PARTY CHARISMA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

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It is something in the nature of democratic dogma to maintain that the two party system, with a legally sanctioned circulation of ruling elites, is not simply operational with respect to Western culture, but organic and universal in any definition of democracy. Perhaps the most direct expression of this view was made by Maurice Duverger, when he wrote that “the two party system seems to correspond to the nature of things, that is to say that political choice usually takes the form of a choice between two alternatives.” Examining this proposition closely, we note that it contains two distinct and not necessarily interconnected elements. First, that the two party system is “natural” because polarization along game-like lines is a social fact. Second, that political choice involves a consideration and a decision between alternative parties.

Since POLITICAL PARTIES was written, a great deal has taken place which would indicate that while politics does indeed involve choice, and while the “myth” of a center in politics is just that, this offers little warrant for the necessity of a two party system. In fact, political gamesmanship can just as readily occur within a single party apparatus, within its factional interstices, as it can between different parties. There is increasingly pointed evidence that even in such a classic two party nation as the United States there is probably more difference between factions within each party than between Democrats and Republicans as such. So clearly is this the case that the more astute commentators have taken to speaking of the American “four party” system—with liberal and conservative groupings within each political party.

The number of parties is therefore not a unique determinant either of the presence or the absence of mass democracy (democracy here being used simply to denote the extent and impact of public mobilization on policy decisions). This asymmetry between democracy and the party system should be kept in the forefront of any discussion of the political behavior in Third World nations; in such “one party democracies” as Mexico (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) and India (Congress Party), no less than in such “two party dictatorships” as Morocco, Union of South Africa, and Paraguay. Thus, to seriously examine political principles and practices in the Third World requires a radical shedding of ethnocentric pseudo-requirements in the study of democratic and totalitarian processes alike.
Max Weber went far toward anticipating the instability of genuinely charismatic situations, and their rapid absorption into bureaucratic institutions through a process of routinization. However, while Weber did allow for the charisma of office; he did not apply this concept to political systems, in an age of bureaucratic regulation and rationalization. For him, it was ultimately a choice between "the sovereignty of the charismatic man" and the "superordination of the institution." While Weber notes that the "conflict between discipline and individual charisma has been full of vicissitudes," the polarities between discipline and charisma remain hard and unyielding. Discipline, "like its most rational offspring bureaucracy, is impersonal," while charisma, which often reveals itself in military or semi-military situations, "uses emotional means of all sorts to influence followers through 'inspiration' and, even more, to train them in emphatic understanding' of the leader's will." What has become apparent, but thus far remains relatively unexamined in the literature of political sociology, is how discipline and charisma, rational authority and personal appeal, are fused in the political party which at the same time is the national party. This party, which embodies both the charismatic leadership responsible for making the national revolution of independence and the bureaucratic directors responsible for guaranteeing the follow-up national revolution of development, in effect transforms the Weberian duality into a search for a "higher unity"--into what is herein called party charisma.

There is scarcely a Third World nation which does not exhibit a series of antagonistic processes. This is becoming clear only now--a decade after the liberation stage. In its most atomic form, this double process might be described as follows: On one side, nearly every nation in the Third World exhibits a powerful leader principle, a führerprinzip, in which power is seen to reside first and foremost in the leader, since he contains within his person the sum and substance of the aspirations and sentiments of the whole people. There is thus a powerful tendency in the direction of charismatic authority--particularly since the leader is identified in the minds of the people as liberator from the colonial yoke. But, contrariwise, along with the existence of an exaggerated personalism, is a strengthened appeal to the principle of mass participation and even mass domination. The use of a socialist rhetoric of mass-cult in the political language reinforces the trend to the further integration of the masses in the political processes. In short, there exists in the Third World contrasting trends in the direction of extra-legal personal authority and legal-rational authority.

In the light of the tensions produced by these contrary trends, a special sort of resolution has taken place in a large number of emergent states. This new resolution, however "transitional" it may turn out to be, can be summed up by the phrase party charisma. Yet, the number of new states moving toward the adoption of party charisma would indicate that it is anything but a passing fancy. The single party, or the unified party coalition, takes upon itself the "God-like" features of leadership, which in the medieval world belonged to a series of Popes; which in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries belonged to a series of monarchs—some enlightened, but all of whom were absolute; and which in the present century has been raised to a new level by such secular rulers as Hitler, Stalin, and to a lesser level, Mussolini and Peron. Nonetheless, in the past charisma was most often lodged in "real people" rather than in the institution per se. Although, as Weber showed, with the Catholic Church there was a real effort to lodge charisma in the institution rather than in the person. But the modern form of party charisma has the unique capacity to "depersonalize" lawlessness, to give a party foundation to public law an authority, rather than an impersonal civic foundation.

Before examining the problems and prospects for this new system of party charisma, we might offer a chart which will distinguish ideological rationalizations from its institutional base. This kind of chart illustrates both the present status and likely consequences of this pervasive response to the politics of economic development.

CHART: The ideological and institutional Bases of Party Charisma in the Third World.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Bases Justifying Party Charisma</th>
<th>Institutional Bases Underlying Party Charisma</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political parties sabotage national unity and even when differences are honest, they sap the nation of a meaningful direction.</td>
<td>1a National independence is often directly linked to a specific leadership, who, since it defines what a meaningful direction is, carries in its party the wisdom necessary for honest rule without a multiplicity of party system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The nationalist organization, which summed up the collective aspirations of the people prior to the national liberation period, is uniquely charged with the responsibility of realizing the fruits of victory in the post-liberation period.</td>
<td>2a Groups outside the nationalist organization are viewed as disruptive and disloyal to the basic aims of the revolution, and hence are not believed to enhance the post-liberation position of the new nations. The idea of party competition is considered bourgeois rather than democratic; and in political contexts increasingly defining national aspirations as identical with socialist aspirations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Multiple parties waste valuable manpower and time; and anyhow, the existence of multiple parties is no guarantor of democratic norms of political behavior.

3a There is indeed a technological-managerial void which tends to drain off talent from directly political ends. Nonetheless, the argument that multiple parties create a waste tends to reveal a strong bias in favor of the cult of efficiency, rather than of democracy. And these canons of efficiency tend to reward precisely that professional sector which garners the rewards of political organization far out of proportion to their numbers. Hence, the only forces capable of meaningful political opposition are in this way coopted.

4. The system of multiple political parties is not suited to emergent nations in which mutual assistance rather than mutual competition is the order of the day.

4a One institutional weakness making multiple political parties hard to establish is the absence of a neutral bureaucracy, without which the functioning of the modern State is extremely difficult. Because of this, a consensus ("mutual assistance") must be developed within the political infrastructure, since in the absence of a neutral bureaucracy, multiple parties would indeed occasion a high degree of dis-sensus ("mutual competition").

5. Competition between political parties is a metaphysical rather than a sociological need. It is based on the principle of the selfishness and interest bound character of political life, something uniquely true for capitalist States, and not characteristic of the new States of the Third World.

5a. This argument of the dysfunctionality of political parties is largely spurious. As a matter of fact, there is a great deal of selfishness and interest boundedness within a single party system, i.e., the competition for control between ideologists and technologists. And, in the older, more mature conditions of political charisma (often where the original leaders have died, as Gandhi and Nehru in India), there are powerful institutional provisions for channeliz
6. Multiple party states arose at a time when the economy sponsored the fragmentation of society into different and antagonistic social sectors; since the economy is itself politically directed, and the Third World societies are not fragmented of either structure or purpose, there is no need for multiple party units.

6a The institutional structure of Third World nations is the farthest from being united as to structure or purpose. Conflicts between urban and tribal interests in Africa; between racial strains in Latin America; between peasant and bourgeois in India and other parts of Asia attest to the disparity of economic structure. The single party State, when it is in effect, only serves to compel these economic interests to funnel their demands through political channels, making the State the biggest "business" of all in many of the emergent nations.

Whatever shortcomings are evident in the chart, this much is clear: that the problems now confronting Third World nations flow from matters of the efficiency and effects of political resolution based on party charisma. No longer is it a debatable point whether or not this is in fact the principal political "formula" in use. It might therefore be most useful to deepen in text the points introduced in the chart.

Every social institution has an ideological rationale. As long as the colonial powers held ultimate power they could support the growth of European types of institutions against the pressures exerted by the internal society to such institutions with a concern for local factors. Universalism, instrumentalism, impersonalism increase steadily under the sponsorship of colonial powers. Indeed, as in India, the bureaucracy is often taken to be the mark of colonial achievement in the underdeveloped areas. But with the completion of the anti-colonial phase of Third World struggles, we find a curious political reversion—or what seems to be a reversion—to traditionalist modalities for the sanctioning of public authority. This is specially noticeable in Africa, although it takes place to some degree in Asia and in Latin America as well. Thus, the new leaders who may appear as demagogues to Westerners often are considered as democrats to the peoples of these newly liberated areas. The Maximum leader is someone in authority with responsibility that is permanent, personal, pervasive, and above all, "legitimized." That it is a power which is not destroyed by being out of office is made clear by the career patterns of men like Patrice Lumumba and Jomo Kenyatta, and to lesser extent by Juan Peron and Getulio Vargas. The colonialist notion that to be out of power meant to be out of favor simply does not obtain in a charismatic situation buffered by party organization. Indeed, it might be argued that political exile ushers into martyrdom, and may actually prolong the life-span of political fossils.

While we have established evidence that charisma, however vague a concept it may be, is a factor in the "national liberation struggle," we have to satisfactorily explain what takes place after this revolutionary phase. On the whole, the social functions of charisma radically shift after the successful conclusion of the national liberation effort. The revolutionary period is characterized by a heightened personal charisma. This can be done by taking advantage of all the weakness of the established social order, by intensifying the mass sense of bewilderment and helplessness without a new set of leaders, and by terrifying the population through the specter of innumerable dangerous enemies. In this way capricious acts can be eliminated, and individual response can be replaced by a contagion effect.

Charisma in the post-revolutionary period must respond to an entirely different set of needs: (a) it entails a response to the need for order out of the revolutionary malaise; (b) it has to fuse social sectors rendered antagonistic during the revolutionary
period; (c) it must resurrect the disintegrated personality by welding it to a higher collective "egotism," which, through the process of symbolic identification of the masses with the leadership, can restore the "personality" dimension to mass man. For such reasons, charisma in the new nations of Asia and Africa increasingly takes on depersonalized qualities—-with the mystique of charisma residing in the office, not the person. This kind of political charisma makes the fusion of mass aspirations with leadership demands much simpler, if for no other reason than that party charisma is a more stable and reliable guide to action than personal (and inevitably capricious) leadership.

Charismatic authority is not simply a stimulus to change, but may act as a broke on social change. As Hirschman has well appreciated, the idea of change may act as a prime obstacle to development.9 The charismatic leader develops what he terms an "ego-focused conception of progress" which acts as a drag on economic development by placing responsibility for development on the political arts rather than upon the commercial arts. In the United States, development has historically been underwritten by a "human engineering" perspective, whereas in many of the emerging nations personalism, political popularity struggles, or simple lotteries tend to throw the weight of charisma onto the side of "luck" and against "skill." To summarize this point, the dysfunctional aspects of pure charisma are that it puts tremendous weight on fate, fortune, and the skills of leadership—in short, on the ends sought, in place of any weight on skill, exact information, and the mass educational apparatus—in short, on the means employed.

One prime reason why charismatic leadership so often degenerates into personal tyranny is that intrinsic to the notion of "pure" charisma is a heavy faith on the ends sought, with slender consideration given to the means necessary to achieve such ends. The charismatic leader, in order to make good on his pledges and his promises, must perforce turn to terroristic methods, or run the risk that disillusionment among his followers will turn into disaffiliation—that the originating consensus will become a finalized dissensus within a short period of time. In some sense, party charisma, the focused investment of energies into the single party of progress, while unappealing to those reared under the constitutional norms, is a solitary instrument limiting the caprice and the wickedness of pure personal charisma. Party charisma can more readily absorb a defeat, or a series of defeats, than can the individual leader. The Church long ago understood that the fallibility of Popes had to be separated from the infallibility of the Popacy, if the charisma invested in Catholicism was not to deteriorate into sectarianism and sectism.

Party charisma is hardly a new phenomenon. While it has achieved considerable refinement in African nations at a different historical level, a related phenomenon can be detected in the evolution of revolutionary movements in Latin America. Here the "science" and "art" of leadership are dedicated to resolving the antithesis
bequeathed by the First World of the West and the Second World of the Soviet East. Capitalism and socialism, mass action and creative leadership, worker and peasant, male and female, etc., are all summed up in the party of the whole people. In Argentina this notion was called Justicialismo. The party became the "mediating power." The party is also the "perfect organization." Whatever the defects of the maximum leader may be, such "human defects" (as Peron called them) do not carry over to tarnish the party. Unlike Africa, old and well established political parties are a factor to contend with in Latin America. This is done by claiming that the traditional political system is riddled with self-interest, fraud, and failure to integrate the nation. The "políticos" do not have a place to go; they lack a telos—which is what Justicialismo claimed to have. For it is not simply an "old fashioned party," but a movement—an activity going somewhere, responsible to somebody, headed by someone.¹⁰

The extent to which Peronism is a party phenomenon, rather than a simple charismatic condition, is made clear in the survival of the party, the attachment of charismatic values to the party of the descamisados, even though the maximum leader is scarcely likely to resume power, and has been in exile for a decade.¹¹ Personal leadership does not disappear by any means. Charisma simply resides in the symbol system of the party rather than attaching to the person of the exiled leader. The Revolutionary Party persists even though the Revolutionary Government may be overthrown. And this is a significant fact—since party charisma seems also to be evident in such diverse places as the Apristas of Peru and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) of Brazil. Signs of this are now taking place in Cuba, where despite the monumental personal authority of Castro, the elevation of the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution (PURSC) to a supreme place necessarily means that Castro has been willing and able to place himself under the authority of the Party.¹² Perhaps this is the only way to prevent factionalism from breaking out. Or perhaps the new emphasis on the party is a response to the problem of succession. But it is interesting that this way should be linked to the mystique of the Party, and not directly to the bureaucracy.

Strangely enough, the Peronist movement in the Argentina of the forties is more a prototype of what took place in Africa a decade later, in the fifties, than an imitation of the fascist Italy of the thirties. Peronism was directly linked to the transformation of a rural society into an urban society; it served as a catalyst for the industrialization of the nation; it served to give the drive toward economic development a base in a socially revolutionary doctrine and ideology.¹³ But perhaps the most perfect symbol of charismatic authority is the unique relationship the "leader" is said to have with the "people," a uniqueness underscored by the "anguish" of the past and the "joys" of the present. "The Argentine people does not forget those days of anguish and of death," Eva Peron wrote, "Why should it not celebrate the First of May, now that it can do so without fear and anxiety? Instead of screaming with clenched fists in front of the closed doors of Government House, the Argentine working people now celebrate May Day with a magnificent
festival, at which their Leader presides from the balconies of Government House in his character of the first Argentine worker, the title which, without any doubt, Peron appreciates most. And the marvelous thing is that, instead of fearing death on that day, the people are wont to offer their lives, yelling a chorus which always moves my soul: 'Our lives for Peron'.

The presence of charisma in developing regions is something much different than responsible self-government based on rational authority. The role of the leader is to purify the hearts and cleanse the minds of his followers. Let it be understood that there is always much to purify and cleanse! The culture of poverty is difficult to celebrate, when it is realized that its asking price is the surrender of the political processes to the benevolence of wealthy classes. Up close, within sight and touch, the culture of poverty tends to evaporate into a poverty of culture. Precisely for this reason, the leader can be charismatic, can appear god-like in his presentation of self to the generalized mass. Precisely for this reason can "working-class authoritarianism" become a factor. The process of development cannot be judged by whether it avoids charismatic appeals, but only by its achievement of the ends of development. Hence, the real difference between Peronism and Nasserism is not so much in appeals to charisma, but in the successful execution of the tasks of social development, in the ability of the one-party system to fulfill its economic tasks before it is overthrown by the claims of traditionalism.

This "role confusion" in which the leader identifies with the nation in an almost tautological fashion has been carried to highest perfection in Latin America. We have the most "perfect" illustration in the suicide of Getulio Vargas, who in his suicide message declared he would enter history by this act of identification with the "people." "My sacrifice will maintain you united, and my name will be your battle flag. Each drop of my blood will be an immortal call to your conscience and will maintain a holy vibration for resistance... I fought against the looting of Brazil I have fought against the looting of the people. I have fought bare-breasted. The hatred, infamy, and calumny did not beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity and I leave life to enter history." One can see here, as in the words of Evita Peron, the powerful strain of messianic fervor, a fervor which gives rich substance to the charismatic aspect of this ostensibly altruistic identification of person with nation, and through this identification, with the gods, with immortality.

From the less sacred and more profane side of things, it is evident that this "old-fashioned" Latin American personal charisma is not easily transferred into party charisma. In the case of Peron, through Justicialismo, and in the case of Vargas, the Partido Trabhalista Brasileiro, the image of the personal leader was a handicap rather than a handmaiden to party charisma. That is why they may have heralded the rise of party charisma, but in the absence of any authentic social revolution
"from below," such nations as Argentina and Brazil tend to waiver in their support of such an impersonal force and return to traditionalistic party approaches. This tends to show that, in Latin America at least, traditional politics may yet house modernist economics—at least until the question of structural reform is not in the docket.

Regional variations are indeed a major factor and should not be overlooked. Thus it could be said that especially in Latin America political party leaders often see themselves as the "vessels of universal truth" while manipulating their party machinery "as simple mechanisms with which to gain power." 16 But in fact, this approach is more common to the "old" underdeveloped nations of South America than to the "new" underdeveloped nations of Africa. In Latin America, the artificial grafting on of a libertarian political code to a soft underbelly of feudal socio-economic relations often accentuated pure charisma, just as it also accentuated pure bureaucratic norms. It is precisely the kind of permanent crisis of dependency evident in Latin America which many of the new nations of Asia and Africa have sought to overcome through party charisma. And it must be said that in those cases where more or less successful changes in the social structure have been brought about in Latin America, i.e., Cuba, Mexico, Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Venezuela, the party apparatus becomes the vessel of universal truth, while the leadership becomes instrumental with respect to the organization—in other words, the model of the "younger" developing nations tends to become the political norm—replacing that of the most developed "first new nation"—the United States, and avoiding the well advertised problems of the Soviet Russian bureaucratic State.

One of the peculiarities of authority in the Third World is that the party ideology is generally much more "hard nosed" and inflexible than criteria for party membership. While the ideological features of the political apparatus are often drawn along a Leninist axis, the actual organizational features are loosely structured to include a wide variety of ideological types. Lipset has recently noted that "such parties tend to be loosely structured, more like a rassemblement than a party of ideology or interest. They combine a number of interests and strata, either through the charisma of the leader or through the original need for unity in the struggle for independence. Charisma is necessary if the system is to survive in its early stages, and the absence of opposition may prove beneficial if it preserves the often frail mystique upon which authority depends." 17 It is not so much the "frail mystique" which determines the situation, but the frailties of power, the inability of any one social sector to define the political contours which determine the contents of the mystique.

What creates the foundations for rational-legal authority is the control by one well-defined social-economic sector over the others. The American
bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century, the Russian proletariat in the twentieth century (notwithstanding the rubrics which may be employed to show that the American bourgeois had aristocratic tastes, or that the Russian proletariat had bourgeois inclinations), gave rational-legal shape to their societies because personal charisma became superfluous in a political context defined by a developing homogeneous economic unit. Since the emergent nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa have never witnessed a complete resolution of their class relationships, they have never properly installed a rational-legal superstructure. The irony is that in many nations of Latin America the study of law was exaggerated all out of proportion to the institutionalization of legal prohibitions upon politically "irrational" behavior. While in those nations where the national movement was based on charismatic force, such as Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba, the strongest grounds are offered for rational authority in the Western hemisphere.

If we take Japan between 1860-1940 as typical of the "Pre-Third World" developmental process, we find the disillusionment with multi-party processes does not necessarily revoke itself in party charisma, but may result in pure charisma. "Despite growing popular participation in elections and extensive parliamentary experience, a political mature middle class, with demands and expectations, did not develop. There was not enough time for this adjustment; rather, politicians came to be regarded as corrupt, parasitic, somehow un-Japanese, and 'politician' took on a pejorative ring in prewar Japan. Essential power remained entrenched in a small elite, civilian and military, with the latter having direct access to the Emperor and able to use him to sanction its objectives without reference to the wishes of the popularity elected Diet." The appeal to mass democracy, the effort to resolve the tension between sentiments and law on the basis of party charisma, was simply not required--either on administrative or on ideological grounds. Part of the reason for this may be the hierarchical rigidity of Japanese political leadership--its close identification with military order and religious sanction.

This hieratic principle is precisely what is absent in most Third World nations, where there is extreme fluidity in both the definition and execution of leadership. Charismatic qualities of leadership are thus necessarily depersonalized, and made the property of the political party as such. Speaking of Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) in Ghana, it has been pointed out that this transference of charisma from the person to the party is nearly total. "The party must become at one the symbol and the focus of the national consciousness towards which loyalty can be directed above and even irrespective of loyalty to particular persons. Thus the agents of the party's authority may be acknowledged to fail or defect and ministerial heads may be seen to roll, but this must never be equated with any failure by the party as such. When the source and agency of authority are successfully separated in this way, it can then become true that le parti règne mais il ne gouverne pas. Charisma will become successfully routinized
once the separation of the source from the agency of authority immunizes it against the failure which would bring about the collapse of a 'pure' charismatic system. 19

This is simply the old "Church Militant-Church Triumphant" notion in modern political dress. The charisma of the medieval Church accrued to the institution as such, rather than to any special papal dignitary. And given the shocks which the Church encountered as a result of inner organizational strife (at one time during the Renaissance, three religious leaders claimed to be the sole and exclusive Pope, with the agencies of control dispersed in Avignon, Constantinople, and Rome), the idea of institutional charisma was absolutely essential for the continued survival of Catholic organization. Since the Church was said to be incorruptible, all imperfections were assigned to individual leaders, those who failed to measure up to the needs of the institutions. It may be said that this kind of institutional charisma is the mid-point between pure charisma on one side and rational-legal authority on the other. And in its specifically political format, it is this mixed type which prevails in the Third World.

Even where personal charisma is exceptionally powerful, as in Cuba, we find direct appeals to party charisma. In an address delivered in May, 1964, Fidel Castro said: "If the imperialists should invade this country, you would have to realize that the majority of the leaders of today would die in the struggle. But the people will remain, and the party would remain. There would be no need to ask for names or for men. Each one of us would do his duty in the way demanded of him and do it well."20 There is no question of the sincerity of the emotions herein expressed. What is obvious is that under stress and duress, the appeal of political leadership to the rank and file is made in the name of the people and party. Underwriting the rhetoric is a clear distinction between transient elite and permanent mass. Cuban leadership displays a Dionysian involvement rather than an Apollonian detachment. To say that this is simply a clever and modern way of reinforcing personal charisma misses the point that the cult of the party is quite commonplace. And if we examine the history of the Soviet Union, it will be found that the "personality cult" came, not at the outset of the Revolution, but only at a late stage when the goals of political revolution hardened, becoming goals of economic development.

One of the chief functional by-products of charismatic leadership is that it dislodges traditional economic sectors from over-riding State decisions. The kinds of independent class struggles engaged in by the trade unions and business associations in the highly developed capitalist nations are found intolerable in the Third World. They are viewed as obstructions to the tasks of social development—and in this way, the conduct of the union or the corporation becomes subordinate with respect to State power. This is perfectly expressed by the African leader Tom Mboya. Speaking of both union and management separatist tendencies,
he writes: "The lesson they have to learn is that if their beliefs are to be respected in our new countries, they will need to show a response to government and nationalistic requirements. If their stand appears to be negative and unnecessarily obstructive, then it is inevitable that, with this sense of urgency in our new countries, they will be overridden and completely set aside. If they show they are cooperative and become partners in the urgent need for development, then they will survive." 21

This is a pleasant way of pointing out to economic sectors that in the Third World politics is trumps. It is also a clear cut indication that conventional mass movements such as socialism, unionism, libertarianism are seen as subsumed under the cloak of the party-State.

IV

Underwriting the new doctrine of party charisma is the emergence of a new post-colonial bourgeoisie, which already controls a large part of the consumer trade in Africa and Asia, while leaving "problems" of production to the European and American bourgeoisie. In place of the concept of class competition is the doctrine of the "whole people." This doctrine makes multiple parties superfluous, since the whole people can obviously be serviced by the whole party.22 Yet, the conception of the whole people, or the myth of the mass, serves to put a serious limitation on the totalitarian possibilities of the whole party. It must respond to pressures at least to the extent of taking the problems of mass democracy seriously. Because of the competing strains between social forces within the new nations, the concept of party charisma has come to function in support of a relatively unstable equilibrium, an instability created by the fact that the very social forces which contributed to the formal political independence of the emergent nation are now compelled to choose between going further onto a socialist track, or choose consolidation in terms of a capitalist track. In the more generic language of development: the choice is between "structural" alternation and consumer oriented "modernization".

A critical feature in many Third World countries is the high valuation place upon the mobilization of the working classes and union movements in support of the national leadership. In this aspect, the nations of the Third World have incorporated selective features of fangangism rather than of socialism. Syndicalism becomes the most powerful bulwark of the nationalist elites. The working classes thus become forces in themselves, rather than for themselves. This variety of "national socialism" is made possible by the rationale of economic "pie splitting". Since large-scale capital is held by foreigners, internal economic fissures between classes is somehow said to be dissolved, or at least drastically minimized. In this form, the development ideology of the whole people comes to replace the socialist ideology of class struggles.

A basic reason that "rational authority" cannot completely replace charismatic rule is that the ideology of the whole people rests on a formal political base
rather than upon a fluid economic base. The formal independence of many Third World nations makes possible greater accessibility of the older colonial powers - since formal freedom liberates the ex-colonial powers of the necessity of rule, and insures greater productivity, greater output, and greater interaction with foreign powers. The new middle classes which emerges in post-colonial situations moves in the direction of the kind of formal authority which characterizes the advanced middle class societies elsewhere. But this direction is thwarted by the overt sentiments of the revolutionary leadership, and more important, middle class political consolidation stands in contradiction to the stated socialist objectives of many emergent nations. Therefore, the political elite must continue to exercise the special prerogatives of office, lest the balance between the post colonial middle sectors and working sectors break out into a rash of social conflicts prior to, and in jeopardy of the thorough mobilization and integration of the new nations as such.

Political sloganeering is a natural corollary of political simplicity. Party elites are shrewd enough to avoid making exaggerated claims for themselves as purveyors of universal truths; they now prefer to invest their particular party with such claim. In a new nation like Mali, for example, the Political Bureau of a dozen men make all decisions, and these decisions are binding on all Malians. It is the Union Soudanaise party which "holds in its hands the destiny of the country and has absolute power." The danger in this situation is in the failure to "surround the party with guarantees of popular agreement." There is a genuine concern with elite connections to the mass; and this is resolved jesuitically, on the "efficacy of working as a team" so as to avoid decisions being "marred by errors." Party charisma enables the new nation to combine maximum organizational efficiency with the greatest mobilization of the masses. It becomes a way of establishing the paradoxical claims of a consensus built upon mass participation and of a coercive apparatus built upon elitist drives toward development. And to the degree that such paradoxical claims are matters of ultimate interests, and are "non-negotiable", then party charisma may turn out to be an unstable and temporary equilibrium. But then again, the entire Third World may be in this position vis-a-vis the advanced industrial-military complexes of the world.

An extremely fertile area for testing this thesis concerning party charisma is the newer nation-States of Africa. The problem might be posed in the following way: why is there a need for charismatic rather than rationalistic types of political authority? Three different answers seem to suggest themselves; the exact "weighting" of them would require detailed empirical studies. First, there are very few educated people in the new African states; very few whose technical qualifications alone would allow for non-charismatic forms of rule. Second, there is a frustration with the tardiness of the natural history of development; party charisma therefore operates as a ready-made tool with which to accelerate this process. Third, there is a long history in most of the African states of a ready acceptance and positive
response to raw power; that is, in both British and French colonies the lines of subordination and superordination are clear and mutually accepted. In such a context, it becomes evident that party charisma overcomes the problem of political succession in the most feasible way possible within a context which exhibits a high degree of traditionalism amongst the masses and a no less marked modernism amongst the elites.

In response to the cry of trahison which has been heard with increasing stridency by socialist elements in the Third World and Western Europe alike, the leadership of many of the emerging states have asserted that the national liberation phase has not yet been concluded (at least this is held to be so in Africa). That in fact, only when the nations like Angola and South Africa are liberated from the colonial domination will it be possible or desirable to focus attention on the internal imbalances between social sectors within the Continent. But that for such advanced nations as Ghana and Nigeria to intensify the conflict between the new urban proletariat and the new urban bourgeoisie, would only postpone a settlement of accounts with the remaining imperial powers, and in this way, prove to be a sectarian and self-defeating struggle. This concept, not only of the whole people, but enlarged into one of the whole continent, seems to underly the frequent expressions of the unique properties of African Socialism.

The growth of party charisma in the Soviet Union was thwarted by two important factors: one practical and the other theoretical. On the practical side, the Soviet Union inherited a relatively well developed bureaucratic apparatus from the Czardist regime. Unlike the post-colonial situation in the new nations of Africa and Asia, the Czardist bureaucracy was left intact. From the outset, it was a distinctively Russian entity, and not a colonial import which could be expanded or withdrawn at the pleasure of the foreign governing body. Thus, it was not necessary for the Bolshevik Party to incorporate unto itself all the features of organizational life. On the theoretical side, the division of labor between Government and Party was a Leninist canon. It represented the Communist Party way of establishing some sort of check and balance. The fact that under Stalin the role of Government was profoundly weakened, and the difference between federal and party functions dwindled in significance, made possible the kind of personal charisma which sapped the strength of all Soviet organizational life. In some measure therefore, one may consider the Khruschev era in Soviet history a time of restoration—the reestablishment of lines of authority which are in some measure traditional, while in other respects, legalistic and rationalistic. In any event, at no point in past Soviet political history has there been any real unfolding of party charisma. It has been a case either of pure personal charisma or highly rationalistic bureaucratic norms of behavior. It might be said that though the Russian bureaucracy at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution was not strong enough or single-minded enough to prevent the Revolution from taking place, it was not weak enough or divided enough to have its peculiarly technological functions undermined by any sort of proletucullist ideology.
V

Despite the temptation to deal with the political "mix" between charismatic and rationalistic authority as a form of secular religion, certain major problems stand between this sort of approach and a settlement of large-scale issues. The underlying assumption that "men will eventually assert his personality against restrictive governments" takes for granted that people of the Third World share the western cultural conception of "man against state." There is no evidence that this is anything more than a metaphysical disposition in favor of constitutionalism, no more valid than the assumption that class struggles are caused by industrialism. The assumption that a mobilization system is undemocratic while a reconciliation system is democratic simply is another way of raising the matter of constitutional electorates to an article of religious faith.25

Historically, constitutionalism does not operate to create or broaden the consensual base, but is a basic instrument for the frustration of popular wants and needs. The role of party charisma is therefore to establish a basis of authority which is at one and the same time personal and legal—a mix which focuses on the party and not either on the individual or the law as such. It should not be assumed that the Third World is one in which personal authority is exclusive and dominant. This is, as a matter of fact, rarely the case. Party authority is not simply a rhetorical device used to disguise the fact of personal charisma. It is itself a limiting principle to pure charisma. That it is not yet legal or universalistic authority is something which must be studied in terms of the social psychology of mass movements—particularly the use of personalist symbol systems to establish authority.

Party charisma does not do away with problems of bureaucracy and formal organization. On the contrary, such problems are multiplied to the degree that authority takes on multiple social roles: a portion of power inheres in the leader, and another portion in the party directly, and yet a third part in the expertise requirements of any given position. Historically, this has been handled differentially: with a greater measure of power invested in the personal leadership prior to the revolutionary syndrome and a greater measure of power invested in the technical-professional elite after the revolutionary phase. The charismatic party functions as the clearing house for ideologists and technologists alike, deriving its own momentum from the unstable equilibrium they create. The ability to perform a particular task may appear to rest on "rational" grounds, while the choice and allocation of such tasks may appear to rest upon "irrational" political grounds. However, actual political interaction is far muddier; since as a matter of course, the line between task and decision is constantly shifting, and it is in the gray areas that friction arises between the ideological elements and the technological sectors within the uni-party State.
The problem becomes particularly acute since so many of the new nations have one party arrangements. All major decisions and tasks must be funneled through this single party channel. Hence, the battle for control of the party apparatus can become especially bitter, since to lose out in the control of this apparatus may mean to lose out in the overall sense, to forfeit the opportunity to move the nation either toward increased traditional norms or increased bureaucracy. Seen in this way, we can understand that personalism and constitutionalism are tactical responses to an unstable historic situation, and not historical stages in the unfolding of nationhood. Thus the problem of political leadership is in considerable measure policy dominated; the extent of charismatic or bureaucratic forms of policy being determined by the needs of the economy and the society in general.

Perhaps the most significant illustrations of the thesis concerning the displacement of both personalism and constitutionalism by party charisma is the growth of a literature dedicated to proving that not all of the emergent nations fit the pattern. Sir James Robertson has recently referred to a widely held notion of Nigerian "exceptionalism" based on the long precedent of compromise, the slow maturation of political responsibilities under the Crown, and the development of three strong parties. But this sounds more like an apologia for the superiority of British imperialism over all others than an example of significant differences between Nigeria and other new African States. There is also the literature attempting to prove that constitutional monarchy resolves the problems of Middle East bureaucracy. The argument is that given the background and context of Middle Eastern history, a cultivated, Westernized notion of democracy can only be brought about by the modern counterpart of the eighteenth century benevolent despot. But this seems to place Middle East nations like Iran in a more backward political condition than that ever realized by party charisma. The latter at least has the advantages of depersonalization of the political machinery, and the legalization of the bureaucracy over and above kings and monarchs.

VI

The ideology of the whole people has become a particularly powerful rationalization in the newer African States. It can be seen with striking voice in Sekou Touré's explicit rejection of the classic struggle in favor of the anti-colonial struggle—even after the successful conclusion of the national liberation phase of the revolution. He speaks of unionism in Guinea as "specifically African... an authentic expression of African values." What this comes down to is the displacement of European socialist standards of labor relations with the ideology of development as such. Speaking for Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor sees this Africization of socialist ideology as eliminating the "onesidedness" of European socialism and communism. Actually, it is an instrument for making socialism and nationalism problems of social development. This development is to
take place through "Community Development Centers." In this the Senegalese Party (UPS) is to be the "echo of the popular aspirations" and also the "scientific expression" of peoples' needs. In this glorious Götterdämmerung of Socialism and Negritude, the party of the whole people becomes at the same time the party of the whole race. Here one can see that the Third World has produced a party ideology no less than a political strategy. However, mythic the synthesis may be of European socialism and African nativism, it would be foolish at this early stage to assume that the doctrine of the whole people led by the single, unified peoples party, headed by the knowing and responsive leader, who is furthermore the choice of the whole people and the unified party alike (the two are not always distinguishable), is either transient or lacking in pragmatic consequences. For whatever else they are, the leaders of the emergent African states are sharp eyed and razor tongued, and above all practical men, concerned with political survival in extremely rugged social-economic circumstances.

The functional supports for some sort of party charisma are guaranteed by the built-in potential for strife, in the drive to strengthen national ties through a process of centralization, and the contradictory drive to maintain local, native loyalties. Party charisma is thus a response to the cosmopolitan-local dichotomy. Speaking of Ghana, Dennis Austin makes precisely this point, "If one asks how such an aim (of resolving the cosmopolitan-local duality) is pursued, the answer is clear--through the party, which dominates the contemporary scene. It remodels the State in its own image--reducing the power of the chiefs, centralizing the trade unions, legislating against tribal and regional parties, and centralizing power within the constitution." According to Kwame Nkrumah: there must be no stress on local, separatist loyalties... in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Dagembas, etc. we should call ourselves Ghanians--all brothers and sisters, members of the same community, the State of Ghana. We can see that contrary to present-day European socialist ideology, ethnic heterogeneity through the "self-determination" principle vanishes after the period of national independence. And similarly, heterogeneity through the American "melting pot" principle is viewed simply as a capitalist aberration. In brief, there is a powerful drive for ethnic homogeneity as a natural corollary to national unity, which is profoundly aided, if not stimulated, by the rise of party charisma.

The time honored distinctions drawn by Max Weber between the three ways to legitimate authority, through traditionalism, charisma, and rationalism, tend to draw the distinctions more firmly in theory than they are in fact. The new States of Asia and Africa exhibit a coexistence, if not a coalescence, of the three types of legitimation. Tribal rulers still have a real measure of political power which they have by virtue of their traditional monarchical rights. It would be a gross mistake to discount traditional sources of authority in the new States. Unlike the "virgin birth" of a nation such as the United States, the new States of Africa and
Asia come into a world of "old societies." And in some measure the definition of the situation in terms of development is the degree to which there has been an integration of these two factors of new States and old societies.

Nevertheless, however recalcitrant the inherited oligarchical system is to surrender all of its traditional power, and however much Gemeinschaft values are celebrated throughout the Third World, the really new elements at work result in the rise of an industrial system, set in a Gesellschaft frame of reference. The two forms of legitimation inherited from the past--personalism and constitutionalism--are historical and structural at the same time. That is to say, personal charisma, while a mechanism of transition from colonialism to independence, is not something which yields over time to rational authority. While party charisma may be unstable, with the leader having to choose between absolute dictatorship and benevolent despotism, it remains an ongoing force in every Third World nation--long after some system of rational-legal authority has been created. In fact, the dialectic of the situation is that a charismatic figure must stay in power long enough to permit the crystallization of those opposing factions which can debate the character of the legal system. Charismatic parties thus make possible discussions on laws of political succession, divisions in the power structure, and relations between social and economic sectors. The growth of rational authority in Third World nations should allow for the kinds of spontaneity from the leadership that will not harden the political dialogue beyond its present levels. There should be enough fluidity to permit the existence of highly personalized relations between leaders and followers in the revolutionary movement for national liberation--which at its optimum working status is the goal of party charisma.
Appendix: INTRA-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN SINGLE PARTY STATES

The body of this paper is given over to a basic consideration of the elements of Party Charisma which are common to Third World nations. However, there exist certain intro-nation, or even intra-continental, variations in this uni-party charismatic pattern which, while they do not disrupt the validity of the root premises, do materially affect the operational phases of Party Charisma. Naturally enough, when these variance factors are pushed to their ultimate limits, the forces cementing Party Charisma dissolve, and give way either to a classic political structure - of either a straight bureaucratic or charismatic variety, or to entirely new political structures.

LATIN AMERICAN BLOC (examples: Argentina, 1945-55; Brazil, 1930-46; Mexico, 1948-64; Bolivia, 1952-64)

(1a) With few exceptions - the early stages of the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions - Party Charisma in Latin America was formed on the basis of the traditional or middle classes. In addition to which, there is only a partial severance of colonial relationships.

(2a) Single party States are formed in social environments which are highly heterogeneous in terms of population composition, i.e., racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences tend to weaken the cementing properties of Party Charisma. Regional, local and immigration factors add to these difficulties.

AFRO-ASIAN BLOC (examples: Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria, India, etc. all in post-colonial period 1945-64)

(1b) In the main, Party Charisma is formed in terms of the modern classes, particularly the peasantry and the urban sectors, both white collar and proletariat. Even though the middle sectors show a steady rise in post-colonial strength, the party directorate is still committed to lower class, socialist solutions.

(2b) Single party States are formed in environments which are relatively homogenous with respect to the racial and ethnic background and composition of the citizenry. The role of Party Charisma is therefore reinforced by the existence of a single racial-ethnic dominant group. The absence of such heterogeneity, and the low degree of immigration, serves to cement Party Charisma.
In Latin America, the historical development of the middle sectors, however impeded and frustrated by the traditional classes, was relatively independent of political domination. Indeed, in nations like Mexico and Bolivia, the economic classes really "won out" over the political directorate which forged the revolution. Hence Party Charisma, which requires a relatively powerful political directorate and similarly weak socio-economic classes, comes upon the existence of well formed classes that are not easily subject to State pressures. Hence, the Latin American Party Charisma has "mediative power".

Latin American intellectual and ideological traditions are long-standing. They stem from the bourgeois Enlightenment. Hence it is extremely difficult for any leader to justify or to rationalize his control in terms of the absolutism of his claims. But the fact that Latin American contains old nations and classic ideologies may aid the formation of Party Charisma as a half-way house between the bureaucratic and the charismatic States. It need not serve to reinforce democratic patterns or norms of political behavior.

In the Afro-Asian bloc, despite the growth of a middle sector and a large urban population as such, there is the continued strength of the State to curb any propensities to independence or class separatism on the part of any one element. In many African nations, the State is the biggest of business, and hence a reinforcement of Party Charisma. In this way, through the combination of political and economic functions, the State comes to have "dominating power" and not, as in Latin America, only "mediative power".

The Afro-Asian bloc continues to reveal a strain between national and local-regional-tribal power. The contact with Enlightenment ideologies of the West in this bloc has been through the colonial-imperial powers. Hence, the bourgeois tradition has come to be perceived as being alien to popular democracy. In such contexts, it may be simple to develop Party Charisma. Indeed, as in the Congo, when the single party State was not allowed to function, it was replaced by mass chaos and not mass democracy. It may, however, be that Party Charisma is too sophisticated a political form to work in many of these newly independent nations.
(5a) The Latin American political pendulum has swung between personalism and constitutionalism; and hence solutions have been demanded in terms of these choices, rather than a compromise decision. Leaders must appear as human, constitutions must provide real safeguards. There are entrenched political factions which have a vested interest in the politics of personal connections on one side, and the legal superstructure on the other. Party charisma might resolve these long standing dilemmas, but at a price that is held to be too high by the contesting parties.

(6a) Perhaps the most basic aspect of Party Charisma in Latin America is its instability. The political structure is such that no one sector can dominate or control all other sectors for any length of time. Hence, in such a fluid political universe, the rate of elite turnover, as expressed primarily in "palace revolutions", is exceedingly high. This in turn has the effect of minimizing undemocratic and antidemocratic tendencies in political rule.

(5b) The Afro-Asian bloc is not plagued by alternative solutions, but by an organizational vacuum. The leadership in these nations tend to fill the vacuum in terms of Leninist principles of organization. But in an "underdeveloped" non-European context, such socialism radically moves into an elitist posture. Party Charisma enshrines the politics of social distance. Politics in the parliamentary sense becomes the expression of select pressure groups rather than the expression of the popular will or an electoral decision.

(6b) In the Afro-Asian bloc Party Charisma tends to be quite stable, and institutionally reinforced by the absence of any countervailing sources of authority. As a matter of record, where Party Charisma has been established it has also been successful. In such a firm political universe, the rate of elite turnover is exceedingly low. This in turn has the effect of minimizing political and social instability, but at the same time, of maximizing undemocratic tendencies in political rule.
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7. The idea that there is a correlation between the growth of charisma and the decline of colonialism was first put forward to me by my colleague Alvin W. Wolfe. This idea is being further developed by him in a work in progress on African Conceptions of Authority.

8. A serious deficiency in the sociological literature is that while "pure" charismatic leadership and bureaucratic structures have been well described, the intermediary, transitional systems have not been appreciated. On pure charisma, see Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, THE PROPHETS OF DECEIT. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949, and Erich Fromm, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM. New York: Farrar E. Rinehart, 1941; on pure bureaucracies, see Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Introduction" to STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP, edited by Alvin W. Gouldner. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950, pp. 3-49.


12. See the report by Richard Eder on Castro's urging of an easing of tensions between Cuba and the United States, in which Castro's plans for a "constitutional regime in Cuba by 1969" are reported. THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 1964.


22. The most impressive study of this phenomenon of the whole people, and its effects on political processes in the new nations, is Emile R. Braundl, "Neo-colonialism and the Class Struggle." INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST JOURNAL. Vol. 1, Number 1 (January-February 1964), pp.48-68.


25. For a conventional "Western" position on this, see David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe (Macmillan) 1963, pp. 57-104. It is interesting that the very abstracts and quotations Apter uses to prove the existence of personal charisma and "political religion" demonstrate an impersonal or better depersonalized charisma lodged in the authority of the party and not the person.

26. The various papers in Gwendolen M. Carter, AFRICAN ONE-PARTY STATES, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962, provide a solid basis for my judgement that charisma and bureaucracy ought not to be viewed as historical stages in the unfolding of nationhood, but simply as dialectical poles, between which choices are constantly made and unmade.


