Universidad de las Américas-Puebla
Prepared for delivery at the 1995 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, The Sheraton Washington, September 28-30, 1995.
SUMMARY: An exploration of the many overlapping causes
of conflict in the state of Chiapas, the role of the military
in the Mexican polity, and the democratization process. The Chiapas conflict is
not only happening in the poorest state in Mexico; it is happening
in the poorest region of the poorest state in Mexico.
Let us begin presenting some (government) figures
for the state of Chiapas, then we will proceed to the region within
Chiapas where the conflict is happening. {2}
Chiapas has a territory of 75,634.4 sq km (the size
of Portugal and Holland together or, if you prefer, a bit smaller
than the state of South Carolina), and 3.5 million inhabitants.
Chiapas has 14,613 km of roads (22% are really paved). There
are two main airports (Tuxtla Gutiérrez, and Tapachula)
plus 166 land strips. There are also 484 km of railroads (dating
back to Don Porfirio). There is only one- 10 meter deep- sea
port "Puerto Madero". Forty radio stations cover virtually
the whole territory.
Agriculture alone generates 32% of the state's GNP.
But it is NOT only subsistence agriculture. Indeed, Chiapas agricultural
products such as bananas, coffee, cocoa, soy, papaya, mangoes,
watermelons and melons provided a 150 million dollars income for
the country (roughly 90% of the federal tax revenue) before 1994.
In spite of 116,000 millions cubic meters of hydroelectric
potential, which comprises 30% of the national potential this
yields little some benefit for the state. Only 3.6% of the 1.
336, 793 hectares of arable land is irrigated. And even though
a system of dams has been built over the Grijalva river (Malpaso
in 1965, La Angostura in 1977, Chicoasen in 1981 and Peñitas)
the hydroelectric system has virtually no impact on the local
economy, short of the flooding of 100,000 hectares of land. Yet,
55% of the Mexican hydroelectricity is generated in Chiapas.
Another of the enclave mega-industries is of course
oil. With 85 oil wells, Chiapas yields 20 million barrels per
year. The Cactus petrochemical complex produces 700 tons of sulfur,
800 cubic feet a day of residual gases, 186,000 barrels a day
of ethanol-plus, 55,000 barrels a day of liquid gas, and 26,000
crude barrels a day.
All this wealth is created in the state, but the
Chiapanecos remain poor. . .
The economically active population amounts to 854,000
people. More than half the population (57%) works in the agricultural
sector. More than 80% of the Chiapanecos make less than 2 national
minimum salaries. {3} 62% of the population has not completed
the primary school. Educational services (6 000 schools) serve
only 40% of the population (800 000/2.7 million). Unsurprisingly,
the illiteracy rate is 30% compared to a national average of 8%.
74.02% of the total population lives in overcrowded
dwellings. 66.56% lives in towns of less than 5 thousand inhabitants.
42.68% lives in "houses" (with the bare soil as carpet)
without sewage and latrines, 35% of these "houses" do
not have electricity and 42.09% lacks running water. . .
But these figures are mere averages: the poorest
region within poor Chiapas is the home of the current zapatista
conflict. Municipalities like Sitalá, Chamula, Zinacantán,
Pantelhó, San Juan Cancuc, Amatenango del Valle, Chenalhó,
Mitontic, Larrainzar, Tenejapa, Tumbalá and other indian
populated areas are dramatically poor.
The 1990 census indicates that 885 605 chiapanecos
speak at least one indian language. Out of a total of 57 languages,
seven are the most spoken: Tzeltal (317 618), Tzotzil (281 677),
Chol (139 646), Tojolabal (44 618), Zoque (43 350), Kanjobal (13
433), and Mame (12 320).
Not all the indian groups are from the state of Chiapas.
There are a number of groups from Guatemala and other neighboring
states. The most numerous among those from Guatemala are: Kanjobales
(10 343), Jacaltecos (950), Chinantecos (488), Cakchiqueles (272),
and Quichés (117). And from neighboring states: Zapotecos
(2 721), Náhuatls (329), Chontales (175), Mixtecos (124),
Huaves (52), and Mixes (31).
Most of these indian groups are found in five of
the nine regions of Chiapas: Altos, Selva, Norte, Fronteriza,
and Sierra. In other terms, the remaining four regions (Centro,
Frailesca, Soconusco, and Costa) are more mestizo than indian.
As could be expected, "ladino" {4} peasants
are more successful in the latter four regions than in the indian
regions, granted that ejidatarios lead a hard life in general.
Farmers (rancheros), large owners (finqueros) and other categories
of private proprietors are naturally against all attempts at expropriation.
A frontier state and rich in land and water, Chiapas
was used to distribute land among ladino peasants. This colonization
exerted a strong pressure over the indian communities, taking
the best agricultural resources away from them, and pushing them
to subsistence regions and to shanty towns in the cities. But
the cities also have had a strong demographic growth in recent
years. And this have pushed the indians away from shanty towns
back to their communities. In other terms, at the origin of the
zapatista uprising is a phenomenon of re-campesinization: a rejoining
of urbanized peasants with rural peasants. {5} This is a point
which is important to retain for a later discussion of the zapatista
movement.
THE MEXICAN ARMY AND GOVERNMENT.
The military uprisings
in the 1920s (De la Huerta, and Serrano) were highly productive
for Mexican stability, inasmuch as most of the remaining important
generals of the Mexican revolution were killed by obregonist forces.
In 1928 it was the turn of Obregón himself at the hands
of a radical catholic.
The elimination of militaristic charismatic leadership
paved the way for civilian control of the Mexican institutions.
By the end of the Second World War the military stopped having
a relevant role in Mexican politics. Moreover, it can be argued
that the last two generals in power, Cárdenas and Avila
Camacho were rather civilians in military uniforms.
The subordination of the military to civilian rule
is an aspect of Mexican politics to be duly acknowledged if we
want to understand the Mexican government's response to the guerrilla
outbreak.
There is of course the great political sophistication
of the Mexican regimes, whose corporatist control of the main
political institutions give them a wide range of options to choose
from between conciliation and repression. . .
But there is an aspect of Mexican foreign policy
that begs to be included. All Mexican presidents since the 1960s
have sworn to defend the seven traditional principles of Mexican
foreign policy when they take office.
1 National self determination
2 Non-intervention in states' domestic affairs
3 Peaceful solution to controversies
4 Prohibition of the use of force
5 States' legal equality
6 International cooperation for development
7 To strive for peace and international security
Peaceful solution to controversies, as well as principles
4 (non-use of force) and 7 (peace and international security)
stand out among the rest, since the Mexican government is morally
obligated to apply them to the case of Chiapas: Charity begins
at home! After all, it was the violations of the indians'human
rights by the Mexican government and army which introduced the
conflict to the international fora.
This leads us back to the Mexican army. The fact
of being subordinated to the civilian power is no guarantee of
permanent holidays. Quite the contrary, self-assured civilians
would not refrain from using military might when necessary.
Several times in contemporary Mexican history, the
government has made use of the army to counter opposition movements.
Just to mention a few examples, it happened in 1959 against striking
railroaders, in 1968 against students, in 1970s against guerrilla
movements and university workers and teachers unions, in 1976
against electricians, and now against insurgent indians in Chiapas.
The army is also used against drug-dealers, in natural
disasters (earthquakes, floddings, hurricanes, etc), vaccination
campaigns, and of course, official parades. . .
But the Mexican army, brutal as it might well be,
is NOT/ repeat/ NOT like others in Latin America. One of the reasons
for this is lack of US training. After all, only very few Mexican
military officers have attended US training centers, and Mexicans
are pleased with that.
Your opinion is, of course, most respectable, but
mine is that Mexico does not need anticommunist specialists, neither
Mexico need specialists in the art of destabilizing governments,
psychological warfare, coup d'états, curfews, etc, etc.
If Mexico ever happens to need any of these, you might all be
assured that it can count on the help of US pros. . .
Mexico historically spends less than one percent
of its GDP on the military, which is comparatively low by Latin
American standards. However, I must emphasize that the Mexican
federal army is overwhelmingly powerful compared to the Zapatistas.
The Zapatistas' best chance to succeed is communicational warfare,
not guerrilla warfare.
THE CONFLICT(s).
Mexico's economic profile had changed
a lot in a few years, quickly becoming a neoliberal success story.
The country was accepted as the third NAFTA partner amid strong
opposition in the US Congress. Ex-president Bush "graduated"
the whole country by saying that Mexico was already part of the
First World (being a member of "great leagues" organizations
such as GATT, IMF, NAFTA, and soon after, OECD).
But the day NAFTA entered into force; that is, on
1st January 1994, there was the guerrilla outbreak in Chiapas.
The army was sent in and the interior minister made redundant.
After short but bloody combats, the Zapatista National Liberation
Army (EZLN) won the media war. Subcommander Marcos, an excellent
communicator suddenly became the most popular figure in Mexican
politics.
When President Salinas asked his Chiapas-born Interior
Minister González Garrido about the existence of guerrillas
in Chiapas, the latter replied "everybody knows there are
guerrillas in Chiapas." Salinas fired him immediately.
González Garrido, I am persuaded, was trying
to point out that guns had been smoking for a long time, but he
was given no chance. {6} The sacking of the Interior Minister
was one of the many symptoms of the Mexican political crisis.
The Salinas government regained some prestige by
negotiating a cease-fire and appointing Manuel Camacho Solís
(ex-Maire of Mexico City and the main rival of Luis Donaldo Colosio
for the PRI presidential candidacy) as the chief negotiator with
the Zapatista. At the same time, Jorge Carpizo McGregor, Mexico's
ombudsman was appointed as Minister of the Interior.
And all this was hapening during an election year!
Mr Colosio's presidential campaign could only suffer from all
these developments. His program, though, showed a fairly good
grasp of Mexico's urgent needs. But, long before he could put
words into deeds, he was shot dead by Mario Aburto, in Tijuana,
on 23rd March 1994.
Ernesto Zedillo took over as the PRI candidate to
the presidency of Mexico. Rather unconvincingly presidential Zedillo
tried hard to catch up. He invited Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas,
and Diego Fernández de Cevallos, the two other main contenders,
to a TV debate. The show went badly for Zedillo. It is worth
saying that it was followed with greatest interest by a very large
audience. At the end of the day, Diego Fernández had won
the debate and emerged as the most popular of the three candidates.
And Cárdenas, the worst-off according to media polls.
The Mexican political crisis was fueled by the guerrilla
outbreak, but at the same time had a strong impact in local politics.
In a relatively short time, Chiapas had changed governor many
times.
Patrocinio González Garrido, elected for the
1988-1994 period was promoted to the Ministry of the Interior;
Elmar Harald Setzer Marseille completed the term (1993-1994).
Javier López Moreno won the 1994 contested
elections. He could not finish (largely due to the unresolved
guerrilla conflict) and left Eduardo Robledo Rincón in
charge. Now we have Julio César Ruiz Ferro as an interim
who has called for elections once more. . .
The coming elections in Chiapas promise to be quite
interesting. In the last ones, Tapachula, the most important economic
center and second largest city in the state {7} voted PRD. Mr
Amado Avendaño, the PRD ex-candidate decided to proclaim
himself "governor in revolt" alleging fraud.
But when it comes to elections, PRI is by all means
the most effective. Tonalá, my own city, on the Pacific
coast, voted PRI (with a high rate of abstentionism, as always);
20 miles away Arriaga voted PAN. {8} My town has now more paved
roads, more housing, more electricity, even unnecessary traffic
lights: reward the faithful! Panistas in Arriaga did not have
enough budget to build a roof for the municipal palace and the
public services are now in a mess: punish the infidel! A campaign
slogan in the streets goes: "Arriaga should be entitled to
progress: vote PRI!"
It may be asserted, however, that parties and the
zapatistas are not the only relevant political actors in Chiapas.
Actually, the zapatistas are probably the end result of many other
related and unresolved problems, besides the indian question:
agrarian movements, primary school teachers, Central American
refugees, etc.
It is worth mentioning that the regional sections
of PRI and PRD have their own dynamics and agendas. Organizations
like the conservative "Auténticos Coletos" {9}
have links with but not necessarily obey the PRI leaders. Priístas
themselves often divide on regional bases within the state, and
often have presented a unified front against chiapanecos that
have made their careers in Mexico City. {10} As for the local
PRD, it is well known that Eraclio Zepeda accepted a post in the
López Moreno administration, which PRD did not recognize
as legitimate. But legitimate or not, it is true that neither
the zapatistas do not recognize the State Government as interlocutor:
the EZLN talks are with the Federal Government.
An inventory of the political forces at work would
be incomplete without including at least two other movements:
The COCES (Coalición Obrero Campesino Estudiantil del Soconusco)
and the Separatista movement.
The COCES, very militant and of Maoist persuasion,
made itself known this year when it coordinated the seizure of
17 municipios (from which it was evicted soon after). Mr. Avendaño,
the local leader of PRD, was immediately accused; but, to use
his own words, he did not have the command of such a powerful
movement.
The Separatistas correctly assume that Soconusco
is the most important economic zone whose effort sustain the rest
of Chiapas, and want to create a new state out of their district,
whose capital will be Tapachula. This is constitutionally possible,
but not advisable under the present circumstances. {11}
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
I will finish my presentation
with a reflection on the meaning of the zapatista struggle and
a forecast.
Many things have been said about the EZLN. The composition
of its leadership still intrigues political analysts. Allegedly,
it contains radicalized primary school teachers, campesino leaders,
Guatemalan guerrilleros, Mexican veterans of the Central American
wars, liberation theologians, and of course, indian leaders. Some
would go as far as to include Bishop Samuel Ruíz. {12}
But the nature and scope of EZLN demands indicates that we are
dealing with. . . an indian movement with an opinion!
Unlike Samuel Ruíz, Manuel Camacho Solís
did not last as mediator, Mr. Esteban Moctezuma took the relay,
the talks have been protracted and the solution is not in sight.
It is obvious for many observers that, unlike the zapatista delegates,
the Government negotiators do not have plenipotenciary power.
Unsurprinsigly, the July 1994 peace talks in San Andrés
Larrainzar yielded no fruit; short of the continuity of peace
and a certain distension.
The Mexican army is still searching and harrassing
indian communities. The army should leave the zone at once, if
peace is going to be established on a permanent basis. The Chiapas
indians should be entitled to land {13} and an autonomous territory.
Democracy is, by all means, a precondition for solution;
but how can we have democracy in Chiapas only, if democracy is
not established in the rest of the country. How can we, if the
Federal Government insists in having just a local solution to
the problems of a nation. But the indian is only one of the problems
awaiting solution in Chiapas. If the zapatistas were to accept
the agenda imagined by the Mexican government, the other problems
would immediately come to the fore.
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NOTES
1 The author is indebted to Dr Roberto Villers
Aispuro for advice comments and breakfast in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.
Equally relevant were all those interviewed in the state
of Chiapas. My relatives in different cities of the state
shared with me their personal views and made my stay very
enjoyable. I am grateful to Drs Randall S Hanson and Marco
A Almazán for advice and comments on this paper and
remains solely responsible for its final contents.
2 The data in this book were taken mainly from
several statistical yearbooks by INEGI (Instituto Nacional
de Geografía e Informática), specially the IX
Census published of 1990. The Mexican government figures tend
to underestimate the extent of social problems.
3 The minimum salary is set by the federal government.
At current prices, the urban minimum salary would be US$ 800
per year. The income in the agricultural sector was US$
596 per year, in average, in 1992 (before the 1994 crisis
and devaluation).
4 Originally used to refer to monolingual Spanish-speaking
mestizos, the term is now widely used to refer to non-
indians. An "ejido" is a communal form of property
This ancestral form of land exploitation was protected by
the 1917 Mexican Constitution. Until president Salinas'
constitutional amendment, the ejido could not be legally
sold.
5 De-campesinization refers, here, to an incomplete
process of proletarization; re-campesinization to the
reinstatement.
€6 The state of Chiapas along with Guerrero
and Veracruz have the highest violent mortality rates.
7 The largest cities in Chiapas are: Tuxtla
Gutiérrez 295 608 Tapachula
222 405 Ocosingo 121 012 San
Cristobal de las Casas 89 335
8 Arriaga has 36 224 inhabitants, Tonalá
has 67 491. These are the first two cities you encounter on
the Pacific coast, coming from Oaxaca.
9 Coleto is the nickname for Sancristobalenses.
The term also means conservative catholic.
10 These are called "Pichichis" in the
local political jargon.
11 Although separatismo is a deep rooted feeling
for many tapachultecos, the movement is in decline for the
moment. Its main leader survived a car "accident"
but was shot dead in hospital.
12 Monsignor Samuel Ruíz is currently the
president of CONAI (Comisión Nacional de Intermediación)
is considered a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, and has
been the object of a nasty campaign (which interestingly enough
unifies the high hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the
Mexican government) to discredit his work with the indians
in Chiapas. After Camacho Solís, the Mexican government
mediator was Mr Esteban Moctezuma (when he was Ministry of
the Interior), now Mr Jorge del Valle acts as the "Delegado
del Gobierno Federal para los Diálogos de Paz con el
EZLN." Mr Emilio Chuayfett (ex-governor of the State
of Mexico) is currently the Mexican Minister of the Interior.
There is also COCOPA (comisión de Concordia y Pacificación)
which is multi-party commission from the Chamber of Deputies.
13 The Federal Government has spent 221 millions
of new pesos for the "agrarian reform" in Chiapas.
Fifty million out of the total went to pay rents to the ocupied
land- owners. The remaining 171 million were used in the
administration or simply "vanished."