Alba Zaluar
Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro
Rising Violence in Brazil
During the eighties a new rise of criminality occurred in most Brazilian states and big cities, mainly in its metropolitan regions such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife, Porto Alegre and Brasilia. At the beginning of the century, when there had been another noticeable spur of criminality during the first republican period the most common offenses and crimes were disorderly conduct, vagrancy, thefts, robberies and to a lesser degree, crimes of passion, that is private vengeance committed between people known to each other. Similar patterns occurred in other European countries. After a period of relative tranquility following Word War II, as elsewhere in Europe, Brazilians have been enduring an enormous increase in violent crimes, especially kidnapping, robbery, and homicide. However, differently from France and other European countries, this did not start during the sixties, but at the beginning of the eighties, when the rate of these crimes increased several times, mainly in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Recife. Such rapid growth in homicides affected mainly young men between 15 and 29 years of age and shifted from crimes of passion to crimes in public areas between strangers. This is exactly the pattern found in disputes over the division and defense of territories and the payoff of crews of traffickers and robbers.
This increase in violence in Brazilian cities from the eighties onward cannot be reduced to a question of poverty, a problem that has always been present in Brazilian society during the former centuries. Neither can the great rural-urban migration flow that marked the country in previous decades be presented as the cause, for it did not provoke the sudden growth of violent crimes. In fact, this migration flux had already changed its route towards the Amazon region (the North and Central West areas of the Brazilian territory) when the rates of violent crimes increased more recently. The rise of violent crime needs to be understood in the context of the illegal drug market and its effects on young Brazilian men, particularly those residing in shantytowns or favelas.
Violence and Illegal Drugs
Illegal drug traffic had never been a social problem in Brazil until the late 1970s. Then, cocaine began to be trafficked on a large scale in the country, following the new routes chosen by the Colombian cartels and the Italian-American Mafia. These routes sent cocaine cargoes to Europe and the United States. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, as well as other cities and towns, also became new and interesting consumer markets for drugs. From the beginning of the 1980s, especially from 1983 onwards, there was a clear market strategy oriented to change the habits of drug consumers in those cities. Formerly the illicit drug market was almost exclusively marijuana, which was an underground and dropout drug and never had great economic importance or received rigid repressive policy. Then, cocaine started to be offered at a good value.
Nowadays, the drug trade has become a synonym for warfare at the final threads of the traffic network. In order to keep hold of a cocaine outlet, one cannot lower one's guard for a single minute. A "front man" is obliged to keep all his underlings in line, to keep his eyes peeled, to make sure his competitors are not taking too big a slice of the action by selling more or better goods or acquiring more fire power. Otherwise he gets ripped off, has his spot taken or is simply wiped out by policemen or by competitors from both inside and outside his gang, inside and outside prison. To carry a gun at all times, to kill or to be killed, and to keep constant surveillance over the gang's power are simply everyday concerns for drug dealers and traffickers.
It is also a sexually charged, virile world. All of the men carry guns, and to carry a gun is to "walk mated" or to have "iron in your belt". To show off you weapon, to "pull your stick out", is a common characteristic of such urban outlaws, yet one which can often prove fatal. Instead of the verb to rob, they say, "to mount" their victims, terminology used both for street muggings and burglary. The prime audiences for such displays are apparently the women they are trying to impress with their power and the money in their pockets.
In this game of seduction, it's important to flaunt fancy clothes and other outward symbols of wealth: a gold chain, cars, expenses at motels, etc. That's what shows you have money in your pocket that you can spend anytime you want, since "women don't like it rough it". Young men say they go into crime to show off for women and to conquer them. However, under this emblem for the femme fatale, womanhood is reduced to a prop for a young man's prestige in the neighborhood: to go to a dance surrounded by women, with money in your pocket, to make everyone greet you, admire you, envy you. Even here, femininity is just one more factor in the competition between men. Nor will they submit to anything or anyone: "they think they can get away with anything". Here may be the crux of the matter: an exacerbated male pride and a thirst for unbridled power in a historical context of moral and institutional crisis, with no restraints on the highly lucrative, expanding market for illicit drugs, sought by consumers as a part of a pleasurable lifestyle.
But it should not be forgotten that this style of drug dealing makes extraordinary profits possible, although not as organized as the transnational drug traffic and sometimes really disentangled, with many crews and individuals striving for power and positions inside the trade. Even if not coordinated entirely as a Mafia hierarchy, drug trade in Rio has a very efficient horizontal arrangement by which a shantytown that runs out of drugs or guns immediately gets them from the allied shantytown through either Comando Vermelho (Red Command) networks, or in the Terceiro Comando (Third Command) networks, the two best known organizations for drug and gun traffic. These networks or commands conciliate the features of a geographically defined network, that includes central or diffusion points, with the anthropological term, which focuses on horizontal reciprocity, which works in both directions: positive and negative. For, even though guns and drugs are quickly lent to the allied dealing crews, the violent reciprocity of private vengeance is imperative in the absence of a negotiable judicial form of conflict resolution. Because of such exchanges, adolescents die in wars for the control of trading points, but also for any motives that menace the status or masculine pride of youngsters trying to assert their virility the "Sujeito Homen" (Subject Man), as they say.
Data on violent crimes during the past few years suggests, therefore, a link between the spread of drug use, mainly among youngsters, the increase in violent crime rates and repressive policies. These have hit almost exclusively the poor and fostered police corruption. The social and economic context of inflation, recession and increased poverty, only add problems to make matters worse. This partly explains the political apathy that has seemed to seize the population of Rio de Janeiro's poor neighborhoods. From the end of the seventies onwards, gun possession has created, for those youngsters involved in the drug traffic war, a military power that has shaken the foundations of any authority. Local politicians, businessmen and policemen became the focus of aggressive behavior. Their schoolteachers as well as local leaders lost their authority vis-à-vis the youths that have the power of money and guns. It is a fact that more and more students carry guns to school and that children sometimes cannot go to school because of gunfire or rivalries between the neighborhoods where the schools are. Even the experienced and politically concerned adults who worked in their countless neighborhood organizations, such as samba schools, dwellers' associations and soccer teams are almost powerless.
Illegal Drugs and Risk of Violent Death
The effect of the illegal drug trade is most evident when examining differences in mortality statistics, particularly for violent death, in different districts of Rio de Janeiro. In the metropolitan region of the city, the homicide rate tripled during the last decade, growing from 23 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 1983 to 63.03/100,000 in 1990, a period where the population grew only by 1.13%. However, this impressive increase in homicides happened mainly in the peripheral and poor municipalities of the city. A careful study of police inquiries and judicial cases during 1991 in Rio showed that 57% of the homicides for that year were linked to drug traffic. This is just one more clue to those suggesting that the growth of the homicide rate has been somewhat linked to the greater entry of guns and drugs into the country.
The risk of dying from violent causes is also linked to the illegal drug trade. Data from a study that compared the risk of dying of violent causes for males 5 to 19 years of age in three districts in Rio de Janeiro found that the differences in mortality probability were linked to the differing styles of drug trade in each district. Most striking is the difference in risk of dying between favela and non-favela youth. In Copacabana, a middle and upper class district with four favelas, the rate was 3.1/100,000 for non-favela youth compared to 8.6/100,000 for favela youth. The same pattern was found in Tijuca, a middle class district with many favelas. Here the rates were 4.2 versus 16.9 per 100,000 for non-favela and favela youth respectively. In Madureira, a lower middle class district with many favelas, the difference was the greatest, with 9.8 versus 19.6 per 100,000 for non-favela and favela youth, respectively. The consistent difference in mortality probabilities between favela youth and non-favela youth derives from the style of dealing inside the favelas. In the favelas the distribution points are fixed, the dealers are heavily armed and fight constantly between themselves for control of these points and the police, also heavily armed, invade the favelas either to take money from the dealers or to make war with them.
The contrasts between districts are explained by the different trafficking styles in each district. The predominant style in Copacabana is the Apista, that is, one in which small dealers with various kinds of occupations (taxi drivers, prostitutes, waiters, doormen, etc) buy the drug cheaply in the favelas and sell it quickly in several and changing spots to their customers. In Tijuca one finds a mixed style, with some customers going up to the favelas in order to buy drugs and others buying them from the street vendors. In Madureira almost everyone goes to the shantytowns, where frequent fights between dealers and constant war or hold ups increases the chances of violent deaths for dealers, users and policemen.
In sum, the rise in violent crime in the 1980's cannot be explained without looking at the illegal drug trade. More than other explanations (such as poverty or migration) the increase in drug trafficking and its non-hierarchical organization are to account for the increases in violent crime, especially homicide. Particularly for young urban males, the drug trade creates a context in which violence becomes a means to power and money. Violence is used in order to maintain and control drug trafficking, to settle territorial and personal disputes and to exert one's masculinity. This violence is most heavily concentrated in the shantytowns, where traffickers run their operations.
Elena Azaola Garrido
Programa de Acción Niños en la Calle
Introduction
My talk will take up four points. First, it will describe the problem of the increase in crime during the last years and the participation of juveniles in this conduct, particularly in those that involve the use of violence. Secondly, it will describe some of the policies that have intended to respond to said problem and their results. Thirdly, it will expound upon some of the hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the problem. Fourth and lastly, it will make mention of some research that have been conducted and topics that they succeed in covering, as well as what research should be conducted in order to cover those aspects which up to now have not been undertaken.
I. The Problem
II. Policies responding the problem
There will be brief reference made to some governmental programs that intend to provide a response to the problems referred to earlier, among them:
III. Explanations that have been proposed
Without a doubt, it is much easier to describe the phenomenon than to explain it. Even more, I believe that there exist few attempts in this direction and that, more than not, lean towards partial explanations that reduce the phenomenon to only one of the possible causes (i.e. economic factors) but leaving to one side others equally important (i.e. familial change, wearing down of the social fabric, lack of legitimacy of the authorities and institutions, impunity, deterioration of the quality of life and life expectations, inequality, inefficiency and corruption in the criminal justice system, police abuses, injustice, inadequate programs of public safety, police involvement in illegal activities, partial and distorted perception of delinquency, the climate of social alarm, etc.)
IV. Research conducted and research that should be undertaken 3
Within the vast and complex problem barely swept over, there are some themes that have been taken up by different research in Mexico, among those worth mentioning are the following:
Nevertheless, and as an obvious result, there are more themes that remain to be researched and fewer questions that we have succeeded in answering. I consider that the larger part of the studies mentioned above have a limited perspective and reach while what is needed are studies of greater span, capable of offering a more complete and comprehensive vision of the complexity that envelops the recent criminal phenomena. From this point of view, to conclude, I feel that forming an interdisciplinary team of specialists at an international level could contribute to amplifying this narrow view that many times has characterized our research.
Homicide in the U.S.
Mark C. Stafford, (University of Texas at Austin)
It is well known that the U.S. has a high homicide rate. Moreover, that rate has increased in the past several decades; the 1996 homicide rate (7.4 murders and non-negligent manslaughter known to police per 100,000 population) was 50% higher than the 1960 rate (when it was 5.1 per 100,000 population). However, the U.S. homicide rate is by no means the highest in the world. For example, it has been estimated recently that the homicide rate for El Salvador is about 40 per 100,000 population; for Colombia it is 100, and for the Goilala of New Guinea it is a whopping 210.
The high rate for the Goilala cast doubts on the notion of the "noble savage". However, acceptance of the Hobbesian view of human nature would ignore enormous variation in the homicide rate among non-literate populations.
In the U.S., there was a substantial increase in the U.S. homicide rate beginning about 1965 and continuing until about 1974. However, the rate has not changed substantially since then; if anything it is decreased slightly. Hence, the current media focus on homicide in the U.S. appears to be fueled more by high rates in particular localities, such as Washington, D.C., than by knowledge of recent trends in the national rate.
There is no evidence of a long-term unidirectional trend in the U.S. rate. U.S. homicide data are questionable prior to 1933, but the homicide rates of many U.S. states increased substantially and then decreased between 1900 and 1940. So there is evidence of a cyclical trend in the U.S. homicide rate rather than a long-term decrease ending in the 1960s.
What about race, age, and gender variation in homicide offending in the U.S. in the past twenty years or so? Homicide offending rates for most age groups of white and black males (based on arrest data) have decreased during this period. However, the rates for 14-17 year old white and black males have increased. The rate for black males actually decreased during the period 1976-1984 (albeit slightly), but from that time until about 1994 there were regular and sizable increases in the black male rate. The offending rate for white males (which is lower than that for black males) increased during the 1976-1996 period, but not nearly as much as the increase for black males.
The contrast between white males and black males would seem to point to poverty as a major cause of homicide variation in the U.S. However, the homicide offending rate for 14-17 year old black females in the U.S. did not increase from 1976 to 1996. If increasing poverty among black Americans caused the increase in the homicide offending rate of 14-17 year old black males, then one must wonder why black females were not affected in the same way.
What, then, might account for the high homicide offending rate of young black males in the U.S. and, in particular, the increase in the rate from 1984 to 1994? According to Alfred Blumstein, it was due mainly to instability in the street cocaine market and increased gun ownership.
Rapporteur, Julie Reid (Sociology)
There was considerable discussion about the nature of the data and whether the rise in delinquency among minors is in fact true or whether it is an artifact of the methodology.
Socio-economic status was reiterated to be an inadequate explanation for the crime rates. Alba Zaluar clarified how the new pattern of consumption and desire for brand name clothing and other status goods among youth, were leading some into crime. It is a general phenomenon affecting multiple layers of the population, including the middle class, although the problem is more serious among the poor. Researchers do not have an explanation for this new desire to consume nor why some youth resort to crime while others, the majority, do not and instead work to earn money. Thus, perhaps the research question should be rephrased to ask why some work rather than why some commit crimes.
Zaluar also emphasized the need to understand the role of family and community/neighborhood associations (e.g., churches) in studying crime. Associations in shanty towns are on the decline, and differences exist between towns which have lost these associations and those where the links are still strong, for example, drug traffickers will specifically avoid some poor towns. Some studies have indicated that Protestantism exerts a stronger control on behavior, and thus criminal behavior, than Catholicism. However, Zaluar did not encounter this pattern and found that evangelical sects sometimes act as a negative influence on community associations, particularly when associations include activities such as dancing and feasting, which certain sects may condemn.
Bryan Roberts highlighted two different types of research questions in the study of crime: rate and incidence. Although explaining changes in the crime rate is important, where these may actually involve very small percentages (i.e., homicide rates), explanations may be very difficult. Thus, it may be more interesting to address incidence issues or how different groups are involved in crime rates.
1Summary by Corinne Davis. Citations and references have been omitted. For a copy of the full paper, please contact Dr. Zaluar.
2 Dr. Azaola’s presentation was made in Spanish. This summary of her remarks was translated and edited by Corinne Davis. Please note that data cited in this summary are, in large part, from official sources such as: Penetentiary Statistics of the Secretaría de Gobernación, Statistical Annuals of the Dirección General de Prevención y Tratamiento de Menores, Reports from the Attorney General, Population Census and Surveys of the Instituto Nacional de Estatística Geografía e Informática.
3 The studies indicated with asterisk (*) are theses or essays that are unpublished. The rest are books or articles, published in specialized journals. Please contact the author for precise details. This listing is just a guide to who is doing what and is not intended as a reference list.