 percent) and low-paid state employment (approximately 18 percent) -- a large parasitic bureaucracy
maintained, as De Soto (1987) would put it, on the backs of small-scale entrepreneurs. Blue-collar work in manufacturing in Peru accounts for only 10.4 percent of the non-agricultural population. In Mexico, employment is less concentrated in informal occupations (28.5 percent); has a larger sector of blue-collar employment in manufacturing (14.5 percent); and has a larger proportion of private sector jobs in professional, technical and managerial occupations.

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MIGRATION

One of the major implications of the new order is high rates of population mobility, now taking place over larger distances. The increasing economic integration of the world system is likely, as we have seen, to accentuate the volatility of local economies, creating both labor shortages and labor abundance as some places stagnate and others prosper. The effects, as Sassen-Koob (1988) notes, are global. There is a demand in the world cities of the core for low-paid labor in the services that, in the absence of a local supply, is met by international migration; whereas the industries "exported" to non-core countries, located in new sites, promote internal migration. These tendencies are strengthened by the relative cheapening of transport costs and by improvements in communications that rapidly diffuse information about job opportunities nationally and internationally.

Political boundaries limit these movements, but as Mexican migration to the U.S. attests, these are rarely decisive and have little effect on movement when there is a demand for workers on the other side of the border (Bustamante and Martinez, 1979). The overall consequence is to undermine local labor markets and replace them by inter-linked labor markets of regional and international scope, accentuating the drain of skills from non-core areas as in the case of the "brain drain" to the United States from Latin American and elsewhere (Portes, 1976).

International migration is not necessarily to the economic disadvantage of the sending areas since remittances may sustain or revitalize local economies, nor does the core always attract the best qualified migrants (Massey, 1988; Adelman et al., 1988). Those moving are likely to seek out the destinations where their skills are best rewarded or their available resources best invested, and these destinations, for reasons of language or of family economy, may be national rather than international. For instance, various studies have reported cases in which rural migrants to the United States from Mexico tend to be less well-educated than those of the same village who migrate to cities within Mexico, a pattern consistent with the demand for cheap, unskilled labor in the United States (Adelman et al., 1988; Massey et al., 1987; Escobar et al., 1987).

The novelty of these changes needs to be qualified, especially in relation to international migration. Massey (1988) documents the long history of such migration, linking it to the cyclical nature of economic growth and to wage differentials between different societies. Core countries have a long tradition of
absorbing unskilled labor, whether it be the Irish during Britain's industrialization or Middle Easterners and North Africans during continental Europe's post-war recovery (Castles and Kosack, 1973). In contrast with the rates of international migration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which helped to populate and develop core areas, contemporary ones are low. Whereas permanent emigration represented almost 20 percent of the increase in population of European countries at the end of the nineteenth century, such emigration represents only 0.5 percent of the population increase in Asia, 0.3 percent in Africa, and 2.5 percent in Latin America between 1970-1980 (World Bank, 1984: 68). Emigration not only does little to diminish population growth in non-core countries, but it is mainly directed at densely populated areas of already developed countries.

The conditions for the displacement of the rural population of non-core countries were created during the years of ISI and its urban bias when, as a consequence of a highly distorted agricultural policies, the economic basis of peasant agriculture was largely destroyed. There is, however, a major contrast in the direction of internal migration between the present period and that of ISI. Migration during the ISI period is predominantly rural-urban migration -- a flow of people from villages and small towns to the large cities. In contrast, under the new order, urban to urban migration predominates, partly because of urban diversity and the volatility of urban economies and partly because the increase in the proportion of the urban population inevitably leads to a decline in the relative importance of rural to urban migration. Urban to rural migration is another pattern likely to be characteristic of the new order. An example is the case of Chile where unemployed urban workers seek jobs in harvesting or packing in the fruit exporting zones of the Central Valley (Rodriguez, 1987: 336-341).

This change in the pattern of migration will have significant effects for urban social organization. During ISI, migration was a key factor in the growth of cities since the large cities attracted migrants from other smaller urban places as well as from rural ones (Abu-Lughod, 1971, 1980; Misra, 1981). This was also the case of highly urbanized countries such as Argentina in the decade 1960-1970, when net migration accounted for 53.1 percent of the growth of the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (Lattes, 1974). The importance of rural-urban migration to the demography and culture of the large cities in the ISI period is demonstrated by the range of studies concentrating on migrant adaptation to urban life (Butlerworth and Chance, 1981). These studies report how people move from villages and small towns to the large cities, using family and village relationships to help each other find work and lodging (Kemper, 1977). These relationships also become the basis for strong neighborhood and ethnic solidarities within the cities.

The pattern of migration in the contemporary period is less likely to reinforce communal solidarities. Urban to urban migration in non-core countries adds to the instabilities of urban life, accentuating competition for jobs and living space. In contrast, in cities of core countries social heterogeneity and ethnic solidarity are accentuated, as shown by studies of migrant ethnic enclaves in such cities as Los Angeles, New York, and Miami. (Portes and Bach, 1985; Waldinger, 1985; Massey et al.,
1987). One result, as Castells (1979) points out, is to add racial as well as class dimensions to urban conflicts.

CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS

The major change in the present period is a global one that is affected in its incidence by the spatial restructuring described above -- the casualization of labor in both core and non-core countries (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Standing, 1988, 1989; Roberts, 1989a). Though this process is facilitated by changes in the technical bases of production, it is a direct result of policies of economic liberalism which have led to a world-wide deregulation of labor. The aim has been to lower costs and increase competitiveness among core countries, between core and non-core countries, and among non-core countries. A key element in this casualization is the increasing feminization of labor in manufacturing as well as in the services. Female economic activity rates have increased substantially in most non-core countries in the 1980s, so that women make up a third or more of the urban labor force, whereas male activity rates have declined (Standing, 1989: Table 1). This female labor supply is heavily concentrated in low-paid, semi-skilled work in manufacturing; in self-employment; and in low-paid, non-manual sales and clerical work.

The major exceptions to this pattern are those Asian countries -- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore -- that, as was noted above, industrialized on the basis of exports. South Korea, for example, has approximately 35 percent of its urban labor force in manufacturing, mainly concentrated in large firms, though 39 percent of these jobs are held by women and are mostly short-term (Deyo, 1986).

The contrasts with the ISI period are various. In Latin America, rapid industrialization, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, created considerable numbers of jobs in manufacturing, but since this industrialization was aimed at the internal market and sponsored by the state, it also stimulated an expansion of service employment. This concentration in the services contrasts with the European cities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where manufacturing and construction employment predominated (Singelmann, 1978; Timberlake and Lunday, 1985; Preston, 1988). Services are a heterogeneous sector that includes "modern" services such as social or producer services, as well as more traditional services such as commerce or domestic labor. In the Latin American case, modern services grew faster than traditional ones during the ISI period. The expansion of these modern services and changes in the technical bases of production became the basis for a substantial rise in non-manual employment - - from 21.8 percent of non-agricultural employment in 1940 to 31.2 percent in 1970. The most substantial increases took place in managerial, professional, technical, and clerical occupations (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989: Table 3).

During the ISI period, self and family employment declined quite sharply. In manufacturing, there was a clear consolidation of the formal, larger-scale enterprise as craft industries in both countryside and
city declined. Whereas in Latin America before 1940, 41.5 percent of the jobs outside of agriculture were in self-employment or domestic service, this proportion declined to about 27 percent by 1970 (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989). As many commentators have pointed out, even the apparently informal activities in the tertiary sector -- self-employment and unregistered workshops -- are often closely integrated into the pattern of industrial development. One of the most important informal activities is, for example, small-scale, unregistered repair shops for automobiles, domestic appliances and the like (Portes and Walton, 1981; Roberts, 1978).

The impact of these occupational changes and of rising real incomes was to raise the levels of aspiration for housing and other consumer goods among the urban population (Durston, 1986). In contrast with the ISI period, the present one has seen a sharp curtailment of these aspirations, and a significant lowering in the possibilities of occupational mobility. The changes affect most sharply the newly entering cohorts into the labor market and these are likely to be made up increasingly of the urban-born (Durston, 1986). The change in mobility opportunities can be illustrated by the case of Argentina, a non-core country with a long experience of incorporation in the world economy. The industrial working class of Buenos Aires has been constituted by separate layers, the first embodying the European-born migrants who found work in craft industry in the early years of this century while the second was largely composed of internal migrants. These came mainly from the small towns of the Pampas area who moved in large numbers to Buenos Aires in the 1940s as Argentina began a rapid period of ISI. The standard of living of this urban working class was, as Marshall (1981) shows, maintained, by state intervention in terms of rent control and food subsidies. In the late 1970s, when Argentina began to promote export industrialization, these subsidies were withdrawn. This withdrawal, together with the declining performance of the Argentine economy, led to substantial declines in real wages for the established urban working class and for many non-manual workers, especially those in state employment (Marshall, 1989). In the 1970s, migrants to Buenos Aires from Bolivia, Paraguay, and from the interior of Argentina concentrated in poorer paid and more casual forms of employment (Marshall, 1978: 122-130). Similar changes over time in the relation between migration and employment have been reported for Mexico City (Munoz et al., 1982).

In the present period, not only are there fewer opportunities for social mobility, but there is a reversal of the decline in self and family employment (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Marshall, 1987). Indeed, if unemployment and unprotected workers are added to these categories, the increase in "informal" employment becomes sharp by the late 1980s (Portes, 1989). This reversal represents, in certain respects, a return to the situation in which earning a livelihood depends on family and community relationships and marks the end to, or at least a halt in, the move to the full proletarianization of the labor force. There are indications that income distribution worsens with these trends (Mertens and Richards, 1987). The growth of intermediate paying jobs in manufacturing slackens, and that of low-payment casual jobs increases, while upper-income groups benefit from high returns on investments at home and abroad.
These trends entail, I argue, a change in the operation of the "informal economy". In the ISI period, cheap labor subsidized the dynamic sectors of the economy, sometimes directly as in the case of subcontracting, but more often indirectly, as when the provision of cheap goods and services, including self-constructed housing enabled workers in the dynamic sectors to maintain a respectable standard of living on wages that were low compared with those of comparable workers in the core (Portes and Walton, 1981: Chapter 3). The expansion of informal enterprises was closely related to the expansion of formal ones; profits, pay and conditions of work improved in the informal sector in line with the expansion of the formal sector.

This type of linkage is less likely in the present situation. First, there is less emphasis on the internal market of non-core countries as a source of growth. Austerity policies mean, in effect, reducing local consumption as a means of increasing export earnings and improving the balance of trade. Free trade policies bring in a flood of cheaply manufactured goods from countries where labor is cheaper and organized more productively. These goods such as shoes, textiles, and cheap utensils compete directly with those produced by informal workshops. Second, urban bias is replaced by anti-urban bias, with dramatic rises in the cost of urban services, and of basic foodstuffs as subsidies are withdrawn.

In this situation, open unemployment rises (Portes, 1989). Also, labor deregulation weakens the dualism between protected and unprotected sectors of the labor market, placing most workers in the same unprotected situation. This reduces one of the "advantages" that gave the informal economy part its dynamism. The reduction in real incomes, including those of substantial sectors of the new urban middle classes, means that there are likely to be fewer purchasers of the cheap goods and services that the informal economy provides.

In the ISI period, the informal economy was an alternative, and, at times, a more flexible and higher-paying alternative to formal sector employment allowing people to maximize the economic usefulness of household and community relationships (Roberts, 1989b). In the new order, the informal economy loses its social as well as its economic dynamic. It becomes a generalized and basic means of survival in the absence of state welfare payments.

Occupational diversity and polarization are, then, the likely outcomes in non-core countries of contemporary trends in urban labor markets: a "modern" middle class based on state employment and producer services, itself differentiated by greater susceptibility of those in state employment to economic retrenchment and lower real wages; and a working class occupying a range of occupational niches, ranging from a consolidated but small industrial working class, to a mass of informalized workers in small-scale employment or self-employment.
URBAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

It is these changes in context -- spatial restructuring, new patterns of migration and labor markets - - that make the basic difference in the present period to the ways in which people act individually and collectively in the cities of non-core countries. Throughout the developing world people have shown considerable energy and ingenuity in making the most they can of economies that, even when they were expanding, offered low wages, limited shelter, and few amenities. Even when the state provided some welfare, this welfare rarely extended beyond food and transport subsidies and pensions for key groups of workers. During ISI, as in the present period of austerity, family and community networks served as a frequent substitute for state-provided welfare, providing help in emergencies and pooling resources to obtain housing, employment, or to generate small business.

The strategies that households employ to get by in the cities of the developing world, based mainly on the intensive use of household and community relationships, are well-documented (Lomnitz, 1977). They differ little from those used during industrialization in Europe, and are affected by similar variables, such as type of work, and main sources of income (Tilly and Scott, 1978; Anderson, 1971).

Scott and Tilly (1978: 64-79) argue that it is not urbanization nor even factory employment per se that makes the basic difference to household organization, but the general changes in context created by proletarianization and the increase in opportunities to earn wages and to spend them. It is these changes that lead to the family economy of the early industrial period being replaced by the family wage economy and, finally, by the family consumer economy, altering the expectations attached to the different family roles. This approach can usefully be applied to understanding the effects on urban family organization of contemporary contexts. It is differences in the sets of income opportunities and expenditures and what these mean for family roles that Mingione (1987a, 1987b) cites as accounting for the contrast between the individualism, competitiveness, and poverty of the cities of the Italian Mezzogiorno, such as Naples, with the highly successful informal economy of central and north-east Italy. Likewise, as Pahl (1984) shows for the Isle of Sheppey in Britain, family-based strategies of self-help are found among workers with stable and relatively well-paying jobs, and not amongst the poor and unemployed.

In Latin America, in the ISI period, there were differences in the strength of social organization between cities with dynamic economies and in those with stagnant ones, as suggested by the contrast between Lomnitz's (1977) account of strong household and community organization in Mexico City and my own emphasis (1973) on relatively weak organization in Guatemala City. However, in this period, households had economic opportunities that contrasted positively with those of the past and encouraged aspiration for further social mobility. Even among the working class, there were the beginnings of a "family wage". Households whose male heads had stable jobs could survive on a single income with the wife attending to domestic work and the children in school. In the new order, this admittedly slow emergence
of a family wage is halted and reversed. When women work it is not to expand consumption and build up resources, but to maintain a basic subsistence. With the exception of the privileged few, most members of the household, men as well as women, young and old, earn supplementary wages.

In this new context, the importance of family and community networks generates more severe contradictory pressures than in the past. As in the ISI period, economic difficulties and the use of family and community relationships in overcoming these strengthen relationships. Household members need to pool resources. Community networks are fortified through a variety of cooperative endeavors such as soup kitchens, housing cooperatives, and neighborhood defense associations. In the absence of formal means of securing advice or loans, informal means prevail, grounded on whatever basis of trust is available, whether kinship, common religion, or common ethnic or regional origin.

In the difficult economic climate of the present period, greater strains are placed on these community relationships, as Tironi (1987) reports for Santiago, Chile. There is evident tension within households, as husbands demand that wives fulfill their domestic chores and take in work for pay. Though members of the household pool resources, the pooling is often perceived to be inequitable with women providing more of their income than men and the young feeling that they have a right to a greater share of theirs for their personal needs. There is some evidence that women are better off alone with their children than when husbands are also present (Chant, 1985). At the community level, the economic pressures fragment as well as unify. Households work long hours with little time to give to community affairs, and their members have jobs different from those of their neighbors.

The situation is made more complex by the decreasing salience of work-based identities and careers for much of the urban population of non-core countries. The practices of employers, as well as the strategies of workers, mean that only a minority of workers pursue a stable job career. Instead, a typical pattern is for the young male or female to begin working for pay in informal activities of various kinds - home-work, as "apprentices" in small workshops, or helping sell goods in the street. From this, they often move on to a job in a formal enterprise when they are still unmarried -- the women in textile factories or modern assembly plants and the men in other branches of manufacturing. With marriage and children the women will cease formal work, and, if they work for pay, will do it at home or in occasional domestic service. As the men grow older, they choose, or are forced, to leave their jobs in large-scale enterprise and take up some form of self-employment.

We saw earlier that the urban economies of non-core countries have a very high percentage of their employment opportunities in informal work. The proportion of the economically active people who pass through such jobs in the course of a working career is much greater than what these percentages suggest. In this situation, work identity and commitment are unlikely to develop -- either with a firm and fellow workers or with a particular work skill. What matters is the nature of the income opportunity, such as the flexibility in hours or earning capacity it provides and the degree of social security protection it affords.
The significance of work as a source of social identity is increasingly being replaced by other forms of identity. In Latin America, religion has been important during urbanization and remains strong in the contemporary period, as shown by the continuing growth of sects, such as the Pentecostals or by the success of the Catholic comunidades de base (grass-roots communities). Gender is also becoming a more salient source of identity for participation in the wider society. There is an increasing and self-aware participation of women in neighborhood and wider political organization (Moser and Peake, 1987). The numbers of women in the work-force throughout the developing world have also increased dramatically, both in white-collar occupations and in manual work in industry and in the services. Along with this increase, there is some evidence of women exercising more say in household budgeting than before. Generation is also an evident public identity, differentiating the interests of the young from the old. Distinct youth cultures have become important factors in politics in non-core countries (Vila, 1989).

The weakness of work-based identities and the emergence of others that have a less coherent relation to class allegiances affect urban social movements in non-core countries. Even in those countries with the highest levels of urbanization, the class basis for popular organization and association is weak. It is hardly any stronger for the middle classes. Population mobility and economic instability have prevented, with few exceptions, the formation of strong work-based associations, such as trade unions or professional associations. There is, indeed, little associative tradition at all in the cities of the developing world beyond that provided by community allegiances.

In this context, urban political movements have been sporadic and ephemeral, often coalescing around urban issues such as the take-over of public land for housing or neighborhood betterment. The main enemy is often the state through its failure to provide adequate housing and other urban infrastructure. Everyday urban issues become a source of politicization, but the nature of the confrontation also makes it an unlikely enduring basis for political organization (Schauman and Van Naerssen, 1989). Urban protests wane over time in the face of repression as neighborhoods conflict over particular interests or as some participants are bought off with government favors. It is the insubstantial nature of these protest movements that leads Touraine (1987) to characterize urban Latin America as lacking genuine social movements.

Indeed much of the urban communal energy tends to be directed away from formal politics and inward toward attempts at creating self-sufficient entities. Friedmann (1989) sees the barrio movement in Latin America in these terms, as an attempt to substitute both the market and the state by providing communal services such as soup kitchens and emphasizing reciprocity as a means of survival.

There is a difference, however, between the urban popular struggles of the ISI phase and those that are likely to intensify in the new period. In ISI, both migrants and natives faced the substantial challenge of creating housing for themselves in cities where the deficit deprived over half the population of adequate shelter (Garza and Schteingart, 1978). Their struggles became a factor in politics, influencing government
policies and at times, as in the case of Peru, bringing governments down (Collier, 1976; Castells, 1983: 190-209). Yet the struggle for shelter occurred in a context where, as noted above, the opportunities for job mobility were reasonably good -- rural migrants secured stable jobs in manufacturing industry and urban natives entered non-manual and state employment in large numbers.

This is one of the bases for the lack of fit between spatial marginality and occupational marginality in Latin American cities that Castells (1983: 181) noted: squatter settlements housed a wide variety of manual and non-manual workers. In this situation, the long-term effectiveness of urban struggles as a distinctive basis for political action was limited by two main factors. First was the desire and ability of those living in marginal settlements to upgrade their housing and to secure amenities to make themselves a regular part of the city (Castells, 1983:203-4). This goal, it should be remembered, had a basis in the rising real family incomes in the 1960s and 1970s. Second was state policies of co-optation defusing neighborhood militancy by selectively granting favors and providing basic resources often, as in the case of land regularization, at little cost to the state (Cornelius, 1975; Ward, 1986).

The current pattern of development makes such diffusion less easy. Most urban populations are now native to the city. They are no longer "making" the city, and their real incomes and their possibilities for mobility are declining. Similarly, the state no longer has the same capacity to co-opt, partly because of austerity and lack of resources, partly because the "easy" forms of co-optation are disappearing. State-owned land has been used up, and the new land invasions increasingly infringe on privately owned property. Contemporary urban social movements may be less ideological than in the past, but they are likely to be more pragmatic and persistent (Palma, 1989).

Thus the effects of the various urban struggles on political change and organization are likely to intensify. Although the urban milieu of the developing world do not provide the conditions for the type of class-based politics that developed as Europe urbanized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is a clear extension of citizenship occurring with urban development. Public participation is constantly being provoked by the everyday struggle to make a living. The size of the cities and the density of urban life make it more difficult for elites to control political activity from above. There are also a large number of non-governmental organizations, often religious and often financed from abroad, that are devoted to engendering participation and self-help among urban inhabitants, especially the poor.

What this immense amount of local-level political activity in these cities is doing is to vindicate basic rights and to institutionalize political participation. This is not to argue that democracy and the new stage in urbanization go hand in hand, but it suggests certain limits on authoritarian rule.
CONCLUSION

The present period of extended "crisis" for non-core countries also brings significant changes in the pattern of their urbanization. Cities are no longer the privileged beneficiaries of development, as austerity and the policies associated with it raise the social and economic costs of urban living. These negative consequences may create, however, a certain space for alternative forms of development, as governments and populations encounter the dis-economies of concentration, and may take more seriously than in the past the need for a balanced regional development.

Present trends do not, however, augur well for such a development. Intermediate cities are emerging, broadening the urban system, but their economic dynamic often depends on fragile links to the world economy. Others are simply places of refuge for an impoverished rural population, allowing them to gain a bare subsistence denied to them in the areas from which they came. There are few urban growth poles, with strong backward and forward linkages into the national economy.

Cities, including intermediate ones, are likely to be more socially and economically volatile than in the past. Closer links to the world economy, and its cycles are factors in this volatility. So, too, are the erosion of some of the bases for social solidarity such as common rural origin that created a certain stability during rapid urban growth. Perhaps most significant of all is the collapse of the safety valve provided by both the sense and the reality of upward social mobility.

In this context, politics becomes less organized. Populist and corporate strategies are less feasible and less to the taste of those in power. Also, some of the bases of organized politics such as trade unions are weakened as their membership relatively declines and work identities are themselves eroded. The weakening of organized politics makes possible a wider political participation, and political groups based on a broad range of issues -- neighborhood, gender, environment. Reaching most urban inhabitants, these issues ensure a potential for mobilization greater than hitherto. The bases for this mobilization are not permanent, however, thus adding to urban volatility.

Welfare issues are urgent. The crisis brings worsening poverty to the cities of the developing world and reduces state-provided welfare. This is happening at a time when the household and community basis for caring is eroded by divisive pressures. The withdrawal of the state, in its welfare and planning functions though not in its control functions, underlines its continuing importance to equitable development in the Third World. Both from conservative and radical political perspectives, the state is often seen as the enemy of development, stifling the growth of enterprise or standing in the way of community development and self-empowerment. The reality is that, in Latin America at least, there never has been an effective welfare-orientated state, and its presence is needed to ensure an effective regional development and adequate levels of urban welfare.

These conclusions are speculatively meant to suggest a research agenda concerned with the social
basis of political and economic change in the developing world. Two strategies are called for. One is comparative research that takes the global context into account. The urbanization experiences of non-core countries are diverse, yet they are also unified by the part they play in the world system. Comparison enables us to avoid premature generalization on the basis of a regional or national context and illuminates what is specific about particular cases. We also need longitudinal research comparing, for instance, urban social organization in the 1960s and 1970s with the present. This historical perspective may help us to separate the ephemeral from the more permanent effects of the present urban crisis.
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