Introduction

My approach to understanding issues facing development efforts is through analysis of a specific type of development (grassroots) throughout the Latin American region^{(1). Within this focus, one organisation serves as a central case study: the Inter American Foundation (IAF), an agency of the United States government that has specifically funded grassroots development projects in Latin America since 1971. Although it has only provided approximately 15 to 20 million dollars a year in grants, which pales in comparison to the amounts of assistance provided by USAID, the IAF has been unique in its exclusive focus on support of grassroots development organisations in the Latin America(2).}

^{Escobar claims that there is a "discord between institutionalized development and the situation of popular groups in the Third World" (1995: 47), yet the IAF has shown in nearly three decades of work that this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, there has been a dramatic rise in the awareness of the importance grassroots or popular groups play in Latin America in particular, leading to an increase in funding for the various aspects of their collective organisations(3).}

^{My approach involves two elements of analysis, the first of which is to identify the essence of the IAF's alternative approach to development and how it has changed throughout its 27 year history. Taking Escobar's notion of development alternatives (1995:222-226) one can make the distinction between 'alternative' vs. 'alternative to' development. I find that the IAF does not exist as an 'alternative to' development, but as a once 'alternative' development agency that has gradually over its three decade history transformed into a 'traditional' development agency(4). Even if the IAF today operates as a 'traditional' development agency, it remains an organisational institution of relationships that are neither static nor bounded. Development is deeply rooted in politics, and very much remains in the dynamic and contested aspects of power relations. The second aim of this analysis is to provide, through what Nader (1969) and Rabinow (1986) call the anthropological 'studying up', a much more coherent picture of the fragmentation and conflict that exists within a development organisation. Exposing the heterogeneity of development agencies and their relationships with the various actors involved, shall amend the current view many anthropologists have toward development. At present this view is extremely limited for the purposes of analysis: there is a tendency to present each agency as a monolithic entity of 'policy' which rests upon a united and homogenous discourse. Anthropologists need to transcend this basic flawed assumption to understand the more intricate details of cultural logic, which are just as complex and bizarre in the 'developed' societies of Euro-America as they are for the 'developing' ones of the Latin America and other parts of the World.}

^{Emergence of the Grassroots}

^{The term grassroots implies a foundation from below, evoking both spatial and agricultural imagery: 'grassroots' can refer either to a specific group of people or to a type of development. As a noun grassroots engages with utopian notions of 'the people', popularised by development practitioners as the domain of 'civil society' which rests neither in political nor economic spheres of social life. Civil society is often used as a homogeneous classification vis a vis the similarly objectified notion of 'the state', a problematic usage associated with the universalist ideals of Western liberal-individualism which sees civil society as quantifiable, and necessary in the quest for good government (Hann 1996: 18). Yet 'grassroots' also serves as an adjective that explicitly states what type of approach a development project or agency is taking, that can be synonymous with 'below' (i.e. the 'poorest' and most 'underdeveloped' of society). Here a metaphor of cultivation is used to portray a 'more effective' development approach such as planting seeds directly in the grassroots level. The self-proclaimed goal of grassroots development is held to eliminate the traditional obstacles to an international cross-cultural policy implementation: local government and bureaucratic self-interest. Carroll (1992) uses the term grassroots support organisation (GSO), to define "a civic developmental agency that provides services (and/or) allied support to local groups of disadvantaged rural or urban households" (1992: 9).}

^{The significance of the term 'grassroots' in Latin America has increased since the emergence of new social movements in the early 1960s. These social movements called into question authoritarian and hierarchical ways of doing things (Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 2), a popular response to political, economic and social repression which restricted access to resources and power in nation-states throughout the region. The classification of 'new' is based on distinction from 'classic' and homogeneous class based social movements that were concerned primarily with activism on behalf of peasants or the urban proletariat(5) (Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 8). The heterogeneous nature of new social movements (NSMs) in Latin America include a growing support for indigenous and women's rights, as well as environmental concerns. As movements they are extremely volatile in both composition and activity, which infuses their very essence with change and instability. This is due to the heterogeneity of new social movements themselves, which makes them a challenging yet necessary subject of anthropological study, as they are key elements of the global ethnoscapes that Appadurai (1996) sees as requiring further anthropological analysis for an understanding of modernity. The difficulty of representation of the transcendent is heightened by the fact that if their differences are prioritised, they cease to form a uniform object, showing their fragmentation (Cardoso 1987: 32 as cited in Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 6).}

^{NSMs are products of a shattered landscape of modernity, where political and social cleavages have heightened in distinct forms. Globalisation of capital permits investment bankers and currency speculators of the United States, Japan and Europe to withdrawal or invest sizeable funds at fractions of a second, a volatile economic reality that Latin American nations continue to face. While the neo-liberal political discourse has swept across the region, seeing state de-centralisation and a decrease in social spending take hold. Such economic and political volatility has increased the sheer amount of poverty and inequality throughout the region as a whole. This was most pronounced during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s where even the most conservative estimates place an absolute increase in poverty by 25% between 1980 and 1989 (Morley 1994)(6). However, there has also been a return of liberal democracy since the 1970s, a movement away from political regimes of authoritarian and military nature, increasing the tolerance toward individual dissent and action. Ethnic and indigenous identities have also emerged in this landscape of fragmentation, difference now being seen as a positive attribute (especially in gaining access to greater resources) rather than the historical curse.}

^{Landmarks of the IAF}

^{An organisation can be seen as embarking upon a journey, through which certain landmarks are more prevalent than others. The metaphor of mobility attempts to avoid the static analyses by emphasising change and conflict both over time and within any given point in time. Care is taken to portray this journey as neither one of uni-lineal growth nor neo-evolutionist expansion, but one of interaction for each organisation whose members themselves may be venturing off onto separate paths alongside or away from the central organisational movement. Understanding this journey involves much more than social science reductionism of 'charting' the path of the organisation's change (using formal systems of quantitative measurement and accounting). Rather, the journey is not easily modelled, as it consists not of ordered, objective units but disparate, subjective individuals. Yet there still remains a history of their movement that social scientists can seek to understand. Here is where discourse(7) proves effective in revealing an organisation's movement, as the most predominant aspects have become established through its policy, publications and practice over the past three decades. For the IAF, examining public discourse proves effective in understanding inter-connected relationships which exist on multiple levels of distinction and power (see Diagram 1). The discourse of the IAF is merely a series of landmarks upon its journey, constructed by people for a variety of different reasons. The following analysis shall explore a few predominant landmarks as a basis for understanding both the organisation's history as well as its continued experiences with conflict and change (see Diagram 2). Policy is then contextualised through history as well as through the distinct interactions of individuals and their relationships (especially those of power).}

^{Diagram 1: IAF Relationships}
 
 
 
 
 
 

^{LATIN AMERICA UNITED STATES}

^{(SOUTH) (NORTH)}
 
 

^{Diagram 2: Landmarks of the Journey (IAF Presidents)}
 
 

^{William Dyal (Former Baptist missionary, civil rights activist and Peace Corps administrator)}

^{Peter Bell (Former deputy under-secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Latin American development experience with the Ford Foundation)}
 

^{Deborah Szekely (California community leader with business experience in Mexico)}
 
 
 

^{Bill Perrin (Former U.S. Ambassador)}
 

^{George Evans (Former Peace Corps Director- Costa Rica, and early IAF staff member)}
 
 

^{Idealism (Alternative Development) [1971-1983]}
 

^{As a pathfinding, alternative agency, [the IAF's] raison d'etre encompassed evolving guiding convictions which would be found compelling in the grassroots of the Americas. Modest assistance to small private groups has assigned no place on the international chess-board, where a loan may be seen as a trade off for a U.N. vote, a high sign of support for a particular government, or part of a packaged political deal. Our only common ground is humanism. And to be convincing we must not just operate according to our beliefs, we must convey them to our beneficiaries in sincere and simple language:}

^{-human beings have value and dignity, not merely ends and uses;}

^{-commoners have the right and capacity to promote their own well-being, manage their own affairs, and make accountable their own institutions;}

^{-people everywhere manifestly know their own world better than any outsider and their lives should not be controlled, manipulated, or engineered by others;}

^{-the ideals of justice, respect, equity, compassion, and the commonweal are basic to human existence. The aspirations may have varying veneers in different societies but they must be understood and respected. (IAF 1977: 1)}

^{These words surprisingly form the founding principles of a development agency of the United States government in the early 1970s, and remained a central part of the Inter-American Foundation's discourse throughout its first decade of operation. The IAF was established by the U.S. Congress in 1969, as a result of the failures of the traditional development practices of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. Its first Board of Directors consisted of several U.S. businessmen who had worked in Latin America for many years, mostly as representatives of major U.S. multinational corporations. Yet strangely enough a combination of politicians and businessmen both initiated and nurtured the idea and practice of 'alternative' development with great passion. The vision of supporting a new type of development assistance in Latin America was finally fulfilled in 1971 when the IAF began funding projects, while the nation's attention was focussed upon the war in Vietnam and the debate over a withdrawal of military personnel. However the timing of its founding is not coincidentally related to the rise in "grassroots" social movements throughout the Latin American region.}

^{The IAF began its operations in a manner that differed substantially from any other U.S. agency, evident by its writing: direct, forthright, critical and self-reflective with a bold emphasis on idealism. The discourse is closely associated with Western liberal individualism, those ideas that place the individual as the central concern, especially with respect to interpretations of rights and responsibilities. The moral undertones are by no means subtle, commanding in the above-mentioned passage the almighty good "ideals of justice, respect, equity, compassion, and the commonweal" which they claim "are basic to human existence". Yet this almighty good seems very similar to the almighty God of Western Christianity, especially that promoted by Protestant sects of Euro-America.}
 

^{Thus the IAF's rationale can be broadly drawn, with four considerations towering over the experiment: the need to :}

^{-reach poor people who have the yeast to better their lot;}

^{-identify techniques that could be helpful to other lending agencies;}

^{-restore foreign confidence in the U.S.'s traditional generosity and idealism;}

^{-reassure the U.S. public that foreign assistance can be valid an effective.}

^{(IAF 1977: 2)}

^{The IAF's ideas and ideals were held up to the basic 'they know how' premise, which was literally engaged on all levels of its meaning. The most significant example of this is the central structure of the organisation: funding exclusively Latin American projects of grassroots development either by the organised poor themselves, or through intermediary organisations (NGOs)(8). The role of the development expert has been significantly altered, as the actual practice shifts into spaces that are not controlled by Northern 'experts' nor by Southern governments. This element alone places the IAF in a position of 'alternative' development, significantly different from the traditional practices of other development organisations that are directly or indirectly part of the U.S. government, most notably the Agency for International Development (AID) and the World Bank. The ideology of empowerment here was most common in determining how involved the organisation should be. Every development agency faces this issue, with one extreme being the helicopter approach (throwing money out into poor communities at random) and the other the micro-managed laboratory (with each aspect of project work carefully planned and directed by a staff of knowledgeable professionals).}

^{This notion of empowerment is also tied into U.S. nationalist discourse:}
 

^{It is our guiding assumption that U.S. idealism has been the wellspring of the nation's international force for 200 years. It has been, if you will, our most powerful weapon. And our preoccupation with the issue of how we are perceived by others is not an act of narcissism, but a question of how are society is to long survive in an increasingly hostile world. (IAF 1977: 3)}

^{Part of the success of the IAF was the initial period of freedom from appropriations scrutiny, a privilege that other agencies of the U.S. government did not enjoy. Attempts were made to write this permanently into law, to avoid the politicisation of its work and undue influence over project funding, yet this was untenable for its passage and subsequently dismissed. After the IAF's first $50 million was spent by 1973 it resumed yearly appropriation review.}

^{The unique outlook during this period of the organisation's history focussed beyond an increase of economic and material well-being as most development agencies did, and emphasised a change in relationships between development agencies and assistance recipients (Breslin 1987: 28). Central to this change was the IAF's focus on culture, identity and history as areas in which relationships could be preserved. Included in this is linguistic and territorial preservation.}

^{The most striking aspect of the IAF is the motto of "they know how", which contradicts the omnipresent notion of ignorance that is closely associated with development thought and practice (see Hobart 1993 for a focus on ignorance and development). Examining the publications throughout this period, as well as discussing with individuals who worked with the IAF during this time, the idealism seemed to be rooted not in a paternalistic essentialisation of the primitive other (like that of Rousseau's noble savage), but in a sense of partnership working toward social change. This partnership was defined in May 1971 on behalf of the IAF Board of Directors as the Enablement Approach:}
 

^{-to listen to, understand, and support with grant funds the activities people themselves are carrying out; -to facilitate what others are doing, but not take part in creating or shaping it, in designing or implementing their projects; -to keep a hands-off attitude in the original design and implementation of projects; not to give advice or technical assistance; to respect the ideas of others and their freedom to put them into action; -to require only an accounting of the use of monies and brief reports on the progress of projects. (IAF 1977: 17)}

^{Shifting from the Foundation: the Liminal transition [1983-1990]}

^{The wave of idealism and activism crashed abruptly when Ronald Reagan's conservative administration took office in 1981. By 1983 the new Board of Directors (a majority of whom were appointed by the new administration) sent a direct signal to the IAF by firing Peter Bell, who as President at the time upheld the idealistic standards of his predecessor Bill Dyal. A new President was appointed and also later challenged by the Board of Directors. Although Dorothy Szekely successfully retained her position of President, her direction was successfully altered from that of her predecessors. The IAF was placed in the centre of partisan political demands, as its autonomy had gradually given way.}

^{The public discourse of this period reflects this transition. Additionally, major restructuring occurred in the process of operations, as in 1985 the IAF introduced the In Country Service (ICS) approach to its grassroots development mission. Aimed at increasing accountability of its grant recipients, grantees would now have an additional level of supervision from within their own countries as outside development specialists (in-country service providers) are contracted by the Foundation to oversee an organisation's progress. The ICS transition was supposedly to "enable beneficiary groups to achieve their own goals more efficiently" (IAF 1986: 7), as it was described as "one of the most significant methodological changes in the Foundation since its beginning."(IAF 1987: 10) This significant change is in apparent opposition to the founding beliefs of laissez-faire IAF idealism, yet is part of the pragmatic-conservative process of 'accountability' and greater control over resources.}

^{The 1987 Annual Report explains further why the change to the ICS approach was necessary:}
 

^{Although (concerns with the ICS) are real, more than 15 years of experience in grassroots development have shown that while community groups often do "know how," they frequently may not know when, where, or why. As the landmark report of the "Evaluation Group" commissioned by the Foundation's Board of Directors in 1982 to study the IAF's work noted, 'In our examination of projects, we found some failing for lack of simple know-how- how to set up a production line, how to market a product, how to design a piece of handicraft. (IAF 1987: 10-11)}

^{The Office of Programs claimed that these necessary changes were for the best:}
 

^{initial reports indicate that benefits justify the costs (of ICS work). Grantees, for example, now are assured at least two, three, and often four visits a year by local monitors and IAF field staff. With this enhanced level of contact, both grantees and the IAF receive continuing feedback about steps taken to reach project goals. .consistent monitoring allows problems to be identified so that damage control and correction can occur before beneficiary hopes are irreparably dashed. (ibid.)}

^{In terms of resource allocation, the IAF's budget was cut three times between 1980 and 1985 (Breslin 1987: 122) while the Reagan administration's re-ignition of the Cold War fire saw defence budgets escalate to unprecedented levels of funding. Undoubtedly these broader political issues made significant impacts upon the way in which the IAF was to operate, leaving the organisational mission and orientation to take significantly new directions. Overall, the changes adopted during this in-between stage moved the IAF from a process based to project based approach. The distinction between the two is best described by an active leader of a Latin American grassroots support organisation who comments:}
 

^{I've noticed a change of attitude.From 1976 to 1980 or 1981, the Foundation was supporting a process. There was something in common in all its projects, a process of structural change, based on the organized poor. Now the Foundation is doing assistance. Small is beautiful. I don't see the repeatability of projects. Why the change? I imagine political pressures. (Breslin 1987:122)}

^{Changes made at this time increased the element of uncertainty associated with the identity and purpose of the organisation at the macro-level, which contrasted to the previous period of active engagement and support of grassroots movements and projects of social change.}

^{Rise of the Market Metaphor: establishing the Neo-liberal agenda [1991-1998]}

^{By the beginning of the early 1990s, a noticeable shift in IAF discourse emerged, a future direction for change. In his 1993 letter, then president Bill Perrin explained this transition in further detail:}
 

^{The new concepts introduced in the 1990s are two-fold: NGOs are working with business and government to mobilize, organize and focus resources on sustainable grassroots development; and that NGOs are getting more resources from the private and public sectors in their own countries, thereby lessening their dependence on foreign assistance. (IAF 1993: 6)}

^{The idealism of the past has all but disappeared in public policy statements as the IAF's new priorities were emphasised in a significantly altered and politicised discourse. Two years later, current President George Evans wrote:}
 

^{The Foundation will continue to work with country-level and international organizations, but will seek to form more strategic program alliances with them to leverage and maximize the impact of resources for grassroots development. In some countries the Foundation is helping to set up new partnerships- innovative consortia-type associations that strengthen local capacity to and help attract local and international resources to scale up support for grassroots development programs. Clearly, this resource mobilization strategy requires a shift in the Foundation's role. For 25 years it has maintained a low profile, responsive and non-prescriptive approach to funding grassroots development programs; now it must become far more proactive in promoting the value of grassroots development in the Latin American private sectors as well as in the international donor community. In the marketplace of grassroots development, it has shifted from a buyer to a seller. Essentially, it must now become a broker in raising support and resources for grassroots development. (IAF 1995; emphasis added)}

^{These comments clearly demonstrate a new transition for the IAF, which now functions as a commercial intermediary for development transactions. It is no coincidence that the market metaphor is used extensively in this passage, as the IAF has reshaped it's own identity in the model of private enterprise, a model of prestige in the eyes of the agency's overseers: the United States congress. As the legislative politics of US government changed with a conservative (Republican) victory in the 1994 congressional elections, policy became wrapped in the market discourse of 'efficiency', 'maximisation' and 'privatisation'. The IAF jumped in this new direction by adding 'resource mobilisation' as an additional element of its mission, a move that supposedly complemented its existing mission of supporting local development through Latin American intermediaries. Evans defines this new orientation toward resource mobilisation as brokering funds for Latin American NGOs, which entails greater interaction with business and government.}

^{By the mid-1990s the IAF's foundation of non-prescriptive development fell completely by the wayside, as the organisation became more attuned to the whims of congressional funding which scrutinised many elements of the foundation's work. Domestic and foreign policy influences had clearly entered into IAF daily life, beyond debates over promoting a specific form of political system. As mentioned the IAF has in the past been in conflict with other interests of the United States government, often times funding conflicting interests in the region or even in a single country-most notably Nicaragua in the early 1980s. Yet the IAF's current approach of passive withdrawal as opposed to the assertive defence of the past is a clear example of how the organisation has changed throughout its three decades of operations.}

^{Why the transition?}

^{An organisation's goals are flexible and mutable over time, yet one has to ask the central question of whose interest they serve? Arguably the changes in the IAF's mission and its short and long term objectives have been made to bolster the power of certain members of the organisation, specifically management, who have increased their control over funding (resource control) as well as the nature of their involvement in project development. These changes not only contradict the very foundations of the organisation, but have also posed severe constraints on the spirit of the front-line practitioners. The idealist country representatives are more often than not marginalised from the pragmatic concerns of management(9). The tension between the two can be seen as a consequence of a crisis in organisational dynamics where interests are not united.}

^{Discussion on these changes with both IAF employees and outside development practitioners who work with the IAF revealed two primary causes. One view focuses on the growing hostility in congressional and presidential attitudes toward the agency's mission, leaving the IAF no choice but to strengthen the role of management and to re-shape its priorities. However others cite the internal politics of the agency itself, mostly on behalf of management, that has led the IAF to significantly alter its policy in the face of congressional and presidential demands. This view sees management as using the dominant discourse of the conservative forces in government to enhance their own position in the agency.}

^{Yet even amongst IAF practitioners there is a mixture of ideologies which range from one extreme of idealism that places individual empowerment at the centre of implementing social change- expressed by the utopian motto "they know how- to the other extreme of pragmatic conservatism that places institutions at the centre of implementing social change- an implicit "we know how" approach. This contributes to the considerable shift in the IAF's discourse that reflects an ongoing process of change, challenging classic Weberian notions of the iron-cage politics of bureaucracy. Such conflicting ideologies within the organisation further reveal its heterogeneity, an aspect that is overlooked by many anthropological studies of development.}
 

^Conclusion

^{In terms of previously mentioned typologies of development practice, the agency has experienced a shift from being more 'alternative' to more 'traditional'. Although the IAF never achieved the ideal of providing an 'alternative to development', it was perhaps the most radical 'alternative' of all U.S. government sponsored development agencies. On a realistic level, this may indicate that change is not coming anytime soon from the large state-sponsored development agencies themselves (nor is it a feasible option), as forming a partnership of respect in the development process is easily sacrificed when it remains within the domain of national and international politics(10). Two immediate elements of change in the development process might entail a call for greater autonomy for state-sponsored agencies as well as focusing on the work of private, not-for profit organisations. Yet is this enough?}

^{In light of analysing the IAF's orientations and operations, Escobar's notion of 'alternative to development' (1995: 222-226) is seen more as misplaced idealism of a post-development future. His theory ignores the role of politics and power maintained by the state (both at national and local levels), and of development organisations (both those of the Northern development scene, as well as Southern organisations). The future direction for a more effective development possibility involves not the utopian disengagement of an existing system of power and politics, but rather to identify ways in which change can come through those traditional institutions and relationships that in the past have proven ineffective in promoting social change. The first step towards imagining possibilities involves understanding these institutions and organisations as consisting of individuals with varying interests, opportunities and experiences. The essence of this portrait of Latin American grassroots development is of relationships that merge at various levels, with power and politics intertwined at each stage.}

^{In sum, the journey of a development organisation is in constant flux, as landmarks (dominant ideologies) may change at certain points, they often remain contested by different members who each ascribe to their own sets of beliefs of how the organisation should operate. Analysis of the IAF has revealed that although its current direction may have moved too far away from the positive aspects of a 'process based' approach to social change, there remains possibility for new directions in the future. A shift on behalf of the IAF's Board of Directors and management in how they relate towards political pressure from the U.S. Congress and President, is one key factor that may facilitate the success of being able to adopt a radically innovative and effective approach to development. This analysis has emphasised that it is improbable for a development organisation to have a stable, settled and unchanging present or future. As this continues to remain true, there is relevance for a focus on the ways in which development agencies can re-formulate and re-orientate strategies and ideologies of social change.}
 
 
 
 

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^{Cardoso, Ruth. 1987. Movimientos sociais na america latina. Revista Brasilera das Ciencias Sociais 3, no. 1: 27-37.}

^{Carroll, Thomas. 1992. Intermediary NGOs: the supporting link in grassroots development West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.}

^{Cohen, Jean. 1985. Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms in contemporary social movements. Social Research 52, no. 4: 663-716.}

^{Escobar, Arturo and Sonia Alvarez. 1992. Introduction: theory and protest in Latin America today. In Escobar, Arturo and Sonia Alvarez (eds.) The making of social movements in Latin America: identity, strategy, and democracy. Boulder: Westview Press.}

^{Escobar, Arturo. 1995. Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.}

^{Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.}

^{Hann, Chris. 1996. Introduction: politcal society and civil anthropology. In Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (eds.) Civil society: challenging Western models. London: Routledge.}

^{Hobart, Mark. 1993. Introduction: the growth of ignorance? In Mark Hobart (ed.) An anthropological critique of development: the growth of ignorance. London: Routledge.}

^{Honneth, Axel. 1991. The critique of power: reflective stages in a critical social theory. London: MIT Press.}

^{Inter-American Foundation (1977) They know how Rosslyn: Inter-American Foundation.}

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^{Inter-American Foundation (1995) 1995 In Review Arlington: Inter-American Foundation.}

^{Inter-American Foundation (1997) 1997 In Review Arlington: Inter-American Foundation.}

^{Morley, Samuel A. (1994) Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Past evidence, future prospects Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council.}

^{Nader, Laura (1969) Up the Anthropologist: perspectives gained from studying up. In Hymes, Del (ed.) Reinventing anthropology New York: Pantheon.}

^{Rabinow, Paul (1986) Representations are social facts: modernity and post-modernity in Anthropology. In Clifford, James and Marcus, George (eds.) Writing Culture: the poetics and politics of ethnography Berkeley: University of California Press.}

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^Endnotes

^{1. Materials used for this research are both primary and secondary in source, a project that first began in September of 1996. Appreciation to IAF staff members who discussed with me their thoughts on the organisation past and present. Thanks to Joanne Rappaport for early encouragement, Helen Watson for comments on a previous version, and Annalise Moser for her valued feedback and continued support.}

^{2. From 1972 to 1997 the IAF has issued 4,077 grants totalling $463.06 million throughout Latin America (IAF 1997).}

^{3. The proliferation of popular groups has found many organising under the umbrella name of NGO, the numbers of which have increased substantially since the early 1970s, especially in the last 10 years. For the purposes of this analysis the terms NGO and grassroots NGO shall be used interchangeably, and define those organisations which emerge from and operate directly at the local level (Carroll 1992: 9). This excludes the giant transnational development organisations such as Amnesty International, Cultural Survival, Oxfam and others that are also involved in funding grassroots development projects but with a different relationship to the local level.}

^{4. The terms 'alternative' and 'traditional' are used here to describe the relationship a development organisation maintains with those that are receiving its assistance. An organisation that implements its ideal of planned change via a one-way process of activity is considered for this analysis to be 'traditional'.}

^{5. The syndicalist movement of Latin America emerged in the beginning of the 20th century and spread throughout the region where industrial production was present. Radical labour activists from Europe assisted in the class based struggle to promote higher wages, improved working conditions and reduced working hours in Latin American nation states. Between 1914 and 1927 anarchist, anarcho-syndicalist and syndaclist influence was at its strongest, instigating general strikes in the capital cities of nearly every Latin American country (Skidmore and Smith 1992: 49). Cohen sees this activity as the 'productivist' cultural model of organisation of the Old Left, which has since been replaced by the New Left and its focus on grassroots politics by creating horizontal, directly democratic associations that are loosely federated on national levels (1985: 667).}

^{6. Statistics for poverty and inequality face the common problem of quantifying a condition that is difficult to assess- should it be measured by income, housing and sanitation, nutrition, education, or other factors? Furthermore these elements are quite difficult to assess given the relative inaccuracy of data gathering in the face of such challenges as incorrect reporting and 'informal' means of income and subsistence. Yet despite these contentious issues which statisticians and economists have and will continue to waste ink on, there is an overwhelming consensus that overall poverty and inequality increased in Latin America throughout the 1980s and up into the early 1990s at alarming levels. Although each country assumed its own experience with economic recession, individuals throughout the region (with the exception of the extremely rich who held foreign currency and assets off-shore) experienced a reduction in economic status (see Morley 1994).}

^{7. Discourse is referred to as a system of social knowledge- which includes language, practices and ideas- that emerges from a strategic order of power, a means of analysis supported by Foucault that proves effective in unfolding the hidden and visible cleavages of a dynamic process of social relationships. (see Foucault 1980 and Honneth 1991)}

^{8. In addition to funding grassroots organisations throughout Latin America, the IAF also disseminates the journal Grassroots Development (which by 1998 had a circulation of 30,000), and also provides grants for doctoral and masters research on 'grassroots' themes in Latin America. Past recipients have included a number of anthropologists including Sonia Alvarez in 1982 and Orin Starn in 1986.}

^{9. Country representatives are the 'practitioners' who work directly with the Latin American NGOs themselves, although based in Washington D.C. they spend at least a third of their time in Latin America monitoring project work of current grantees. They also review new grant applications to decide which organisations should be candidates for funding. Management's role is to 'supervise' the activities of the Country Representatives, ensuring that their work reflects the goals, objectives and orientations of the IAF. Management also has more decision making power in the ultimate grant funding process. The nine members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the President of the United States to oversee the IAF's mission and activities, and work closely with management.}

^{10. This claim is mostly related to the U.S. government, which in comparison to the other Northern nations has more issue with a lack of political independence of development work. European government agencies which fund projects abroad (Dutch, German, Swedish and others) are notably different in approach, yet it still remains that the U.S. is an international force in development (most notably its power over the larger transnational organisations- World Bank, United Nations, IDB, etc.)}