George Scariano & Ryan Polomski, May 2001
Introduction
Guatemala, a land of extreme ecological and ethnic diversity, is located
immediately south of Mexico, west of Belize, and north of El Salvador and
Honduras on the narrow Central American isthmus. The country's 11.1
million people are divided between mestizos of Spanish and Indian
descent, and an extensive indigenous population of pure blood. The 1.5
million people living in and around Guatemala's City make up, by far, the
country's largest urban center. Like most Central American countries,
Guatemala is bi-coastal, and has rare tropical forest-regions within its
borders.
An initial survey of Guatemala's economic and social conditions provides
a clear look at the country's future struggle in attaining Internet
equitability. In many ways, the present digital divide is not only an
extension of the nation's social and economic ills, but is also serving
to agitate and augment those ills. The instruments for freedom of
expression and individual empowerment have yet to reach the people of
this often ignored neighbor of Mexico.
The Digital Divide in Guatemala
Guatemala's primacy in size, population and gross national product has
not been translated into widespread prosperity or the abolition of a
significant digital divide. While collecting and analyzing data on
Guatemala's telecom and computer infrastructure as well as Internet
Service Provider issues, it becomes apparent that, although there are
encouraging projects and initiatives, the overwhelming obstacles stem
directly from Guatemala's status as an impoverished nation and its
internal underdevelopment.
Telecommunication Infrastructure
First, we will present some statistics that round out the economic/
communications portrait of Guatemala. All these statistics are cited
from (1.) the UNDP Human Development Report 2000, (2.) the World Bank
World Development Report 2000/2001, (3.) International Development Center
- Canada 2000.
The percentage of households in Guatemala with phone coverage was low at
five percent. When determining telephone density, the percentages were
10% urban, 1% rural, and 3% total. The latest figures from 1998 show
that Guatemala has about 40 telephone mainlines per 1000 people, as well
as 10 mobile phones per 1000 people -- the latter almost certainly being
a statistic which has increased over the past 10 years. Switching to
computer statistics, 8 Guatemalans per 1000 actually owned a personal
computer in 1998, and as of January 2000 there were 1.56 Internet hosts
per 10,000 people. The coverage of the Internet (in terms of percentage
of the population) was quite low at 0.6%, with the existence of
nationwide local service being basically limited to the "capital and a
few other cities". The telecommunications systems, including the ISPs,
have been fully privatized with an intense competition between the phone
companies. According to (4.) IDRC: "Privatization promotes an
accelerated development of telecommunications and the private offer of
Internet service directed towards the population with spending power.
There is little presence of social compensatory interventions, and
quite unfavorable socioeconomic conditions when it comes to Internet
access for the majority of the population" (own emphasis).
One example of Guatemala's few compensatory interventions are the
community technology centers, called "centros digitales", available as
part of a development program privately funded by Francisco Marroquin
University. They offer connectivity and training, with the eventual goal
of over three hundred centros -- one per municipalidad. As far as
large-scale educational policies with an Internet component, Guatemala
has them planned, but not yet implemented due to public financial
resources. One needs the hardware with which to teach before embarking
on a nationwide program, and that requires funds that seem not to be
available in the near future.
The 1998 privatization and sale of the Guatemala's telephone system to
private entities has achieved the desired result of spurring investment
and increasing equipment imports -- which rose by $17 million from '96 to
'97 alone. (Industry Sector Analysis: U.S. Foreign Commercial Service
and U.S. Department of State, 1998) Computer hardware import is rose at
a 15% clip over the same period. As of 1998, there were 300 recognized
computer dealers (ISA). Many more are suspected to conduct business in
Guatemala's informal economy.
Foreign, wealthy communication corporations are increasingly penetrating
the shores of Guatemala. In April of 1999, Telgua Inc. launched it's PLS
Digital wireless program, which enhances voice, data and enhanced calling
services in Guatemala City and Antigua. Puerto Barrios, Quezaltenango,
Escuintla, and Puerto Quetzal are scheduled to be added to the service
area in the future. In July of 2000, Guatemala was included in Emergia's
planned, extensive Latin American seamless broadband network. How dense
the connectivity to Guatemalans living outside the urban centers is yet
to be seen. It is possible that corporate infusion may be correlated
with the government's Phase II of MayaNet, whose goals include a stronger
metropolitan backbone with more points of presence, expansion of LAN's in
academic and governmental institutions, and expansion of MayaNet to the
country's interior. An improved infrastructure would possibly drive
down the current impossible telephone and Internet rates that plague most
of the country.
Internet Usage and Adoption Patterns
While the specific data is lacking that delineates who is getting on the
Internet first, last or not at all --- the statistics on poverty,
literacy, and disparity in incomes can lead us to safely assume that
urban and rural poor (especially those who are illiterate) are the
citizens of Guatemala whom are least involved in Internet
communications. If the private telecom providers do not deem poor rural
areas profitable, there will almost certainly not be increasing coverage
unless public policy emphasizes interconnectivity and training/
education. At present, such public policy excludes huge swaths of the
nation -- especially the rural and urban poor.
While temporarily shelving the philosophically quagmire of whether or not
poor villagers need or want the Internet in their lives and assuming that
the digital divide should be bridged, there are Internet applications of
perceived utility which are being fostered. The main thrust of these
comes from USAID. Guatemala's bilateral program was named in the 1999
Internet for Economic Development Initiative (IED). Two of the platforms
of the IED are as follows:
These platforms neatly encapsulate both the strategy and the applications
in narrowing the digital divide in Guatemala.
An indirect statistic related to Internet adoptive patterns are the
purchase of computer hardware. While purchasing of computers and
peripherals are rising at a 15% annual rate, the great majority of
purchasers are, in order, the government, the financial service sector,
industry and commerce, and banking systems. Private individual purchase
is, by far, the least of all (ISA Dept. of State, 98).
Economic Issues
Recent economic data concerning Guatemala illustrates a nation that
continues to struggle under an oligarchic system, inept public policies,
and racial segregations that limit the benefits of trade and commerce to
an elite few. While the country boasts the highest GNP in Central
America at $18.4 billion, and a respectable 3.5% average growth rate,
64.3% of Guatemalans exist on less than 2 dollars a day, and $1,660 GNP
per capita (World Bank: World Dev. Report, 2000-2001, Tables 1 and 4).
The economic divide is magnified in the rural and indigenous sectors. Of
Guatemala's 4 million people that make up the labor force (out of 11.1
million total population), over half work in the low-wage rural
agricultural industry where less than 2% are estimated to own at least
65% of the land and resources. 78% of all the farms are less than 3.5
hectare and occupy just over 10% of the land (World Bank Table 3, CIA
World Fact Book 2000, & USAID-Guatemala). Restricted to these small,
less-than favorable plots, rural farmers (60% of whom are Mayan or of
Mayan descent) migrate to large plantation farms for seasonal wage work
on the Pacific coast sugar and coffee plantations (International Labor
Organization, 1989). These seasonal workers join with the permanent
laborers to drive the large agro-export industry, which creates 1/2 of
all export earnings. The entrenched latifundio-minifundio complex (20
families control most all of the agriculture and industry) has and
continues to result in a severely oppressive economy, where workers lack
all opportunity to achieve financial independence and purchase profitable
land (UNICEF, "Break Through for Children). This system is enforced
through the powerful political alliance of the landowners (The National
Farmers and Ranchers Assoc., CONAGRO) whose interests are often protected
by a corruptible and deadly military. Since the end of the 36 year long
civil war in 1996, the promise of agrarian reform remains an
unfulfilled: 76% of the poverty stricken Guatemalans are rural dwellers;
74% are of indigenous background (International Labor Organization).
The agricultural economy, which added 23% to the GDP in 1999, is not the
only sector dominated by a dualistic structure. Industry (19% of GDP),
manufacturing (13%), and services (58%) all suffer from similar lacks of
mobility and equality (World Bank, Table 12). Nation-wide, 63% of the
income and consumption occurs within the top 20% of the earnings bracket,
while the lowest 20% contributes and relieves only 2.1% (World Bank,
Table 5). Most non-agricultural business is located around the urban
center of Guatemala City. Driven to the city by the unequal rural land
distribution, migrants are creating a pool of cheap, desperate and
disorganized labor. Foreign direct investment has risen from 48 million
in 1990 to 673 million in 1999 (World Bank, Table 21). Investment, in
large part, is in the cities' maquiladora sector by large U.S. owned
corporations taking advantage of the inexpensive labor, and the
government sponsored Free Trade Zones ("Guns and Greed", Richter). The
work force in this intensely growing sector is composed of mainly (est.
90%) women between 18 and 25. Nearly 100% of the products made in the
low-wage and brutal conditions are U.S. bound (Murga, G.P., "Promised the
Earth").
Meanwhile, Guatemala's economy is under increasing strain from the
world's financial governing bodies including the IMF and the World Bank
to solve its macro-economic imbalances, and to curb its rising external
debt, which is listed at 4,565 million in 1999 (World Bank, Table 21,
Murga). Instead of changing the nation's internal imbalances, the
Guatemala government, its military, the large land and industry owners
and now the intense foreign investment capital facilitated by advances in
telecommunications, data transmissions and data processing are all
augmenting the economic crisis of the great majority of the nation's
inhabitants in order to improve international credit rankings.
Guatemala's economy of exclusion has a long and troubling history,
beginning with the Spanish conquistador invasion and indigenous
enslavement in the 16th century, to the U.S. backed military coup of
Guatemala's only financially reforming government in 1954, up unto the
current, globalized financial structure which preys on cheap labor.
Social Issues
Any social comment on Guatemala society must begin with the recent and
horrific war between the Guatemala army and the country's people from
1970 to 1996, in which 150,000 to 200,000 Guatemalans, mostly rural
indigenous, lost their lives (Jonas, Centaurs and Doves). The war
exists as a sub text for any discussion of the country's present and
future circumstances, but is particularly and immediately important in
regards its social character.
At its height in 1982-83, under the leadership of Rios Montt (now the
current president of Congress), the Guatemalan military conducted a
massive counterinsurgency campaign against the revolting UNRG guerrilla
group by destroying and murdering entire villages, creating barb-wired,
Spanish-only speaking "model villages" in their place, using methods of
documented torture and, in general, creating an environment of fear and
terror throughout the country side. The partially U.S. trained military
has and continues to act with impunity, including the recent 'unsolved'
assassination of the prominent activist and author Msgr. Juan Girardi in
April 1998 ("Guns and Greed", Richter). The repression of all acts of
reform and empowerment dominates the social consciousness of Guatemala,
especially the rural, indigenous Mayan population, who were the main
targets of the military. The World Bank Post Conflict Unit has grouped
Guatemala with Cambodia, Rowanda and Somalia, as areas in which extended
armed conflict undermines social capital, and "intrapersonal and communal
trust". Evidence that a multi-generational experience of warfare and
violence tears at the social fabric can be found in every statistic
measuring the health of Guatemala's communities. A most telling
statistic, however, published in June of 2000 by the Dallas Morning News,
predicted that guns would outnumber people in Guatemala City by the new
year. There are 1.5 million people in Guatemala City.
World Bank 2001 statistics gauging nation-wide illiteracy for men and
women above 15 years of age at 25 and 40 percent, respectively. Urban
numbers are higher, at 37 and 39 percent, respectively. Rural statistics
are unofficial, but ground reports by humanitarian organizations, such as
the Poresa Xtani Project, and Casa Xelaju claim that 66% of girls drop
out of school by the 3rd grade for traditional and financial reasons, and
in some rural communities, female indigenous illiteracy is close to
100%. Small NGO operations are attempting to spread the skill of reading
and writing with limited success. In the report "Reasons For the
Non-Participation of Adults in Rural Literacy Programs in Western
Guatemala", by German Cutz, she writes, nonparticipation is caused by
feelings of threats to their ethnic identity, native language, and a
sense of loyalty to their community. Top reasons for avoiding Spanish
literacy programs were a fear of participating in groups, lack of
self-esteem, and financial lacking. The war continues.
Unique to Guatemala are the 22 separate indigenous languages spoken
throughout the country. The most prevalent non-Spanish languages is
Quiche Maya which has 700,000 speakers, 95% of whom do not speak Spanish
(Stross, 2001). The preservation of culture and ethnic diversity seems
to symbolize Guatemalans richness as well as its inherent disunity.
Internet programs, like LearnLink, have begun indigenous language
preservation programs, as well as the embryonic installation of
dual-language academic instruction. Currently 12% of Guatemala's schools
are bilingual, and, with Internet training, the number is expected to
rise dramatically (USAID).
Statistics recording academic enrollment are incomplete, but, roughly one
half of all children are reaching grade five -- 52% of male and 47% of
the female population (World Bank, Table 6). Guatemala City is home to 5
universities, including University of San Carlos whose student population
exceeds 50,000, and who may soon acquire partial ownership of Guatemala's
first public access television station (Moore, 2001). Guatemala's
universities have traditionally been the home to progressive movements;
reform groups have quieted, however, since a military crackdown in the
early 90's. For every 1000 people, there are 79 radios, 126 television
sets and only 41 telephone mainlines (World Bank, '97, '98 & '98, 2000
Table 19). The daily newspapers, mainly La Prensa, is read by 3.3% if
the population (World Bank, 1996, Table 19). Military and political
interests when necessary have traditionally controlled the content of
Guatemalan media, especially during elections and times of social unrest.
More lingering evidence of Guatemala's social poverty is evident in some
disturbing trends. According to National Survey on Mother and Child
Health, 50% of Guatemalan children suffer from chronic malnutrition.
(1999). The Inter-American Development Bank claimed the country to one
the worlds 5 most violent, citing the 257 murders in the first half of
2000 alone, as well as the increasing prevalence of vigilante law and
lynching (26 for the same period) in the police-vacant country-side
(July, 2000). In the fallout from the war, Guatemala has become the
world's 4th largest provider of adopted children, whom are seen as
financial commodities for lawyers, agencies, and (far less, however) for
the parents themselves (IAD, July 2000).
While violence and terror are embedded in the current Guatemalan society,
some amazing evidence of resiliency, especially amongst the indigenous
populations, have become recently noticeable. The UN's peace-building
initiative in Guatemala is "its largest and most ambitious such operation
in the world", spearheaded by the MANAGUA watchdog program (UNICEF,
"Breakthrough for Children 2000). International NGO's like Amnesty
International and charity arms of corporations such as the eBay
Foundation have taken notice and are contributing resources to the
revitalization effort. Locally, the Guatemalan society, for all its
ills, appears to be picking up the pieces, especially in the rural
highlands; Quezaltengo has recently elected an indigenous mayor. The
Guatemalan people are slowly being heard by the international community,
making their claim as important and vital members of the increasingly
integrated global village, a people rich in history and beauty, to be
forgotten or exploited nunca mas.
Conclusion
The parallels between Guatemala's economic and social inequities and its
digital divide seem to be extremely correlative. Education and literacy,
two necessities for Internet and technical utility, are being thwarted by
the grander, macro-economic and ethno-political crisis. Lack of public
subsidies and corporate not-for-profit infusion of telecommunication
infrastructure -- combined with an instilled indigenous fear of intrusion
and destruction of culture and community complicates the future of the
'have-not' Internet deployment. Without public or international
assistance -- it takes years of waiting, and the price of an average
annual salary for a family to obtain just a phone line -- the wide spread
of the most recent tool of democratic liberation will remain unobtainable
for 90 to 95% of Guatemalans (Guatemala Weekly, 4-96; IDRC, Martinez).
The situation is ironic, for the under represented and exploited
Guatemalans are those who could most benefit from access to global
information, cross-community communication and organization, on-line
trading of crafts and wares, and distance learning of language,
agricultural and business skills. International investment in the
telecommunication infrastructure appears to be the best hope for
financial and political revitalization in Guatemala for, currently, the
nation lacks the social and financial capital to build a productive
nationwide network.