Conference Papers & Current Trends
Discussion of Rational Choice Theory
Round 2: Reviews & Rejoinders
Tim Steigenga
Political Science, Florida Atlantic University
Anthony Gill brings the methods of economics and comparative political science to his provocative and ambitious study of church and state in Latin America. Gill asks why national episcopacies in some Latin American countries opposed ruling dictatorships while others did not. Using the tools of rational choice theory, Gill develops an "economic model of church-state relations" outlining the incentives for church-state cooperation as well as conditions for conflict. He treats national episcopacies as unitary rational actors and defines religious competition primarily in terms of the threat to Catholic religious monopoly posed by the rapid growth of evangelical Protestantism in Latin America. Based on this model, Gill hypothesizes that, "Where competition for the souls of the popular classes was fierce, a pastoral strategy of a preferential option for the poor was adopted... Where competition was minimal, bishops downplayed the preferential option for the poor and sought to maintain cordial relations with military rulers so as to preserve traditional perquisites (p. 71)." Using a statistical analysis of twelve countries, Gill demonstrates a significant correlation between Protestant competition and opposition to authoritarianism by national episcopacies. Gill also notes a lack of supporting evidence for poverty-based, repression-based, and internal Church reform-based explanations of Church anti-authoritarianism. Case studies of Chile and Argentina provide evidence for the causal links between religious competition and opposition or support for authoritarian governments.
The application of rational choice analysis to the study of religion in Latin America provides Rendering Unto Caesar with both its strengths and weaknesses. Gill's deductive model is carefully constructed and parsimonious. His focus on the supply side of the religious equation is clearly a useful supplement to traditional demand side explanations for changes in the Church. However, Gill's assumption that demand for religion remains relatively inelastic (p.48) seems unwarranted. Furthermore, Gill relaxes the unitary rational actor assumption selectively in support of his hypothesis. To treat individual bishops such as Bartolomé de las Casas in the 1500s (p. 22) or Bishop Samuel Ruíz today (p. 24) as representatives of the Catholic hierarchy's "center of gravity" is certainly questionable. The weakest aspect of Gill's argument is the evidence provided to establish a causal link between Protestant competition and Catholic anti-authoritarianism. In particular, evidence from the Central American cases of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala (as well as the Chiapas region of Mexico) appear to contradict rather than support the competition hypothesis (see pp.112-119). Based upon these cases it appears as though rapid modernization, a large indigenous population, and increasing relative deprivation are more basic causal factors for both Protestant growth and Catholic anti-authoritarianism. While the growth of evangelical Protestantism may be a good "predictor" for Catholic opposition to authoritarian, the ultimate causes of this opposition are more likely to be found in the social and economic conditions that nurture such religious competition in the first place.
Dr. Timothy J. SteigengaDavidson College
Department of Political Science
Davidson NC, 28036